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Before, times like these 
have come before 
Times when we witnessed 
hurricanes that never stopped uprooting trees 
We thought that we had learned 
how to travel the road  
to the gods’ gate 
How to carry the burden 
and rise up again after the flood 
How to go, again 
If days come when we see hurricanes 
that never stop uprooting trees 
 
By Sargon Boulus1 
  
                                                      
1 Extract from “Times: The song of a Sumerian who lived for a thousand years,” a poem by Sargon Boulus, 
translated from Arabic by Sinan Antoon. From Azma Ukhra li-Kalb al-Qabila (Another Bone for the Tribe’s 
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Note on Transliteration 
 
The thesis uses expressions and words in three forms of Arabic: classical Arabic; the 
form of Iraqi Arabic spoken in Baghdad; and the form of Jordanian Arabic most 
commonly spoken in Amman (among both Jordanians and Jordanians from 
Palestinian origin and few Iraqis). I have tried to maintain this variety of forms in the 
transliteration of Arabic terms and expressions. In general, the transliteration of 
Arabic words and phrases follows the simplified rules of International Journal of 
Middle East Studies (IJMES). All Arabic words, except for proper names and standard 
English forms, are italicized, while I used common English spelling of proper names 
and place names.  
 
To make it simple, I followed the IJMES transliteration symbols, except for the article 
“al-” which I kept as it is, and the final “ة” for which I used “a”, instead of the 
symbols “3” and “a2” respectively. In addition, I used “g” for the Iraqi common 
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Recent events of forced displacement in the Middle East are compelling millions of people to 
move within the borders of their country, while forcing many others to become strangers in 
other lands. In the modern era categorized by the nation-state rise, the military and 
disciplinary power of ‘national’ and ‘enemy’ states has been the main factor in controlling the 
movements of people. Forced migration has marked the Iraqi state-building history since the 
early twentieth century, when various colonial and post-colonial regimes used population 
movement as an instrument of rule, at various scales. What is unique in the phase of 
postinvasion Iraq (post-2003) is that displacement has not only affected certain segments of 
the Iraqi society, but has extended to displace the whole system of rule with its state 
institutions, causing a rupture in the former urban inter-mixed communities. This has led to 
sweeping the Iraqi space of many of its original communities, the members of which have 
felt, as expressed in the observations and stories in this thesis, that they have had little or no 
space in the New Iraq. These include whole sections of the Iraqi society, in addition to 
professionals and academics from various sects and religions, leading to a sharp decline in 
the former Baghdadi urban inter-communal way of life, education and work.  
 
The thesis is based on ethnographic fieldwork in Amman, among Iraqi state employees and 
highly skilled professionals during 2010 and 2011, the majority left after 2003, specifically 
between 2005-2009, and few had left during 1990s and were still unable to return. Their lives 
have been shaped by a once wealthy oil developmental state severely affected by three wars 
within two decades and thirteen years of comprehensive UN-economic sanction. The 
destructive US-led war and invasion of 2003, the military occupation and the new ruling 
sectarian regime resulted in a large flow of Iraqis across the borders into neighboring 
countries.  
 
The international and regional response has been limited and restricted to the provision of 
temporary space of protection/himaya within the region which has addressed the 
developmental needs of host state institutions more than addressing the urgent needs of Iraqis 
in the Jordanian Kingdom (who is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention that defines the 
rights and obligations of refugees and the host country). Getting resettlement in a third 
country was restricted to limited numbers of Iraqis (able to provide a well-founded story of 
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fear of being persecuted), although until the end of my fieldwork, Iraqis were still crossing 
their country’s borders in growing numbers in search of ʾamān (the state of feeling safe). 
Iraqis— formerly state-employees and professionals who experienced personal and collective 
losses and on top of that became jobless and status-less— were torn between waiting in 
conditions of uncertainty in Jordan for assistance that was pre-conditioned by the ability to 
present a strong evidence of ‘need’ (usually ‘visible’ need) on the one side, and on the other 
side, they were actively responding to their urgent need to make spaces of ʾamān as they 
perceive ʾamān for themselves and their families (and households).  
 
To understand this complex condition of displacement and protection, this thesis explores the 
stories and experiences observed among Iraqis within relevant historical, political and socio-
economic contexts. Making ‘amān in conditions of war‒ or “well-being in a world of want” 
as Michael Jackson (2011) described it in another region and context‒ was not a new 
experience for these Iraqis who lived through longer events of social transformation during 
times of state development, wars and economic sanctions.  
 
I argue, using ethnographic details that the displacement of this group of Iraqi professionals 
and state-employees following the destruction of several aspects of their social and cultural 
life provides a space to re-think forced displacement in the wider context of structural 
violence. The thesis uses ‘amān as a generative concept, to explore different meanings and 
possibilities of being-in-the-world among this group of Iraqis “in its relation to what is 
possible”. In the fragmented spaces in Iraq and Jordan, ʾamān was a term shared collectively 
by Iraqis to explain how they relate to the world around them, their memories of good old 







Introducing the thesis – themes, concepts and arguments  
 
Dr. Omar, who was in his mid-sixties when I met him in his apartment in Amman in March 
2011 left Iraq in 2005. As an Iraqi cardiothoracic surgeon, and former dean of higher studies 
in cardiology in Baghdad, Dr. Omar is one of many health sector professionals and academics 
who were made redundant as part of the post-war and reconstruction process that would “lead 
to a ‘new’, ‘free’ and ‘democratic’ [sic] Iraq” (Barakat, 2008: 3). While his son, a physician, 
had gained resettlement to a third country through the UNHCR and left for the USA, Dr 
Omar said he preferred, at his age, to stay and work in a country close to Iraq where he could 
practice his profession and provide medical help and treatment to Iraqis and Jordanians, 
despite the limitations imposed on Iraqi professionals and workers, since Jordan, as he said, 
had enough doctors and exports medical experts to other countries. Eventually in the years 
following 2003, Jordan (and other neighboring countries) received many Iraqis seeking 
medical treatment, education and other services that were disappearing from Iraq.   
 
Dr Omar recalled vividly his last day in Ibn al-Bitar Cardiac Surgery Hospital, 8 April 2003; 
it was the day when he and some of his colleagues were at the hospital. They all watched as 
the American army invaded Baghdad. When their tanks reached close to the Iraqi museum, 
one of the tanks pushed the entrance gate of the museum, opening a big hole in one of its 
walls that allowed easy access to the looting gangs who emptied the museum in front of the 
American army’s watching eyes.  
 
Another tank headed towards the hospital, pushed the gate at the main entrance, and broke it 
allowing other groups of looting gangs to steal, and destroy the hospital that once provided 
comprehensive high standard care, including transplant and cardiac surgery to patients from 
all over Iraq and nearby countries for a minimal flat rate. “The doctors and health workers did 
all they could to protect the hospital, but the American soldiers who supervised the looting 
operation made sure that everything was destroyed; one of the soldiers, an Arabic speaker, 
used some kind of adhesive ribbon that set the hospital building on fire,”2 as Dr Omar 
recalled angrily: “In one hour the American tanks attacked the museum and burned the 
                                                      
2 Interview with Dr Omar, Amman, March 2011. 
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Cardiac Surgery Centre. When I asked the American army officer why are you destroying a 
hospital? He replied: we will construct better hospitals than this.”  
 
The burning of the Cardiac Surgery Centre, also known as Saddam’s Cardiac Surgery Centre, 
and other similar incidents indicate that the so-called “US reconstruction plans in Iraq” 
envisaged replacing, not building on existing conditions. There was no recognition of Iraq’s 
achievements as a modern secular state, as Sultan Barakat explained in his introduction of the 
edited book Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq, the contracting—out of reconstruction— and 
the rapid privatization of key industries that followed, marginalized Iraqi middle class 
professionals and the general public (2008: 13). Dr Omar explained that most of his 
colleagues had been forced to leave too, some were killed, others were kidnapped and 
released after paying a high ransom, and some were threatened and arrested.3 
 
Dr Omar had not only lost his job, home and the aspirations he and his generation of Iraqi 
professionals and former state employees cultivated to ensure better future for their children 
and younger Iraqi generations in general. The conditions imposed by the US invaders meant 
that it became almost impossible to realize his and his offspring aspirations to work and live 
in Iraq. The story did not end here. While his son chose, among other limited possibilities, to 
accept ‘the refugee label’ and resettle in a third country, Dr Omar’s reflection on the losses he 
experienced following the destructive conditions that forced him out of Iraq led him to 
perceive Jordan as an alternative for him. What was important to him was the ability to work, 
even though on voluntary basis, and assist in the provision of medical treatment to Iraqis who 
were coming in large numbers to Jordan seeking medical services that had become scarce in 
Iraq after 2003. As perceived by Dr Omar, this was the only possible solution, because 
returning to Iraq posed many threats, partly due to his name4 and his affiliation to the former 
government, in addition to the absence of former ways of working and living in inter-
communal neighborhoods in Baghdad. There were little chances for him to return to live in 
his Baghdadi neighborhood and do what he used to do as a surgeon and university lecturer 
without risking to be kidnapped or killed. 
 
                                                      
3 Dr Omar’s eldest son, who is also a doctor was imprisoned by the US-led occupation army.  
4 ‘Omar’ is one of the ‘Sunni’ names that was often described as the most dangerous names in Iraq after 2003. 
In one single incident in 2006, the bodies of 14 Omar(s) were found in a Baghdad garbage dump. (See the 
article published on 10 July 2006: “Where your name can be a death sentence” by Bobby Ghosh available 




The field site of ‘learning experience(s)’ 
The case of Dr. Omar represents several issues I shall discuss in this thesis. The basic 
ethnography is based on my interaction with around 90 Iraqis, both male and female, and 21 
representatives of local and international NGOs and community centers during one year of 
fieldwork in the Jordanian capital Amman, from June 2010 – May 2011. The majority of 
Iraqis I met were former civil servants (I refer to them as ‘state or government employees’ as 
they were part of the civil and military services) and professionals who escaped the 
conditions of destruction and chaotic violence following the 2003 US-UK led invasion of 
their country. Most of them used to live in the capital Baghdad and had left during the period 
2005-2009 (although I met few who left Iraq before and after these years). In addition, I met 
a few Iraqi academics and doctors, who had fled Iraq during the UN economic sanctions 
period (1990-2003), which is known among Iraqis as al-ḥiṣār, and who were unable to return 
to Baghdad despite all the promises of the ‘liberating’ forces. The majority were members of 
the urban middle and upper-middle classes in Iraq, hailing from different backgrounds and 
religions.  
 
They were medical doctors, academics, engineers, teachers, lawyers, artists, journalists and 
authors and some few younger workers in various careers including carpenters, hairdressers 
and tailors, as well as some religious and political leaders. And they represented the socio-
cultural complexities in their homeland, Iraq. The people I met were Sunni, Shia, Christian, 
Yazidi, Sabean-Mandean, Kurdish or half Kurd, half Shia or half Sunni. The majority of them 
had lost their salaried jobs and several individuals and households experienced 
impoverishment and unemployment in Jordan. But there were differences. Some of the Iraqi 
professionals I met had managed to obtain employment in Jordan at universities and 
hospitals. This did not solve all their problems, and as we shall see in Chapter Three, some 
individuals in this group felt marginalized and struggled with how they could maintain a 
decent living standard for themselves and their families. Other Iraqis found themselves in a 
more difficult situation. Some, who had no access to remittances became dependent on the 
limited aid provided by the UNHCR and other local and international NGOs. And as we shall 
see in Chapters Four and Five, the status of ‘refugee’ and the ‘protection space’ provided by 
the UNHCR and other organizations for such refugees did not meet the requirements or 




But the problems all Iraqis faced had not started in Jordan. They were all victims of the 
transformations in the crises in Iraq that date back to the 1990s following the first Gulf War 
and the comprehensive and devastating international economic sanctions following that war. 
This disaster destroyed large parts of the material and social fabric inside Iraq. The situation 
got even worse with the attack on the Iraqi space and former state institutions after the 2003 
invasion and the US-led occupation of Iraq. The failure of the new ‘democratic’ political 
process based on the American vision of a free neoliberal Iraqi economy ruled by a system of 
ethnic-sectarian quota-based governance created increased levels of violence and chaos. The 
post-US-invasion-government was supposed to be more inclusive than the previous regime 
which brutally excluded all its opponents. However, the ‘new Iraqi’  governors represented 
competing interests of certain sects, ethnicities and global powers while the collective Iraqi 
national interests receded with the exclusion of many qualified Iraqis who used to constitute 
the former state bureaucracy, and had no place in the new Iraq being labeled as ‘unwanted 
regime people’. Former professionals like Dr. Omar were expelled from the new Iraq for 
belonging to undesirable professions or factions affiliated to the former regime. And state run 
institutions, like the Cardiac Surgery Center, were destroyed. All originated in the so-called 
de-Baathification order issued by Paul Bremer, the American leader of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
 
One of the most visible segments of Iraqis who sought refuge in neighboring countries, 
during 2010-2011 when I did my fieldwork were precisely the type of people I describe 
above. They were former government employees, like Dr. Omar and his son, who had 
become redundant. With the rising violence in 2003 thousands of them were forced to flee the 
country to different parts in the world. Their experiences were dramatic. Houses of hundreds 
of university professors were stormed and hundreds of them were arrested. The range and 
numbers of academic staff killed indicate a systematic physical elimination of Iraqi 
academics by assassination, torture and arrest as described by a senior Iraqi academic living 
in Amman: “They [the occupation authorities and the new Iraqi government] don’t want us. 
They say that they’ll prepare a new generation of academics and professionals, people of our 
own coloring. In order to understand why we [‘refugee’ academics] are here [in Amman] 
you need to know that it’s a clear-out of people like me, for whom there is no place in the new 
Iraq” (Baker et al, 2010: 212). The expulsion of these former government employees and 
professionals led to further deterioration in the provision of health and education following 
years of wars and economic sanctions (al-ḥiṣār), and, with the level of violence emerging, 
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more and more Iraqis decided to leave (Marfleet, 2007; Chatelard, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, De 
Bel-Air, 2009; Adriaensens, 2010; Baker et al., 2010; Campbell, 2016; Hoffmann, 2016; 
Chatty, 2017b). Sources indicate that in the years following the US-led invasion the number 
of teachers in Baghdad fell by 80% and “up to 75% of Iraq’s doctors, pharmacists and nurses 
have left their jobs since the invasion in 2003.”5   
 
The chaotic violence which spread in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq was also combined with 
another development. This was the general privatization policies of the post-invasion Iraq. 
Privatizing the Iraqi economy and selling off its industries led to the expulsion of several 
Iraqi bureaucrats from their jobs in the public sector, where most of them used to work. Many 
of the private contractors’ projects were funded by the USAID and once the money was 
disbursed, it ended up in the hands of private companies, most of which were American.  
Eventually, the vision of the US authorities and that of the CPA, promising a ‘New Iraq’ as 
an oasis of democracy and free market economy, was far from realized. Instead of economic 
development the result of the deteriorating security situation made any investment in Iraq a 
risky business.  
 
Ismael and Ismael explain how the political process after 2003 excluded many former social 
groupings and forces from participating in the developments. As a consequence of the 
privatization programs, private contractors were hired but the process was all dominated by 
the USAID. The aim was to recruit staff that could oversee their reconstruction of Iraq, and 
what they were looking for was “the most appropriate ‘legitimate’ and functional leaders—
that is, educated Iraqis, particularly expatriate Iraqis who were residents of the US, or those 
leaders that [they] can work with” (2015: 31-32). Obviously, this meant individuals not 
opposed to the US occupation and Iraq’s westernization. The ultimate aim was to create a 
New Iraq based on a neoliberal model. Thus Ismael and Ismael concluded that: “The first 
elected government would be starting fresh, without the bureaucratic legacy of the Baathist 
regime, barring great swaths of Iraqis from participating in the reconstruction” (2015: 22-23). 
 
                                                      
5 In the early years of Saddam Hussein, the health care system in Iraq was a showcase, with most Iraqis 
receiving excellent, inexpensive care. Iraqi doctors often studied in England, and Iraq's medical schools, based 
at hospitals, had high standards.  
From http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/30/international/middleeast/30doctor.htm?_r=1, accessed on 6 July 




On ʾamān أمان and its lack or absence among displaced Iraqis in the field 
In my conversations with the members of the groups who had experienced the developments 
described above, they all expressed a lack of security and safety as a basic reason for their 
escape from their home country, and that they were in search of such safety in their new 
places of residence. In Arabic this was expressed as a search for ʾamān. During my 
conversations with Iraqis in Amman they repeatedly explained their leaving home in Iraq by 
referring to a lack of ʾamān. “Mākū ʾamān fil Iraq” was a much used expression – “in Iraq 
there is no ʾamān anymore.” 
 
ʾAmān6 literally translates into feeling safe among one’s family and community, away from 
danger, and as explored among middle-class Iraqi professionals in the following chapters, it 
is related to having the means to work and live a dignified and stable life. As a result of the 
social transformations this group experienced in the last four decades, ʾamān did not have a 
fixed meaning for all Iraqis all the time. The following chapters present different attempts I 
observed and heard among Iraqis about their past and present experiences of producing 
spaces of ʾamān in both Iraq and Jordan. The meanings of ʾamān varied in relation to access 
to means of life and labor in both countries. There are also generational differences; the 
perceptions and practices of older Iraqis are different from younger generations when it 
comes to potentials of producing ʾamān in times of war and forced displacement. In the 
coming chapters, we meet Iraqi professionals and state employees who had lived through 
various wars under oppressive state-regime. For most of them, being able to work in one’s 
profession, and access relatively good governmental services such as free health care, 
education and employment, and enjoying rich social life used to formulate the sense of ʾamān 
which they missed when they described their life in Baghdad prior the economic embargo.  
 
Lack of ʾamān did not start in Jordan and in the post-invasion Iraq. The older generation of 
Iraqi government employees described how they gradually lost access to decent salary and 
had to suffer severe deterioration in accessing health and educational services, and became 
dependent on a ration system to meet basic nutritional requirements, after the US-led 
bombing of the Iraqi state infrastructure in 1991 and during the 13 years of economic 
embargo. There were various reactions among this generation of Iraqi professionals to the 
lack of ʾamān; while some perceived themselves as engaging and practicing their capacities 
                                                      
6 It is derived from the Arabic root A-M-N, the same root for the term ʾamāna, which means integrity, and 
ʾimān, which means faith. 
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as professionals in making a limited space of ʾamān inside Iraq, others were struggling to 
leave the conditions of destruction (and lack of ʾamān ) in an attempt to extend the space of 
ʾamān for themselves and their families, as expressed later by some Iraqi professionals and 
academics who left Iraq during the 1990s and were still unable to return during my fieldwork 
time. All Iraqis I met in 2010 and 2011 shared feelings of the absence of ʾamān in the post-
invasion Iraq with the spread of violence and the rise of daily killing by explosives, 
kidnapping and torture, sticky bombs and silencers. They talked extensively about the 
absence of ʾamān in their home country as the main reason for their presence in Jordan.  
 
One of the biggest sources of ʾamān for this group of professionals and state employees was 
related to what they labeled ‘order’. They referred to the absence of ʾamān in relation to lack 
of order and the spread of conditions of lawlessness and destruction of state-institutions: “It is 
chaos/ fawdā فوضى in Iraq”; or “The US got rid of one Saddam to replace him with 100 
Saddams"; “mākū niẓām/ there is no order.” The use of niẓām here refers to the absence of 
order and regulations or rules in general not only the former regime. The details presented in 
the coming chapters show how the absence of order forced many Iraqis to leave their homes; 
they referred to the loss of order which enabled them to live and work in inter-mixed 
neighborhoods and institutions, despite many other types of difficulties. The informants 
described the lack of ʾamān during the oppressive rule of Saddam’s dictatorship and what 
they called “his crazy decisions to involve the nation in one war after another.” However, 
when they compared what they described as ‘Saddam’s Iraq’ to post-invasion Iraq, they often 
referred to how they missed the strict order and regulations imposed by the former police and 
army in their control of the Iraqi space. The dismantlement of the Iraqi police and army 
apparatus following the invasion led to the rise of fawdā/ chaos. While there was agreement 
on the absence of ʾamān in post-invasion Iraq, the meanings of this absence were connected 
to what these Iraqis miss most. The following expressions were most commonly shared with 
me:  
 “mākū ʾamān/ there is no safe place in Iraq: Going to school or work can get you 
kidnapped, burned alive or beheaded. It became normal to say goodbye to my family 
members in the morning when I leave to work with tears and hugs fearing that we 
might not meet again”, 
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 “there’s no future, no water or electricity in Iraq, the weather changed, the air is full 
of dust and sand, and poverty and misery increased”,7 
 “mākū ʿilaj: there is no medical treatment and health services in Iraq.” 
 
In postinvasion Iraq, the absence of ʾamān was also often narrated in relation to one’s 
sectarian, ethnic or religious affiliation and the increasing level of violence among various 
groups. An Iraqi woman I met in Amman narrated the story of the killing of her two brothers 
who were violently pulled from their neighborhood together with other Shii men. They were 
found dead by the police later, with signs of torture all over their bodies which had been tied 
together, shot and burned with chemical acids. The woman said that members of her family 
in Iraq could recognize one of her brothers because his face was covered by his hands and 
thus partly preserved its shape. The police and several families who could identify their sons 
indicated that among the piles of dead bodies, there were both Sunni and Shii men.8 Another 
woman had this to say: 
We thought that we will feel safer in Jordan. At least, not threatened to be 
slaughtered or die in an explosion if I leave my home to buy food or just to have 
a walk. My kids can go to school alone, I do not have to accompany them in the 
morning and hire a taxi driver to pick them up in the afternoon so that they 
won’t get kidnapped, they can play outside freely. In Baghdad [after 2003] we 
had to stay at home, and even home did not feel safe at the end; at first, 
Americans used to raid at night and after 2006, the militias’ business thrived. 
Our biggest problem in Iraq today is that you don’t know who is your enemy, 
you don’t know from where or by whom you’ll be attacked.9 
 
The general argument 
This dissertation thus explores the complex process of what I call “learning to live again in 
ʾamān” with social transformations that affected the possibilities of being in the world and 
also affected the perceptions of ʾamān, as experienced by Iraqis I met in Jordan. A basic part 
of the discussion is to show that the adaptation of this group of Iraqis was not only a result of 
the context of Iraqis as ‘refugees’, constrained by the rules and regulations of the institutions, 
of which UNHCR is a major one, providing assistance to the Iraqis labeled as refugees. It was 
that too, and I shall discuss it in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five. But what I found 
was a much more complex situation in which the Iraqis I met also developed adaptive 
                                                      
7 This is not restricted to state employees who lost their means of labor, the Financial Times declared Iraq “the 
most dangerous place in the world to do business” (Klein, 2004). 
8 Interview with Nadia on 20 November 2010.  
9 Interview with Um-Mazen in her rented home in Amman on 13 January 2011.  
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strategies that challenged the definitions of the international humanitarian system. I argue that 
this capacity of the Iraqis to circumvent the limitations of the aid-based system has to be seen 
also in a historical context in which the economic and political changes during four decades 
of war conditions in Iraq had affected all the former state employees and professionals I 
engaged with, whether they were affluent or not. From listening to the stories they told me, 
and in observing the way they presented their memories, and also observing them in specific 
events, it became clear to me that the “life-worlds” of the Iraqis in Amman could not be 
reduced to a narrow understanding of their experiences with displacement in Jordan. In order 
to understand the observations collected during my fieldwork, it became important to explore 
the social and political transformations governing their lives in earlier years. This included 
previous events of great social change and transformations such as the rising class of 
government employees and state-welfare services during the 1965-1980s, the regime 
despotism and its prolonged war with Iran, the 1991 US-led bombing (desert storm war), and 
the 13 years of the UN-led infamous economic sanctions (al-ḥiṣār). These parts of the story 
are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. 
 
It is in such a broader perspective that I refer to the ʾamān-making experiences as ‘learning 
experiences’ to describe how these former Iraqi state bureaucrats had to constantly find new 
ways to cope with the socio-political and economic transformations in their home which also 
led to a history of displacement. To understand the learning experiences and the social roles 
members of this group aimed to preserve, I argue with Stephen Lubkemann that it is 
important to consider the historical and economic contexts that constituted this group of 
professionals and state bureaucrats. This is what Lubkemann argued in his book Culture in 
Chaos (2008) in which he explored developments among Machazians, a group of people in 
Mozambique: “[t]he analysis of war as a social condition must be rooted in a history of the 
social processes that precede war.” In my case, such a perspective helped me see that in order 
to understand how the Iraqis negotiate the effects of forced displacement, war-time 
displacement needs to be understood as shaped within “complex array of culturally scripted 
life projects and social interests” (Lubkemann, 2008: 5). The ability of Iraqis to survive the 
two recent Gulf Wars, the crippling 13 years of sanctions, and the violence and deprivation 
after the invasion is an indication of the ‘learning process’ involved. This was, most of the 
time, a difficult and painful process which did not necessarily lead to positive ends, and as the 
current ethnography documents, it involved and indeed does involve loss, suffering, courage, 
relentless battling, and most important “talent for life” (to borrow Scheper-Hughes’ term, 
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2008). But again, while this is true for all Iraqis at a general level, it remains a fact that the 
experiences of the Iraqis varied, and that different groups, with different types of 
competences and levels of affluence could pursue different strategies and adapt in different 
ways. My presentation in Chapters Three to Five show how different individuals and families 
adapted. Iraqis in Chapter Three had more access to financial and symbolic capital (being 
highly skilled professionals as medical doctors and academics) and were able to secure 
temporary employment in Jordan, or in Iraq, while Iraqi individuals and families in Chapters 
Four and Five did not have such resources and were left to adapt as ‘refugees’ and thereby 
also adapt to the internationally accepted rules and regulations for the treatment of refugees. 
The key institution for promoting such rules and regulations was— apart from the Jordanian 
government itself— the UNHCR. The details will come in the chapters, here it suffices to say 
that for all Iraqis met during fieldwork, the search for ʾamān was key.  
 
Theoretical approaches on ʾamān or ‘well-being’ under conditions of structural 
change 
In order to understand this notion of ʾamān it is important, as I argue above, to understand the 
dynamics of social survival in conditions of violent structural change. In search of such an 
understanding I link this notion of ʾamān to anthropological research on well-being. Well-
being is not normally explored in contexts of wars and displacement, where survival is many 
times reduced to and dependent on ‘humanitarian’ aid. In an edited volume by Alberto Corsín 
Jiménez titled Culture and Well-being, Wendy James explores the concept of well-being in 
understanding the problems involved in managing refugee protection in Darfur in Western 
Sudan. James makes an interesting distinction between ‘welfare’ and ‘well-being’, linking 
welfare to wider context of care of the social whole, such as the states, while well-being 
includes subjective ways individuals follow to achieve their sense of the good life that might 
be in conflict with the state, or other centralized aid systems (2008: 69-76). Well-being then 
is linked to notions of agency and having some degree of control over one’s life course 
(Harper and Maddox, 2008: 36). According to my observations in the field, this distinction is 
important to understand the rising tensions in most humanitarian aid encounters. The 
‘popular’ neo-liberal perspective which links humanitarian aid to developmental aid led to a 
deeper gap between mass welfare programs that could provide adequate care for the social 
whole(s) and the limited project-based aid geared ‘to help individuals to help themselves’. As 
I argue, with my ethnographic descriptions from the field, the limited formal protection space 
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and absence of welfare programs forced many individuals to re-define their well-being within 
the possible limits.  
 
Another insightful research on well-being or “Well-being in a World of Want” are Michael 
Jackson’s two works: Life Within Limits (2011) and The Wherewithal of Life (2013). Jackson 
presents an impressive account on the tension between established rules, roles and people’s 
desire to reconfigure their lives outside of these constraints―between hierarchy and 
humanity. In his account, Jackson relates human agency to inventiveness, resistance and 
competence. In the life stories he presented in The Wherewithal of Life, he manages to 
describe the crushing weight of circumstance without effacing human agency and to convey 
the competence of his informants in a way that is legible, as the following quotation 
indicates:  
“These life stories bring home to us the subtle interplay between what we accept 
or submit to and what we cannot accept and seek to change. For Hannah Arendt, 
we are all caught up in an existential dialectic between suffering—in which we 
are subjected to the actions of others—and agency in which we appear to be the 
authors of our own lives. Because the actor always moves among and in relation 
to other acting beings, he is never merely a ‘doer’ but always and at the same time 
a sufferer. To do and to suffer are like opposite sides of the same coin. 
Paradoxically, therefore, action is often contingent upon yielding conscious 
control over one’s life, as in that desperate moment in the vineyard when Roberto 
[one of Jackson’s informants] prayed for a chance to go to college”10 (2013: 223-
224).  
 
What I take from this is that agency is a central concept to explain how people obtain well-
being or engage in the process of making ʾamān. Furthermore, in “a world of want” and 
under conditions of “structural violence,” suffering and agency are like opposite sides of the 
same coin, as Jackson indicates. While humanitarian aid tends to focus on the suffering part 
of humanity (Fassin and d’Halluin, 2007; Fassin, 2008, 2011), individuals and communities 
tend to struggle to find other means of living according to their perception of well-being or 
good life. This is precisely what I experienced with the Iraqis. They had all experienced 
conditions of structural violence and had lost access to ‘order’ and the ability to control their 
own future. In the absence of adequate humanitarian aid after displacement to Jordan, Iraqis 
                                                      
10 I use double quotation marks “x” for indented quotations when the text is copied from a secondary resource, 
to distinguish these texts from indented excerpts taken from my interviews in the field, which are not marked 
unless quoted in the text (not indented). The single quotation marks ‘x’ indicate my emphasis on a word or 
phrase, while the use of double quotation for short phrases or terms “x” indicate that the term or phrase is copied 




could hardly think of the ‘good life’ or well-being. Rather, what the Iraqis in Amman 
experienced was what I call conditions of ‘–lessness’. The concept of -lessness is a common 
suffix in the terminology of refugee-related literature: homelessness, statelessness, 
powerlessness, helplessness, speechlessness, hopelessness, rootlessness, rightlessness, 
meaninglessness and other such terms comprise a lexicon that describe human existence in 
conditions of deprivation; they are present in the visual, verbal and written presentations of 
the people who were forced to flee their homes to survive. But again, for the Iraqis in Amman 
there was internal differentiation between them. The most visible cases of such conditions of 
-lessness were found among Iraqis who were labeled as refugees, and must be sought in the 
failure of the humanitarian system established to assist them. As we shall see in my 
discussions, the tension between Iraqi refugees and the UNHCR was precisely linked to the 
difference in understanding of what being a refugee should mean. For the Iraqis it meant a 
temporary assistance until they could sort out their problems. For the UNHCR and other 
international and UN-based refugee systems, a refugee was only a refugee if the person was 
in a category of poverty and marginality that could be visible. If a person did not fit into this 
definition, that person did not qualify for the UNHCR limited aid in Jordan. For others, who 
did not become asylum seekers or refugees, the marginality and poverty linked to conditions 
of –lessness was not as visible. The reason for this was that among the non-refugee Iraqis 
they pursued individual strategies that were more problematic for me to observe. In these 
cases I depended on interviews and collecting narratives about the experiences of the Iraqis in 
this latter category.  
 
What I got out of all this was that becoming a refugee was only one mode of survival for the 
Iraqis I met in Jordan during 2010-2011. They might have needed the resources they obtained 
by the refugee status, but they often expressed resentment about the demands they had to face 
within this refugee system. Those who had the resources to stay out of this protection space 
certainly preferred to do so. But for all what they were concerned with all the time was to 
learn how to establish their space(s) of ʾamān.  
 
On agency in conditions of reduction 
As mentioned above, Iraqi professionals and state-employees had a long history of dealing 
with conditions of structural violence and therefore also creating spaces of ʾamān where they 
could be as capable as possible to lead a dignified life as professionals. Thus, Iraqis were 
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developing new patterns of agency in which they developed new ways of dealing with their 
problems. Such an ‘agent’ is more similar to Bourdieu’s agent who seems bound to act in 
ways that reproduce structure; the agent, in this sense, tends to internalize structure. Bourdieu 
refers to this internalized structure using the term habitus, which is a system of dispositions 
that are both structured and structuring. In this way dispositions embody and reproduce 
external structure. Bourdieu’s agent is restricted by habitus (as structure) and gains the ability 
to act only through the generative properties of the habitus, while other actions, outside the 
boundaries of the habitus seem undesirable or not possible. Yet, what is interesting in 
Bourdieu’s agent is that although, restricted by habitus, the agent can transcend these 
restrictions because habitus is generative; it has an endless capacity to engender thoughts, 
perceptions and actions in his and her relation to “what is possible”:  
“The relation to what is possible is a relation to power; and the sense of the 
probable future is constituted in the prolonged relationship with a world 
structured according to the categories of the possible (for us) and the impossible 
(for us) [sic], of what is appropriated in advance by and for others and what one 
can reasonably expect for oneself” (1990:64). 
 
As an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions 
in which it is constituted, the habitus, according to Bourdieu, engenders the thoughts, 
perceptions, and the actions consistent with those conditions, and not others. Because the 
habitus is an endless capacity to engender products—thoughts, perceptions, expressions, 
actions—whose limits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its 
production, the conditioned and conditional freedom it secures is as remote from a creation of 
unpredictably novelty as it is from a simple mechanical reproduction of the initial 
conditionings (ibid., 1990).  
 
Bourdieu’s perspective is useful also in my attempt to understand the situation of Iraqis I met 
in Amman. I have outlined a general situation in which agency among Iraqis in Jordan was 
limited by the possibilities allowed by different systems governing the formal space of 
protection. The way humanitarian aid was managed by quantifying the need in the temporary 
space of protection forced many Iraqis to adjust their needs to fit the possible limits. This 
forced Iraqis to explore other thoughts and actions to think of other probable possibilities to 
produce ʾamān. The production of ʾamān, in this sense, is, to speak with Bourdieu, a learning 
process in which thoughts and actions are generated within the historical and socially situated 
conditions of their production. The ability of people to cope cannot be explained by a short-
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term adaptation to the constraints and possibilities related to the status of ‘refugee’ in Jordan. 
Rather, the ability (and sometimes inability) to deal with their existence in Amman was 
linked to what might be labeled a habitus of ‘making ʾamān’ that had been generated through 
processes of learning and processes of trying and failing which Iraqis had developed in order 
to deal with restricted conditions in Iraq throughout four decades of war (1970-2010s). 
Obviously the two situations are very different, but what is common in both is the ability of 
the Iraqis to seek solutions to their problems. And the aim of this search for solutions is to 
arrive at a situation I have labeled ‘amān. I find this a useful concept to explore the 
experiences of Iraqi state-bureaucrats and professionals with the declining state-
infrastructures in Iraq and the life situation they experienced in Jordan. In both situations, 
searching for ʾamān opened up a wider perspective to explore the various social spaces 
created by Iraqis in an attempt to extend their survival in conditions of structural violence.  
 
One central question that connected Iraqis’ stories and experiences, in this thesis, with social 
transformations in their country during the last decades (1965-2010s) is: how do Iraqis learn 
to live again and reformulate a sense of well-being (or ʾamān) after the destruction of many 
aspects of their familiar social world? Iraqis had to learn how to live with large 
transformations over a relatively short life span. The effects of the rise of state public sector 
after the revolution of 1958 with its relatively good welfare services, especially between the 
mid-sixties and mid-eighties, and the various levels of restrictions imposed by the state 
coercive policies on its subjects could be observed in the different reactions among members 
of former Iraqi state bureaucracy. These reactions are generated “within the historical and 
socially situated conditions” of the production of state institutions. Differences were observed 
in relation to generational, economic and political backgrounds and personal experiences with 
oppressive policies of the former regime, but the shared elements, during times of the rise of 
state public sector created some similar reactions and patterns.  
 
As indicated before, well-being is usually measured against its absence (Jiménez, 2007: 22). 
Well-being or ʾamān as presented in the stories and practices of Iraqis in the field is measured 
against their past experiences of access to good-quality-free education, stable employment 
and good health services and infrastructure as part of their role in the collective institutions 
governed by the Iraqi state. ʾAmān is also measured against their past experiences with wars, 
al-ḥiṣār and oppressive regime policies, as well as the limited state protection and possible 
communal social life. Among the old generation, ʾamān was measured against their 
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experiences with the rich social and cultural life they enjoyed within inter-communal 
Baghdad. These various and rich experiences were perceived as their ‘share’ of well-being as 
Iraqis, who were part of the Iraqi space with its wealth of human and natural resources. This 
included various possibilities of being, not restricted to being part of the ruling Baathist 
regime. In addition, the perceptions of Iraqi professionals and state employees of well-being 
were not restricted within the neoliberal limits11 of well-being, which governed the post-
invasion Iraqi space (and oil resources),12  and the limited development-humanitarian aid in 
Jordan.   
 
A brief perspective on space: In my description of the space of ʾamān, I use space here, not 
as a static entity but rather as a social product that involves the interaction of various types of 
spaces characterized by different sources of power. Examples of such spaces include the Iraqi 
state space characterized by its violent history. The Jordanian state, UNHCR and other 
organizations all engaging in a protection space. And within these spaces we find the Iraqis in 
search of a space of ʾamān. The spaces represent different contexts that have helped shape the 
responses of the Iraqis. This ongoing process of dynamic interaction— presented as a 
learning experience in conditions of structural change during the last four decades— takes 
place at various levels: local, trans-local (within the same region), transnational (among 
Jordan, Iraq, Syria and other neighboring countries), and global.  
 
I am leaning here on the inspiring discussion of Lefebvre in The Production of Space. 
According to Lefebvre, the space as produced within specific conditions serves as a tool of 
thought and of action. In addition to being a means of production, it is also a means of 
control, and hence of domination, of power (1991, 26). In this sense, the production of space 
is a process that involves forces of production and relations of production in addition to 
history (ibid., 46). Social space, according to Lefebvre, is the outcome of a sequence and set 
                                                      
11 There is no one definition of neoliberalism, and I do not use it in this thesis as a theoretical perspective, but I 
refer to neoliberalism as a descriptive concept that I think is important to explain the political economic 
practices and policies governing post-invasion Iraq on the one side, and the international development (and 
refugee) aid business in Jordan, on the other side. Neoliberalism, as defined briefly by David Harvey (2005) 
“proposes that human ‘well-being’ [emphasis added] can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property 
rights, free markets and free trade.” The state, in this case, plays an important role only in allowing the system to 
work, “by force if needed,” as the US did in Iraq and other places (see Doran, 2012), but the state should not 
intervene in markets as per the neoliberal doctrine.  
12 One of the jokes Iraqis exchanged in the field was that the new governing bodies in Iraq “don’t govern the 




of operations, and thus cannot be reduced to the rank of a simple object; it is not a thing but 
rather a set of relations between things: objects and products (ibid.: 73, 83).  
 
In the thesis, the ethnographic details presented will describe how Iraqis produced their own 
spaces of ʾamān, during different periods, by learning how to live with social change and 
transformations. The space(s) of ʾamān, is a productive concept in Lefebvre’s sense, it serves 
to explore the experiences of the Iraqi Baghdadi urban communities with the changes they 
had to endure in the period between mid-1960s‒2010. It generates more in-depth 
understanding of the complex processes of survival under conditions of structural violence 
than other concepts such as refugee, homeland, refugee camps and protection policies.13 This 
is not to say that I ignore the ‘refugee’ experience, but as indicated earlier I address this 
experience as part of a larger process through the concepts of ‘learning’ and ʾamān spaces.  
 
Limited aid structure: the ‘formal’ protection space in Jordan 
The –lessness of people who were classified as refugees was a basic criteria for obtaining aid. 
But as suggested above, this aid came at a price. The price was a dependence on various 
institutions that defined the access people had to different types of services. In their dealings 
with such institutions the Iraqis met with many problems that were related to the mandates 
and bureaucratic operations of the institutions and Iraqis’ everyday needs. One example is the 
UNHCR. 
 
The UNHCR was one of the main official actors in the field, though its role was limited in 
the daily realities of many Iraqis I met. Many reasons can help explain why this was the case. 
The early contingency planning undertaken by UNHCR in 2003 was based on a false 
assumption that any Iraqi refugee exodus [as a result of the US-led attack] would be managed 
in a traditional manner, by accommodating the new arrivals in camps in the border areas of 
asylum countries. However, the UNHCR’s response to the crisis was delayed (UNHCR, 
2009: 8). The UNHCR lists various factors that caused its late response to the Iraqi refugee 
crisis. Such factors were dealing with a largely middle-class refugee population in middle- or 
lower-income countries (according to the categorization followed by international 
organizations); and the interest of states who were directly involved in the crisis in addressing 
the refugee situation, not least by delays in providing high levels of funding and resettlement 
                                                      
13 I elaborate more on this in the methodology section in Chapter 2. 
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places. Furthermore, the neighboring countries of Jordan and Syria, and also Lebanon already 
had the challenge of the Palestinian refugee populations within their borders, a fact that 
tended to overshadow the focus on the situation for the Iraqis. Neither Jordan, Lebanon nor 
Syria are signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, they lack refugee 
legislation and institutions, and have strict internal security forces. As a result the response to 
the crisis was slow. And when action was taken it became clear that the prevailing policies 
relating to Iraqis had to be modified (ibid., 9-10). 
 
An important concept the UNHCR developed in the Iraqi context was “protection space.” 
The concept of protection space was discussed in a report called “the Policy Development 
and Evaluation Service (PDES) Report” of July 2009:  
“The notion of ‘protection space’14 is a relatively new one, and one which has 
become particularly associated with the Iraqi refugee operation. It is not a legal 
concept, has ‘no formal’  or agreed definition. [According to a PDES paper 
prepared by Anne Evans Barnes in January 2009] the protection space can be 
understood as an environment which enables the delivery of protection activities 
and within which the prospect of providing protection is optimized. [..] It means 
the extent to which there is a conducive environment for the internationally 
recognized rights of refugees to be respected and upheld. […] The most ‘critical’ 
elements of protection for Iraqis arriving in neighboring countries and seeking 
refuge […] regardless of the formal status conferred included: (a) access to safety 
and non-refoulement; (b) non-penalization for illegal entry; (c) permission for 
temporary stay under acceptable conditions; (d) registration and the identification 
of protection vulnerabilities; (e) access to durable solutions, including 
resettlement; (f) availability of ‘humanitarian assistance’ to persons with ‘specific 
needs’; and (g) access to ‘essential services and opportunities’ for ‘self-reliance’”  
(ibid., 14). 
 
An important element in the description of the “protection space” as quoted from the 
UNHCR report above is the absence of formal or agreed definition of what is meant by the 
concept. The seven conditions listed from a-g, that were considered “critical” are vague and 
broad; for example what are the “specific needs” that would categorize some Iraqis as eligible 
to “humanitarian assistance” in point (f) above? What are the “essential services and 
opportunities” provided for Iraqis to help them achieve “self-reliance”? And if many of the 
Iraqis in Jordan belong to middle class professionals, how can they be assisted to resettle in a 
third country if that option was limited to the Iraqis who were classified as most vulnerable? 
 
Such ambiguities and unclear limits were often questioned by Iraqis I met in the field in their 
                                                      
14 Emphasis added.  
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encounters with UNHCR and other custodians of the formal “space of protection” such as the 
Jordanian authorities, in addition to various local and international organizations who 
provided services and assistance to Iraqis according to previously assigned conditions of 
“specific needs” (see Chapter Five).  
 
Given the limited opportunities for Iraqis within such a protection space in Jordan, people I 
met had to carry the burden of creating their own spaces of ʾamān and well-being. Many 
times this meant moving among different categories and labels in search for services and 
opportunities: ‘guest’ or Iraqi ‘investor/resident’ in Jordan; ‘migrant worker’ between 
Amman and Baghdad; ‘asylum seeker’, or ‘holder of refugee certificate’ in Jordan. This 
meant a constant moving beyond the formal protection space in which assistance was limited 
to individuals carrying the ‘refugee’ label. This also included travelling between Baghdad 
and Amman when possible for different purposes, a fact that also was in violation of the 
bureaucratic and political definition of the victimized refugee and status.   
 
It was very clear then that the dynamics within the protection space were not managed by a 
centralized force such as the UNHCR, nor was it (the protection space) defined by boundaries 
of a refugee camp. At the time, the international organizations and hosting states introduced a 
new model of ‘humanitarianism’ in crisis situations. The model linked the governmentality of 
refugees with efforts to govern the rising poor by addressing the host communities’ capacities 
to provide health and education services forming “a nexus between humanitarian aid and 
development” (Castles et al., 2014). The limited humanitarian aid funds targeting “persons 
with specific needs” were channeled through several parties: international and local NGOs 
and host state institutions. Most of the time, this protection policy tended to place the burdens 
of the crisis onto the Iraqis’ shoulders, telling them that they have to be “self-reliant” (as 
indicated above by the UNHCR PDES report, 2009). This encouraged the Iraqis to engage in 
activities outside the aid oriented context of the protection space. They did not regard 
themselves as refugees nor did they ‒at least the people I mostly interacted with‒ adopt the 
attitudes and types of behavior that were expected of a refugee. Rather, the Iraqis engaged in 
many different income bringing activities in Amman, including pursuing the kind of 
occupations they had left in Iraq. In many cases they also tried to produce their spaces of 




An Iraqi history of crises – lessons in survival 
While the thesis empirically looks at the effects of the absence of a ‘formal’ refugee-status 
and minimal aid on the survival of Iraqis, conceptually it expands the study of survival 
beyond the category of ‘refugee’ to include a broader perspective which sees the Iraqi 
adaptation over time as a ‘learning experience’. For this group of Iraqis, producing spaces of 
ʾamān was not something that had started with their experiences in Jordan. Rather the search 
of ʾamān had been going on for a long time. During the last four decades, they had to learn 
how to live with social transformations also back home in Iraq. Thus the thesis had to move 
beyond the period of my fieldwork in Amman and the problematic refugee-like experiences 
there. Based on the narratives of my informants it became increasingly clear to me that the 
time-frame had to be extended so that I could explore deeper into the stories shared in the 
field about Iraqis’ learning experiences in conditions of structural change in their home 
country during the last four decades from the 1960s to 2010. In summary the change can be 
characterized by the titles of two of my chapters, from ‘living with promises of a better 
future’ during times of prosperity in 1960s-1970s (Chapter 6) to ‘learning to endure the 
privations of war and al-ḥiṣār’ or as reflected in their daily life ‘from filling freezers to 
counting calories’ (Chapter 7).  
 
As my informants were trying to deal with their problematic situation in Amman (the capital 
of Jordan), they remembered and drew on their memories of these learning experiences of 
how to live with large change. The experience and the change they stressed in our 
conversations were related to how they had to live with the displacement that came as a result 
of the destruction of what used to be the state of Iraq. This required complex processes of 
learning that also benefitted their lives in Amman. In the good old days in Iraq, Iraqis were 
subjects of a nation-state where ‘learning’ and ‘disciplining’ was done in a more collective 
way, as part of national policies and various disciplinary practices by the regime, including 
developmental policies, dictatorship, forced conscription and long years of military service, 
and resistance to the UN-led economic sanction. But with the deterioration of the situation, 
the collective grip disappeared and the Iraqis had to find new ways of living their lives. After 
2003, Iraqis had to handle the transformations in their lives, as dispersed factions of 
communities: no longer Iraqis but Shia, Sunni, Yazidi, Christian and others, in the newly 
divided Baghdadi space according to politicized sectarian identities. Others had to leave and 
learn how to live simply as individuals, deprived of the assets that seemed essential in their 
earlier lives at home, such as a regular salaried work. What they also discovered was that 
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education and professional expertise which earlier had been a sign of prestige and which had 
provided access to a stable life no longer was the same. Thus, also, those who left Iraq 
experienced that their competences were not valued in the way they expected, and found 
themselves marginalized, seeking employment that had little to do with their level of 
competence.  
 
My overall impression from my fieldwork is that while the dynamics of interaction with the 
formal protection space in Jordan that I could observe might have been relatively new to this 
group of Iraqis, through the narratives and stories I also learnt that they had longer 
experiences in dealing with processes of marginalization in times of insecurity. These 
experiences were related to earlier periods of Iraqi state decline resulting from prolonged war 
conditions and the general repressive policies of the regime. But in both cases, in Amman and 
in Baghdad, the lesson taken away by the Iraqis I interacted with was that, during times of 
crises, they had to learn how to solve their own problems.  
 
Big questions and anthropology 
Following my observations of Iraqi refugees’ encounters in Jordan with host country NGOs 
and international organizations, and hearing their stories about living in Baghdad in good and 
bad times, a central question that connected these stories and experiences is: How do we learn 
to live again in conditions of social transformation? 
 
This is one of those big questions that can be important to human beings regardless of 
culture. It belongs to that field of anthropological research that turns to big questions, or 
“Zafimaniry questions” in reference to Maurice Bloch’s theoretical project as it has 
developed over the years. I refer to the edited volume Questions of Anthropology in which 
Jonathan Parry’s preface provides an interesting discussion of Bloch’s project and its 
influence on shaping our questions in the field:  
“The Zafimaniry are one of the Malagasy groups with whom Bloch has done 
intensive and prolonged fieldwork. Though few of them have had much formal 
education, and a good many are illiterate, Bloch has been at pains to point out in a 
couple of recent publications (2005) that they are often intensely interested in, and 
spontaneously speculate about, anthropological questions of a general theoretical 
sort – questions, for example, about what aspects of human behavior are learned 
and what is innate; […] questions about the relationship between language and 
culture […]. In this, the Zafimaniry are probably no different from people in any 
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other society and Bloch’s message has been that it is to these fundamental 
questions that ordinary people ask that anthropology must return” (2007: ix).  
 
The questions posed in Parry’s preface helped me realize that in order to deal with my 
experience with this group of Iraqis I would have to think outside the ready-established 
concepts and theories in studies on refugees and displacement. How can we learn to live 
again? was one of the questions that echoed in the field. The complexities in the Iraqi case 
which I attempt to introduce in this thesis made it difficult to ignore this persistent question 
and focus solely on conceptualizing their experiences in the legal refugee framework. Instead, 
this ethnography attempts to explore other meanings Iraqis gave to their experiences with loss 
and expulsion from home. And in this a dynamic understanding of different spaces became 
important.  
 
My learning experience among Iraqis’ in Jordan started through my observations in the field, 
when I noticed their attempts to cope with the changes after being displaced from home, I 
could follow it further through their stories about having to learn how to live with wars, 
dispossessions and ruptures during the last four decades inside Iraq. In each of the chapters 
that follow, we encounter learning experiences of Iraqi attempts to make new space(s) of 
ʾamān in the context of the dynamics in other spaces.  
 
In the encounters with several impoverished Iraqi state employees, we see them learn how to 
cope with the reductionist conditions in the protection space in Jordan. They attended training 
events and they took on voluntary tasks, and in order to make these activities fit into their 
self-understanding, they ‘pretended’ that the activities represented a situation in which they 
were ‘employees/ workers’ who received a ‘salary’ for what they did. But, what they liked to 
call ‘salary’ was in most of the cases the transportation allowances they received to cover 
expenses while doing voluntary work. We see cases in which Iraqis had to adapt to the 
expectations of what a refugee should look like and behave. As in the case of a former Iraqi 
librarian who had to learn that to be included in the formal space of protection, she would 
have to dress shabby and keep a low profile, hiding the fact that she was a quite educated 
person. And, even worse, the family was excluded from the limited protection space (cash 
assistance) when it was revealed that the female librarian and her husband had a daughter 
enrolled to study in a college in Jordan. This clearly was in violation of the reductionist and 
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bureaucratic understanding carried by operators within the protection space of what a refugee 
situation was supposed to be.  
 
We will also see how some Iraqi professionals kept their professional titles, thereby refusing 
to play into the various expectations embedded in the refugee title. Rather than being 
refugees they‒academics as well as doctors‒ insisted to practice their professions, most often 
with a minimal income. They operated under various labels: migrant worker, investor, 
fugitive doctor, exiled poet or foreign lecturer. And they perceived themselves as engaging 
and practicing their capacities in order to help other Iraqis and Jordanians. Being able to work 
in one’s profession clearly extended their feelings of dignity and self-worth, and allowed 
them to preserve their privacy and follow their responsibilities as parents. But this option was 
possible for some Iraqis only. The highly skilled Iraqi professionals, especially academics 
and doctors, were the ones  who could secure means of living from additional sources. Others 
had to adapt to the ‘refugee status’. The above examples are from the Iraqis living in Amman, 
it was interesting to observe that there were some doctors and academics who decided to 
return to Iraq in order to carry out work under tribal protection in their original towns (and 
not in their former neighborhoods in Baghdad), while their  families continued to live in 
Amman and enjoy the services missing in Iraq. A third option was to seek employment in 
Europe and the US. Some were offered resettlement legally, while others had to use 
smuggling services in long and dangerous journeys. One of the experiences is narrated by 
Lutfiya al-Dulaimi (an Iraqi author) who sought asylum in France, and how she decided, after 
a painful journey, to return to Jordan, where she was hoping to live in ʾamān and “accept the 
life of ascetics with dignity and writing” (see Chapter 3). 
 
The motivation for all the people mentioned above is ʾamān, they sought ʾamān and found it 
in various ways, all of which pointed beyond the protection space established. Rather, what 
we shall see is that the Iraqis in their search for ʾamān did not necessarily seek a pleasant and 
unproblematic life, but rather sought to reconnect with the reality they carried with them from 
the old Iraq also in cases where this implied to expose themselves to risks. The protection 
space offered in Amman might have secured a physical safety, but what we see is that the 
search for ʾamān takes us beyond minimal physical safety and points towards some more 
existential dimensions of the lives of these Iraqis. In this the Iraqis join the Zafimaniry in the 
quote above, in returning to fundamental questions that ordinary people ask and that 





In search of understanding – comparisons, methodologies and reflexivity 
 
Engaging with literature on Iraq and ethnographies on social change, 
displacement and well-being in reductionist conditions 
My search for a deeper understanding of the choices made and the stories told by Iraqis I 
came to know in Amman started with a search in Iraqi history. The establishment of an Iraqi 
state bureaucracy was not merely a local affair. It evolved as part of broader regional and 
global changes since the end of the 19th century, with the arrival of the Ottoman empire 
reform (Tanzimat) policies to the three Iraqi provinces of Mosul, Basra and Baghdad, 
especially under Midhat Basha’s brief rule of Baghdad (1869-1872). The nascent Iraqi 
bureaucracy was further restructured by the colonial effects during the British mandate 
imposed on several territories in the region and its involvement in the Iraqi oil business and 
the 1948 colonization of Palestine. These colonial effects and other local changes led to the 
rising political debates on Arab nationalism vs. Iraqiness (Davis, 2005; Tripp, 2007). The 
enhancement of modern state institutions in Iraq is often described as a troubled project 
(Sluglett and Sluglett, 2001; Dodge, 2003; Davis, 2005; Rohde, 2010; Dewachi, 2017); this 
shadowed several aspects of the Iraqi state-society relations (Rohde, 2010). 
 
Like other neighboring states, the rise of secular education with particular investment in 
professional higher education, and salaried employment opportunities, in addition to other 
welfare ‘socialist-like’ services offered by the state were perceived by the Iraqis I met as 
important aspects of building the nation, as well as allowing its subjects to enjoy good living 
standards (especially after the mid-20th century and until 1980s). These elements are only 
partially addressed in research studies which focus on displacement and refugees among 
similar groups. The time I spent among Iraqis in Amman presented other aspects of being a 
displaced Iraqi professional and state-bureaucrat, a status many of these Iraqis were trying to 
reclaim in the space(s) of ʾamān they tried to establish between Jordan and Iraq.  
 
The older generation of Iraqi state employees I met in Amman described the 1970s as the 
good old days, with the oil boom and the development of the state social and welfare 
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services, while their stories of the 1980s focused on the gradual decline in the living 
standards with the militarization of Iraqi society during the Iraq-Iran war and the 
liberalization and privatization of the state starting from the mid-eighties. Two stages could 
be described as “transformative moments”15 in terms of their effects on the living potentials 
of this group of displaced Iraqis: the first moment was the dismemberment of the state 
institutions by the US-led Gulf War of 1991 (after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), and the 
following 13 years of al-ḥiṣār. The second transformative moment was the US-led invasion 
and occupation of Iraq in 2003 when former national state institutions, figures and symbols 
were eliminated in the process of de-Baathification; and several institutions were burnt and 
looted in what appeared to be a ‘random’ spree of violence. The elimination of the former 
state was not restricted to the attack on public institutions; Iraqis I met told various stories of 
the way border control was loosened which allowed the entry of all kinds of military gangs 
and groups. Eventually, these global and local events contributed to the demise of modern 
Iraqi bureaucracy that was schooled in “secular nationalist tradition” (Marfleet, 2007: 409).  
 
To analyze the experiences of Iraqis in coping with social change in war times I engaged with 
relevant empirical studies and more than one theoretical approach to help explore the decline 
of state role in times of economic and political change, in addition to recent anthropological 
scholarship on well-being. In aiming to recast anthropological approaches to displacement, I 
engaged with relevant ethnographic studies on refugees and displacement in the region 
(Chatty, 2010, 2017a, 2017b; Peteet, 2005a; Chatelard, 2003, 2005, 2008; Feldman, 2009; 
Hoffman, 2016), in addition to Dewachi’s (2017) recent study of the exodus of Iraqi doctors. 
I find Lubkemann’s (2008) theorization of displacement insightful, especially the way he 
traces different lines of social, cultural and political transformation throughout the context of 
structural violence in Mozambique civil war and how this historical perspective provides a 
standpoint from the relationship between agency and social change.16 
 
In ethnographies of displacement and refugees, anthropologists tend to focus more on 
meanings of home, identity and belonging and structures of humanitarian aid. These are 
important concepts to understand the problems facing displaced individuals, families and 
                                                      
15 I am borrowing this term from Joseph Massad (2001) who refers to certain historical moments as 
transformative moments that are definitional of the Jordanian identity in his study of the making of national 
identity in Jordan. I use the term here to refer to moments of radical change that altered the living possibilities 
among these Iraqi urban state bureaucrats.  
16 See chapter 10 in Lubkemann (2008). 
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communities in their attempts to search for survival opportunities and cope with the changing 
living conditions away from home. However, these concepts do not offer adequate 
understanding of the daily experiences of this group of Iraqi professionals with displacement. 
My observations among former Iraqi professionals and state employees in Jordan revealed 
that survival involves much more than becoming a refugee, although some Iraqis eventually 
tried to gain the label to get access to the limited protection aid it offers. The refugee label 
was used by Iraqis as one practical step to increase their access to essential resources, rather 
than adopting it as part of a new identity reflecting their displacement as in other cases I 
observed during my MA research among Palestinians in refugee camps in Syria and Palestine 
(Adwan, 2011). The observations of coping among Iraqis in the region show different routes 
and mechanisms, which did not match with the UNHCR initial preparations to respond to the 
crisis (Chatty, 2017b; Chatty and Mansour, 2011). Dr Omar’s decision to emphasize his 
professional identity by staying in Amman, where he could continue to treat Iraqi patients 
and stay in close contact with his community was not uncommon among other Iraqi men and 
women, who were struggling, in various ways, to deal with the rupture in their daily lives 
after 2003 by connecting and reconnecting to the recent past. Access to work for this group of 
displaced professionals seemed to play an important role in creating more familiar spaces of 
ʾamān through sustaining social relationships within the limited formal protection space (see 
Chapter 3).    
 
The experiences explored ethnographically in the following chapters present multiple scales 
and complex routes of survival in times of big changes. When systems of protection provided 
by nation state or international bodies receded, individuals and groups had to learn how to 
create their conditions of ʾamān to survive. Anthropological attempts to engage in broader 
forms of political violence in which state power is at stake is a rather recent phenomenon, as 
described by Lubkemann in his study of prolonged war conditions (in the case of 
Mozambique). Lubkemann described the anthropological literature in that field as “related 
both to the dramatic decolonization struggles that erupted in so many societies and to the 
discipline’s growing preoccupation with theorizing social change” (2008: 104). 
 
During fieldwork in Jordan, Iraqi former bureaucrats were constantly referring to the effects 
of the destruction and collapse of state institutions on their personal living conditions and 
wider social relations, not only after 2003, but during the 1990s, the decade in which other 
societies witnessed the decline of state role as employer and services’ provider, as a result of 
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liberalization policies and regime change (in the case of Eastern European countries). 
Ethnographies exploring regime change in the ex-socialist bloc, or the Eastern-European 
transitions provide insightful analysis of survival experiences and coping or lack of coping 
strategies among individuals, families and communities who were affected by big structural 
change and social transformation (Agardi, 2012; Maček, 2009; Parsons, 2011). Despite the 
differences in historical and political contexts between post-socialist countries and post-
‘Saddam’ Iraq, similar conditions and experiences are presented when it comes to losing 
access to state-salaried jobs and state-sponsored services which resulted in drastic change in 
social status and conditions of living. Some of these works present relevant insights on the 
way individuals and families experienced the structural transformations with the changes in 
state structures. Though I do not often refer to these works in the current thesis, reading 
ethnographies on other experiences of social transformations as a result of regime change was 
insightful and thought-provoking. I find several similarities in the literature that explored the 
experiences of former professionals and bureaucrats with the collapse of single-party states in 
former so-called Eastern European countries. One common theme is experiences with the 
promises and losses before and after the regime change. 
 
Parsons in her Ph D dissertation: Death and Freedom in Post-Soviet Russia: An Ethnography 
of a Mortality Crisis explores experiences of losses among middle-aged post-Soviet women 
and men following the collapse of the Soviet regime order. With the loss of order and work, 
these men and women lost the sense of collectivity and integration that they formerly 
achieved through social relations and connections at work, as Parsons explains: “This 
generation not only lost their work and savings—they lost their lives. The experiences and 
expressions of those most at risk of dying reveal a generation who felt unneeded” (2011: 11). 
Several Iraqis expressed this feeling of losing the future they dreamed to achieve through 
their hard work as students and state employees and sacrifices in prolonged military service 
to build the state and protect its institutions. In the case of Iraqis, unlike the above case 
among the middle-aged Russian generation, the losses, resulting from the regime change, 
were not intensified among one generation. The experiences shared show how losses 
extended to their descendents and this augmented the feelings of loss among the older 
generation who worked hard to secure better future for their children in Iraq. One case is Dr 
Omar whose son had to search for his future in the USA or Europe, as the postinvasion Iraq 
did not only exclude members of the former regime and party (as in the case explored by 




The exclusionary policies related to members of the one state party are highlighted by Agardi 
in her PhD research among women from Hungary, Romania and Serbia. Party membership 
has become a social taboo after 1989, and this as she indicated was confirmed by other 
researchers of former single-party states (2012: 275). Similarly in my meetings with Iraqis, 
none of them talked of her/his membership in the Baath party. I realized that it was a 
sensitive topic and therefore avoided asking direct questions about the meaning(s) of being 
part of the Baath party in their former Baghdadi life. Complicity with Baathist or Saddam 
regime is not a topic discussed by Iraqi state-bureaucrats and professionals, as reflected in the 
coming chapters. Rather they preferred to focus on their high educational merits and 
professional expertise and celebrated the high cultural and social life they enjoyed in 
Baghdad. Few mentioned the topic when they described the interviews for resettlement at the 
UNHCR and IOM (International Organization for Migration), in which they were repeatedly 
asked about their role and membership in the Baath party: “we all had to join the Baath party 
at some stage, as students and professionals, membership was not a personal choice.” They 
insisted that there was pressure at their work place to become a member in the party. After 
2003, membership in the Baathist party was criminalized, especially with the dick of cards 
members announced by the US-led occupation authorities as part of the de-Baathification 
process. Although members with lower-status were not strictly followed, in general, Iraqis 
preferred to distance themselves from the Baath party and military. However, when they felt 
comfortable to talk about their experiences as military and state-bureaucrats during times of 
wars, most of them used to recall the hard days in Iraq during the 1990s and the sacrifices 
they endured for the future they believed will come. Some of them tended to describe their 
sacrifice for the nation with feelings of pride and honor. I found similarities when it comes to 
Agardi’s description of the experiences shared by women about their lives in three former 
east European countries; their narratives of that period “testify that just because politically a 
whole period may be scorned by some, it cannot be dismissed or written out from history. For 
these women narrators [interviewed by Agardi], this period involved personal sacrifices, 
arduous efforts, proud achievements, financial successes, and a sense of historical agency” 
(ibid., 273). 
 
In the Iraqi case, unlike former eastern bloc countries, the levels of destruction seem 
omnipresent due to prolonged conditions of “structural violence” resulting from the US-led 
invasion and occupation of Iraq, in addition to the despotic rule of the country resources and 
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people throughout the period following independence. In the stories Iraqis tell of wars and 
sanctions during 1990s-2000s, loss was not a passing experience, it accumulated by time — 
whether exposed to state oppression back in Iraq for refusing to take part in the state wars as 
a soldier, or having to lose loved ones by getting involved in the wars initiated by the state or 
losing one’s former professional status and job following the US-led invasion and occupation 
of Iraq in 2003— loss in the life stories told about those who are alive or dead seemed like a 
structural condition with which Iraqis had to learn how to live.  
 
By making the above comparison, with other studies of regime change in single party states, I 
am not trying to establish the Iraqi case as a unique case globally or regionally. What is 
unique is the way the Iraqi problem is often presented in relation to Saddam’s or Baathist 
dictatorship. While the changes and transformation of ruling regimes in other states were 
presented in different paradigms and terminology such as post-colonial or post-socialist, the 
2003 war on Iraq with all its destructive effects is often reduced (in mainstream media) to 
regime change or the Baath party annihilation termed as ‘de-Baathification,’ and most 
commonly linked to the personal removal of a dictator as indicated by the common use of 
post-Saddam Iraq to refer to postinvasion Iraq.  
 
The memories and stories shared by urban professionals and state bureaucrats in the field 
reflect various aspects of living inside Iraq during the last four decades. They identified with 
the former state apparatus as a national frame in which they worked and lived as Iraqis from 
various religions, sects and ethnicities, rather than as a single Baathist ideological frame. In 
most of their stories of the 1970s and 1980s (chapter 6), they remembered the former state in 
relation to what they were missing in their supposedly ‘temporary’ shelter in Jordan. Their 
memories of those days felt more nostalgic than ideological. The nostalgia was more related 
to a former Iraqi state in its national model juxtaposing the current sectarian Iraq. They 
described the order that they missed in the postinvasion chaotic Baghdad; and what they 
missed including: social security, access to career, education, health and other services, and 
even the ration card during the times of al-ḥiṣār (Chapter 7). They juxtaposed these former 
aspects of living as Iraqi middle class Baghdadi communities against the ‘lack of ʾamān/ 
mākū ʾamān’ conditions, which they described as a result of the changes in postinvasion Iraq: 
killings on identity, explosions, lack of adequate education, lack of health and other essential 
services such as electricity and above all the reduction in social and national status as 
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qualified Iraqi professionals and government employees, which this thesis follows using the 
expression most commonly used by Iraqis in the field: ʾamān.   
 
To explore aspects of the social change in relation to Iraqi state growth and decline, this 
thesis engaged with studies addressing the relations between the rise/decline of state 
institutions and society. One of the recent studies which addressed the State-Society 
Relations in Iraq is Achim Rohde’s book State-Society Relations in Baʼthist Iraq: Facing 
Dictatorship (2010). Rohde presents and evaluates various parts of the former Iraqi 
governing system with particular focus on a “gender perspective to research on the 
contradictory dynamics of political, economic and social developments affecting Iraqi society 
at large” (ibid., 13). Rohde argues that the evolution of the Iraqi state was part and parcel of 
the socio-economic transformations Iraq underwent along the 20th century and he aims, as he 
presents in the introductory chapter of his book, “to move beyond the dichotomous 
conceptualization of liberal vs. totalitarian polities, of state vs. civil society etc. that are 
prevalent in the studies on Baathist Iraq” (ibid., 12). In this attempt, he uses Gramsci’s and 
Foucault’s conceptualization of the state as not simply an instrument of coercion in the hands 
of ruling class but also refers to “the productive role of power for the creation of individual 
and collective identities for the functioning of modern societies” (ibid., 14). He argued that 
the violent and oppressive character of regimes in the region is a sign of its inherent weakness 
and failure to attain the active consent of its subject citizens to its rule, or hegemony, in 
Gramscian terms, as Rohde elaborates further in the following excerpt:  
“The longevity of Saddam Husayn’s rule implies the efficacy of his system 
despite lacking hegemony. […] It would thus be simplistic to assume the “fierce” 
state personified in Saddam Husayn to stand as the sole subject agent over the rest 
of the society. In this vein, the present study [Achim Rohde refers to his study] 
produces evidence concerning a degree of debate and political bargain both within 
the party and state structures as well as between wider sections of the Iraqi public 
and the state that should not be glossed over as insignificant ephemeral 
phenomena. Focusing on the microphysics of power allows us to reach a deeper 
understanding of state-society relations in Baathist Iraq than would be possible by 
limiting our scrutiny to the repressive state apparatus” (ibid., 16). 
 
While I agree with Rohde (and other researchers, I engaged with)17 when it comes to 
understanding the inner workings of the state-society relations in this alternative focus that 
moves away from dichotomies, it is not enough, as Rohde himself states, to rely on archival 
                                                      
17 See also Eric Davis’s Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq (2005), 
Dina Khoury’s Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom, and Remembrance (2013) and Omar Dewachi’s 
Ungovernable Life: Mandatory Medicine and Statecraft in Iraq (2017).  
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official documents and interviews with former high ranking officials to understand the state-
society relations. It is important to explore other methods such as field research among Iraqis 
who used to constitute part of the former state professional and bureaucracy class. The 
current study focuses, in particular, on the transformation processes of the state-bureaucracy 
based on fieldwork and participant observation among groups of former state employees and 
professionals who were displaced in Jordan. 
 
This study is not unique in its use of fieldwork among Iraqis outside their home-country, 
there are various recent attempts to explore the society-state relations and write the Iraqi 
history from below such as Nadia Al-Ali’s work Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to 
the Present (2007) in which she explores the relationship between experiences, memory and 
truth using the method of oral history among Iraqi women from educated middle-class urban 
backgrounds. Al-Ali’s study presents rich data on the experiences of former educated middle-
class women from urban backgrounds with state authoritarian policies. Other debates from 
different disciplines are compiled in Tejel, Sluglett et al. Writing the Modern History of Iraq: 
Historiographical and Political Challenges (2012).  
 
Omar Dewachi’s study of Iraqi medical doctors is the most relevant to the current thesis 
research, in the sense that it refers to the role of colonial and post-colonial regimes of control 
in socialization and the processes and modes of governance of its professional subjects, 
specifically medical doctors. In his description of Iraqi state control, Dewachi states that it is 
possible to “sketch an alternative account of state making in Iraq—one more in tune with the 
changing relations of state power and its modes of rule” (2017: 10). Dewachi’s particular 
interest was in the development and decline of state medicine, through which he partly 
explored state-society relations:  
“[G]iven the country’s contested colonial and postcolonial histories, the regimes’ 
shaping of institutional life and population politics has been dynamic, 
multifaceted, and enmeshed in global processes of knowledge making and power 
relations. As I [Dewachi] demonstrate throughout the book, medical discourses 
and practices have been central to the country’s architectures of governance. 
Medical schools, state hospitals, government ministries, and overseas educational 
missions have been sites where state building has been contested and subjects and 
citizens fashioned” (2017: 11). 
 
The current study presents another attempt to understand the experiences of Iraqi educated 
urban middle class with system-changes during shorter times of relative stability and long 
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periods of wars and displacement. By following the experiences of Iraqi professionals and 
state-bureaucrats with the making of ʾamān, this thesis explored ethnographically how 
humans deal with social transformation as active agents, not only as victims of oppressive 
regimes and wars. In my meetings with Iraqis in the field, I listened to the stories they tell 
about various levels of coping with humanitarian aid and wars and state violence inside Iraq, 
and observed their encounters in the limited formal protection space where they were 
struggling to create their spaces of ʾamān in Jordan.  
 
The social conditioning of working and living as government employees from mid-60s until 
mid-80s had been transformed by several local, regional and global events which reduced the 
capacities of enjoying the former middle and upper-middle class living standards. Later, 
during the 1990s and 2000s, Iraqis had to learn how to survive the ongoing transformations 
resulting from prolonged wars which transformed many aspects of their daily lives during al-
ḥiṣār period and the US-led occupation of Iraq.  
 
The current study positioned the displacement and expulsion of Iraqi government employees 
within broader literature about social change during war-times and regime change. The 
transformations and changes in the institutional structures had affected the lives of once 
prosperous Baghdadi professionals and middle class government employees. Lubkemann’s 
description of structural violence can be useful to think about the changes this group of Iraqis 
had to live with during prolonged wars: “Structural violence occurs when changes in the 
broader social, economic, and political environment render everyday and strategic life 
projects dramatically more difficult or even impossible to realize” (2008: 112). Most of these 
Iraqi professionals had to learn how to cope with different levels of dispossession, whether 
inside Iraq during long years of wars and economic sanctions, or outside Iraq in their search 
of safety when their neighborhoods turned into dangerous places and most of them lost their 
means of labor with the dismantlement of several state institutions.  
 
Iraqis are presented as “agents in war-time violence” (Lubkemann, 2008), whose stories 
reveal complex experiences of learning to live during times of prosperity as well as times of 
wars. The subjectivities produced as a result of the social changes are explored beyond the 
two most common references of victims and heroes, or nationals and traitors. The following 
chapters present several other experiences to survive the conditions of structural violence, 
between the two extremes of nationals and traitors, which have been widely used to 
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categorize Iraqis in the political discourse of the former regime and several current Iraqi 
political factions. As defined by Lubkemann, structural violence is less about what happens 
to different social groups or actors when they cross the same threshold of conditions than it is 
about the experiences of living through and reflecting on the deterioration of whatever 
conditions each social actor or group starts with and expects to confront (2008: 346). 
Structural violence is thus “a function of how far one has come from where one once was”, 
rather than a common destination that is reached (ibid.). This perception helps to think of 
Iraqis’ attempts to create their own spaces of ʾamān, as explored in the coming chapters. In 
the next section, I will turn to describe the methods used to understand these Iraqi 
experiences during my fieldwork in Jordan.  
 
Methodological concerns 
This thesis explored ethnographically the experiences of Iraqi professionals and state 
employees with state policies, wars and displacement. Iraqis had to learn how to live with 
social transformation enhanced by internal and external factors. They had to cope as members 
of state bureaucracy with state-development policies and their decline, under the oppressive 
policies of Saddam’s regime that fiercely sanctioned, killed and displaced his opponents-
regardless of their ethnicity, religion or sect-18 and squandered human and material resources 
during long years of costly wars. In addition, they had to learn how to live with the 
destruction of the country infrastructure that started in the 1991 first Gulf War led by the US 
(and allies) as well as the radical decline in economic conditions resulting from al-ḥiṣār, 
followed by the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.  
 
My journey with Iraqis did not start with the current thesis. As a Palestinian who grew up in 
Syria, Iraqis were present as students and exiled political activists. The songs and stories I 
used to hear from Palestinians and Iraqis in that period were a combination of the suffering 
resulting from the disconnection from family and loved ones and a nostalgic description of 
the life they missed in a homeland from which they felt distanced by several forces.  
 
Given my background as a Palestinian refugee when I used to live in al-Yarmouk refugee 
camp in Syria and my former research among Palestinian refugees, initially, I took it for 
                                                      
18 As several Iraqis described Saddam’s regime: “he killed anyone who opposed him, even his sons-in-law and 
second cousins.”    
40 
 
granted that Iraqis who were forced out of their homes and crossed the borders of their 
country would fall under the category of refugee, while those who remained displaced within 
the borders of their homeland would technically be called internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). These were common labels used in describing Iraqis by other researchers and report-
writers. However, I realized, from my observations in the field which I shared with Iraqis in 
Amman that Iraqis (who were not considered refugees by the host country) refused also to be 
known as such. This forced me to rethink the common legal categories we, as researchers and 
professionals, usually use to describe displacement—refugees, asylum seekers, forced 
migrants, IDPs— especially as these categories do not reflect similar meanings to those who 
are labeled by them. Another important realization, which was expressed earlier by other 
anthropologists, is that these categories are not static and acquire different meanings in 
changing conditions. In her insightful book (2005a)19 and article (2005b),20 Julie Peteet 
explored ethnographically the concept of “refugee” as a constructed category: people are not 
born as refugees, as I and my peers in the UNRWA school in al-Yarmouk refugee camp in 
Syria used to think. Several years later, while in the field with Iraqis, I had to further reflect 
with Peteet’s description of refugees, when I first noticed that several Iraqis did not like to be 
labeled as refugees, others used different categories to describe their presence in Amman: 
migrant worker, asylum seeker, refugee, stranger, being ‘there’ in Baghdad or ‘here’ in 
Amman or elsewhere in the region or in the wider world.  
 
According to my observations and discussions with Iraqis during the time we spent together 
at their homes or during informal social gatherings and more formal training events 
sponsored by the UNHCR, this group of Iraqi state bureaucrats did not share the same 
perceptions of their current presence in Amman. The absence of unified governing 
regulations in Iraq and Jordan in 2010-2011 and their diverse access to resources led to 
different patterns of livelihoods. The common denominator in most of the stories and 
experiences observed was the loss of ʾamān, as a result of the gradual decline of their former 
middle-class status linked to their relation to the Iraqi state as professionals and government 
employees.  
 
Being part of the Iraqi professional and bureaucratic class does not represent a stable 
condition as per Weber’s explanation of the role of modern bureaucracies. The Iraqi 
                                                      
19Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps (See chapters 3 and 4 of  Peteet’s book).  
20 “Words as Interventions: Naming in the Palestine: Israel Conflict.” 
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bureaucracy was not a product of local affairs, it was related to several internal and external 
forces and capitals which shaped and reshaped the structure of the Iraqi “bureaucratic field” 
(Bourdieu, 1999 [1991]), over the last two centuries. The majority of Iraqis I met (about 68 of 
the 90 males and females) were between 35‒65 years old; they were born between the years 
1946‒1970s and thus they grew up and lived in Iraq during the period extending between late 
60s and 2003 when they witnessed various stages (and scales) of social transformations. 
Eighteen of the participants came to Jordan before 2003, mainly during al-ḥiṣār times in the 
1990s and remained in Amman since then, while the rest (72 Iraqis) came after 2003, and the 
majority, around sixty five of them only left Baghdad after 2006.21 I met 61 females and  43 
males, in group interviews or interviews at family houses in which most family members 
participated, but I counted the main narrator(s) only. Most of the informants had a degree 
from a college or university including 14 PhD holders and 15 with Master degrees in various 
disciplines. The majority had a working experience in Iraq, but when I met them, only 25 
explained that they had a chance to work in Amman, on temporary contract basis. The rest 
were dependent on multiple resources including remittances from relatives in Iraq or abroad, 
or pension salary from Iraq. Others relied on illegal work that was not regular, or limited 
‘voluntary’ work for international organizations.  
 
In this respect, the thesis draws heavily on the life experiences of Iraqi governmental 
employees and professionals as ‘constructed’ in their Ammani temporary ‘protection’ space, 
aiming to understand how they coped with the social transformations during the last four 
decades as part of the rise and decline of the state bureaucracy and institutions. I spent time 
with Iraqis in their rented apartments in Amman, or at their work places in the case of some 
doctors and academics, and during training events as part of the developmental- 
humanitarian- aid targeting Iraqi ‘refugees’ by local and international NGOs based in 
Amman.  
 
This study extends the displacement experience beyond the limits of the refugee label to 
explore the practical experiences of these groups of Iraqi government employees to secure 
their well-being/ ʾamān in conditions of –lessness. The learning experiences and coping 
                                                      
21 The escalation of violence during the US-led occupation of Iraq reached an unimaginable point (for many 
Iraqis, as expressed in the field) with the attack on al-Askari Shrine in the city of Samarra which marked an 
escalation of sectarian tensions that spread throughout previously sectarian-mixed Baghdadi neighborhoods. As 
sources indicate: “Nearly 4 million Iraqis fled their homes in 2006 and 2007 with 1 to 1.5 million crossing 
national borders into Syria and Jordan (Chatty and Mansour, 2011: 98). 
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strategies Iraqis turned to in managing the current crisis need to be addressed in the wider 
contexts of local and global changes which produced increasing uncertainty. The thesis 
explores Iraqis’ interactions with conditions of structural change between the presence and 
absence of state regulatory policies in the various periods discussed and the presence and 
absence of development and humanitarian aid in Jordan. 
 
As explained earlier, ʾamān is the concept used to ‘follow’ the experience(s) of this group. 
The complex experiences did not start in Jordan; Iraqis shared parts of their life stories during 
the economic boom and ‘socialist’ state-style services, the war-time(s) and al-ḥiṣār. I 
followed the personal experiences in the stories Iraqis shared about these events with the aim 
to explore how they affected their lives and what strategies they used then and now to survive 
and extend their ʾamān. The life stories collected in the supposedly ‘transit’ space in Amman 
were taken in unstable conditions, some of the narrators were trying to search for new means 
of survival, and the life-story served as one of the tools to achieve this (Chapter 4). The 
insecurity in their lives was reflected in the unstable life stories they tell in the formal 
protection space, certain events and details were silenced, or changed in a way that serves 
their survival needs in the formal protection space.  
 
The personal stories shared by state bureaucrats and professionals in both the formal 
protection space and the space of ʾamān present several aspects of the troubling state 
formation and destruction from the perspectives of this group of people who took part in the 
“state-making and un-making” (Chatty, 2017a) processes as agents and witnesses. To 
understand the effects of wars on middle class urban Iraqis displaced in Amman and how 
they reacted to them, it is important, as I explained above, to analyze them within the wider 
historical and political contexts. 
 
The stories shared among Iraqis in the field tell how these events transformed the lives of 
individuals and households in times of war and state transition. Whereas, the stories of the 
70s and 80s and 90s tend to refer to collective gains and losses as part of being Iraqi national 
subjects, the stories of the postinvasion period are more focused on the losses of Iraqis as 
individuals or as part of minority and ethnic groups. Analysis of the accounts of the events 
does not serve to represent one collective version of the story of the current war and US-led 
invasion. As al-Ali presented in her work, the processes of construction and selection of the 
stories are affected by various factors, memories and stories told are not static and frozen in 
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time, they are alive, rooted in the present as much as in the past, and linked to aspirations as 
much as actual experiences (al-Ali, 2007: 2).  
 
To understand the complex dynamics of the social changes, this ethnography presents the 
experiences of the current wave of Iraqis beyond the officially designated label of refugees. It 
explored how Iraqis experienced their expulsion from the state not only in the stories they tell 
in the formal space of protection to be eligible for aid. Observations among Iraqis in the field 
show different ways through which Iraqis bring meaning to their war-torn lives, through 
practical experiences in direct encounters with aid in the host country and the social relations 
they develop in the local, transnational or global space to ensure wider space of ʾamān.  
 
Another insightful ethnographic research on experiences of war survivors22 that is relevant 
here is Lubkemann’s critique of the way “war-time migration of refugees has typically been 
theorized in terms that starkly differentiate it from, and fail to explore potential connections 
with, labor and other forms of migration” (2008: 4). Lubkemann further elaborates that: 
“[w]hile many anthropologists have critiqued such reductionist framings of refugee agency 
by exploring how war-time migrants negotiate the many effects of displacement as socially 
positioned and culturally embedded actors, there have been very few investigations of how 
refugee agency shapes the social organization and dynamics of the migration process itself”23 
(cf. Wilson 1994 in Lubkemann, 2008: 5). I agree with Lubkemann on the necessity to 
explore displacement and migration from a wider perspective that takes refugee agency into 
consideration. 
 
The question of agency, is another important question which emerged from the field: What 
possible agencies can exist when everyday life projects get impossible to realize in conditions 
of structural change? Thinking of the living experiences of the members of former Iraqi state 
bureaucracy within four decades of changing conditions from prosperity to prolonged wars, I 
draw insights from the work of Lubkemann (2008) and his argument about ethnographic 
approaches that originate in “the historically informed and culturally expressed 
understandings of local actors and how this may offer a better understanding of the social 
conditioning of political agency” (ibid., 108). I explored the agency of Iraqis by following the 
                                                      
22 In his rich ethnography Culture in Chaos: An anthropology of social condition in war, Lubkemann uses the 
term “warscape inhabitants” to refer to war survivors and refugees.  
23 Emphasis in the origin.  
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metaphor of ʾamān-making within the wider historical and social experiences as narrated and 
shared by the Iraqis I met; in this sense I observed the coping experience ‒making of ʾamān‒ 
as a process embedded in history, in which the past experiences functioned in a similar way 
to what Bourdieu described as habitus. 
 
To explore agency in relation to well-being/ ʾamān, I decided to follow the Iraqi experiences 
and stories regardless of the labels or categories used to refer to their presence in Jordan. The 
labels, as I discuss in Chapters Four and Five serve different meanings when used by 
different actors in the field: to pledge aid, identify its distribution and identify the duties and 
responsibilities of Iraqis. However, the interest of the current research was in the experiences 
of learning to live in times of structural change, and the meanings Iraqis give to these 
experiences. The current ethnography includes descriptions of different settings in the 
protection space and spaces of ʾamān: training courses, house-visits, social gatherings to 
celebrate a birthday or commemorate death of a loved one, shopping, in addition to few 
conversations with Iraqi professionals in their places of work at universities or hospitals.  
 
The content of the stories, in this sense, are “multi-sited”, moving back and forth between 
Amman, Baghdad and other cities in the region and other parts of the world. However, the 
main fieldwork site was fixed, in Amman; due to resource, time and mobility limits, I was not 
able to follow Iraqis in their journeys among different localities and labels. Yet there were 
other means of doing multi-sited research as Marcus has told us: “follow the metaphor, 
follow the narrative or story and the life or biography and the conflict” (1998: 90-95).  
 
The meanings of being here and there, not only in more than one locality but within different 
assigned spaces resulting from complex legal and political contexts “cannot be presumed but 
are themselves a key discovery of ethnographic enquiry,” as Marcus expressed when he 
discussed how multi-sited imaginary explores the distinction between life-world and system 
by which “classic ethnographic authority” has been conceived (1998: 117). Multi-sited 
research provides a space to rethink categories and perceptions that are otherwise taken for 
granted. In the time spent with Iraqi individuals and families, I came to understand the need 
to step forward and look beyond the institutionalized or ‘normalized’ categories of refugees 
or forced migrants and IDPs, by listening to the Iraqis’ stories, songs, tears, jokes and 




Small thoughts on ‘positionality’ 
Being a displaced person or ‘refugee’ is part of my personal life story. I spent part of my 
childhood and youth in al-Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria in the 1980s and 1990s. Later, 
things changed with the culmination of the infamous Oslo Agreements that gave a fraction of 
Palestinians a chance to return to Palestine. My family was among those who ‘returned’. I 
will not get into a discussion of the insider vs. outsider perspectives, as it is not the criteria, in 
my opinion, to judge the value of academic research. Whenever this issue was brought up 
regarding my research among Palestinians, I could hear an old quote I read once by Benjamin 
Cardozo (1921): “We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can 
never see them with any eyes except our own.”   
 
My choice of researching Iraq did not come by chance. It was driven by my interest in the 
broader context of the refugee question, which started with my own experience as ‘refugee’ 
and was enhanced during my research for my Master thesis among Palestinian refugees in 
Syria and occupied Palestine. It was not an easy decision to choose Iraq as a research area for 
my PhD, considering time and budget limitations; it would have been easier to resume my 
knowledge journey in a field which I have already researched. Yet I decided, as a challenge 
and compromise, to continue within the field of refugee studies but move to exploring a 
different case, where I could claim some “distance”, which I have been previously accused of 
lacking. Actually, the time I spent in the field and the new experiences I observed during this 
journey pushed me away from the refugee question in general and closer to the specific Iraqi 
experience with the rise and decline of the ‘modern Iraqi nation-state’. I discovered that I 
share many other experiences with Iraqis, besides the experience of being a refugee or 
displaced. When they allowed me to participate in their learning experiences in the limited 
protection and ʾamān spaces in Amman, I was able to observe other common historical and 
current experiences of loss, hiding, escaping and confronting despotic regimes, deprivation of 
freedom of movement, walling of the homeland space, uncertainty and fear at checkpoints 
and war-like conditions; although, some of the Iraqis I met kept making me feel that it is 
easier to be Palestinian than Iraqi today when they repeated: “at least you know your enemy, 
you have one enemy but we don’t know who our enemy is?” This is another story which I 





During a workshop at Birzeit University in 2012, I was criticized for using the term ‘forced 
migration’ and ‘displacement’ in the title of my presentation of the Iraqi experience in Jordan 
and have been almost accused of complicity with a system that deprives Iraqis of the 
‘refugee’ label and the rights assigned to it. I might have said the same before I went into the 
field, having in mind the conditions of Palestinian refugees for whom the refugee label, the 
UNRWA ration card, and the camp became integral parts of an identity which resists the 
Israeli colonial project (Peteet, 2005a, 2005b; Feldman, 2009). However, my journey among 
Iraqis in Jordan forced me to rethink the common use of the refugee label. In my very first 
encounters with Iraqis where I rented an apartment in Tlaʿa al-ʿAli (a district in the so-called 
western Amman), my Iraqi neighbor told me that I would not find Iraqi refugees in this 
neighborhood: “there are no refugees here, we are self-dependent, the Jordanian government 
does not provide us with food or shelter.” That made me rethink my research terminology and 
boundaries: was I looking for Iraqis who were legally classified as refugees (those who 
gained the UNHCR refugee or asylum seeker certificate)? Or Iraqis who call themselves 
refugees? What about those who were excluded or decided to exclude themselves for various 
reasons: the limited protection space provided by the UNHCR and host country; a preference 
to rely on their own resources, mistrust of the UNHCR and other aid authorities, etc.? In 
addition, I noticed that Iraqis tended to link the refugee label to the other most popular 
refugee context in the region, namely the Palestinian settler-colonial context. Several Iraqis 
mentioned that they are not “Palestinian refugees”; usually they emphasized that Iraq still 
exists and that one day, when conditions change, they might be able to return to their homes, 
while the Palestinians were deprived of this possibility because their homes were occupied 
and their land are colonized by Israel, (there was not a Syrian refugee crisis when I did my 
main fieldwork).  
 
The Palestinian refugee case developed in different historical and political contexts in which 
the refugee label was not only used as a legal term. It evolved, among the Palestinians, into a 
political identity that was the basis for the Palestinian Liberation Revolution in the 1960s and 
1970s. According to my observations and earlier research among Palestinian refugees, the 
‘refugee’ label that turned into a collective carrier of the Palestinian struggle for liberation is 
not as static as it appears in the political speeches of Palestinian officials and the oft repeated 
slogans by various political parties leaders, or as it has been constructed in some literary 
works. The label has experienced several levels of transformation due to the drastic turn of 
the Palestinian political project following the signing of the Oslo Peace Agreements with 
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Israel on the one hand, and the changes in the living conditions among Palestinian refugees in 
the camps, specifically in refugee camps which have experienced severe destruction leading 
to new displacements of its inhabitants: Jenin in the West Bank; al-Nahr al-Bared; and 
previously Tel al-Zaatar in Lebanon; al-Maghazi in Gaza and al-Yarmouk in Syria are some 
examples.   
 
However, in the Iraqi case, the terms exile, emigrant and diaspora are more common to 
describe the displacement of Iraqis in academic written works and talks. Among the Iraqis I 
met in Jordan, the term exile was used by academics, authors and poets or artists, the term 
diaspora was not common, while the refugee label in Iraqis’ narratives seemed to 
function‒for some Iraqis but not for all‒ as an instrumental tool that would offer them 
protection rights and resettlement in the US or Europe; the term refugee tended to have a 
pragmatic function in the official space of protection while it usually disappeared in their 
private space of ʾamān.  
 
In the field, being a Palestinian who lives in occupied Palestine made it easier in some cases 
for Iraqis to share their time and stories with me; as they used to tell me we were both 
“guests” in Jordan and shared experiences of insecurity and uncertainty (though my 
experience as a second generation refugee did not seem as drastic as theirs at that time). This 
allowed better understanding of issues of authority control, deprivation and anxiety when it 
comes to gaining residence permits and access to work, health and education. Iraqis who 
relied more on aid often expressed feeling less comfortable in the presence of a Jordanian or 
Palestinian Jordanian researcher who they feared to be connected to the authorities. Thus, 
being a Palestinian who lives inside occupied Palestine was positively received by many of 
the Iraqis I met; in some cases, they tended to identify with the Palestinians’ experience of 
losing their land and belongings. It also might have been easier than being an Iraqi and 
having to prove that as a researcher I was neither affiliated nor aligned to a particular sect, 
religion or political party. Another advantage was a shared language; though I did not master 
the Iraqi dialect, knowing Arabic made it easier to understand the conversations around 
without the need of a translator.  
 
This does not mean that I was considered an insider among Iraqis. They called me al-
filistīniyya/ the Palestinian woman, and some chose to put me under test before they agreed to 
welcome me into their private space of ʾamān. In real life, where most of the things are not 
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simply black or white, it was not always easy to establish a favorable relation. There was an 
incident when I was introduced by a Jordanian friend to an Iraqi family. The father and his 
son seemed quite welcoming during our first meeting, and invited me for lunch at their house. 
We had a short conversation and exchanged our mobile-phone numbers to set up the meeting. 
However, when I called them, they apologized for being too busy, and in the next call, the 
father ended the call furiously screaming that they did not have time to waste with me. When 
I mentioned this to my Jordanian friend, he explained that he noticed how they were trying to 
test my ‘loyalty’ (to the former regime) in the short conversation at his office, a test which I 
had failed, as my friend explained.  
 
In addition, I encountered situations in which being a Palestinian, Jordanian or Iraqi did not 
seem so important. In those cases I was perceived as an aid agent probably for having a 
foreign name with a pen and notebook. In certain instances, it felt egoistic as much as painful 
to go around and observe people’s suffering and pain while they were desperately waiting for 
help to save their own or their family’s lives. For instance, a woman told me that she would 
be willing to share her story with me if I could help her collect the extra Jordanian Dinars 
(JD) 1500 (US$ 2115) she needed for the chemotherapy session which she had to take two-
weeks-before my meeting with her. Despite my experience of reading and living among 
refugees, I found the levels of performance that Iraqis were demanded to exert to prove their 
eligibility for humanitarian aid disturbing and incomprehensible.   
 
Fieldwork ‘as a learning experience’ 
The learning experiences presented in this ethnographic research carried out among Iraqis in 
Jordan in the period 2010-2011 are not presented here as just experiences of another group of 
refugees with conditions of reduction.  
 
During the first three months of fieldwork, I spent most of my time contacting Jordanian 
acquaintances and friends to introduce me to Iraqis they know in Amman. I met Iraqis in their 
homes (most of the time the home was a rented apartment, although I met few more affluent 
Iraqis in their own apartments in Amman), some of them agreed to introduce me to other 
Iraqis while the majority were reluctant to do so. In these home visits, I usually observed and 
listened to the story of Iraqi survival narrated by various members of the household, I asked 
them questions about how it felt to live in Baghdad during different periods. They talked of 
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their school and university days, work and professional life, travels and consumption style, 
wars and military conscription, al-ḥiṣār and family life and social events and gatherings full 
of music, jokes and poetry. With the passage of time and the growing pile of field notes, I 
realized that there are several stories and experiences in their responses to the major changes 
and social transformations they witnessed and took part in over the last four decades. 
Eventually, I came to realize that these rich experiences cannot be captured solely within the 
framework of the ‘refugee’ label that was ‘awarded’ to some of them.  
 
Towards the midpoint of my fieldwork, I discovered that the label ‘researcher’ which I used 
seemed to have had another meaning among Iraqis. I was advised by an Iraqi friend to use the 
label ṭāliba/ student instead of bāḥitha/ researcher, as the latter was used to refer to the 
Jordanian social worker (or known as ‘social researcher’). Jordanian social workers used to 
visit Iraqis who had made claim at the UNHCR for financial assistance to assess their needs 
and quantify them in a report form with recommendations upon which the decision to support 
or not would be made. My presence with the Iraqi volunteers and my mixed accent 
(Palestinian-Syrian-Jordanian), and foreign name was not the best combination for some 
Iraqis who had had a bad experience with aid representatives.  
 
Another factor that played a part in the field was my gender, which made it easier to meet 
women than men especially when it comes to the official space of protection where I 
established my initial contact with Iraqis. The majority of the training events, except those 
concerning legal issues or small business initiatives, were not mixed, and I was welcomed by 
NGOs to attend courses with women. The courses followed the common gendered divisions 
of labor: women attended courses designed to teach cooking, embroidery and other 
handicrafts, and lectures on topics concerning child care, early child education and domestic 
violence; while men attended courses on mechanical engineering for airplanes, carpentry and 
metal works. I could meet Iraqi men usually in the presence of other family members and 
during the house-visits through Iraqi contacts and through my voluntary work in teaching 
English, where all students (in my section) were males. However, I spent more time with 
women, and this is reflected in the thesis chapters in which women are more represented than 





The data collected include interviews24 and field-notes of my observations. This involved 
careful editing and interpretation and I had to translate my interviews and observations from 
Arabic into English.25 The stories in the context of this research serve the goal to understand 
how the events affected the lives of Iraqi people and how they reacted to those events. In my 
analysis of the collected stories I was interested in how the personal accounts— whether 
shared in informal gatherings or prepared and written for the more formal protection space— 
related to the wider historical events. To achieve this in my presentation of my observations 
and the stories shared in the field, I consulted relevant historical writings and other 
ethnographic studies of similar contexts. In addition, I followed Iraqis’ stories about specific 
events in the past with the aim to find out how this group of Iraqi former state-employees and 
professionals perceived well-being in conditions of peace and war and how they dealt with 
their personal (and collective) suffering and losses. Most of my informants lived through the 
Iraq-Iran war, the first gulf war in 1991 and the 13 long years of ḥiṣār and the 2003 invasion 
and occupation. Few elder informants also talked of earlier events during the 1960s and 
1970s. Most of the Iraqis I met came from Baghdad, the majority were in their middle ages 
(35‒60) when I met them.26 The few who were over 66 years when the interview took place, 
were adults during the decades of the semi-socialist development program of the Iraqi state 
(Chapter 6), and have spent few years in Baghdad as retired pensioners, while some of them 
were deprived of the pension as part of the de-Baathification law.   
 
As explained in chapters Six and Seven, the personal stories of social transformations inside 
Iraq in the period from 1970s‒2003 reflected shifts in identity and perceptions of good life 
ʾamān: the state regime enforced certain identities of strong working women, mothers of 
fighters, heroes, martyrs’ and soldiers’ wives, strong military men, fighters and martyrs, 
while the conditions of wars, al-ḥiṣār and refuge enhanced the victim identity as presented in 
the official UNHCR categories: “single women in danger”, “trauma survivors”, etc. In my 
analysis of the fieldwork data, I followed the most common themes observed during my 
fieldwork among these former Iraqi state-employees: the attempts to create conditions of 
                                                      
24 Few interviews were recorded, as I noticed that several Iraqis were reluctant to talk when I asked for 
permission to record. Therefore, I stopped recording and relied on note-taking, when convenient, and had to 
write down the detailed transcription from memory. 
25 I am not referring to literal translation or the linguistic effort of conveying the “exact” meaning, other 
challenges were involved in presenting the meaning within the context as explained in earlier studies. An 
interesting discussion of translation in fieldwork time is done by Nadia Jones-Gailani (2013) in her study among 
Iraqi women in Jordan. See “Third Parties in ‘Third Spaces’: The Multifaceted Role of Translator in Oral 
History Interviews with Iraqi Diasporic Women.”  
26 As I mentioned earlier (68 participants out of 90). 
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safety and stability as explored through the concept of ʾamān, and the search for means of 
labor to be able to regain one’s former status and live in dignity through finding a job.  
 
Working with communities of war survivors makes it harder to control one’s presence in the 
field. Many times it did not go as planned and I and the Iraqis could not swim against the 
tide, as we so wished. We were forced to discipline our presence and limit our conversations 
to control what should be revealed or hidden in certain times and places.27 The introduction I 
had by mutual friends meant a lot. I was also keen to explain my research and ensure how I 
will observe confidentiality. Except for few political activists, professionals or artists who 
demanded the use of their real names since their experiences are known to the authorities 
because, as they explained, they were ‘public figures’ and exposed to the media, I decided to 
use pseudonyms rather than actual names. Some of the Iraqis I met were threatened from 
home and were too afraid to be identified, while others whose resources were dwindling and 
had to turn to international organizations for assistance at some stage did not want to share 
openly all the details in the stories they tell in their private spaces of ʾamān which –as they 
thought‒ might harm their chances to be included in the formal protection space (see Chapter 
Four). To the other Iraqis who expressed their interest in having their actual names next to 
their stories, I explained that this research is more concerned with understanding the 
relationships and dynamics of survival and that experiences counted more than names. 
 
I also contacted several Jordanian organizations working with Iraqis in Jordan. It was easier 
to gain access to Iraqis through organizations where they meet or volunteer, but this applied 
to some organizations not all (few organizations did not like to have researchers around). 
Sometimes, I had to visit the organization several times and meet with different employees to 
explain my research and listen to the services and encounters with Iraqis before I was allowed 
to take part in the organizations’ activities and training events. I attended several activities, 
mainly with women participants, during which I introduced myself, as participant researcher. 
Through these activities, I preferred not to take excessive notes to avoid disrupting the 
interactions which included conversations among women about the situation in Amman or  
Baghdad. I used to write down as much of my observations in my field notes at night. During 
these training events and activities, I met women with whom I spent later more time in social 
gatherings and less formal activities. We spoke at some length about my research and their 
                                                      
27 I present details of these incidents in Chapters Four and Five where I discuss the conditions of story-telling 
and sharing in the protection and safety spaces in the field.  
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experiences and I accompanied them sometimes in their visits to hospitals and aid 
organizations. We attended training and awareness raising events and in the evenings did 
shopping together, drank tea with friends and prepared meals while listening to Iraqi songs 
and music.  
 
In the period between November 2010 and March 2011, I joined other volunteers to teach 
English to young Iraqi men (17‒34 years old) who were preparing to travel to the United 
States, as part of a voluntary aid NGO that was run by a foreign woman in Al-Hashimi Al-
Shamali with assistance of other Iraqi volunteers, this association offered a space to contact 
more Iraqis, as ‘beneficiaries’ and students, which helped me understand how other forms of 
aid are designed and distributed and how subjectivities as ‘persons eligible for aid’ are 
formed.  
 
The easiest way to meet Iraqis was in the public space of protection. I attended training 
courses, recreational events (mother’s day, picnics). This gave me a chance to observe the 
Iraqi encounter with aid. Following the courses, I was sometimes invited to social gatherings. 
In these gatherings, I avoided asking direct questions that would channel these personal 
events into the aid or research mood. Usually the TV would be turned to Iraqi channels, its 
volume turned down to be increased when a song is played. The participants would join in 
singing. Some songs would bring back memories about particular incidents from Baghdad, 
sometimes narrated in a joke-format and other times in between tears: stories about the long 
compulsory military service during the Baath time; exchange of funny incidents about the 
time they spent hiding in shelters during the first Gulf War (or the so-called desert storm 
operation); or survival during al-ḥiṣār and incidents from the last war; and stories of 
smugglers and asylum journeys to Europe. Another story shared in these gatherings was 
Food. Cooking and food was another opportunity to connect with home, one which became a 
rich cultural journey that I experienced at the provision, consumption and production levels 
(and after a year among Iraqis, I gained 10 kilos!) Iraqi food presented aspects of variety, 
diversity and rich Iraqi history— Dolma, Biryani, Kubbeh— the names of some famous Iraqi 
dishes have Turkish, Persian, Indian or Shami/ Levant origins.  
 
I realized that to understand the specific coping experiences of these Iraqi professionals and 
former state employees with the limited formal protection space and their attempts to create 
ʾamān in Jordan, it is important to follow the stories they shared of well-being and ʾamān in 
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earlier encounters with state policies, wars and al-ḥiṣār inside Iraq. Instead of following a 
chronological order, I decided to follow the order imposed by the conditions of my fieldwork, 
and to start with my ethnographic observations among Iraqis in Amman. The first three 
chapters present the Iraqi experiences in Amman, while the last two chapters explore the 
social transformations in the lives of these former professionals and state bureaucrats in the 
last 4 decades.  
 
Outline of the chapters 
Chapter Three focuses on my key group of Iraqis in Jordan, the qualified professionals and 
academics who explored various routes to establish ʾamān. Rather than being confined to the 
rights and duties relating to the label refugee they sought other alternatives. Four strategies of 
adaptation are discussed. First I present information on individuals who move from being 
highly-skilled professionals holding permanent positions in Baghdad to becoming temporary 
contracted workers (within fields of their competences) in Amman; second, I discuss a group 
of people who move from being highly skilled professionals in Baghdad to becoming 
“circular migrants”, meaning that they chose to operate between Iraq and Jordan trying to 
secure better living standards for their households; third, working in Amman as de-valued 
professionals, outside their fields of competence; and fourth, leaving the region altogether, 
searching for ʾamān in Europe or elsewhere. We see that their existence in all categories was 
a constant struggle and that the new experiences all the time were seen in the context of what 
they had lost; mainly the experiences of these Iraqi professionals and state bureaucrats after 
losing their jobs back home in Iraq. The chapter presents the struggle and efforts exerted by 
members of this group to save their former social status as qualified professionals, and their 
search for their lost past. 
 
Chapter Four extends the focus from the individuals presented in Chapter 3 to examine 
further the problematic process involved in managing the limited aid and services provided 
for those Iraqis who qualify as ‘refugees’. The qualification was depending on the degree of –
lessness that characterized the potential refugees, meaning that only people defined as the 
poorest and most needy would get support. The chapter presents ethnographic cases that 
show how people attempted to appear “as if” they were destitute. Also, the chapter deals with 
the tension between the requirements of aid and protection structures and Iraqis’ perceptions 
of ʾamān. By this the chapter explores the interactions observed in the ‘formal’ space of 
54 
 
protection created by humanitarian aid following the change from humanitarianism to 
developmentalism. A key idea was to promote entrepreneurial thinking and to offer training 
workshops to help individual Iraqis learn new skills on how to help themselves. The chapter 
shows that the outcomes were full of contradictions and tensions.  
 
Chapter Five explores two key contexts for Iraqis’ adaptive strategies discussed in the 
previous chapters. The two relate to first, the possibilities of work in Jordan, and second, the 
context of aid organizations related to local Jordanian authorities and the international aid 
system. By focusing on these contexts the chapter discusses the general legal, social and 
economic implications of being an Iraqi in Jordan. One clear aspect is that being an Iraqi in 
Jordan was characterized and understood using several different and confusing labels: asylum 
seeker, temporary refugee (waiting for resettlement to a third country), guest, visitor, fellow 
Arab, stranger, foreigner, emigrant, migrant worker, exiled, expatriate. The chapter presents 
ethnographic cases that show how Iraqis had to deal with these unclear and ‘ambiguous’ 
conditions in which their basic human existence seemed to be made invisible by the demands 
and the policies of the dominant organizations dealing with them.   
 
In Chapter Six,  I change from the adaptations in Amman to a focus on Iraqi middle class 
employees and professionals, and their perceptions of well-being as they experienced it in 
Baghdad in the 1970s and 1980s. In this, I change from the field based observations of 
Chapters Three, Four and Five, and focus more on analyzing the narratives and stories Iraqis 
told me during my fieldwork. These narratives and stories help us understand better how 
these state employees and professionals were affected by the Iraqi state economic 
development programs during the 1960s and 1970s, a period described by them as the ‘good 
old times’. The basis for this was the government investment at the time in the provision of 
education, rewarding job opportunities and welfare services.  
 
Chapter Seven continues the discussion started in Chapter Six by examining the big social 
transformations in Iraq during the 1990s-2003. The accounts and stories from this historical 
period show how Iraqis learnt to live in conditions of structural violence during prolonged 
war and severe economic sanctions. The deterioration in economic conditions produced many 
effects. An important one was the emergence of a new patron-client system that produced a 
new class of traders and business elites. This new class benefitted from the problems in the 
country, while the well-being of the majority of state bureaucrats was reduced, and they and 
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their families were left to rely on the governmental ration-system and minimal levels of state 
services and protection. On a general level this produced new state-society relations in Iraq. 
The Chapter proceeds to discuss the transformations in the Iraqi space and society following 








Highly skilled Iraqi professionals and academics in search of ʾamān and 
well-being 
 
Dr. Sharif had been considered a top specialist in Baghdad, but in Amman he worked as a 
volunteer for minimal or no salary in a clinic affiliated with one of the local community 
centers. He considered himself luckier than his colleagues, who were specialist physicians 
and had to work at Jordanian hospitals and clinics to be treated as junior non-specialized 
doctors, whereas he could still practice his career as he used in his clinic in Baghdad and 
survive from his savings and the support of his son who himself was a doctor based in 
London. News spread quickly among Iraqis who knew Dr. Sahrif from Baghdad and they 
started coming from different neighborhoods in Amman and other Jordanian cities to this 
clinic located in a western Ammani district, where they hoped to be diagnosed and treated by 
Dr Sharif. In his book, Joseph Sassoon indicates how in certain Jordanian hospitals, such as 
Al-Essra  private Hospital in Amman, Iraqi doctors constituted the majority of doctors. In 
addition to their normal load and responsibilities, Iraqi doctors saw a large number of Iraqi 
patients who tended to trust them more than other doctors and whom the doctors treated 
outside their hours of work (2009: 47).   
 
I spent Sunday 27 march 2011 in the clinic. I met a few Iraqi families; some accompanied by 
volunteers and others who came for a regular check-up. An Iraqi woman waiting with her son 
told me that since they had come to Amman, whenever somebody was sick in the family, 
they consulted Iraqi doctors: “Dr. Sharif was the most famous in Baghdad, holding a PhD as 
an ENT specialist [ear and nose and throat].” I could feel it from the flood of Iraqi patients in 
the clinic. Dr. Sharif had been contracted by an international medical NGO to work as 
volunteer three days per week for four hours per day. I was hoping to hear more about his 
working experience in Amman and displacement form Baghdad, and sneaked into his office 
after he had finished with the first appointment to introduce my research and ask if he would 
be willing to talk to me. He agreed but we were interrupted by one of his patients and I had to 
wait, and continued to wait as the patients kept coming in the following three hours. I still 
had some hope as the doctor kept comforting me every time he left his room in the clinic to 
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wash his hands in between the check-ups that he would give me more time after his official 
working hours were over, although, as I learnt later, he usually continued to examine patients 
as long as they kept coming, and many times his work extended beyond the initially 
scheduled four hours. It was around 7 p.m. when the waiting room in the clinic was finally 
empty.  
 
Dr. Sharif’s story- a fugitive and doctor volunteer 
The following extract from my interview with the 73-year-old physician presents various 
aspects shared among Iraqi professionals in their struggle to work between Baghdad and 
Amman: 
We stayed in Baghdad in the period 2003-2005 and lived through it all: the 
occupation, and the fall of Baghdad. These were sad and confusing times: we saw 
the fire in the sky of Baghdad, but I stayed there, and used to go to work every 
day; to both the university where I teach and to my clinic. The clinic was busy as 
usual, my working day used to end at around 11 p.m., there were 8 km between 
my house and clinic in al-Mansour. I had to drive carefully because I never knew 
if the car behind mine would target me, I used to slow down for seconds and then 
drive faster to check, I became more cautious after several killing incidents of 
academics and doctors. My work was stable in the clinic but life in these 
conditions of fear was stressful and we left for a short visit to Amman and then to 
London where one of my sons lives. Two days after my leave, they sent a 
threatening letter to my home, but it was good that we were not there then.  
After spending six months in London, I decided to return to Baghdad hoping that 
things would have changed. Unfortunately it felt worse, and they continued to 
target doctors. I was afraid to drive my car, sometimes my daughter would drive 
but I had to come back home early and close my clinic at 9 p.m. We might have 
exaggerated our fears then; gradually I stopped leaving the house and only went 
to the clinic if there were very urgent medical cases. I stayed one year and a half 
without work and in the summer of 2006 we decided that we had to leave. I left 
with my wife, my widowed daughter and my granddaughter to Amman. The same 
day on which we left Iraq and on our way through the borders, I received a phone 
call informing me that my brother had been killed, he was retired, they said it was 
al-Mahdi army who killed him and that I might have been their initial target. 
I was planning then to stay for a short while in Amman just to relax and take 
some fresh air, but since 2006 I have not returned to Iraq. My wife and daughter 
went to my brother’s funeral, I could not go. My case is similar to the cases of 
other Iraqis. We went to the UN, my son got resettlement to the States [USA]. I 
got resettlement too, but I do not have any intentions to go there, I am a doctor 
and can still practice my profession here, but in the States I would become an old 
retired man, and I was told that the American system does not recognize our 
degrees and in the best case I could only work as paramedic.  
I never thought I would stay in Amman this long, every time we used to come 
here, it was enough to spend two weeks or ten days to decide to return to 
Baghdad. But Baghdad has turned into a waste land (arḍ kharāb) أرض خراب, the 
streets, pavements and the city features are lost with all the walls and controlling 
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check points (sayṭarāt) سيطرات and the random killings and killings on sectarian 
basis. I am a doctor, I used to treat everybody, many times free of charge, never 
thought of my patients as Sunni or Shia, this is a recent development, initiated by 
these new politicians.  
 
Dr. Sharif refused to be called a refugee and described his new status in two words: “ana 
harbān  أنا هربان I am a fugitive.” When I asked him about his professional life in Jordan, he 
responded that although the Jordanians welcomed Iraqis in general, he still feels like a 
stranger and avoids any unnecessary discussions in public space to stay out of trouble. To 
extend his and his family space of ʾamān, Dr. Sharif paid JD 50,000 (US$ 70,500) as bank 
deposit to obtain an official residence permit that would allow him to stay and work legally in 
Amman. He tried to apply for a teaching position at a Jordanian university but his application 
was rejected for being too old. He seemed content that at least he could practice his career 
and examine many of his Iraqi patients in Amman and explained that every time the UNHCR 
called the family to complete their resettlement interviews, they tried to postpone it so as to 
keep their file open just in case things got worse: “we mention our granddaughter’s education 
as a justification for our stay here.” I had to leave at this point as few patients were still 
waiting to be examined by Dr. Sharif though his official working/volunteering hours were 
over.  
 
The story of Dr. Sharif is similar to other stories of Iraqi professionals: academics and 
physicians for whom ʾamān and well-being were linked to being able to preserve a 
professional life and symbolic status through practicing their career. Many of them left Iraq 
only after receiving direct threats to their lives, but they still have close connections to Iraq, 
either through relatives managing their belongings which some of them chose not to sell, 
hoping to return one day, or via the pension that some of them receive.  
 
The expulsion of highly qualified professionals from Baghdad 
Some Iraqi academics and professionals had greater access to symbolic and material capital 
than others, which allowed them more possibilities to lead a life closer to their perceptions of 
ʾamān. And here lies the paradox as the same source of this symbolic capital that enabled Dr. 
Sharif to live closer to his expectations, turned into a source of threat which reduced his 
actual possibilities of living in Iraq. After 2003, professionals were targeted–like other groups 
of Iraqis– for different claims, some attacks were sponsored by sectarian militias, others were 
part of the de-Baathification project. Several professionals turned into hostages as part of a 
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proliferating kidnapping business; while some were released alive, the corpses of others were 
delivered to their families after they paid large ransoms.  
 
Anthropologist Omar Dewachi presents more details of the expulsion of Iraqi doctors: 
Hundreds of physicians have been murdered or kidnapped by militias and criminal gangs for 
ransom—some killed in reprisal for their past affiliation with the Baath Party, others 
murdered as a means to further destabilize Iraq’s infrastructure (following the effects of the 
US-led bombing in 1991 and the 13 years of al-ḥiṣār). Numerous doctors have been 
assassinated in their homes or clinics. Others have been targeted with car bombs. In parts of 
the country, doctors refuse their government assignments or do not show up for their jobs 
because of insecurity and deterioration of hospital conditions, especially in Baghdad. Across 
Iraq, doctors have also been subjected to other forms of violence from patients’ relatives. 
Families and kin have taken matters into their own hands, mobilizing party militias or tribal 
thugs to negotiate with—and if necessary coerce—doctors to pay reparations for a lost life 
(2017: 3-4). Eventually, the attacks targeting highly qualified professionals created sharp 
shortage in qualified and experienced educators and medical staff, while Iraq turned into a 
country plagued with horrific birth defects and cancers.  
 
An earlier wave of Iraqi professionals left Iraq in the 1990s, when the working conditions and 
salaries deteriorated sharply during al-ḥiṣār (the UN-imposed economic sanctions), while 
many of them managed to reach Europe, the USA or other Arab countries, some were still 
working in Amman. I met few of them who managed to visit Iraq after 2003 hoping to find 
better working conditions, but they were shocked by the levels of destruction and lack of 
essential services and the anticipated danger and decided to leave again with the intention to 
return when safety conditions improve.  
 
For many Iraqi professionals I met, leaving Iraq has not been straightforward or the final 
decision. As in the case presented above, Dr. Sharif had to learn how to live in conditions of 
uncertainty, in both Iraq and the new places he moved to, and eventually he chose to stay 
where he could lead a familiar life partly through being able to practice his profession at an 
accepted level. The restrictive structure at home meant that Dr. Sharif had to reduce his active 
presence in the public space as a specialist physician, by resorting to hiding at his home in 
Iraq and gradually giving up his career as an academic in the university of Baghdad to work 
only for few hours treating urgent cases in his private clinic. In Jordan, where he fled to 
60 
 
escape direct death threats, ʾamān was not restricted to gaining access to the essential 
services which Iraqis lost in Baghdad, and it was not perceived as gaining resettlement in the 
USA; the solution designed by the UNHCR to save few eligible Iraqis from “a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted.” In Amman, Dr. Sharif perceived his and his family ʾamān in 
relation to his understanding of well-being that is linked to his ability to practice his career as 
a specialist physician and/ or academic, as he had been doing in Baghdad. 
 
This does not mean that Iraqi physicians and academics were immediately admitted in 
medical centers or hospitals and universities in Jordan. During my fieldwork in 2010-2011, it 
was possible to locate Iraqis in these two sectors still practicing their career. In the 
engineering faculty at one of the Jordanian universities I visited, I noticed that more than half 
of the academic staff listed on the board hanging in the entrance were Iraqis who graduated 
from different European and American universities in the seventies and eighties with PhD 
degrees in electrical, chemical, mechanical or civil engineering. I met a few of those 
academics, either at their offices in the four universities I visited or at their rented (and 
sometimes owned) apartments and listened to their stories about being a qualified academic 
professional in former Iraqi public universities and becoming an academic on a temporary 
contract in a private university in Jordan. Most of them anxiously expressed that after 2003 it 
became hard to accommodate the huge number of Iraqi academics in the limited vacant 
positions in the Jordanian universities. This forced few of them to take the risk and return to 
work inside Iraq to be able to support one’s family members who remained in Jordan, where 
their sons and daughters could enjoy better services in terms of school and university 
education, health services, access to clean water and regular electric power and the ability to 
walk around and play without fear of being kidnapped or killed in an explosion. Iraqi students 
were visible in the cafeterias of al-Isra and Philadelphia universities, one could hardly miss 
their Iraqi accent. I met with dozens of Iraqi female and male students; few students came 
alone or accompanied with their siblings to study at Jordanian universities, while their parents 
(living and working in Iraq or elsewhere) supported their tuition fees and study expenses. 
Some of the students I met have moved to live in Amman with their families following 2005, 
they often referred to the problems their generation expect to face in finding a job upon 
graduation.  
 
In this chapter I present the complex survival strategies and experiences of former highly 
qualified professionals, like Dr. Sharif, in their attempts to secure employment opportunities 
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following the destruction of former state institutions and infrastructure and their expulsion 
from Baghdad. The ethnographic details present how different Iraqi professionals had to 
negotiate the terms of losses and gains in complex conditions to the possible in Amman, and 
Baghdad. They had to negotiate with several local and global institutions which affected their 
will to pursue their former career lives or start a new job in a deregulated market; that was not 
governed by a centralized state. The unclear and constantly changing policies concerning 
their presence in Jordan meant that Iraqis had to learn how to cope with various levels of 
risks involved in securing resources for survival in increasingly uncertain contexts. Securing 
a job for this group of former qualified professionals was not only presented as a necessity to 
attain their livelihoods, but also as an attempt to reestablish a lost social status and regain a 
daily routine. To understand the processes of making ʾamān among this group of former Iraqi 
state employees, I draw on the anthropology of well-being in conditions of –lessness or 
“well-being in a world of want” as termed by Jackson (2011).  
 
‘Working’ to extend the space of ʾamān in complex conditions to the possible 
In the process of searching for work opportunities outside the scope of the Iraqi governmental 
sector, Iraqi professionals and state employees had to learn how to adjust to new working 
conditions in postinvasion Iraq and in Jordan, or between the two countries. I will first 
identify the meanings of well-being (or what Iraqis called ʾamān) in restricted and restrictive 
structures, before exploring the experiences of these former middle-class (and upper-middle 
class) professionals in negotiating the terms of losses and gains associated with their attempts 
to proceed their career life in the absence of Iraqi state institutions.  
 
The majority of Iraqi government employees I met in Amman lost their positions. Highly 
skilled professionals including university professors and medical doctors who were able to 
find work in their field in Amman had to work in restrictive conditions under temporary 
contract terms in the private sector without further benefits; many of those professionals were 
seeking work in Amman as an attempt to extend their space(s) of ʾamān. In their descriptions 
of their new conditions, they referred to the good life they once enjoyed compared to the 
present losses they had to endure. In practice, the decisions they took to secure better well-
being take into account the future of their household and other extended family members and 




In the stories shared by Iraqi professionals in the field, they often discussed their losses and 
well-being in relational terms (Joseph,  2012, 1994, 1993; Al-Mohammad, 2015) as family 
members rather than presenting individual losses or suffering. Several anthropological works 
exploring well-being in various cultures focus on the idea of “proportionality” or “balancing” 
what is measured as well-being for different communities or individuals in various conditions 
(Jiménez, 2008). The concept of well-being (or ʾamān, as Iraqis described the ‘good days’ 
when mentioned in the field) helps understand the survival experiences involved in the 
complex process of choosing among various possibilities in conditions of deprivation, threat 
and impoverishment. Dr. Sharif could have simply chosen, as his son did, to accept the 
UNHCR ‘refugee label’ and the solution it offers to few Iraqis to resettle in the USA where 
he would be further away from threats and could eventually gain citizenship rights instead of 
depositing the $ 50,000 to receive an annual residence permit in Jordan. But the resettlement 
solution that seemed the most appropriate solution for several other Iraqis, was not perceived 
as the best possibility for him (and his wife, daughter and granddaughter), at least not at this 
stage, as long as he could practice his career and treat Iraqi patients in Amman. Dr. Sharif 
explained that he kept his file at the UNHCR ‘open’ as an attempt to extend his survival if 
things became worse in the future; which he realized might be the case considering the local, 
regional and global changes that his generation witnessed in the last four decades. Well-being 
and ʾamān for this professional physician was related to the possibilities of creating safe but 
also familiar conditions of living with his own family. Familiarity here means the ability to 
make a choice to practice his profession and treat patients as he had done for years in his 
clinic in Baghdad, even if this meant reduction in his entitlements to payment and other work 
benefits. In the process of making ʾamān in Jordan, Dr. Sharif realized that his will to choose 
is not entirely free and that he might be eventually forced to desert this possibility of working 
as a medical volunteer in Amman to the resettlement solution in the USA, supported by the 
UNHCR, so he decided to keep his UNHCR file open and postpone resettlement for another 
year. Well-being in this sense became “a matter of finding the right balance between the 
visible and invisible elements of social life” (ibid., 180).  
 
An inspiring and interesting study on Iraqi experiences of living and survival in conditions of 
threat and impoverishment is Hayder Al-Mohammad’s anthropological work in the city of al-
Basra. Al-Mohammad moves the ethnographic accounts about life in postinvasion Iraq 
beyond destruction and collapse to understandings of the ways in which Iraqis in their 
everyday forms of dwelling are not only making and remaking a world for themselves but 
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also each other amid tremendous daily pressures and struggles (2015: 114). In his 
ethnographic description, Al-Mohammad turns to the everyday in Iraq; to what he describes 
as “small gestures, moments of kindness and care, that are not simply positive tales contained 
within the destruction of postinvasion Iraq but are the very grounds by which many Iraqis 
have been able to survive and live through the terror and uncertainty of the last decade” 
(ibid., 111). In this account of Iraqis’ lives and survival in al-Basra, Al-Mohammad describes 
well-being as contingent on one’s relationships with others; what he calls the ethics of being 
there. Similarly, in the stories about the changes in their living and working conditions inside 
and outside Iraq, the Iraqi professionals I met in Jordan related well-being to ethics and moral 
connections in relationships with others (family members, tribal fellows, neighbors, Iraqi 
volunteers, as well as Jordanian friends) which became essential for survival after the 
destruction of former collective institutions especially governmental jobs, institutions and 
mixed neighborhoods, and more importantly the former social code to share the Iraqi space 
regardless of ethnic or sectarian origins as reflected in Dr Sharif’s comment “never thought of 
my patients as Sunnis or Shias.” 
 
Jackson reflects on the relational aspect in well-being, not as a default set of social relations 
but as an ongoing achievement characterized by commitment, as he further explains:  
“By locating the ethical in the field of inter-subjective life, we call into question 
the assumption that existence is a struggle to bring one’s life into alignment with 
given moral norms or a mere enactment of moral scripts, and become more 
fascinated by our mundane struggles to decide between competing imperatives or 
deal with impasses, unbearable situations, moral dilemmas, and double binds. 
[…] The ethical quandary lies in how to redress a situation in which there is 
considerable moral ambiguity, for there are always two sides to every story and 
several possible ways of restoring order or seeing that justice is done. That is to 
say, ethical dilemmas are never resolved by simply laying down the law, invoking 
a moral principle that covers every situation, or passing judgment; the dilemmas 
require collective discussion, in which people attempt to come up with the best 
solution possible, given the complex circumstances, even though it is understood 
that any solution may make matters worse and no one is ever in a position to 
know the repercussions of his or her actions” (Jackson, 2013: 11-12). 
 
The dilemmas involved in the attempts to come up with the best solution possible for the lack 
of ʾamān is observed in the negotiations involved in the case of Dr. Sharif’s attempts to reach 
a solution among possibilities: to stay inside Iraq or move to Jordan or accept resettlement in 
a third country and move to live with one of his sons in the USA or London; he was not sure 
of the repercussions of the choices he made for him and his family, therefore he decided to 
keep other choices ‘open’ to discussion. The temporary choice which he made– to stay in 
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Jordan as long as he could practice his profession– is a complex one and should be examined 
within the larger historical, political and economic contexts in which these former Iraqi state 
employees sought survival.  
 
Being an employee, professional, house owner, citizen, and even a father or a mother, in 
some cases, became less possible for this group of professionals inside Iraq, after 2003. In the 
absence of a collective response to their current refuge outside their country, each Iraqi had to 
search for ways to control one’s life. There were little possibilities for collective initiatives. 
This meant that each Iraqi family had to depend on the resources and relations they had 
access to in their hiding space in Iraq and temporary space of protection in Jordan to create 
the best possible conditions for their family survival. The conditions of war and refuge had 
imposed on this group a complex structure of human relations to the possible(s). The 
Jordanian government carefully observed any attempts to formulate associations or groups 
and the protection space managed by the UNHCR was limited. In addition, several Iraqis 
refused the ‘refugee’ label and the conditions it imposed by quantifying the needs of an 
“exemplary victim,” instead they went through a longer process to learn how to satisfy their 
needs according to their perceptions of well-being.  
 
Regardless of the imposed solutions by actors in the field, well-being (and ʾamān, in this 
context) is related to the ability to make one’s choice according to what is perceived as the 
best possible for him/ herself and his/her family; it is related to shared responsibility. 
Similarly to Jackson’s perception of well-being in relational terms, as an ongoing 
achievement characterized by commitment. Rather than passively accepting the Jordanian 
government’s various classifications of the Iraqi presence in Jordan as a guest, Arab brother, 
migrant worker, foreigner and the UNHCR categorizations of Iraqis who registered in the 
organization as asylum seekers or refugees, Dr Sharif perceived his presence in Jordan as a 
volunteer Iraqi physician; he appreciated the chance this category (volunteer) offered to 
practice his former role in treating needy Iraqi patients. 
 
However, Dr. Sharif did not abandon completely the possibility of accepting the refugee label 
entitlement of resettlement to the USA that might bring some relief to his family in the future.  
Becoming a refugee might be one possibility, in the near future, that Dr Sharif did not 
consider as long as he could afford to preserve his expectations of living in dignity and 
practicing his career, despite the reductionist conditions in Jordan (and during the previous 
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decade in Iraq). This complex relation to the possible as an agent in restricted structure is 
similar to the agents who tend to “cut their coats according to their cloth,” as described by 
Bourdieu in his exploration of agents’ adjustment possibilities within restrictive and restricted 
structures:  
“[T]o adjust to the objective chances of satisfying need or desire, inclining agents 
to ‘cut their coats according to their cloth’, and so to become the accomplices of 
the processes that tend to make the probable a reality” (1990: 64-65).  
 
As an acquired system of generative schemes objectively adjusted to the particular conditions 
in which it is constituted, habitus, according to Bourdieu, engenders all the thoughts, all the 
perceptions, and all the actions consistent with those conditions, and no others. This 
paradoxical product is difficult to conceive, even inconceivable, only so long as one remains 
locked in the dilemma of determinism and freedom. Because the habitus is an endless 
capacity to engender products—thoughts, perceptions, expressions, actions—whose limits are 
set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production, the conditioned and 
conditional freedom it secures is as remote from a creation of unpredictably novelty as it is 
from a simple mechanical reproduction of the initial conditionings (2010 [1977]: 95).  
 
In the absence of collective responses to their expulsion from their country, these former Iraqi 
professionals had to satisfy their needs by adjusting to the structural constraints imposed in 
postinvasion Iraq, and Jordan. Dr. Sharif and other Iraqi professionals I present in this chapter 
have lived through reductionist conditions before in Iraq, especially during the 1990s 
(Chapter 7), and as Bourdieu explained, they seem to have the capacity to engender thoughts, 
perceptions, expressions and actions whose limits are set by the historically and socially 
situated conditions of its production.  
 
In the coming sections of this chapter I present various cases grouped within four patterns of 
adjustment processes, which Iraqi professionals from various generations and economic 
backgrounds explored in their attempts to create their space(s) of ʾamān. The ethnographic 
details discuss how these Iraqis had to adjust with several dilemmas involved in their 
attempts to come up with the best solution possible to work in their profession and realize 




Four possibilities of ‘working’ as highly-skilled Iraqi professionals in the absence 
of state institutions 
The Iraqi state investment in development during 1960s‒1980s focused on preparing highly 
qualified professionals to support the nation-state building project; they had to learn how to 
cope with various changes in state policies throughout the last four decades. Most of them 
experienced de-valuation in their former status, due to the decline of state support in 
providing professional training and rewarding conditions of employment. As explored 
through their stories in Chapters Six and Seven, the deterioration in their conditions did not 
only start in 2003, these professionals had to constantly negotiate new terms of losses and 
gains with authorities of power. They had to learn how to cope with changing policies 
introduced by the Baathist regime which turned from ‘socialist’ development to heavy 
militarization, privatization and liberalization, to be followed with the destructive attacks by 
the US-led bombing campaign in 1991 Gulf war and the impoverishing UN economic 
sanctions.  
 
The invasion and occupation of Iraq destroyed the state symbols including governmental 
bodies and law. Previously, of little significance, sectarian parties and networks started to 
exert a much stronger influence in the absence of a strong central state (Marfleet, 2007: 409). 
The years 2004 and 2005 (and later 2006-2008) evolved in terror tactics including 
assassinations, disappearances, killings by death squads and imprisonments that were directed 
to minorities and also professionals such as doctors, lawyers and academics. Common 
phrases shared among professionals in the field to describe their exit from Iraq during that 
period include: “Iraq changed, we don’t have a place there anymore”! “I am a stranger inside 
Iraq as much as I am outside, here in Jordan.”  
 
While the employment conditions and bad salaries of the 1990s, which drew out many of the 
Iraqi academics had improved in the years following 2003 (after lifting the UN economic 
sanctions), an increasing number of academics and doctors were still forced to leave Iraq 
following waves of killings and targeting of professionals. These were usually professionals 
who used to belong to the upper-middle professional class in Baghdad, i.e. they were well-
established in their home-country and could survive better in the initial months after moving 
to Jordan from their savings or through remittances transferred by relatives who already 
migrated abroad, as in the case of Dr Sharif in this Chapter and Dr Omar in Chapter One. The 
number of highly qualified Iraqis who could find work in their original professions in 
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Amman became limited. In their struggles to create better working conditions without a state, 
we can observe four patterns in which these highly qualified professionals generated various 
coping strategies and resources within the limited structures created by the new conditions of 
war and complex displacement journey(s).  
 
Possibility 1-From highly-skilled professionals in Baghdad to temporary 
contracted workers in Amman 
In general, Iraqis tend to see themselves proudly as coming from a society that was the cradle 
of civilization in its ancient contributions to the development of writing, legal systems, 
libraries, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, technology and so on (Herring, 2011: 345). 
Higher education and health are two sectors in which Iraqi skilled professionals were visible 
in Jordan. This dates back to the 1990s. Iraqis belonging to these two professional sectors got 
work permits thanks to the flourishing of private universities business and medical tourism28 
in Jordan. I met academics, doctors and artists who had come to Jordan during the nineties to 
escape the evils of the UN economic sanctions and look for better living opportunities; they 
too complained that their possibilities to work were shrinking every year following the 2003 
US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and the ensuing destruction which led to the 
expulsion of more than two million Iraqis who have fled to Jordan, Syria and elsewhere. 
 
In their attempts to keep practicing their former professions and gain access to more regular 
salaried jobs, these highly skilled and qualified Iraqi professionals, who used to have regular 
jobs at universities and hospitals in Baghdad, had to compete for few vacant positions which 
were not filled by Jordanian professionals. I met several Iraqi academics and doctors who had 
completed their education at Iraqi universities and/or European and American universities 
through scholarships and fellowships funded by the Iraqi government. Most of them had been 
employed in Baghdad for different periods ranging from four to forty years, but eventually 
had to move out of Iraq to search for ʾamān.  
 
ʾAmān had different meanings, depending on the period in which these academics moved out 
of Iraq; feeling safe (ʾamān) in the late eighties meant the ability to work in less oppressive 
conditions when Iraqi men were forced to serve for long years in the army on the war-front 
and women had to secure family survival by exerting double efforts as employees in the state 
                                                      




bureaucracy as well as single mothers taking care of the household and children. In the 
nineties, the oppressive state rules increased with drastic deterioration in the living conditions 
and state services due to the UN international sanctions (al-ḥiṣār) and the increasing 
restrictions on travel imposed by the Iraqi state. According to the stories of Iraqi 
professionals, ʾamān in the nineties had been reduced to searching for better living conditions 
in terms of health and education services and infrastructure, in addition to higher salaries 
(Chapter 7). After 2003, ʾamān for many professionals, like Dr. Sharif’s case described 
above, meant not being threatened, kidnapped or killed. The threat in 2003 was not coming 
from an identified source such as Saddam’s secret police, serving on the war-front or the UN 
sanctions regime but as many Iraqis tended to describe recent conditions of threat and fear 
prevailing in Iraq after 2003: “the US got rid of one Saddam to replace him with 50 or 100 
Saddams. In today’s Iraq, one never knows who will target him/her and why"!   
 
Initially, Iraqis who criticized Saddam’s regime and “crazy decisions” (as some used to say) 
that led to wasting the country material and human resources and involved the Iraqi society in 
one war after another had expected that their working and living conditions would improve 
after lifting the US economic sanctions, some expected that their living standards would rise 
to a level similar to other neighboring gulf countries. However, the bad conditions they 
survived in the last decade and a half only turned worse. In addition to lack of economic 
security, the political and social conditions after 2003 deteriorated and the personal safety of 
many Iraqi academics and doctors was at risk. Several professionals had no choice but to seek 
living opportunities in the job markets outside Iraq, where other professional acquaintances 
and relatives sought jobs in earlier periods. Being highly skilled and qualified— especially if 
one was holding an academic degree from an accredited higher education institution abroad 
with strong work expertise— Iraqi professionals expected that their qualifications would be 
transferable elsewhere to secure them good working opportunities, as they used to hear of 
Iraqi doctors and academics who left their country during the 80s and 90s. However, this was 
not the case experienced by the current wave of Iraqis; the few highly qualified Iraqi 
academics who managed to secure jobs at Jordanian universities after 2003 were employed in 
private universities with short term renewable contracts. The focus was on certain disciplines 
including business administration, accounting, engineering and medical sciences, since not all 
academic specializations were taught at private universities, therefore Iraqi Professors in 
humanities and other fields like social sciences, religious studies and education had little 




I present below a summary of my meetings and interviews with few Iraqi academics who 
succeeded to get employment opportunities in Jordanian private universities, and as reflected 
in the stories’ titles, each of them described his presence in Jordan using a different label: 
foreign worker, exiled Iraqi, fungible or disposable worker, migrant worker or fugitive and 
Dr. volunteer (as in the case of Dr Sharif above). These various labels reflect the different 
perceptions of their displacement experiences and individual attempts of making space(s) of 
ʾamān in conditions of reduction in Jordan.  
 
-Professor Naim: a foreign worker in Jordan and an Iraqi in exile (al-manfa) 
Professor Naim, who was advised to leave his position at the university in Baghdad in 2005 
to avoid assassination for being considered affiliated to the former Baathist regime, spent two 
years at home in Amman before he got a position at a Jordanian University on a temporary 
annual contract basis, after being nominated by one of his former Iraqi students who moved 
to work in Jordan during al-ḥiṣār  period in the 90s. He described the reductionist conditions 
from a highly qualified professor and dean of the engineering college in Baghdad to a 
temporary contracted university lecturer in Amman:  
Back in Iraq I had an authority that allowed me to hold students accountable; I 
had the right to evaluate their level of work using higher academic standards but 
here in Amman I have been  advised to keep silent, I am reminded every day that 
I am a foreigner and a guest: Yā gharīb kun ʾadīb  يا غريب ُكن أديب (Stranger be 
Polite). I had a larger space to work in my role as academic in Iraq to build human 
capabilities and support building the nation, but this is not appreciated in the 
limited role assigned to me to teach students at this private university which 
competes for gaining more students regardless of quality. Therefore, I resume the 
serious academic work as a freelancer, mostly on voluntary basis, through my role 
as editor in two international journals in my field, lecturing Iraqi students online 
and designing e-learning programs.  
 
Professor Naim measured the reduction in his well-being by comparing his former academic 
achievements in Baghdad that were not taken into consideration in his present employment 
contract in Amman. He talked of his high achievements at school in the sixties, upon which 
he had been awarded a governmental fellowship at the age of 17 when he left Baghdad to 
study engineering in Britain. In 1973, he returned after completing his post-doctoral research 
at the age of 29, to teach in Iraq and after two years he was assigned the role to establish the 
University of Technology in Baghdad and the School of Control and System Engineering. 
Since then, he proceeded with teaching and research until he was forced to leave his 
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academic position in 2005. He described his presence in Amman as “an Iraqi academic in al-
mahjar  المهجر (exile) and expressed how minimal his contribution at the private Jordanian 
university has been compared to his previous job as the dean of the Engineering College in 
Baghdad: “I am only a guest here, ʿarabi bas ʾajnabi  عربي بس أجنبي (I am an Arab but 
foreigner).  In Iraq I used to enjoy a wider space for teaching and academic research, here 
according to my contract, I am only expected to give my lectures and go home. I am not 
allowed to suggest or introduce any developments to the curriculum, because if they find my 
suggestions strange, they might not renew my contract next year.” Professor Naim’s earlier 
academic achievements in building educational programs, curriculum design and research 
and his high qualifications as an editor of two peer-reviewed journals were reduced to limited 
academic role in teaching and lower salary as contracted worker. 
 
However, he still considered himself lucky to gain a position at a Jordanian university where 
he could practice part of his daily academic routine, though at reduced level. To cope with the 
reduction in his academic role, he adjusted to do what he described as “serious academic 
work” on voluntary basis. This included working with Iraqi academics and universities from 
a distance to develop their teaching and research programs. He did not seem interested in 
discussing details of this work when I asked him, but he mentioned that following thirty eight 
years of academic experience, he considered his role as academic to contribute to the 
production of qualified human beings to be capable of building their nation, instead, in his 
current position, he was struggling to preserve a limited space of ʾamān by teaching on a 
temporary basis in the Jordanian academia. He explained that academic life for an exiled 
foreign worker, though important for his survival and well-being, was no longer providing 
the space he needed to achieve his aims of graduating qualified and well-disciplined 
professionals. To keep his position at the Jordanian university, he had to learn how to 
discipline his presence as obedient worker with limited role in teaching and research in the 
public space of the Jordanian university, where he was officially employed, while he 
arranged to exercise his former academic role in research and curriculum design on a 
voluntary basis through working with Iraqi students and lecturers online.  
 
When I asked him if he had considered gaining resettlement in a third country through 
registering in the UNHCR, he explained that he could have moved to live in the UK, the 
home-country of his wife, but instead he preferred to stay in Amman, close to Iraq, as long as 
he could practice his career. He refused to be categorized as refugee and would never contact 
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any UN body which “brought misery to his nation through imposing a brutal system of 
economic sanctions.” Instead, he perceived himself as being an Iraqi in al-mahjar  المهجر
(exile). The use of al-mahjar might be affected by his love of literature and poetry,29 as Prof. 
Naim told me: “In Baghdad, I used to read poetry in the little free time between my 
administrative duties as a dean and my teaching and writing as an active member in two 
refereed academic journals. In Jordan I have more time to enjoy poetry.” Professor Naim 
offered to read me few lines of a poem he had recently written about Iraq. The rhythm felt 
familiar; it was another version of Al-Jawahiri’s: Yā Dajlat al-Khīr يا دجلة الخير   (O blessed 
Tigris): “I greet you from afar, O greet me back, O blessed Tigris, river of gardens green,” 
but Professor Naim, in the poem he wrote, had replaced the Tigris in Al-Jawahiri’s poem 
with Baghdad and added his own poetical metaphors.  
 
This seemed like another tactic to compensate for the devaluation of their former status in the 
‘refuge’ place, some Iraqis evoked what they described as a latent talent. Professor Naim 
seemed to recall his love to poetry as another possibility he considered to extend the limited 
space of ʾamān in Jordan, and deal with the reductionist conditions in his former status and 
“more serious roles” as academic.  
 
-Professor Balqees: a fungible worker  
Professor Balqees, holding a Ph D in industrial pharmacy, explained that since she moved to 
work in Jordan in 2001, the employers at the two Jordanian private universities, where she 
was offered work, kept reminding her at the beginning of every academic year that her 
contract would be renewed as long as there was no Jordanian applicant who could fill the 
position:  
This year, the university had already renewed my contract, but I was on the 
waiting list until they had received an official letter from the Civil Service Bureau 
with names of Jordanian academics in Pharmacy. There is no job security and my 
husband who holds a Ph D degree in engineering could not find a position in a 
Jordanian University after the expiry of his former contract; he started working as 
an engineer in an Iraqi company, he too might lose his job if the company decided 
to move to Syria or return back to Iraq.30  
 
                                                      
29 Adab al-mahjar (literature of exile) refers to the writings of Arab poets and authors who migrated in the 
period between the end of the 19th century- the beginning of the 20th century, that marked the end of the 
Ottoman Empire to Northern and Southern America, such as Jibran Khalil Jibran, Iliya Abi Madi, Mikhail 
Naima and Amin al-Rihani. 
30 Interview with Professor Balqees at her parents’ home, where she lived, on 18 April 2011. 
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At the age of 36, with 11 years of teaching and research experience, two academic awards 
and several publications, Professor Balqees described her and her husband’s feelings as 
“disposable” or fungible workers who could be easily replaced by another Jordanian 
academic regardless of their credentials and academic achievements. She considered her 
well-being in migration to Europe and had explored various options until she heard from Iraqi 
friends in Syria of the skilled worker migration program in Canada.31 She had to travel to 
Syria in 2008 to apply, the main condition was not to enroll in any other scheme of 
resettlement or migration, so they did not register in the UNHCR in Jordan.  
 
Highly qualified Iraqi professionals who managed to secure jobs in their fields of 
specialization, had to work in Jordan at reduced conditions of their perception of well-being. 
Depending on their access to social and material capital, they negotiated the terms to improve 
their space of ʾamān in Jordan. Professor Balqees’ parents were both academics in Baghdad. 
They had retired and could survive in Amman by relying on the pensions they received from 
Baghdad. Her father, a retired history professor, explained that he considers Amman a better 
place for a retired Iraqi couple, where he had access to Arabic books and could spend 4-5 
hours in the public library daily reading and writing another book on the Arab history in the 
Abbasid period (he already published several history books and articles). To extend his living 
opportunities in Amman, he had to sell most of his properties in Baghdad to be able to 
purchase the house he rented in Amman, where he lives with his wife and his married 
daughter and her family. 
 
-Professor Waleed: a migrant worker 
Professor Waleed, was 53 years old when I met him on 14 April 2011.  He had been one of 
the students of Professor Naim in Baghdad. In Jordan, he enjoyed more authority, than other 
Iraqi academics, through his role as a dean of the engineering college in a private Jordanian 
university. He described his presence in Amman as part of the loss of academic capital (or 
brain-drain) during the last twenty years in Iraq:  
                                                      
31 Canada, contrary to other European countries migration policies, had more welcoming policies when it comes 
to receiving highly skilled migrants and allowing them to work in their professional career following the 
necessary accreditation of their certificates and reintegration programs. See the article by Danielle Edwards: 
“Canada playing major role as safe haven for at-risk academics from strife-torn countries.” On 23 April 2019, 





Many Iraqi academics, from my generation, had been forced to leave in the 90s. 
Due to al-ḥiṣār, we had then [during the 1990s] better opportunities to work at 
foreign universities than Iraqi universities. In 1996, my monthly salary was 
equivalent to $ 5, the cleaner who was a Baathist used to receive, then, twice 
more than me.  
 
Professor Waleed explained that he feels settled in Jordan, having a job and residency permit, 
but he too is contracted on a temporary basis and migration is one of the options he is 
considering if his contract is not renewed. He explained that he would delay his migration 
decision as long as he could work in his profession, even if he is paid half the amount of his 
Jordanian academic fellows, because he feels at home with his family in Jordan, an Arabic 
country. Like most of Iraqis who left in the 90s, Professor Waleed had visited Iraq after 2003, 
but seeing all the destruction in Baghdad, he did not consider Iraq as a good possibility where 
he could move with his family, if his job contract was not renewed:  
I am a migrant worker in Jordan; I had been living here for 15 years. I got my 
PhD degree in Engineering from a prestigious British University and I am an 
editor in a high ranking academic journal in my academic discipline, but I do not 
think that I would be valued in Iraq as I have to compete with the new Iraqi 
comers— in a corrupt environment— some of them work with fake certificates. 
 
Professor Waleed seemed more satisfied with his current working conditions, than other Iraqi 
academics I met. In addition to teaching, he was appointed as a dean of the engineering 
faculty and this allowed a wider space for his academic development through research 
partnerships with European universities. Among the possibilities to ensure his family well-
being, he considered that staying in Jordan is a good option as long as he could preserve his 
job as qualified academic, and ensure good education for his daughters. The university 
administration took care of renewing his work permit, based on which he could obtain a 
residence permit for his family members. To increase his well-being in the future, Professor 
Waleed did not consider returning to Iraq, which was not among the possible solutions for 
him, especially after following the news of the assassination and killing of highly skilled 
professionals:  
One week ago, they killed the dean of the medical school in al-Mustansiriyah 
university. Imagine! When Iraq is in high need of qualified human resources in 
the reconstruction stage, they kill qualified doctors and academics. One month 
ago they also killed an expert physician in cancer treatment, Dr Zaid al-Ali, 36 
years old had been assassinated by a sticky bomb attached to his car, although he 
was Shia. Instead of rebuilding the nation, they are eliminating the Iraqi society 
when the academic and educated class is targeted. There is no hope with this 
corrupt government! Did you hear of the new Iraqi Minister of Higher Education 
and Scientific Research?  There are hundreds of qualified Iraqi academics holding 
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PhD degrees from respectful academic institutions, and they appoint a person who 
just graduated from al-Mustansiriyah University in 2009 with an MA degree. I 
also heard that his certificate is fake. 
 
Unlike other Iraqi academics I met in 2010-2011, Professor Waleed who had established a 
good career profile in Jordan since the mid-nineties, did not describe himself as a foreign 
worker or stranger who needs to stay within limits and keep a low profile. Instead, he felt 
more comfortable with the category of migrant worker, which he used to label his presence in 
Jordan, as well as his future plans, if he moved to work in Europe when the Jordanian 
university stop renewing his contract.  
 
When it comes to medical doctors who reached Jordan after 2003, they either do not work or 
when they find a job it is at a lower scale compared to their previous positions in Iraq; as 
support to a Jordanian Doctor. Some of them realized these employment conditions in Jordan 
and seemed to appreciate the limited possibility of working on a voluntary basis for minimal 
financial returns:  
Jordan is not in need for our expertise, it’s a country with limited population and 
they have their local professionals and export doctors to the Gulf and other places 
in the world, they don’t need Iraqi physicians to work in hospitals or training 
centers. Iraqis are not allowed to form social or professional networks in Jordan. 
Those who organized small networks to help other Iraqis, rely on personal efforts 
through informal and personal contacts, which is nothing compared to the heavy 
need (From an interview in March 2011 with Dr Omar, see Chapter One). 
 
Iraqi professionals who managed to secure work in Amman do not share similar or unified 
views concerning their presence in Jordan and tend to ascribe different subjectivities to that 
presence. Those who were familiar with Amman and spent longer years working in its 
institutions (since the 90s) and enjoyed more regular employment status described themselves 
as migrant workers. While the most recent comers described their presence as foreign 
workers (a term more commonly used to describe non-national workers in Arab countries 
especially in the Gulf). The labels of refugee or asylum seeker were used occasionally when 
these professionals expressed interest in third country resettlement. All agreed on being 
guests in Amman, although they were not sure when and how they will end their visit and 
stop being called as guests, especially that they were many times reminded by the Jordanian 
hosts that as strangers they should be polite. The less common descriptions where “exiled” 
which I heard from a poet-nurse and Professor Naim, a poet-academic teaching engineering, 
while Dr Sharif described his presence in relation to his flight from Baghdad as a fugitive. 
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Migration to a European country seemed a more probable possibility as expressed by younger 
Iraqi academics in certain disciplines. Both Professors Waleed and Balqees expected that 
with their qualifications and academic experience, they could find a job in the academia 
abroad, as skilled migrant workers, and secure the well-being of their families in Europe. 
  
These various labels do not only reflect the lack of collective response to address the needs of 
Iraqis in Jordan, but they functioned as part of the coping strategies to extend the space of 
ʾamān for one’s family and adjust with the changing working conditions between Iraq and 
Jordan. In the cases of Dr Sharif and other academics and professionals who were working in 
reduced conditions in Jordan, they used to recall their working experiences with students, 
patients and the rich professional and social life they had enjoyed in Baghdad. It is in these 
complex entanglements and life stories through relationships with others that I observed the 
well-being of these groups of former Iraqi highly-skilled government employees.  
 
Possibility 2-From highly skilled professionals in Baghdad to “circular migrants” 
who work (and live) between Iraq and Jordan 
Amman has been described, in previous studies as the preferred location for more privileged 
Iraqis: some professionals and their families moved there in large numbers following 2003 
(Marfleet, 2011: 282; Chatelard, 2009). In addition to Iraqi politicians and parliament men, 
who were not included in this research, most used to live and work in the Green Zone in 
Baghdad while their families lived in Amman or elsewhere in a safe country (see Roald, 
2011). When finding a job in Jordan has become too complicated, going back to work in Iraq 
has been a solution some Iraqi professionals turned to despite the risks involved.  
 
I use the term “circular migration” to describe this Iraqi worker experience rather than 
transnational migration. Transnational migration is usually explored in relation to 
globalization and its effects in increasing “the ability of migrants to maintain network ties 
over long distances [...] and foster multiple identities to travel back and forth, to relate to 
people, to work and to do business and politics simultaneously in distant places” (Castles et 
al., 2014: 41). Anthropologist Ruba Salih describes transnational migrants as being: “more 
and more able to construct their lives across borders, creating economic, social, political and 
cultural activities which allow them to maintain membership in both their immigration 
country and their country of origin” (2002: 51). The risks involved in the circular movements 
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of these qualified Iraqis between Amman and Baghdad make it a dangerous migration 
experience, rather than increasing abilities and network ties among migrants and different 
communities, as described in the case Salih researched among Moroccan female migrant 
workers in Italy. Iraqis in the cases I observed had to move, settle and work in increasingly 
restricted conditions in both countries; Baghdad turned into a working place where they could 
secure a job opportunity providing more stable income, but within insecure living conditions: 
professionals required protection from one’s tribe or the institution guards, usually armed 
militias affiliated to one of the ethnic or sectarian ruling groups. While Jordan was 
considered, as Chatty described Syria‒ another host country of Iraqi refugees during my 
fieldwork time‒ a “site of permanent ‘temporariness’” (2017a: 208), where Iraqis used to live 
‘temporarily’ with their families and spend the income earned in Baghdad. These Iraqi 
workers do not perceive themselves as migrant workers in their country of origin, where they 
returned to work in disguise or under the protection of their tribal or sectarian and ethnic 
group. I borrow the term “circular migration” from Dawn Chatty’s description of Iraqis 
movements between Syria and Iraq (before 2011) as “circular migrations into and out of Iraq 
to make money or collect rents” (ibid., 208). According to my observations in Jordan among 
Iraqi professionals in 2010-2011, this kind of circular migration for work was more common 
among certain professionals, such as academics, engineers and medical doctors, some of 
whom had left Iraq before 2003 to escape the harsh conditions of the economic sanctions by 
looking for work in neighboring Arab countries, which became less possible with the political 
upheavals that started in 2011 in several Arab countries. 
 
Several of these professionals left Iraq between 2005-2008 following the targeting of doctors 
and academics, in addition to the lack of electricity and health and education services and the 
destruction of state infrastructure. They feared risking the safety of their family members in 
Baghdad when one or more of its members were targeted: they had either received a direct 
threat (as a written notice with one bullet or more in an envelope), or endured a kidnapping 
experience and other losses.   
 
I met few Iraqi families who had adjusted the terms of their survival by moving between 
Amman and Iraq (back and forth). This strategy secured higher living standards for the 
household members who remained in Amman. Well-being for these families meant the 
ability to secure a middle class or upper middle class life style in a safe environment, 
especially in terms of consumption and access to services which are missing in Iraq such as 
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education, health and electricity. The remittances sent by the family member who returned to 
work in Iraq ensured comfortable housing conditions for the household, often in western 
Amman, in addition to educational opportunities for their sons and daughters who were able 
to obtain a university degree, usually from a private Jordanian university, and the ability to 
consume branded clothes and enjoy the former social life-style of celebrations and gatherings 
with family and friends, shopping and eating in (Iraqi) restaurants in Amman. Access to 
higher financial resources from their work in Baghdad made it possible, for these Iraqi 
families, to purchase an expensive annual residence permit which allowed the household 
members to commute more easily between Amman and Baghdad. This circular migration 
living style seemed like other known cases of foreign workers in Arab countries.  Like other 
households (Palestinian, Lebanese, Egyptian, Syrian) living in countries with poor 
economies, when a family member, in working age, would move to work in one of the Gulf 
countries and secure the living needs of his/her family through financial remittances.  
 
The living style of these Iraqi families shared many aspects of the foreign workers’ families’ 
life style, where the family breadwinner worked in another country to support his or her 
family who remained settled in their country of origin. What makes it a strange case of 
foreign-worker or migrant worker was the fact that the ‘foreign’ workers in this case were 
Iraqi professionals who had returned to work in their country of origin, Iraq, in order to 
support their families who were seeking safety in a foreign country (Jordan); in this case 
leading a middle class or upper-middle class life style was more possible in Amman than in 
Baghdad. In the cases explored for this ethnographic research, it was the father, brother, son, 
daughter or, in a few cases, both parents who had made the necessary arrangements to return 
to work in Iraq and send the greatest part of their salaries to the family in Amman. As in other 
cases of foreign workers, the money earned in the state of migration was transferred and 
spent in the form of remittances in another state, but the paradox in this case was that the 
Iraqi professional— who turned into a forced migrant or refugee waiting for resettlement in 
Jordan due to being threatened or kidnapped in his country—decided to return to Iraq, this 
time not to ‘live’ there but to work and support the hosting costs of his (and/or her) family 
members who live in Jordan. 
 
Despite the risks involved in returning to work inside Iraq, this seemed like the best solution 
for some professionals, especially physicians “to avoid starting from zero,” as Iraqi 
professionals used to say) when they described how some of their colleagues had to go 
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through a long process for licensing and accreditation to be eligible to practice medicine in 
the new country.  Migration to Europe or the USA did not seem the best possibility for Iraqi 
doctors who were interested in practicing their profession, especially for older generations of 
physicians, and sometimes among the middle aged, who learnt about several obstacles other 
Iraqi physicians were facing to practice their profession abroad and, thus, decided to return to 
work between Baghdad and Amman within more familiar limits. This applied also to other 
professionals, such as academics and engineers, who realized the difficulties involved in 
practicing their professions, in western countries due to the high competition, not only with 
qualified locals but also with other qualified migrants.  
 
The decision to stay in Amman or move back to Iraq depended on their access to capital: both 
financial and social. Being able to pay the deposit of $ 50,000 (and freeze $ 25,000 in a 
Jordanian bank) allowed easier circular mobility for the transient worker and his/her family. 
Another factor was having the right social connections in Amman and Baghdad. Iraqi 
professionals had learnt from their previous experiences with wars and living with an 
oppressive regime that establishing strong social networks with influential figures in the 
government is important to protect one’s life, family and property. One of the academics who 
returned to work in Baghdad expressed that he feels safer to stay in his house because the 
young son of his old neighbors was appointed as a guard for a high ranking officer in the 
Ministry of Defence and he could rely on him to protect him and his house.  
 
In other cases, to reduce the risk to their lives, some Iraqi returnees, Dr Sabah (um Tai’s 
father, mentioned later in this chapter) moved in with members of their extended families or 
ʿashīra/tribe in relatively peaceful areas, or among their sectarian group in a different street, 
district, town or city, away from their original home residence in Baghdad where they had 
been threatened or attacked. Others, who could not rely on influential figures or their tribal 
connections, arranged for accommodation in their working place (the hospital in case of some 
doctors).  
 
-Professor Salim: returning to work in his former university in Baghdad to 
support his family’s expenses in Amman  
At the age of 61, Professor Salim who had been working in Amman since 1998, decided to 
move back to work in an Iraqi university in 2010 just few months after he had been informed 
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by the UNHCR that his resettlement file to the USA was accepted. Resettlement seemed one 
possibility to gain citizenship rights and ensure better future for his three daughters, but after 
several visits to Iraq where he met with relatives and friends and observed some improvement 
in the conditions of living, he realized that if he accepts resettlement in the USA, he will not 
be able to practice his profession abroad while he still had a chance to work as academic in 
Baghdad and secure higher living standards for his family in Amman, where his daughters 
study:  
After several visits to Baghdad in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2009, I noticed that the 
salary rates were improving compared to the sanctions period when I left to work 
in Amman, despite the deterioration in the security situation. Age was one factor 
for turning back to Iraq as a better choice than resettlement in the USA. In 
addition to the higher wage and better benefits. I am 61 years old, and I managed 
to return to work at my former university in Baghdad with a higher salary than the 
one I used to receive here in Jordan. Unlike the times of al-ḥiṣār, when I left Iraq, 
the economic situation of Iraqi academics and other workers’ families is better 
today: Salaries in Iraq are improving like in the old times, people are more 
capable of covering their living needs, working women are able to buy gold as 
they used to do before al-ḥiṣār. But the security situation is still risky, especially 
for my daughters who got used to different way of living in Amman. In Iraq they 
will have to wear ḥijāb. I decided to go back alone as a migrant worker in my 
country while keeping my family house in Amman where security conditions and 
services are better. But eventually, we will have to move as a family! I hate to 
mention this, but being Shia played a role in my decision to return. Sectarian 
identity was not present in our former life in Baghdad, it was not a factor in my 
earlier decision to migrate to Amman. But with the growing sectarian culture in 
the region and inside Iraq, it became an important factor to consider. Despite 
improvements in living conditions and the reductions in killings on identity, I 
think that as a Shia academic, I and my family members would have better future 
in Baghdad especially when it comes to my daughters’ chances of marriage.  
 
In addition to gaining higher salary and better working conditions in the Iraqi academia, 
Professor Salim’s decision to return to work in Baghdad is another example of the complexity 
involved in preserving the family well-being and extending the space of ʾamān, without a 
state or other formal protection bodies. In this case, several factors were involved in Professor 
Salim’s decision to live temporarily between Amman and Baghdad and eventually move back 
with his entire family to Iraq. These factors include the actual improvement in the salary and 
wage levels in Iraq to a level similar to the pre-ḥiṣār conditions in addition to his perception 
of his family well-being in the future. He perceived his return to work in Baghdad as an 
opportunity to raise his family living standards in Amman, as well as paving the way to his 
daughters’ eventual return to live and work in Baghdad upon completing their higher 
education. Another factor related to his perception of his family future well-being is what he 
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called to solve “his daughters’ problem”, approaching marriage age, in conditions of rising 
sectarian thinking in the region, he anticipated that they have less chances to find a Jordanian 
partner.  
 
The politicization of sectarian belonging was another problem which he observed in his 
earlier visits in 2004 and 2005: “the current Iraq does not seem a safe place for my daughters 
who grew up in Jordan and tend to speak Jordanian accent. They are used to a different style 
of life here, to spend time with their friends and go out unveiled.” Only in 2009, with the 
decrease in killings on identity, he decided that he could finally return to work in Baghdad 
and considered the possibility of his daughters’ return. The paradox is that although Professor 
Salim refused what he called “sectarian thinking” but he used it when he considered his 
family’s future life in Baghdad, as he explained that being a Shia and qualified academic he 
was able to gain a good job in his former university in Baghdad, while he managed to 
preserve the family property in Baghdad during his absence for years, thanks to his wife 
Sunni family relatives who moved in their house that was in a mixed neighborhood, and this 
is another factor that supported his decision to move back, having a house in a relatively 
secure area where he felt safe and protected by the family good neighbors and relatives.  
 
Professor Salim referred to the sectarian problem in relation to its regional dimension. 
According to his and his daughters experiences, people in Amman are less tolerant when they 
learn of their Shii origin. Although his wife is a Sunni Iraqi, he thought that a Sunni 
Jordanian would not be willing to marry a Shii Iraqi. He described this development in 
sectarian thinking as one of the main factors that led him to decide to return to Baghdad. In 
his negotiations of the possibility of finding a good job after the age of 60, he considered the 
well-being of his family members, especially his three daughters who could enjoy better 
living standards, with the support of their father’s salary from Iraq to continue their university 
education in Amman. However, well-being is not restricted to the present, he thought of his 
daughters’ future well-being as he perceived it in the ability to find good career and marriage 
opportunities. Eventually he moved to Baghdad alone, with the intention to move the entire 
family in the near future. He believed that his daughters’ chances of finding a job and suitable 
marriage partner will be easier in Baghdad: “I think that my daughters’ life will be easier with 




Returning to Iraq was perceived as the best possibility for extending the space of ʾamān and 
well-being not only for his family, but also as part of renewing his national aspirations of 
rebuilding a strong Iraq:  
I am optimistic because things cannot stay bad forever, maybe I will not live to 
see Iraq turning into United Arab Emirates or Japan, but Iraq as country and 
nation has capabilities: we have land, water, oil, people and history; these are all 
success factors, for me I believe in facts, forget about recent history, we have 
historical roots in the land but as Iraqi people we have another distinctive 
characteristic: we are persistent and hard-working people, we work with our own 
hands, we do not rely on others to work for us. We do not have the culture of 
importing domestic workers or foreign workers like here in Jordan or in the Gulf 
[he referred to the exploitation of domestic service and other Asian workers]. If 
the security situation improves, many qualified Iraqis will go back. I have already 
seen the improvements. Amerika is not a good option for me [he referred to the 
possibility of resettlement in the USA]: first, because it is the country which 
destroyed my own country, and second: because I learnt from friends who went 
there that refugees do not lead a good life, they are not treated as original citizens. 
I know medical doctors and specialists who were denied a working permit 
because they did not obtain their degrees from American universities. 
 
Work, in the case described above, gains a collective meaning of survival and opportunity to 
improve the well-being of the Iraqi collective through the anticipated return of qualified 
Iraqis and their persistence and hard-working nature, as described by Professor Salim. It is 
not only a ticket for his own return but it could be seen as a way to revive a Baghdadi society 
who can enjoy a prosperous life thanks to the country wealth, as he explained above. This 
optimism towards the future of Iraq was not common in my interviews with other Iraqis who 
had little connection with home. Having a regular job in Amman, and an official work permit 
allowed Professor Salim several chances to visit Baghdad, without fearing the denial of visa 
entry into Jordan. The changes he observed in his visits in 2004, 2005 and 2009, were another 
factor to support his decision to return to work in Baghdad in 2010, even though he still 
considered it unsafe for his daughters but he was optimistic about the future of Iraq in 2011 
when I met him. One of the factors that he mentioned briefly was being Shia that feels safer 
than being Sunni professional in postinvasion Iraq. Although he refused what he called the 
rise of sectarian factional thinking, but it was one of the factors by which he judged the 
feasibility of his return to work in Baghdad, within a region where sectarian affiliation is 




-Dr Tareq: a temporary employee in Jordan looking for better position in his 
mother’s home-city Erbil 
Dr. Tareq, 38 years old, a specialist in nuclear medicine, was in the process of moving to live 
with his family in Erbil, where he had been offered a position in his specialty.  He left Iraq in 
1999 shortly after his graduation from the medical school in Baghdad. He works and lives in 
Amman with his wife and two daughters. His wife, an anesthesiologist, came to Jordan with 
her family in 2006 when killings on identity in their Baghdadi neighborhood increased. They 
married in 2007 in Amman. When I met him he was working in one of the largest hospitals in 
Amman where he completed his specialty, on temporary contract basis, like most Iraqi 
doctors employed in Jordan. He also received resettlement to the US, but when he explored 
the possibilities of working in his profession, he found out that many of his friends who were 
trained as specialist physicians failed to find a job in their profession in the USA:  
I decided that I won’t start from zero. At this stage, Iraq requires more specialists 
than ever, I will try to go back to invest my knowledge and expertise in Iraq, 
currently Erbil, my mother’s home-town, seems like the safest area to practice my 
profession but I hope to return one day to Baghdad– where I grew up– when 
living and security conditions improve. Resettlement to a third country is not an 
option for me or for my wife. My best friends, both doctors who graduated from 
Baghdad could not find a position to practice their profession; one works in a 
super-market in the USA and he keeps changing jobs. The other, who was a 
surgeon, works as a butcher, he is making good money and decided to stay there 
where he could ensure better education opportunities for his children. I think that 
it is not enough to live but one has to live with dignity. 
 
“Living with dignity” is another factor that Iraqi professionals were missing in their new 
places of survival among Amman, Baghdad and elsewhere. Dr. Tareq criticized the 
corruption and chaos in Baghdad when he described his wife’s attempts to withdraw her 
certificates from the Ministry of Health. After several attempts of contacting officials to 
facilitate the mission, his wife had to pay ‘formalized’ bribes to get her certificate but was not 
able to obtain any recommendation letter or certificate of service. He described the bad 
situation which he observed in a recent visit to Baghdad while he was visiting family 
members and examining jobs announced in Iraqi hospitals as “unhealthy” and corrupt:  
In my visit in 2009, I witnessed the same bad conditions which I experienced 
upon graduation in the nineties during the time of al-ḥiṣār (UN economic 
sanctions). Worst is the living situation in Baghdad; in our old district al-
Khadraʾa, our neighborhood changed completely and my family house was 
occupied by a Sunni family from another area. Baghdad looked like a wasteland 
and corruption prevailed, that is why I decided to move to my mother’s city in 




It was not always possible to return to Baghdad without risking one’s life, Erbil, the capital 
city in Iraqi Kurdistan seemed like a better option for Dr. Tariq, who did not give up the idea 
of returning one day to Baghdad and like Professor Salim above his ambitions extended to 
gain a chance to contribute to improving the health conditions in his country: “Iraq provided 
me with free education and health services, I am hoping to return to serve my country as a 
specialist in nuclear medicine, and hope that one day my children will have similar 
opportunities to receive free quality education and good health services in their country, as I 
did.” 
 
-Shaima: an Iraqi student in Amman planning to return to work in Baghdad 
with her father, upon her graduation 
Returning to work in Iraq was not restricted to former Iraqis who left during the 90s. Several 
Iraqi professionals who were forced to leave more recently considered return as a better 
option to improve their family well-being and extend their space of ʾamān in Jordan. 
However, this group of Iraqis (who left after 2005) could not return most of the time to their 
original home and neighborhood. This is what happened to Shaima’s father, he is a surgeon 
physician, 51 years old. Shaima and her family left Baghdad in 2006 following the release of 
her father who was kidnapped on his way from the hospital to his house in al-Jadiriyah. His 
family had to pay a ransom of $ 30,000 for his release. Shaima’s family fled immediately to 
Jordan. Her father spent two years unable to find a relatively stable job in Amman; the 
position he managed to get at a private hospital had been sponsored through a Jordanian 
physician but the salary was too low to provide for his family needs. He decided to return to 
the hospital in Baghdad where he was working and living at the time of my fieldwork.  
 
Shaima, who told me her family story, was studying pharmacy in a private Jordanian 
university where I met her. Her father’s job in Baghdad secured her study fees JD 1500 (US$ 
2000) per semester; her biggest concern was that her chances of finding a job in Jordan upon 
graduation were quite limited:  
Last year 400 Iraqi students graduated from our university, half of them as 
pharmacists, none could find a job in Jordan. My father works hard to support my 
studies. I miss him a lot; he comes to visit us few days per month. I want to go to 
work in Iraq when I graduate but my father says that it is still unsafe. 
 
Like Shaima, other Iraqi university students expressed similar worries of ending up as jobless 
in Amman. Some were hoping to gain a third country resettlement and migrate to live and 
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work abroad while others, like Shaima, were looking for a suitable time to return to Baghdad. 
Most of these students belong to families who enjoy relatively affluent living standards in 
Western Ammani neighborhoods. 
 
-Um-Tai: unemployed engineer supported by her father, a medical doctor who 
returned to work in his tribal town in Iraq 
The following description of my meeting with Um Tai— whose father like Shaima’s father 
returned to work in Iraq— provides further details of the living conditions which more 
affluent Iraqi families could afford in Amman. I visited Um Tai in her owned apartment in 
Khalda (another affluent neighborhood in western Amman). Um Tai was 31 years old and 
she had worked as an interior design engineer in Baghdad. Being unemployed, it seemed that 
she used her skills and ideas to decorate her and other relatives’ apartments in Amman. She 
welcomed me and my Iraqi friend Aseel in a big open hall which seemed to serve as a large 
living and guest room with a dining space in one corner and an American-style kitchen in the 
other. She invited us to sit in what she called the red corner: dark red leather sofas with black 
cushions, red and black carpet matching with a standing lamp and framed wall paintings with 
the same colors, while the opposite space was decorated in a zebra-color motif (a mixture of 
white and black). She asked if we would be interested to watch the video of the ṭuhūr 
(circumcision) party of her baby-boy who was seven-months-old: 
The circumcision operation was done in the clinic, but we celebrated the occasion 
the Iraqi way: early in the morning we had a sweet breakfast of kahī and giyymar   
 The family, relatives and friends joined .حالوة دهينة and ḥalāwa dihīna كاهي وقيمر
us and al-muṭahir (the physician who did the circumcision) and al-muzayyin (the 
barber) were invited. The barber cut the baby’s hair, we dressed him in white robe 
“dishdāsha” دشداشة .  [On the large flatron TV screen fixed on the dark red painted 
wall facing us, we saw a crowd of people, women and men and kids clapping and 
singing alongside a group of musicians. She pointed at the little baby]. This is Tai 
and my husband. In Baghdad we usually organize a bigger ṭuhūr celebration and 
we sacrifice more than one sheep, a share is distributed among the poor, and we 
cook the other share and have a big meal for the friends, family and neighbors. 
[The guests, whom she said were her sisters and cousins who lived between 
Amman and Baghdad, were distributing money which she called شوباش (Shubāsh: 
she explained is a term used to refer to the contribution of gifts by guests). There 
was a big tray covered with shades of green and white]: The guests throw the 
money [gift] in the tray and it is divided among the musicians, the barber and al-
muṭahir [the physician], and all guests are invited to eat lunch afterwards.  
 
In what seemed as an attempt to distance her family from other so-called rich Iraqis who 
could be seen in expensive restaurants, hotels and shopping centers around, um-Tai criticized 
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how some Iraqis she met in Amman, were exaggerating in their celebrations by adding extra 
and unnecessary expenses to their occasions and consuming higher amounts of money. 
Compared to other Iraqis I met in eastern Amman, I thought that this exaggeration applied to 
her family as well. But she explained how odd it felt when they were invited to an 
engagement party, one week prior our meeting, at the Royal Hotel in Amman: “The mother 
of the bride had prepared a distinguished golden tray, the tray and the other materials were 
made of real gold, they placed it at the entrance of the party hall.” Um-Tai mentioned 
cynically the show-off style among whom she described as “nouveau riche” Iraqis in Jordan; 
referring to the Iraqis who hold no university degrees and were “unknown” in Iraq, but 
suddenly grew visible among the Iraqi community in Amman as rich businessmen and 
investors.  
 
Um Tai, who exerted an obvious effort during our meeting to distinguish her family from 
these nouveau riche Iraqi families‒ seemed quite settled in her spacious and heavily 
decorated apartment to the extent that I was surprised when she informed me of her decision 
to move to the USA through the UNHCR third country resettlement solution. She described 
her stay in Amman as a dull and boring life when compared to her memories of a beautiful 
Baghdad that had been destroyed. She showed us pictures of social gatherings and events in 
her spacious family garden in Baghdad and described how all the promises of a comfortable 
life disappeared when their life turned upside down after 2003:  
In Baghdad, my parents used to live in Zayouna [al-Rusafa side of Baghdad] and I 
lived in al-Qadisiyah [al-Karkh side of Baghdad]. Visiting my parents became a 
big terrifying mission, when you go out of your home in Baghdad you might be 
killed for any reason. I stopped driving because driving became dangerous for 
women; some women were killed in Baghdad just because they were caught 
driving. Once I almost got a heart attack when they shot very close to warn me 
against wearing pants. To visit my parents, we had to go through a journey of fear 
among concrete blocks, barriers and check-points where you did not know which 
identity to show if you were stopped.  
 
Eventually Baghdad turned into a strange place, as described by this group of former upper-
middle class professionals and state-bureaucrats. Um-Tai described how her parents’ family 
and her own had made the final decision to leave in November 2006 when her father, a 
medical doctor, received more than one death threat, and her husband’s store was attacked 
and robbed: “Our homes became like prisons, Iraqis are not used to this life, we enjoy social 
gatherings and are used to visit family and friends and eat out in restaurants and clubs.” She 
explained that her father later decided to return to Baghdad to support their living expenses in 
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Jordan: “My father, Dr. Sabah, who was a famous surgeon in Baghdad, could not find a good 
job in Amman. He could no longer live in our family house in Zayouna; he returned to work 
in a private hospital outside Baghdad where he was protected by his tribe.” She explained that 
her father’s work helped provide for her sisters’ university education and the family’s 
expenses in Amman. 
 
Well-being for this family of a qualified professional who returned to work in Iraq was 
perceived as the ability to work and live in relatively high standard conditions which allow 
them to share celebrations and happy moments the way they used to celebrate them in Iraq 
with their relatives and friends. This meant having access to resources and a larger space of 
ʾamān to enjoy the company of extended family members and friends. In general, they 
seemed more settled and at home in Jordan than the impoverished Iraqis I used to meet in 
rented small apartments in eastern Amman. However, unlike her parents who considered their 
stay in between Baghdad and Amman as the most reasonable possibility, um-Tai perceived 
her well-being elsewhere: “It is safe here and I like to stay close to my parents, but there are 
no chances to find work in the future.” Like Professor Balqees who was sharing the 
apartment with her retired parents to cut on expenses. Um-Tai explained that they were able 
to live well in Jordan, thanks to the support of her father with whom they share living 
expenses. I learnt that her parents owned an apartment in the lower floor of the same building 
with a small garden. Much smaller than their family garden in the pictures she showed of 
their Baghdadi houses. 
  
Families like Um-Taiʼs fled Iraq due to the changes imposed on former living conditions that 
had made them feel like strangers in Baghdad and reduced their well-being, in addition to the 
threats targeting her father, a famous surgeon. Their access to material and social capital—the 
money they brought from selling her husband’s business and properties in Baghdad and her 
father’s financial support from his work in the private hospital in Iraq in addition to her 
husband’s job, which he secured through his relatives who were running a private business in 
Amman—had enabled them to buy a house and enjoy good standards of living in Amman. 
However, she decided that she had to search for other possibilities to secure the well-being of 
her nuclear family in the future: “In Jordan, there is no future for my generation or my son’s 
generation, I do not expect to be able to find work here. Iraqis in Jordan are treated as 
foreigners, and they would always be restricted by the annual residence permit: Either you 
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pay the JD 50,000 (US$ 70,500) or you’ll be crippled, even your car driving license is 
conditioned by the residence permit and you need a Jordanian sponsor’s name to register it.”  
 
On our way out of Um-Tai’s house, she pointed at the small green space in front of the 
entrance of the opposite building where an old woman was sitting on a white plastic chair: 
“Our Jordanian neighbor is a kind lady, she put this plastic chair for my mother who spends 
the evenings under the neighbors’ palm trees.” I looked at the three little palm trees standing 
at the entrance of the neighboring house opposite Um-Tai’s building. Recently large and 
small palm trees had become a popular decorative plant in the streets of Amman, I do not 
remember seeing dates on them in any season; it seemed part of the fashion and keeping up 
appearances among the residents of western Amman areas who planted them in front of their 
houses’ entrances, but for Um-Tai’s mother, the palm trees were part of Baghdad to which 
she longed to return, they constituted a small space of ʾamān in her exile.  
 
Well-being was partly associated with social relations among Iraqis and restoring the good 
old days of the past. For the older generation, this could be the familiar presence of objects, 
smell and people, as well as the ability to enjoy the social life they used to have in Iraq, as 
Um-Tai and other Iraqis expressed. The weight of loss among older Iraqis felt harder to 
release. I noticed that during home visits, where older people were present, they were usually 
the most silent. It was common to observe them listening silently to their story narrated by 
younger members of the family, while a vague non-expressive look would cover their faces: 
it seemed they were living in another world, less capable of coping with the conditions of 
strangeness in Jordan than those in Iraq. Some insisted on going back home, their house in 
Amman, even when they owned it did not feel like home. Some managed to survive 
economically thanks to their pension payments which were transferred from Iraq or to a 
skilled professional or younger member of the family who sent remittances from Iraq or 
elsewhere, but life was harder for those whose sources were diminishing, especially if 
sanctioned by both the Iraqi state and the programs of international organizations for being 
categorized as part of the former Baathist regime.  
 
Well-being as perceived by Iraqi professionals in conditions of circular migration  
I spent less time among these seemingly well-to-do families (like Um-Tai’s) than the time I 
spent among impoverished Iraqi families in eastern Amman. However, the stories they tell 
88 
 
about their expulsion from Baghdad were similar to the ones told by Iraqis in the space of aid 
that will be my focus in the following chapter. For all of them they were stories of missing or 
murdered family members on sectarian claims or for reasons related to their profession, as in 
the case of Dr. Sharif and other professionals presented above. This rather more affluent 
group of Iraqis generally seemed more settled, and some could afford to purchase a house in 
affluent neighborhoods in western Amman. But the houses never became real homes, the 
Iraqis talked about them as ‘guest houses’. The members of those households were living in 
these houses in Amman as foreigners; they paid for their daily stay and their children’s 
education fees at private schools and universities and other living expenses. Well-being, as 
expressed by members of this relatively affluent group of Iraqi professionals was related to 
having access to jobs in their profession, better services and higher ability of consumption. In 
this, Amman was a better and safer place to be in than postinvasion Baghdad, with access to 
safety, health and education, and other basic services including electricity, freedom to move 
around and dress the way they pleased. The greatest part of the resources necessary to sustain 
these living expenses were provided through the financial support and remittances transferred 
by family members working inside Iraq or in the form of pension in the case of older family 
members.  
 
I met professors, doctors and other qualified professionals from different generations who 
were thinking of going back to Baghdad they had been postponing their return due to lack of 
needed services as well as a lack of security. The dilemmas were summarized in one 
interview:  
I came to work in Jordan in 2002. I submitted a file with the UN and I had 
received an appointment for resettlement in the USA, but in the end this was not 
an option which I would consider. My options in Iraq as an academic after the 
government has passed the civil service law in 2005/2006 would be better, the 
salary scale had raised; the only problem today is lack of services and security.32 
 
 
It is possible to find some similarities among the tactics adopted by these highly qualified 
professionals (upper-middle class urban Baghdadis) to cope, but  in the absence of state 
employment and protection back in Iraq, each of them had to negotiate the best possible ways 
to achieve their well-being. Well-being as explained above is realized in relational terms; it is 
related to the well-being of their household members and sometimes to the wider Iraqi 
                                                      




society. According to professionals who could not return physically to Baghdad (like 
Professor Naim, Dr. Sharif and Dr. Omar ), well-being and the space of ʾamān were 
perceived as creating a possibility of practicing their profession in Amman as volunteers or 
hired employees on temporary contract. They saw this choice as acceptable as it establishes 
some connection with their professional life and Iraq because they could treat Iraqi patients 
and teach Iraqi students. This compensated for low returns, and was considered better than 
the possibility of third country resettlement, where they expected to end up sitting alone at 
home.  
 
In addition, perceptions of well-being among these highly qualified people varied according 
to their age and generation. Older highly skilled professionals, above 65, had experienced 
living abroad, as students or earlier employment, but now, considering their age, they realized 
that resettlement to a third country would mean inability to practice their profession. Thus, 
they decided to live and work in Amman or between Amman and Iraq. On the other hand, it 
was more common among the younger generation of skilled professionals, like Professor 
Balqees and Um-Tai (in their thirties) and Professor Waleed (early fifties) to think of 
migration and resettlement as the best possibility to move ahead in their personal and career 
life and to secure better future space(s) of ʾamān for their children. But there were few cases 
of highly qualified young professionals who still dreamed of returning to Iraq, as in the case 
of Dr. Tareq, who was in his late thirties and applied for a position in Erbil-Iraqi Kurdistan 
with the aim to assist in improving the health sector in Iraq. He liked to think of the well-
being of his two small kids as gaining access to free and good quality education and health 
services as his generation and his parents’ generation experienced in Baghdad during the 80s 
and 70s. He indicated that, eventually, he and his wife plan to search for jobs in Baghdad, 
when security conditions improve as they were before 2003 and state services and 
infrastructure would be restored, at least to their former levels, prior 1991.  
 
For other Iraqi professionals who had less sources of financial support and who wanted to 
preserve their former life style as members of middle- and upper-middle class, going back to 
work in Iraq had been a solution some turned to despite the risks involved, especially when 
finding a job in Jordan had become too complicated. Chatty and Mansour described such a 
movement of Iraqis back and forth as an important mechanism for improving life 
opportunities and reducing family risk (2011: 104). According to my observations in the 
field, this was more common among professionals: academics, engineers and physicians, in 
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addition to politicians and businessmen as earlier research indicated (Roald, 2011). These 
professionals left Iraq initially because they were targeted under the pretext of belonging to a 
professional or sectarian group. They had either received a direct threat as a written notice 
with a bullet; or, loss and damage had been caused to the person, his relatives or possessions 
(see Baker and Ismail, 2010). This reality had to be considered when making choices about 
what to do.  
 
Possibility 3- Working as ‘de-valued professionals’- outside their fields of 
competence 
The experiences of the third group of skilled Iraqis present cases of professionals who were 
not able to find opportunities to work in their former career and had to work instead in poorly 
paid jobs and sometimes degrading conditions. They are engineers, academics and doctors. 
Although they used to work as qualified professionals in their home country, in Jordan they 
had to accept any available work as secondary labor. Having less access to material resources 
and factional, sectarian or tribal support in Iraq, their economic conditions deteriorated and 
eventually some were forced to accept any available working task to increase their access to 
ʾamān. 
 
Iraqi professionals with dwindling resources could not afford to live and work between 
Amman and Jordan. They had to learn how to accept the reductionist conditions in Jordan 
where they were constantly reminded that they are foreigners and strangers who should be 
polite, and watch the limits. One interesting case was an Iraqi nuclear engineer who 
eventually decided that it would be best to quit his former profession that was perceived as a 
dangerous profession. He decided to become an artist, with the aim to gain resettlement. In 
his late thirties, Firas seemed very enthusiastic about his new profession:  
My life changed two years ago, when I was invited to attend the opening of a 
painting exhibition by a friend-artist. I decided then that this would be my new 
profession. I knew an old Iraqi painter who had lost everything after the fall of the 
regime. I used to visit him in his small rented room in downtown Amman where 
he lives from selling his paintings. I was determined to learn painting and spent 
long hours daily watching him until I mastered the Art.  
 
There was a big wall painting (almost 2x1 meters) hanging in the sitting room; the nuclear 
engineer-artist said that this was his latest work. I had already noticed the painting in the 
living room: a mixture of neatly arranged colors isolated by straight lines with a high dose of 
orange, which was also the color of the artist’s sweater and the greater part of his furniture. I 
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could relate this painting more to his original profession than to any school of modern plastic 
arts. He seemed interested when I first told him about my research, but refused to talk until I 
put my notebook aside. He said that he was always fond of chemistry and physics and got an 
MSc in nuclear physics and worked in his profession for 11 years in both Baghdad and Libya, 
but he preferred not to talk much about the past saying that it was high time to move on and 
do something else. Firas used to spend his days working as a part-time volunteer in an 
international organization in Amman, but it was his painting work in the evenings which kept 
him busy and satisfied, as he explained. He was proud of one of his drawings which had won 
a prize from one of the international organizations, and was planning to run a big exhibition 
at the end of the year.  
 
Unlike other Iraqis who attended training events and courses designed by aid providers to 
assist former Iraqi state bureaucrats and professionals to develop new skills that would help 
them establish their own small projects, this engineer arranged for his rehabilitation program 
alone by asking a former Iraqi artist and academic who used to teach Arts in the Institute of 
Fine Arts in Baghdad to teach him drawing. In the limited protection space offered by the 
UNHCR, Iraqis had to explore strategies and tactics to extend the constantly shrinking limits. 
In his attempt to expand the spaces of ʾamān, Firas decided to change his profession: “no 
foreign country would accept the resettlement of a former Iraqi nuclear engineer,” as he 
repeated. 
 
The most difficult cases among former highly skilled professionals were those who did not 
have adequate access to resources from family members elsewhere and could not return to 
work in Iraq due to high threats to their lives. They had to learn how to extend their safety 
space by selling their skills and expertise to other junior professionals and students. Such as 
highly qualified Iraqi doctors who had to work under the sponsorship of junior Jordanian 
doctors and earn low wages.  
 
I met an academic holding PhD in pharmacy, in her mid-forties. She complained that the 
Jordanian private university where she worked earlier did not renew her contract when she 
asked for an unpaid leave to proceed the difficult stages of her cancer treatment. She was not 
interested to share her story with a researcher when I met her and cynically mentioned that 
she can meet with me later if I could help support her next cancer treatment session. The 
limited support she could secure from different sources including her brother who lived 
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abroad and the UN cash assistance was not enough to cover the costs of her stay in Amman 
and pay for the expensive cancer treatment. So she started giving private courses in chemistry 
and mathematics for both school and university students for (JD 5-10 per hour; which equal 
US $7-14), in addition to writing assignments for university students who pay her JD 20 (US 
$ 28) per assignment. After working as a university professor for years, she had to turn to 
limited aid provided by international and local organizations including an Iraqi welfare 
association which provides support for cancer patients.  
 
Another Iraqi woman, a doctor, 43 years old, who used to work as a medical researcher in a 
governmental project, designed to examine the devastation caused by depleted uranium (DU) 
weapons used against Iraq during the 1991 US-led Gulf war. When I met her, she described 
angrily the serious threats which she experienced in Iraq after 2003, including the rape of her 
13-year-old daughter. Being a general practitioner in medicine, she failed to find any good-
paid jobs in her profession as a medical doctor in Amman. Using her former research 
experience and writing skills, she could do irregular academic writing tasks, in which she 
sold her copy-right for the books and research papers she composed on behalf of academic 
medical students and doctors teaching at Jordanian Universities. The largest amount of 
money she received per book was JD 500 (US $ 700) and sometimes she was only paid JD 
200 (US $ 280). She explained her reluctance to contact the UN for aid: “The last thing I 
wanted to do in my life was approaching the UN who were involved in destroying my 
country.” However, when her conditions deteriorated, she was advised to contact the 
UNHCR for assistance. But she was told that in her case resettlement was a weak possibility, 
due to her involvement in the DU weaponry research as she told me: “I had to turn to them to 
protect my children, they give us JD 160 (US $ 225) as cash assistance but resettlement is out 
of question, because I worked for the regime of my country, if I worked with the Americans I 
would have been eligible. I would do anything to secure better future for my daughters, who 
might be eligible for resettlement. It would be painful to live separated but they have no 





Possibility 4 – Searching for ʾamān in Europe and Jordan- The experience of 
Lutfiya al-Dulaimi, an Iraqi author 
The chaos in Baghdad gradually spread, deterring many possibilities Baghdad’s inhabitants 
had known in their former lives. Al-Badr brigade militia published online a death threat with 
list of names of authors, artists and journalists who were still living in Iraq. Lutfiya al-
Dulaimi’s name was on the list. 
 
Lutfiya al-Dulaimi, is an author who has dedicated her life to writing and has published 30 
books including fiction, drama and literary essays. She was 67 years old when she had to 
learn how to live a new life as a refugee in Paris. In December 2010, I met her at a publishing 
house in Amman. We had an interesting conversation about her life in Jordan and asylum 
experience in Paris. Following the meeting, I asked if I could interview her for the purpose of 
my research. She did not mind but preferred to put her responses in writing. She wrote about 
her recent experience living in between Amman and Paris, and much less about her former 
Baghdadi life. The longest part was about her asylum period in Paris which she described as 
the hardest stage of her life:  
A sudden, strange and completely groundless stage of my life for which I was not 
prepared. I felt as if being struck violently on my head to fall into an endless cycle 
of dizziness. I used to lead a good and relatively stable life in Baghdad; in my 
home: a large two-storey house with a lovely garden. I had a driver who used to 
assist me. I spent my early mornings taking care of the flowers and other plants in 
the garden where I liked to eat my breakfast in front of a beautiful fountain while 
listening to music. Then I would be ready to start my daily tasks of writing from 
eight a.m. till two p.m. in my spacious home library that faces the garden. I 
enjoyed my solitude at home and the only times I left my house were to prepare 
the new issue of the cultural magazine that I was editing. Halā is a periodical 
journal published every two months, concerned with texts on place and space. I 
prepared the fourth issue and it was ready for print before I left Baghdad in 2006. 
 
In my meeting with her, she told me that she had come to visit her daughter who had settled 
in Amman in 2005 following an attempted kidnapping of her husband. Al-Dulaimi’s plan 
was to return to Baghdad in a week’s time. However, this was in February 2006 when the 
explosion of Samarra mosque turned Baghdad into a sectarian killing zone. Her friends and 
relatives in Iraq advised her to stay in Amman for a while as her district, al-Amiriya, had 
turned into a battleground, as she described:  
I waited for the situation to improve, but the sectarian killings increased and al-
Qaida entered the neighborhood. I submitted an application to the Jordanian 
authorities for opening an office for Halā Journal in Amman, but the authorities 
refused. In the summer of 2006, I received the news from Baghdad that the 
American Marines accompanied with Iraqi armed forces were searching house-to-
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house in al-Amiriya and since my house was locked, they smashed the doors 
down and broke into it. They crashed the computer and the piano and destroyed 
the library and broke the antiques and dispersed our family photo albums and the 
clothes. When some of the neighbors tried to stop the destruction by telling them 
that the house belongs to a well-known author, the soldiers screamed at them: 
“Shut up, you are all terrorists.” I arranged with one of my relatives to repair the 
doors and lock the house, and he arranged later for relatives to stay in the house to 
protect it from an Islamic militia who wanted to accommodate the families of 
mujāhidīn (fighters) there. 
  
Lutfiya al-Dulaimi was attending a conference in Paris when she and other authors were 
threatened by an Iraqi parliament member from one of the religious parties. It was then that 
she first thought to apply for asylum in France and is “when a new stage of my life started” to 
use her words. She describes her experience as a refugee in Paris as a big disaster. She would 
stand in the long queue with other refugees from six o’clock in the morning till four o’clock 
in the afternoon to renew her monthly residence permit: “I was standing in the rain trying to 
be patient, but soon my tears would fall when I remembered how my life had been turned 
upside down. I was lost and did not know what to do, having been deprived of my Iraqi 
passport after getting myself stuck with asylum and refugee applications; as a refugee 
applicant I had no documentation except a temporary residence permit with my number on it. 
I was reduced to a mere number. I cried every night until my left eye started bleeding and 
they refused to treat it because I had no medical insurance.  
 
The French authorities did not care. I was invited by several French TV stations to present 
information about the Arabic and Islamic culture according to a discourse that presents Arabs 
and Muslims as backward or even terrorists. I refused to be used by the media to serve others’ 
interests and discourses; I refused to allow them to take advantage of my critical situation and 
force me to attack my culture and memories. 
 
Getting a permanent residence for ten years did not make it easier for her: “what can I do 
spending ten years in France without accommodation or passport?” She described the pain 
she had gone through in her attempts to find a room to rent. In the end, she rented a room on 
the eighth floor in a far suburb of Paris which she preferred to the room she had been offered 
to rent in a shelter for sick old people in Paris. She used to leave her rented apartment in the 
suburb in the mornings and spend two hours commuting to school where she attended lessons 
to learn French language: first she had to take a bus, then a train and finally the metro to 
reach the House of Journalists in Paris where she attended French language lessons. Every 
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evening she would take the same journey back to her rented room in the Parisian suburb, until 
the day when she was attacked by three men who pushed her, one trying to steal her laptop 
and another pulling her handbag. She was screaming when they managed to grab the laptop 
and run. An Algerian man intervened to help her and called the police. The police officer 
informed her that this was not an uncommon incident, especially in that suburb where they 
recorded 15 criminal cases daily. She spent the rest of her second year in Paris moving from 
one friend’s house to another while they were away to take care of their pets. She was cut off 
from her previous routine and life with no time to write and without a valid travel document. 
Her visa applications to attend cultural events in Qatar and Egypt were turned down because 
she had a refugee passport:  
Finally, I decided to put an end to this hell, it was on the day when we, as 
refugees, were invited to attend an event by the Migration and Integration 
Department to prepare us to integrate in the French society, another experience 
with racism to add to previous experiences that are too many to mention and I do 
not want to remember them now. I went to the Jordanian Embassy in Paris and 
they promised that the visa would be ready in two weeks. I was so happy when I 
got the visa. I carried only one of my bags which I had already packed and kept 
the rest of my things with friends. I had to save my soul and couldn’t believe it 
when the airplane took off from Charles de Gaulle airport and flew to al-Aqaba 
airport, it felt as if I had been saved from a death sentence in the last moment.  
 
To my question about how she thought of being in Amman, she replied:  
I consider myself a migrant in a homeland where I was offered residence and 
ʾamān after living through unbelievable suffering. My soul settled here and 
because I feel secure in a familiar place I have managed to publish two books in 
two years and I am working on a third one. I cannot return to Iraq and I will never 
think of it although I left all my belongings there. My children are in exile and I 
have no one in Iraq except a few friends who visit Amman every now and then. 
My daughter and many of my friends live here and I can write freely and leave 
my home anytime and meet with friends whenever I want. I prefer to spend most 
of my time alone to be able to work and write. For many years, homeland was a 
real hell, even before the US-led occupation, but after 2003 the hell turned into an 
inferno. The European exile was a disaster and it felt like another hell, I managed 
to find the cure from the emotional idea of homeland. My homeland is the place 
where I can live with dignity, and where I feel secure and respected. Homeland 
becomes sometimes an enslaving concept that forces us to behave in a sick 
fetishism: I have escaped this state when I decided to deal with the idea of 
homeland in a different logic. I have not abandoned Iraq; I write in an Iraqi 
newspaper for Iraqi readers and I am interested in the Iraqi cause and constantly 
address its problems through my writings. I am always in contact with my friends 
in Iraq. But in the end: writing became my homeland and Amman is the house of 
this homeland. I worked in the worst conditions and have tasted the bitterness of 
life in Iraq and France; I learned to live in ʾamān and to accept the life of ascetics 




Loss -of balance -of daily routine and -of dignity is another bitter taste of the asylum 
experience. Establishing a space of ʾamān in the above long story that this well-known Iraqi 
author shared with me was linked to restoring the balance and life routine that Lutfiya al-
Dulaimi used to enjoy in her former Baghdadi life. Amman in this case offered her greater 
potential to stay in contact with her networks of readers and friends and most importantly to 
save her dignity through writing despite the poor living conditions compared to her former 
life in Baghdad.  
 
Lutfiya al-Dulaimi’s painful experience of exile in Paris force us to rethink asylum in a 
global age. Globalization, among its supporters, promises an era of increased prosperity and 
decreased obstacles to the movement of capital, information and people. According to this 
prescription‒ the dominant account of globalization‒ mass displacement of people is likely to 
become less significant and the tragedies of refugees in the twentieth century will be 
remembered as a mark of the tortured decades that preceded a new era. As Marfleet, using 
various examples from the European Union, states in Refugees in a Global Era: The more 
that the world system fails to conform to the model of growth and global harmony, the more 
eager are those in authority to displace responsibility onto the victims of conflict and social 
breakdown. Refugees are reviled and rejected, becoming the focal point of campaigns 
through which they are made to carry more and more of the historic burden of racism (2006: 
2-5). Matthew Price tells us that there are over nine million refugees recognized by the 
UNHCR in the world. Only a small fraction of these refugees receive asylum in western 
states; the vast majority are unable to make their way to Europe or North America where they 
would be able to apply. Asylum, therefore, neglects those refugees who arguably need 
protection the most: those who lack the resources and mobility to remove themselves from 
the zone of danger (2009: 12). 
 
Gaining refugee status and resettlement in a third country seemed like the most practical 
choice for Iraqis who did not have other means to support themselves and their families in 
Jordan. Iraqis who have remained well-connected and networked with relatives at home and 
elsewhere have learnt from those who had already got refugee status that one should not 
expect to keep the professional and family status he and she owned in their homeland: “To be 
offered a new homeland, gives one a place to be. But these achievements do not guarantee 
respect and dignity, and a certain yearning persists”, as Knudsen describes the experiences he 
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observed among Vietnamese refugees in Norway (2005: 21). Dignity is what Lutfiya al-
Dulaimi could not feel in her Parisian asylum but managed to regain through writing in 
Jordan, as she expressed.  
 
During my fieldwork in 2010-2011, I met other Iraqis who had registered with the UNHCR 
and gained resettlement to the USA, but chose to return after spending several months in 
what was supposed to be their new home. Some blamed the US resettlement system which 
did not provide adequate assistance equal to the European System. Others complained that 
they did not have families or friends to help them start a new life in the USA. A third group 
simply felt insecure raising their children in a society with different values.  
 
Losing one’s professional status and dignity was another concern among highly qualified 
Iraqi professionals. This sense of loss did not only result from losing one’s material 
belongings, it felt painful and hard when one thought of the reduction in his/her social status 
or symbolic capital. Back in Baghdad, Iraqis were members of various professional, highly 
skilled state employees and social networks. Today in Amman or elsewhere, they have been 
reduced to foreigners or alien individuals struggling to survive between Iraq and Jordan or 
waiting to become refugees in a third state.  
 
Moving between different labels and places 
Most of the highly skilled professionals and state-bureaucrats I interviewed belonged to 
middle aged and older generation Iraqis, those aged from 40-80. Most of them completed 
their university graduate studies abroad (in European Universities), and benefitted from the 
Iraqi government system of fellowship. In Jordan, they had to go through a longer coping 
process to create their space(s) of ʾamān. While some would contemplate returning to Iraq 
(Professor Salim and Dr. Tareq), or gain resettlement in a third country (Professor Balqees 
and Professor Waleed), others, like Dr. Omar (whose case opened the Introductory chapter) 
and Dr. Sharif (in this chapter), who were both well-known medical doctors among Iraqis I 
met in Jordan, preferred to stay in Jordan in connection with their Iraqi patients, as long as 
their lives are threatened inside Iraq. This applies as well to Lutfiya al-Dulaimi who went 
through a longer journey to decide that, at her age, being close to her readers in Jordan and 
Iraq allowed her more space— than the space she could gain by becoming a refugee in 




Bourdieu’s metaphor of “cutting one’s coat according to one’s cloth” can be seen in the 
complex practices adopted by these Iraqi professionals, through the various labels they 
tended to use to describe their presence in Jordan. Dr. Sharif who chose to work temporarily 
as volunteer instead of accepting the UNHCR solution of resettlement in the USA described 
his presence in Jordan as a ‘fugitive’ and Dr. volunteer rather than a refugee. While Professor 
Naim who could secure a temporary job at a private Jordanian university with reduced 
academic roles but increased interest in reading and writing poetry, described his condition as 
an Iraqi living in exile, which reminded me of the Lebanese poets of exile in the early 
twentieth century. These Iraqi professionals were aware of the reductionist conditions of 
displacement that had turned them from highly skilled professionals in Iraq to volunteers or 
‘fungible’ workers in Jordan, however they did not passively accept these conditions, as 
observed in the field, most of them acted as agents in “a complex relation to the possible.” 
Dr. Sharif, in his seventies, while denied a position as academic, tried to prolong his 
professional life by working as a volunteer doctor, while he kept the refugee label as a 
reserve strategy of ʾamān (in case the conditions change in Jordan). Professor Naim, at the 
age of 63, could still find an academic position at a Jordanian private university, where his 
former role as dean and researcher was reduced to teaching, yet he managed to extend this 
role by establishing contact with Iraqi academics through distance learning and academic 
research and curriculum-design cooperation.  
 
Unlike younger professionals such as Professor Balqees and Waleed, who considered 
resettlement to a third state, and Dr. Tareq and Professor Salim, who planned to return to 
work in Iraq, for Dr. Omar and Dr. Sharif their choices were restricted within the possible 
limits of what they perceived as the best choice. They made a decision to stay in Amman as 
long as they could afford living there. For them ʾamān was related on the one side to self-
actualization by preserving one’s former social status and career that would not be possible if 
these professionals accepted to resettle abroad, and on the other side, the well-being of these 
Iraqi doctors (and other cases of professionals presented in this chapter) is relational; related 
to the well-being of other fellow Iraqis. As elaborated by Jackson (2011) and al-Mohammad 
(2015), well-being is related to their ethical commitment to share ʾamān with others; family 
members, friends and fellow Iraqis. At this moment, the option of taking up voluntary work 
or working in low-paid jobs seemed essential for these physicians as they perceived their 
well-being in relation to the well-being of sick Iraqis who required urgent medical assistance. 
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Their intention to help was achieved by prolonging their stay in Jordan. Both physicians were 
aware of the limitations of this possibility, as they explained that one is not supposed to 
exploit the space of protection in Jordan beyond its limited capacity. In their attempts to 
extend ʾamān, Iraqis, like Dr. Sharif and Dr. Omar could fill the little vacant spaces that were 
less attractive to local Jordanians in terms of salary or the type of work or employment 
benefits.  
 
In general, Iraqis belonging to the older generation who had been part of the state 
bureaucracy during the sixties and seventies and had contributed to the construction of the 
modern Iraqi state referred to deeper levels of loss. In the stories of Iraqis from this older 
generation, Iraq is presented as a place linked to high cultural and educational opportunities 
and a secular life style where Iraqis from different religions and sects could enjoy free 
education, rewarding employment opportunities and live a rather good life in inter-mixed 
institutions and neighborhoods. Such a vision was less present in the stories of younger 
generations about the late eighties and nineties. They grew up during wartime and had to 
witness the decline in Iraqi educational and cultural life, health services and infrastructure 
during the 90s, and the politicization of sectarianism in Iraqi neighborhoods and government 
after 2003, eventually migration seemed more appropriate solution for the majority of 
younger professionals. 
 
The individual cases presented in Chapter Three bring us to the issue of possibilities which 
agents create in conditions of increasingly restricted opportunities. Former Iraqi qualified 
professionals had to learn how to find a space to work with several structural problems 
resulting from the decline in state development programs and eventual destruction of state 
institutions. The cases present various levels of constraints these professionals had to deal 
with in their attempts to identify possibilities to work in Jordan, Iraq and elsewhere after 
2003. Eventually they had to adjust to the new conditions, and work in jobs that were below 
their level of education and expertise.  
 
Making a space of ʾamān in the long run, with dwindling resources, many times involved the 
strategy of sacrificing one’s former role as professional, father, or mother. As presented in the 
two cases within the third group above, the doctor and pharmacist-academic who had to sell 
their skills and knowledge in the cheapest private market, while the young engineer decided 
to quit his former profession as nuclear engineer (that might harm his migration file) hoping 
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to gain better chances as an artist. These professionals seemed to have less chances to extend 
their well-being by practicing their former jobs, they had to learn how to work within reduced 
limits or what Jackson described as “the ethic of living within limits rather than struggling to 
transcend them” (2011: 150).  
 
The ethnographic details in this chapter presented part of the complexity involved in the 
decisions and choices Iraqi professionals considered to extend their space(s) of ʾamān and 
well-being. There are multiple factors involved that are usually ignored by international 
organizations in their decisions to classify asylum seekers running from war. The details of 
the cases described above indicate how individual Iraqis— in the absence of a collective body 
to govern their protection in Amman and Baghdad— had to consider complex choices for 
survival including circular migration and going back to work in Iraq under the protection of 
one’s tribe or sectarian faction. Earlier experiences with wars and survival during economic 
sanctions seemed like points of reference that Iraqis appropriated in their search to make their 
spaces of ʾamān after 2003. In his study of  warscapes in another troubled region (Africa), 
Lubkemann found similar trends:  
“Warscapes and other crisis contexts are full of individuals who decide to stay, to 
resist, and to risk the worst consequences, making choices that to outside analysts 
seem “self-evidently”  the worst ones to make. Yet far from demonstrating poor 
judgment, such choices usually demonstrate that the terms in which warscape 
inhabitants evaluate and interpret their life circumstances differ in substantial 
ways from those of the analysts who theorize their behavior. […] Rather, war-
time movement reflected the complex ways in which warscape inhabitants sought 
to realize culturally imagined life projects and negotiate the meaning and 
configuration of social relations as socially positioned and differentiated actors” 
(2008, 20-21). 
 
One of the strategies observed among this group of qualified Iraqi professionals in their 
attempts to deal with their expulsion from their former jobs in Iraq on the one hand and the 
lack of job opportunities in Jordan on the other hand, was to keep a low profile in the public 
space and increase one’s professional role through private channels. Keeping a low profile in 
the public space was the first step in extending their space of ʾamān; several Iraqi 
professionals, like Professor Naim, Dr. Sharif, Dr. Sabah (um-Tai’s father) and Shaima’s 
father tried actively to pursue their careers by extending the limits to practice their 
professions between Amman and Iraq, and using the tactic of keeping a low profile or what 
they described as ‘politeness’ in the often repeated phrase shared by Iraqis in Jordan: 
“stranger be polite.” Being a “polite” worker— in both Jordan and postinvasion Iraq— means 
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to stay within the shrinking limits that govern foreign workers, while their “stranger” 
position, i.e. not being defined strictly as refugees or asylum-seekers with clear rights and 
entitlements allowed them more space to constantly negotiate their limited conditions of 
existence and explore other ways to expand their spaces of ʾamān among different labels.  
 
Personal achievements and well-being, especially among the older generation of Iraqi 
professionals were presented as part of their hopes to enhance their country health 
infrastructure, in addition to realizing their personal professional and material aspirations. As 
indicated by Professor Naim and Dr. Tareq, they tended to perceive their employment and 
academic training in Baghdad (or abroad funded by former Iraqi governmental scholarship) 
as part of building a strong and modern nation-state. This was not restricted to Iraqis who had 
left Iraq recently. Some of the academics and medical doctors, like Professor Salim and 
others had come to Jordan in 1990s to escape the harsh conditions of al-ḥiṣār; they too 
complained that their possibilities to work as qualified academics in Jordan were shrinking 
every year and turned to search for ways to return to work in Iraq.  
 
In their positions as ‘stranger workers’ in Jordan, these Iraqis were careful with how they 
operated in public spaces. This was part of a strategy of self-protection and a protection of 
their ability to extend their ʾamān potentials. Thus Professor Naim kept a low-profile as he 
was advised to do in order to keep his job at the Jordanian university. His academic work was 
reduced to giving the required lecturing hours without further tasks, to avoid any unnecessary 
confrontations with students, their parents or the Jordanian university administration. Yet, he 
did what he called “serious academic work” from home by working from a distance with 
Iraqi academics and universities to assist in developing their teaching and research programs.  
 
On the other hand, Shaima’s father and Dr. Sabah, decided to take the risk and return to 
Baghdad as an option to work in their profession and ensure more rewarding employment 
conditions and higher standards of living for their families in Amman. Dr. Sabah, formerly a 
famous surgeon in Baghdad could not return to his house and neighborhood in Baghdad, 
instead he moved to work in a private hospital in his original town in Iraq, where he was 
protected by his tribal family. Similarly, Professor Salim was counting on his “Sunni wife’s 
family and good neighbors protection” to return to his house in Baghdad in a neighborhood 
re-populated with a majority of Sunnis after 2003, while he relied on his sectarian affiliation 
as a Shia; he expected that being a Shii academic would be safer than being Sunni academic 
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in Iraq today. Shaima’s father, however, had no access to factional, sectarian or tribal 
protection, and he kept a lower profile by choosing to live as a stranger or foreign migrant 
worker, in the Iraqi hospital where he used to work before. For all three, they were living as 
“polite strangers”, in lower-profile than their previous status, whether in Amman or in Iraq. 
   
Working conditions in Jordan were better during 1990s, as Iraqi academics were paid 
according to the Jordanian academic scale taking into consideration their former expertise 
and qualifications. With the acceleration of privatization and the opening of several private 
universities in Jordan, many non-Jordanian academics were dismissed from governmental 
universities, despite the role they played in establishing some colleges in the fields of 
engineering, medicine and other scientific fields. Following the 2003 war, former Iraqi 
professors who were employed at Jordanian governmental universities had to move to work 
in private universities on temporary contract basis. 
 
Generational differences affected the decisions of these Iraqi qualified workers concerning 
their current and future professional plans, when it comes to their different perceptions of 
their past and future well-being and their access to resources. However, in cases of increasing 
impoverishment, the distinctive patterns were less clear in the attempts observed among 
members of the older and younger generations to locate employment opportunities after 
2003. The generations concerned here are the older generation of professionals who had 
joined the state bureaucracy during the sixties and seventies and those who graduated and 
were employed by the Iraqi government during the late eighties and nineties and the younger 
generation who were born during the 1980s.33 The processes to negotiate the terms of 
survival were more related to their professional specialization, personal experiences with 
state destruction and the ensuing losses (and gains) they and their families had experienced 
during the last four decades than generational differences; Iraqis from the same generation 
learnt to handle losses in different ways depending on their access to material and social 
capital inside and outside Iraq, and their perceptions of well-being.  
 
In their attempts to expand the limited space of protection provided by international 
organizations, these displaced Iraqi professionals merged all available sources from their 
local and global networks. Having access to material and/or symbolic capital made Iraqis 
                                                      
33 In their studies of various features of Iraqi society, Khoury (2013), Davis (2005) and Campbell (2016) use 
another classification by distinguishing between the revolution generation and the war generation.  
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look ‘less vulnerable’ than the exemplary vulnerable victims who would ‘normally’ deserve 
the UNHCR support. To answer my question about the discrepancies between the high 
numbers of Iraqi “refugees” announced by the Jordanian government in donor conferences 
and the low numbers of Iraqis who had actually registered in the UNHCR, the UNHCR 
spokeswoman responded that: “Iraqis are resourceful.”  
 
The cases presented in this chapter show that this is not a special talent or ability restricted to 
Iraqis. In the absence of formal protection programs, Iraqis who had been successful 
professionals and state-employees in Baghdad had to learn how to be resourceful, through 
complex and risky processes of negotiations, in order to extend their spaces of ʾamān within 
the limited structures created by the new conditions of war and the absence of the Iraqi state 
with its oppressive and protective apparatus. They gradually realized that their educational 
and professional capital was no longer transferable or valuable as it used to be perceived 
during the state semi-socialist development plan in 1960s-1980s. The possibility to live as 
Iraqi professionals who were excluded from the new Iraq was associated with being able to 
practice their profession and making good living. What made it easier for some of these 
highly skilled professionals is that they had more access to capital through an indirect 
relationship with Iraq, which enabled them to act as agents exploring new potentials of 
existence in Jordan by becoming volunteer workers or turning to a latent talent or becoming a 
migrant worker in one’s former home country.  
 
As explored in the various cases, several factors were involved in the decisions of these Iraqi 
families to stay in Amman, or return to work and live between Iraq and Jordan and/ or wait 
for resettlement. One of the important factors include: former experiences with state rise and 
decline, ethnic and sectarian affiliation, access to financial resources and social connections 
in Amman and Baghdad, and access to symbolic capital. The former experiences of learning 
to live with structural change affected these professionals’ choices and the decisions they 
made. This will become clearer in the next chapter which explores other means of survival 






Iraqis stuck in Amman: On the conditions of ‘–lessness’ and how to be 
‘most vulnerable/ eligible for aid’ in the formal space of protection 
 
1. 
Um Muhammad, the fortuneteller, 
the woman from whose thin neck 
dangles what initially appears to be a necklace, 




She said that when 
she crossed the border, 
she knew that she might never see it 
again in this world. 
 
2. 
She said it contains a handful of the 
homeland’s dirt. 
She sat on a stone bench, 
at the Hashimiyya Square, in Amman, 
with thousands of others, 
waiting for a visa, to any country. 
4 
Therefore, she will carry it, 
like a yoke, wherever she ends up. 
Wherever she ends up,  
she will carry this black pouch of dirt. 
  
by Sargon Boulus34  
 
 
“To attract money, refugees must be visible” (emphasis in original)  
-Harrell-Bond (1986: 8) 
 
In 2010-2011, when I did my fieldwork, Iraqis were still crossing the border from Iraq to 
Jordan, officially termed as ‘guests’, ‘Arab fellows’ or ‘Iraqi brothers’ when mentioned in 
governmental reports and local media. In reports from UNHCR and their partners, they were 
labeled as ‘asylum seekers’ or ‘certified refugees’. In academic reports and also reports from 
various NGO institutions they were referred to by the terms ‘exiles’ and also ‘refugees’. I 
observed how Iraqis, in the process of creating their spaces of ʾamān, constantly had to 
negotiate among these different labels and the realities they implied. While, as we saw in the 
former chapter, affluent Iraqis were able to buy residency permits, which secured them rights 
to reside, work, travel and gain access to public and private services in Jordan, those who 
could not afford these services found themselves in limbo, with no legal status, no jobs, and 
little to no health care or (higher) education for their children. 
 
                                                      
34 From ‘Azma Ukhra li-Kalb al-Qabila (Another Bone for the Tribe’s Dog) by Sargon Boulus (Beirut/Baghdad: 




Iraqi women and men, who were like Um-Muhammad in Sargon Boulus’ poem, seeking 
ʾamān in Amman, or waiting to move ahead in search of ʾamān elsewhere through a visa, 
smugglers’ services or the UNHCR’s assistance to resettle in a third country. Many of them 
were running from war conditions, while they carried memories from home that was no 
longer safe, “like a yoke”, that accompanies them in their search for other possibilities to live 
according to their perceptions of well-being. 
 
In this chapter I leave the explicit focus on individuals with a professional competence as part 
of their adaptive resources, and look at other Iraqis who possess fewer individual resources 
and therefore also had difficulties in earning their own living. This group had different 
experiences from the experiences of the professionals I presented in Chapter Three. A major 
difference was the fact that these Iraqis were seeking to obtain the status of ‘refugee’ which 
meant that they would belong within the ‘formal protection space’ organized and run by the 
UNHCR and other aid organizations. The positions of formal asylum seekers or refugees 
were obtained by different strategies. I observed how they did their best to prove that they 
were eligible to the rights and benefits provided by the UNHCR system. The aim was clearly 
to qualify first as an ‘asylum seeker’ and, more importantly, to qualify to the status of 
‘refugee’ eligible for protection and resettlement in a third country. But to succeed the person 
had to be classified among the ‘most vulnerable’. 
 
As we know by now, other Iraqis made different choices. They seemed to ignore the formal 
UNHCR protection systems, such as in the cases presented in Chapter Three. Several highly 
skilled Iraqi professionals relied on their own resources. Others gave up on UNHCR after 
several experiences of interviews in which they realized that they did not have much to gain 
by engaging with those systems. In such cases the people involved turned to explore other 
possibilities of making their ʾamān space. But in all cases that I observed Iraqis were 
struggling to understand and learn how to respond to this complexity of labels that were 
applied to govern their presence in Jordan. Whatever happened to them, the one thing they 
understood was that in Jordan they were and would remain ‘strangers’. 
 
This variation in the understanding of the labels assigned to Iraqis in Jordan also implied that 
they were treated in different ways, according to the different bureaucratic and political rules 
and regulations that applied to the different terms. In the context of this chapter my focus is 
on those who carried the label of ‘refugee’ which also meant that the term “-lessness” 
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becomes particularly relevant. In general, and as indicated in the title of the chapter, I use the 
term “-lessness” to express a situation of reduction in being. Obviously –lessness is a suffix, 
and as explained in the introductory chapter it is a common suffix used in the terminology of 
refugee-related literature: homelessness, statelessness, powerlessness, helplessness, 
speechlessness, hopelessness, rootlessness, rightlessness, meaninglessness and other such 
terms which describe human existence in conditions of reduction.  
 
The current chapter is an ethnographic attempt to understand how this -lessness and reduction 
in being and well-being is reproduced in the encounter of ‘refugees’ with humanitarian aid in 
the case of Iraqis in Jordan. This -lessness is one stage of what I will call the ontological 
conditions of reduction in well-being that the majority of Iraqi professionals and state 
bureaucrats had to undergo in the long years of wars, economic sanctions and forced 
displacement, though some experienced more losses than others. As indicated in the former 
chapter, some members of the relatively affluent professionals had failed to continue working 
in their former professions. Such a failure could result in a process of economic decline that 
landed them in a situation in which they felt compelled to enter the formal protection space to 
be discussed in this chapter. To do this they joined many other poorer Iraqis who also tried to 
be accepted as refugees to become eligible for the UNHCR limited aid and protection 
services. For them all this implies that they joined a “race to the bottom”, meaning that they 
all had to present themselves as ‘poorer than the poorest Jordanians’ to be eligible for the 
cash assistance and other in-kind and financial aid in Jordan. While resettlement in a third 
country, which became the aim of many impoverished Iraqis was limited to only a few who 
had to enter through formal screening and selection process to determine their eligibility for 
this solution. This increased the waiting time in the transit for many Iraqis, who had to learn 
how to deal with economic deprivation, because of the rules and restrictions which did not 
allow these groups of Iraqi former professionals and state employees to take up any legal 
employment in Jordan. The tension produced by this situation led to feelings of insecurity 
and lack of ʾamān among Iraqis, in addition to rising frustration among both Iraqis and aid 
workers as expressed in the spread of rumors about future possibilities for employment 




House-visits and the production of –lessness 
I start this chapter with some visual images of –lessness, to move on to explore 
ethnographically the complexities involved in managing humanitarian aid by referring to 







While in the field, there were many cameras around capturing the faces and places of Iraqis 
in various states of –lessness. The pictures above were taken by a private aid organization and 
distributed through a mailing list to potential donors. Such images of -lessness of Iraqis were 
not made visible in the public space but they were presented in fundraising campaigns, during 
donors meetings and in the correspondence between institutions involved illustrating what 
was to be meant by the category of ‘most vulnerable’. 
 
To support the ‘most vulnerable’ Iraqis, the UNHCR and its partner organizations 
(international and local NGOs, local community centers including a few private initiatives) 
developed what is termed as an ‘outreach service’ with the aim of helping Iraqis get access to 
healthcare, education, training for income generation skills, legal protection, and other in-
kind services and cash donations. In order to evaluate who should be accepted into the formal 
‘protection space’, the outreach service initiated the ‘house-visit’ as a key mechanism in their 
methodology for selecting who should get support. I was present during several visits to Iraqi 
households observing both new arrivals, and families and individuals who had spent years 




The house-visit (ziyāra manziliyya) was usually conducted by a volunteer who was 
her/himself an Iraqi and who was paid for this type of activity a minimal monthly wage 
ranging between (JD 160 – 250, approximately US $ 225-350). The paid-volunteers 
(generally called volunteers) collected data to fill the forms they were asked to complete by 
the relevant organization they worked for. During the house visits some of the volunteers 
represented more than one organization and would fill in more than one questionnaire/report. 
In addition, they also usually took pictures to support the data in their written reports.  
 
Pictures were important evidence to document the house-visit. Iraqis were sometimes told by 
the volunteers that: “The photos will be added to the visit report and support your need for 
assistance.” I noticed that some volunteers focused on capturing the faces of the household 
members, while others took pictures of some details that showed visible signs of need among 
household members. Volunteers rarely bothered to explain why they would have to take 
pictures and Iraqis did not ask either. Actually, the house-visit evolved in ways that gave me 
the impression that everybody knew what roles they were supposed to perform, as if they 
were on a stage, in this case the stage of aid.  
 
Iraqis knew that in order to be considered for the ‘cash emergency assistance’— what is 
commonly called by most Iraqis in the field as ‘salary/ rātib’— they would have to provide 
‘strong’ or ‘well-founded’ evidence(s) of need. And volunteers, who were most of the time 
Iraqis, knew that in order to receive their remuneration (which they also called salary/ rātib), 
they would have to submit complete reports with consistent data on the families under 
consideration. 
 
Again, the photos played an important role. It was commonly accepted that the strongest 
evidence is the evidence that can be presented in the most visible way. For instance, during 
one of the home visit I observed, a father who called his 15-year old son and lifted up his 
shirt:  
Look what they did to him. They [he referred to one of the several sectarian 
militia groups in Baghdad] sent us a threatening letter to leave our home in 
Baghdad. In the beginning, I did not consider it a serious threat. They kidnapped 
my daughter and we never found her, she did not come back and we still have 
heard nothing about her till today, God only knows what happened to her! [He 
hands a paper to the volunteer, with eyes full of tears] This is my story, in detail; 
there are things that I cannot tell in front of everyone. They came again. In the 
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second time, they tried to kidnap my son […] no, not to kidnap him; they wanted 
to kill him, openly, in the daytime. He stepped out from our home door, they 
pulled him, tightened his body with a rope to the back of their Jeep-car and 
dragged him for miles. The rope, it seemed, was not strong and was cut. Our 
neighbors rescued him. Every part in his body was torn, we did not expect him to 
live after this incident, but here he is, still alive and half insane.  
 
The volunteer asked if he could take pictures of those parts of the boy’s body, the legs and 
the chest where the skin was severely damaged. He got the permission and he reassured the 
Iraqi man by telling him: “you have a good case here.”   
 
The above pictures do not differ much in their -lessness from the images that pop up on the 
screen if we do a simple online search. When one types the word ‘refugee’, the image section 
of the search engine will show pictures of people, both in groups and as individuals, 
especially women and children, in what seems to be a constant display of –lessness. The 
images create an instant impression of people in need of help, and stands in stark contrast to 
the look of Angelina Jolie, the Hollywood actress who is one of the UNHCR special celebrity 
envoys. Her photos appear alongside the photos of the refugees, thus adding to the effect of 
the photographs.35 Photos taken in refugee situations anywhere, at different times, all express 
a similar story, a story of –lessness. Taken together, the general impression from photos of 
this type is that they reflect an understanding of the concept of –lessness that functions in the 
same way as “brand names.” In this logic, –lessness plays the role of “branding” in 
marketing.  
 
Pictures, documents and stories were and are important means to attract aid money and 
donations, as Harrell-Bond observed in her seminal book Imposing Aid (1986). In the Iraqi 
case the management of aid was not centrally controlled by the UNHCR. The UNHCR and 
other international organizations certainly played an important role but different local NGOs 
and private initiatives were also involved. Iraqis in need would turn to all aid providers who 
claim to offer assistance. A woman who was desperately approaching aid organizations to ask 
for money she needed to pay for her cancer treatment described her negative experiences with 
aid providers whom she called “abusive beggars, whose only task was to collect stories about 
Iraqis in order to get access to more funds.” She elaborated on her criticism by telling me her 
story: “I did not hesitate to give them copies of my medical reports because I thought that 
                                                      
 35 For a critique of celebrity humanitarianism, see (Kapoor, 2012). 
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they would provide assistance for my treatment, but I was shocked when a friend who did not 
know about my illness called me to tell me that she saw my medical report on Facebook.”36 I 
discovered later that this woman, my informant, who had a Ph D in Pharmacy, was referring 
to a private aid initiative run by a foreign woman in coordination with other Iraqi volunteers. 
They followed similar procedures as other organizations, in collecting dramatic information 
and then contacting wealthy Iraqis to ask them to contribute with money which is then 
distributed to the families they visit. In my brief meetings with people involved in a few of 
these initiatives I could notice that many of them seemed well-organized, with well defined 
duties for volunteers to make them more efficient in bringing in money. And for all of them 
the organized efforts at fund-raising seemed to be more profitable for the organizers than the 
Iraqi families they claimed to assist. 
 
The ‘production’ of refugees 
This chapter presents my observations of the design and practices of humanitarian assistance 
provided to Iraqis who successfully proved their –lessness and were thus deserving of the 
cash assistance and in-kind aid. I refer to ethnographic cases from the field to illustrate the 
encounters between Iraqis and aid organizations. My impression was that this system of aid 
did not serve to protect Iraqis in need. On the contrary, and paradoxically, it reproduced their 
existence in a condition of -lessness. The paradox lies in the idea of humanitarian aid that is 
embedded in a universal discourse on international law and more recently on human rights, 
while, in practice, the provision of aid (in this Iraqi case) reduced human rights into needs. 
With reference to Agamben (1998) I argue that part of the problem results from the persisting 
humanitarian ideology that designs its protection programs based on the logic of dividing 
human life into the bios, or qualified life “which indicated the form or way of living proper to 
an individual or a group”, and the zoé, or unqualified life “expressing the simple fact of living 
common to all living beings (animals or humans)” (Ibid., 1-4). The following sections present 
observations from the field that give ethnographic substance to what effects this line of 
thinking had on humanitarian protection in general and the protection of Iraqi refugees in this 
case.  
 
                                                      
36 Interview on 6 April 2011.  
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Drawing the boundaries of the protection space 
To be counted for aid, Iraqis had to constantly reproduce themselves in the standard visible 
image of –lessness and being in need. In an interview with a UNHCR representative I asked 
about a case of an Iraqi family whose emergency cash assistance was stopped because their 
conditions of living were “not considered poor enough.” The reason for this was that 
UNHCR discovered that one of daughters in the family was attending college. The answer of 
the UNHCR representative came immediately: “You know that many Jordanians cannot 
afford to send their sons and daughters to college? Do you want me to give this Iraqi family 
money to send their girl to college while others don’t find money to feed their kids? Iraqis, 
you know, have this culture of dependence on aid, regardless of their real need.”37 
 
His question is an important one, not because it answered my question, but because it forces 
us to rethink the meaning of a refugee. The term refugee was fixed by the international bodies 
who have claimed the legal responsibility to protect man’s basic rights or more accurately, in 
this case, man’s basic needs. This family whose monthly cash assistance was stopped for 
having a daughter in college presents one example of the different boundaries and meanings 
of needs among refugees and aid institutions. In his discussion of Vietnamese refugee 
experiences, Knudsen (2005) uses what he calls “technical terms” to refer to the encounter 
between refugees and relief workers. He refers to two terms: the first term “therapeutic 
strategies” refers to the ways relief workers base their help on pre-conceptions about 
refugees, while the second term “coping strategies” refers to the ways refugees handle the 
uncertainties that face them. Knudsen explains that “Coping strategies, especially, involve a 
process, a hope for better times and, perhaps, for peace. Ironically, new ways of coping are 
introduced through the relief workers’ ‘therapeutic’ paradigm, and these imply a promise; a 
conviction that, having sorted everything out, the past will fall to rest; for a person in pain, 
such sense making is senseless” (ibid., 88).   
 
Knudsen observations of the tensions in the encounter between relief workers and refugees 
involves future hopes and past experiences of refugees and the latter, I agree with him, cannot 
be ignored. In the above encounter, the Iraqi family’s insistence on offering higher education 
to their daughter did not only reflect their “hope for better times” to borrow from Knudsen, as 
higher education represents— for this generation of middle class Iraqi professionals and 
state-bureaucrats— an integral part of securing well-being. The parents of the girl who were 
                                                      
37 From an interview with a UNHCR manager on 23 February 2011. 
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university graduates spent long time and efforts to collect the necessary money to cover the 
college fees for their daughter. The mother explained how they had to accept the fact that 
their girl, who got high scores in her secondary education, would join a two-year college 
because the study fees and expenses are lower than a four-year BA University program which 
they would normally choose if they could afford it. Still the family explained that they were 
dependent on remittances from relatives in Baghdad to cover the college fees for their girl, 
and they were looking for other sources to cover other households’ expenses. However, 
according to the UNHCR’s “therapeutic” strategy, which is based on quantifying the need of 
refugees to provide cash assistance to the most vulnerable, the family was not considered 
vulnerable enough if they could afford to send their girl to college. Iraqis had to gradually 
learn that education— which was free in Iraq and most Iraqis took it for granted—was no 
longer easy to secure.  
 
In their new situation, and as refugees in Amman, many Iraqis experienced that affording to 
educate a daughter or a son disqualified them from other types of assistance, such as cash 
assistance that, according to the aid standards, is designed to cover the essential needs that 
would sustain a “bare life.” Which, as explained by the UNHCR representative, consisted of 
assistance to cover basic needs for shelter or food. In practice, this meant that, in order to 
obtain cash assistance to cover their basic needs, many Iraqis had to reduce their needs to 
those basic needs. In this race to the bottom, their needs should be comparable to those of the 
poorest Jordanians, which is what Barbara Harell-Bond explained: “Aid should be evenly 
distributed on a per capita basis and assistance should not be so generous that refugees seem 
better off than their hosts” (1986: 19). The obvious reasons were to prevent present refugees 
from settling down as well as discourage new groups of potential refugees‒ to be attracted to 
cross the borders. 
 
But this equalization in poverty is not unproblematic. First, because the poorest Jordanians 
are national citizens, they are not required to pay a fee to obtain a resident status, and, 
regardless of their level of education, the Jordanians had the right to freely compete for jobs 
with their fellow Jordanians even though the job market was poor. Iraqis, on the other hand, 
even the highly-skilled and most well-educated were officially denied this right and had to 
deal with the daily threat of arrest, payment of fines and deportation if they were caught 
working ‘illegally’. When it comes to the right to work, Iraqis were considered by the 
Jordanian host country authorities as foreigners, and therefore their legal status did not allow 
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them to work unless they had a valid residence and work permit. The two permits (residence 
and work) were interrelated, and some Iraqis who worked in high positions at international 
organizations or at Jordanian universities and hospitals (as we saw in the previous chapter) 
were eligible for an annual residence permit. Others had to pay JD 50,000 (around 
US$70500) in 2010 and 2011 as bank deposit38 to obtain the annual residence permit which 
would allow them to work legally and travel freely between Amman and Iraq and other 
countries.  
 
Iraqis who were forced to flee their country following the war in 2003 were not treated as 
refugees in neighboring host countries. In their attempts to make a space of ʾamān, they had 
to explore various routes, the protection space offered by the UNHCR and other aid 
organizations seemed as one important source for several impoverished households. 
However, the limited protection offered could also end up increasing the hardships of Iraqi 
households. In the absence of adequate humanitarian aid, many Iraqis, like the family with 
the girl in college, have been excluded from the space of protection and left to negotiate the 
terms of their space of ʾamān alone.  
 
The following cases from the field present further examples of how the limited protection 
space offered by humanitarian agencies produced effects among the applicants of the refugee 
status who were striving to appear as needy as possible. By doing this they came close to 
transforming their efforts into what Agamben characterized as a splitting of human life into 
the bios, or qualified life that would be excluded from aid and the zoé, or bare-life, that might 
be eligible to aid and assistance. What we see is that the boundaries between the two are 
fluid. 
 
Case 1: Making need visible 
I was with an Iraqi paid-volunteer during a house-visit tour in Jabal al-Hussain, a 
neighborhood in Amman classified as neither poor nor affluent. We could not find the next 
house on his list easily although the streets in Amman are relatively well marked, especially 
if compared to other Arab cities in the region. We followed the street name and house 
numbers, but failed to locate the building. The volunteer, who looked tired following four 
house-visits, had to call the family to check the address. I could feel the impatience in his 
                                                      
38 A fee which I heard had cost much more earlier (JD 100,000).  
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voice as he explained to me when he finished the telephone conversation: “You see how they 
waste our time, they don’t give us a clear address, there is a street name and a house number, 
why do they make it difficult?” A few minutes later, a middle-aged man came running to 
meet us next to a barber shop where we were standing. The man apologized for the confusing 
location of the building in which he rented an apartment; it appeared that we had been 
looking for the building number on the opposite side of the street as we were counting the 
side with even numbers while his house ended with an odd number.  
 
This was one of the first house-visits I participated in and I was surprised by the way it 
evolved. I could not understand it when the man’s first comment upon meeting us in the 
street was the following: “I don’t want you to get the impression that we are rich, just because 
we rent this apartment in Jabal al-Hussain. We can hardly afford the rent (JD 150 around 
US$212) and the owner of the building increases it every month. Sometimes he takes extra 
JD 5 (US$ 7), sometimes JD 10 (US$ 14) for the tax and electricity. The volunteer I was with 
told him not to worry, because he himself was an Iraqi and was also renting an apartment, so 
he knew how the landlord might treat Iraqi tenants. But the man continued “please don’t look 
at the sofa set, we just got it from my wife’s sister, they got resettlement to America [USA] 
and left.”  
 
We reached the apartment, which was on the first floor of a five-storey building. I noticed 
that it consisted of two rooms: one bed room and a hall that seemed to have once been a 
balcony or terrace which the owner had apparently turned into a room by adding a windowed 
wall. This event of the visit took place in February 2011, and it was one of those hazy cold 
days. Both the Iraqi volunteer and I were feeling cold following a long day of house-visits. 
We were invited to sit on two plastic chairs when I noticed that the room’s temperature 
actually seemed much lower than that of the street. There was a gasoline heater around which 
the man’s wife and their three children gathered. It felt a little bit warmer when I saw the 
heater though I could not sense its heat as much as I could smell the gasoline odor. The man 
reminded us again not to record the new sofa set or the small table: “my wife’s sister gave us 
their furniture when they left for the United States. You can see that this chair is broken. [He 
put his hand on the seat next to his and its fabric sank deep] We use this hall as a bedroom for 
my kids at night, it was better when we didn’t have the sofas, the kids keep complaining that 




He invited us to come and take a look at the kitchen. The volunteer went with the man while I 
remained in the hall with the wife and the children. I explained to her that I was not from the 
aid organization but a Palestinian student doing research about Iraqi refugees in Jordan. She 
did not seem interested in knowing what I was doing and stopped me upon hearing the word 
‘refugees’: “You can see how we turned into refugees, like you. No, not like you. The 
Palestinians were living well in Iraq, even better than many Iraqis in those times, they were 
respected by all and we loved them. Look how they treat us here.”  
 
I tried to apologize for the situation and asked her about the reason that made them leave Iraq. 
She explained that they had to leave Baghdad and their home “a separate big house with a 
garden” when their son was kidnapped and killed. The father came and continued the story, 
but the volunteer seemed interested in other data for his report. He asked to see their 
documents (passport and UNHCR document). The volunteer jotted some notes in his booklet 
and asked to take a picture of the family for the report. He took pictures of the kitchen, the 
bed-room corner where the clothes and mattresses were piled, and a portrait picture of the 
family members sitting on the sofa set in the hall. 
 
During my presence in this and similar house-visits, I tried to make it clear that I was not part 
of the aid regime in order not to raise expectations or fear. Therefore I avoided taking any 
pictures and did not ask about “the story” and “the file”, nor did I ask to see the UN paper 
(Iraqis normally call it warqit al-UN) or any other official documents that Iraqis, both 
individuals and household members used to bring, usually in arranged files and a few times in 
plastic bags. I do not think that my attempts to disassociate myself from the aid 
workers/volunteers made a big difference to the Iraqis I met. But with the passage of time, I 
could feel the tension these encounters with aid workers produced among all parties involved, 
be they Iraqi applicants or volunteers and aid workers in general. They were all engaged in 
producing results that were demanded by the aid organizations, results that were defined in 
the standardized practices that defined the space of aid assistance to refugees. I came to 
realize how hard it was for the volunteers to follow all the refugees all the time to ensure that 
the assistance would reach those who really needed it. On the part of the applicants for aid I 
realized that they were engaged in a constant process to present visible proof of their 




This feeling of tension was further strengthened by my knowledge about the background of 
these applicants. From my engagement with the Iraqis I presented in Chapter Three I knew 
that many of the Iraqis who had to turn to aid organizations in Jordan came originally from 
middle class income backgrounds in their country.39 The majority were educated and had 
been employees in the ex-Iraqi state institutions. Some of them talked about horrible 
experiences of direct or indirect violence and personal losses that forced them to leave Iraq. 
Initially they had to survive in Jordan on their savings and remittances and transferred 
income: 42% of the households who had relied on transferred income received transfers from 
Iraq, according to a study done by FAFO (Norwegian Institute for Applied International 
Studies) in 2007. But after a long time in transit some had to turn to the limited formal space 
of protection in Jordan in which the entry ticket was defined by the evidence they could 
produce of their own vulnerability. Most of these Iraqis initially contacted the UNHCR 
hoping to get the right to resettlement in a European state, where they had relatives or friends. 
In my meeting with the UNHCR spokesperson, the woman officer explained that they 
constantly had to repeat to the Iraqis that resettlement was a limited solution for some, but not 
a right for everyone. However, in the absence of survival potential in the temporary 
protection space in Jordan, while the dangers in Iraq persist, many of the impoverished Iraqis 
started to think of resettlement as the best solution and they strived to prove their eligibility 
for it. The following case presents one example. 
  
Case 2: The production of documented evidence of need 
It was not uncommon to see households composed of groups of Iraqi males or females who 
had ended up sharing an apartment in Amman.40 In a less formal house-visit to an apartment 
shared by five young men, I went with an Iraqi volunteer (a woman whom I had met during a 
training course). She introduced me to the men— two of whom she knew from Baghdad. One 
of the men made Iraqi tea and we ate the sweets I had bought on our way. I asked them about 
their living conditions and how they had ended up together in this three-room apartment with 
                                                      
39 Although, many families experienced economic deterioration during al-Ḥiṣār period in the 1990s, they had to 
learn how to cope with drastic decline in their income. What made it possible to survive is their access to 
residence back at home and a governmental job (despite hyperinflation making a regular monthly salary worth 
no more than two dozen eggs), and free education and health services, in addition to the ration system. I explore 
this transformation through the stories Iraqis narrated about that period in Chapter 7.  
40 In the household presented in this case, I learnt that the four single men were sharing the living costs. Each 
paid JD 40 monthly to cover his share of the house rent which cost them JD 160 including water and electricity. 
Three of the men used to receive emergency cash assistance JD 75, while the fourth was dependent on the 
money sent by his family from Iraq, and the fifth who just fled from Iraq had no regular source of income. Four 
of the men had university degrees but they all had to work as porters carrying heavy materials or waiters in Iraqi 
restaurants or tailors.  
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a small hall in the middle and with two small bed rooms. I could see from the open door of 
one of the bed-rooms that it had no beds but mattresses and blankets on the floor.  
 
One of the young men was particularly interested in telling me his story, while another man 
commented: “He will now bring al-taqarīr/ the reports; millions of reports.” I learnt from the 
man’s long and detailed story that he had left Iraq at the end of 2005 after the killing of one 
of his brothers on 28 September 2004; a taxi driver, the 32-year-old brother was killed by a 
militia gang who took the car and all the money he was carrying. His other brother was 
kidnapped in 2005, and he himself had been threatened into leaving his job at one of the Iraqi 
Ministries if he did not want to face his brother’s fate. He left for Syria where he lived for 
four years in Aleppo and worked with a Syrian engineer, “who loved Iraqis”: he explained 
how lucky he felt then to have met that Syrian man who helped him a lot. Still life was not 
easy (as he expressed) and he decided to apply for resettlement to a third country, but when 
his file was raised to “al-wafd al-amrīkī/the American delegate” as he called it, his 
resettlement application was rejected. His file in Syria was closed, and when he moved to 
Amman the UNHCR office in Amman opened a new file for him. He could survive thanks to 
the support he received from his family in Iraq. His father was a martyr who had died in the 
Kuwait war in 1991. He continued to narrate his and his family’s stories supplying details of 
exact dates and names while pulling out documents and pictures from a big file hoping to 
convince me that he deserved aid and resettlement.  
 
He brought out one of those large files (usually used by professionals to store and organize 
documents) full of papers and hardly able to fit additional documents. I noticed that he had 
everything laminated, including the brochures and information pamphlets of some 
organizations. He started narrating his life story in episodes: 1. running away from Iraq to 
avoid conscription during “Saddam’s time”; 2. the years he spent in one of the Gulf countries 
working in a business company; 3. his return to Iraq after the expiry of his job contract and 
residency permit in the Gulf; 4. his kidnapping and torture experience: he said that he had 
been kidnapped from the Ministry office where he worked in Baghdad 5. how his 
resettlement file had failed in Syria and then in Jordan after three years of waiting. He kept 
pulling out documents, ID cards and papers (all laminated) as a visible evidence of all the 
episodes of his life story. Finally, he gave me a CD that he said was a video recording of the 
torture he had endured during his kidnapping. He asked me to take one CD and watch it at 
home (as he showed me that he had several other copies), apologizing for not being able to 
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show it to me in the presence of his flat mates. He kept pushing me to take the CD while I 
kept refusing and apologizing for not being able to watch it.  
 
I found myself again in a position where I had to emphasize my status as a student/researcher 
who could not provide assistance (in aid or resettlement). However, I asked him if I could 
take a copy of the resettlement rejection letter. He immediately agreed, but while I was 
preparing myself to go to the nearby bookshop, he offered to do the photocopying and 
refused to take money in return. I did not insist as I had learned that in the Iraqi space of 
ʾamān, the conditions of giving and taking change from those in the formal space of 
protection. I was their guest as the men told me; they made more Iraqi tea and talked about 
the marriage arrangements for one of them. Suddenly they all started laughing at the sight of 
the man coming out of the other room elegantly dressed in a black suit, black shirt with black 
tie and shiny black shoes. It felt embarrassing but I could not help laughing myself. The 
volunteer I came with was more sensible when she said: “Why are you laughing? Sometimes 
I put on my best clothes, like we used to dress for work back in Baghdad, and I just go out for 
a walk in Jabal al-Hussein.” Even the man in the suit started laughing when one of his flat 
mates asked him: “Are you going to a wedding party? You are just going to the bookshop to 
photocopy a paper; you see how Iraqis are getting crazy while sitting and waiting here in 
Jordan.” And in seconds, the joking mood had filled the room.  
 
In the spaces of ʾamān, away from aid workers, Iraqis tried to preserve their habits in 
dressing, listening to Iraqi songs, dancing, reciting poetry, sharing stories from the past and 
cooking. Even when they did not have access to extra resources, they tried to appropriate the 
little resources they had managed to secure in a way that contradicted with the visual image 
of -lessness they strived to portray in the formal space of protection. During social gatherings, 
most Iraqis were well dressed. I am not describing here a specific fashion, but during my 
fieldwork, I do not remember seeing many Iraqi men unshaved, it was a sign that “something 
was wrong”, as I heard them commenting when this happened. I could also see this care to 
dress and appearance in pictures (taken back in Baghdad) which were placed in the corners of 
some rented apartments I visited or hanged on the walls in the houses owned by more affluent 
Iraqis.  
 
Coming from a refugee background where visibility of need was not a condition of the 
refugee label and lacking interest in fashion, I would not have normally paid attention to 
119 
 
these dress codes if they had not contrasted so sharply with the standardized conditions of –
lessness created in the encounters of Iraqis with the formal space of protection. I was invited 
by an Iraqi friend—who wanted to see me in more ‘chic’ clothes— to go to the Friday market 
in Amman where they sold second-hand clothes. In the market I could hear the Iraqi accent 
around the tables and hangers where shoes and clothes were displayed in an open yard in the 
busy Ammani centre al-Abdali. Considering the urban background of the Iraqis I had met in 
the aid space and their educational and professional experiences, this issue about their 
dressing style might seem redundant. However, in the process of getting access to the refugee 
entitlements, I observed several incidents in which these Iraqis were struggling to learn how 
to produce an image of need that would help them to get access to the aid assistance they 
needed.  
 
The aim of this chapter is not to discredit the aid services provided by different organizations 
to impoverished Iraqis who were pushed by dwindling resources to turn to the UNHCR and 
other organizations to receive aid and protection. Rather I present details of these encounters 
with aid to provide better understanding of how, in the majority of cases I observed, as the 
ones presented above, it was a basic part of the behavior of people to present themselves as in 
need. This was in anticipation of the conditions of aid provision which were based on the 
visibility of need and –lessness. What I observed was that the attempts of producing 
documented evidence of need produced more uncertainty than protection. What produced 
uncertainty was the lack of understanding among people about the logic in the decision 
making process within the aid organizations when they decided who would be eligible for aid 
and who would be excluded. Gradually, Iraqis learnt that they need to fix their experiences as 
‘a good story’, which provides brief and strong evidence that their lives are in danger, so that 
their case will be prioritized by the UNHCR for assistance. It was not uncommon to receive 
printed versions of the family or individual story during house-visits. The next section 
explores the main characteristics of the formal procedures used by aid agencies. A procedure 
based on quantification of needs. 
  
Quantifying the need 




While Iraqis were disqualified as collective recipients of the refugee status, they were 
deconstructed into quantifiable categories and turned into ‘targets’ in aid project documents 
and aid reports. The quantification of Iraqis as asylum seekers and refugees served the 
organizations (and Jordanian government) in their appeals for funds, more than they seemed 
to change the quality of Iraqis’ lives. The only official reference to Iraqis as collective 
refugees (by the Jordanian government) was when they were presented as numbers submitted 
to international donors for financial support. However, when it came to the distribution of 
aid, Iraqis who were looking for support had to compete for the available aid on the basis of 
vulnerability that was measured by quantifiable indicators. I argue that these practices of 
quantification tended to reduce Iraqis in the discourse of aid to “bare life” (the opposition 
between bios and zoé as explained by Agamben). Rather than seeing the Iraqis as bios 
representing ‘qualified life’, but in need of urgent assistance due to the loss of their homes, 
salaried jobs and social status, they were reduced into ‘bare life’ as fixed in the quantified 
representation of loss in the pictures and ‘brief bullet-point-style stories’ collected by aid 
agencies to provide evidence of need, to attract aid. Iraqis re-emerged as defined by –
lessness, and by a quantification of such –lessness one could obtain support. The dilemma is 
illustrated by an Iraqi woman who had first qualified for support, and then had lost this right:  
I left Iraq in 2006 when I got a threatening letter. They sent it with a list of other 
people’s names who were already slaughtered and shot in our neighborhood, and 
my name was the seventh on the list. We lost everything and had to start from 
zero in Jordan. Today we are below zero. The UN [UNHCR] stopped our “salary” 
[emergency cash assistance], because they discovered that I have a daughter at 
college. We are stuck here in Jordan and I can’t return to Baghdad to be killed or 
die in an explosion. But they want us all to be beggars, or they’ll stop the aid.41 
 
The conditions of aid created more uncertainty than protection, as perceived by this family 
who attempted to extend their space of ʾamān by the provision of higher education to their 
daughter, but they had to suffer from further reduction in their living conditions. In the 
following semester, the family was planning to suspend their girl’s studies to be able to cover 
other urgent household expenses, and her education would be on hold until they could find an 
Iraqi welfare association which used to support the tuition fees of Iraqi students with high 
academic records. However, according to UNHCR representatives, as explained earlier in this 
chapter, the quantification of need was designed to ensure that refugees did not abuse the aid 
system, which indeed happened as I was sometimes told by both Iraqis themselves and by aid 
                                                      
41 From one of my several meetings with an Iraqi friend, 54-year-old woman whom I met during several training 
events I attended during my presence in Amman in 2010 and 2011.  
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workers and Iraqi volunteers. There were cases in which ‘rich’ Iraqis would hire a shabby 
house in poor eastern Amman areas and put in some cheap furniture and dress up like 
‘beggars’ in order to be considered for the cash assistance or what Iraqis (and some Iraqi 
volunteers) called salary. To protect the space of protection from abuse, the system of aid 
developed parallel systems of control and surveillance. In previous cases of refugees 
management, the physical space of the refugee camps allowed more possibilities for direct 
practices of discipline and control. In their description of attempts to prevent cheating, 
Voutira and Harrell-Bond mention night-time invasions for accurate census— taking and 
daubing refugees with gentian violet so as to avoid anyone getting double rations (1995: 
219). Peteet describes similar techniques where UNRWA aid workers resorted to early 
morning census visits at 4 a.m. to avoid double counting of children who otherwise used to 
slip under the tent wall into the next tent to be counted again in order to increase families 
share of the rations (2005:72).  
 
Seen in light of such huge efforts to stop misuse, it is relevant to mention here that the 
number of Iraqis who used to receive financial assistance was 5000, according to an 
interview I did with the UNHCR spokeswoman in May 2011. In a cost-benefit perspective 
we see that the numbers of those who received cash assistance was small when compared to 
the announced number of Iraqis in Jordan (5000 versus around 500,000 Iraqis) and below the 
number of registered asylum seekers in the UNHCR (5000 versus 21,857 Iraqis) in 2010. The 
monthly cash assistance amount was JD 70 (US$ 99) per individual, JD 180 (US$ 254) for a 
family of 3 members and did not exceed JD 260 (US$367) for larger families.  
 
In several encounters (with aid) which I observed, I could see the performance efforts both 
Iraqis and aid workers had to exert to quantify the households’ needs in a visible and 
measurable form. With an increasing number of impoverished Iraqis arriving, especially after 
2007, mostly settling in the less affluent neighborhoods in East Amman and staying there 
without residence or job permits, the aid agencies saw an increase in the number of people 
applying for refugee status. In this situation more Iraqis were forced to compete for aid and in 
this competition they used all possible means to become eligible for cash assistance, 
including the use of deceit and trickery. In some of the events I observed it felt like there was 
a kind of collusion between the two parties when the aid workers would make the effort to 
inform incoming Iraqi families, directly or indirectly, of the ways to attract aid and avoid 
future uncertainties as much as possible. In one of the house-visits to an Iraqi family who had 
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recently arrived from Baghdad, the family, that was composed of the husband, his wife and 
three children, hired a furnished apartment in the Gardens, a neighborhood that was 
categorized as one of the affluent areas in West Amman. The discussion between the 
volunteer and the family seemed like a practical training session on how to prove that one 
deserved the help and assistance of the UNHCR and other organizations.  
 
In the following house-visit to a family who had recently came to Jordan, during March 2011, 
with the hope to secure medical treatment that was not available in Baghdad for their autistic 
child, the volunteer presented practical advice on where to go for shopping or medical care, 
how to behave, and what the family needed as evidence to support their stories. She tried to 
explain to them how to present their story within the limits that would ensure they could fit 
the conditions for aid. Here I present the conversation which provides more details on how 
this evolved. I refer to the volunteer by ‘V’ and use ‘F’ for the newcomer family: 
 
V: When you go to the market, be careful! Don’t you ever speak Iraqi [he means 
Iraqi accent]. This country [Jordan] is for women, women can get what they want 
here. When a woman cries and shouts at them they keep silent, but if a man 
objects an abuse they will immediately attack him. You should take the lead 
[directing the talk to the wife, then turning to the man]: Don’t tell anyone that 
your wife is Shii. And you should go to the UNHCR and apply for a refugee 
certificate.  
 
F: This won’t help; if the situation in Iraq improves they will put you back on the 
first plane flying to Baghdad.  
 
V: No, it’s [referring to resettlement] much easier now, you’ll get out quickly. 
 
F: I heard that this is only possible for Iraqis who worked for the Americans as 
journalists, contractors, cleaners and guards but not others.  
 
V: No, this is not true, just go to the UN and make up a good story.  
 
F: We have a story, a good story, the story of our son [who suffers from autism], 
we knocked on all the doors in Iraq and did all we could do for him but there are 
no specialists. We heard that here they have good institutions, or maybe we can 
go to Europe or the US? 
 
V: No, make up a good story, this story won’t help you.  
 
F: But a good story needs proofs and supporting documents or badges [to prove 
that they worked for the Americans in Iraq after 2003]. We read about it on the 
Internet, that lies won’t save us. But I have a story that I fled the army once and I 




V: I know someone who told them that he worked for the new government and he 
is now in Canada, a story that is well-themed and not too long. 
 
F: But if I register in the UN, I won’t be able to travel to Baghdad. 
 
V: Of course, you can’t return to Baghdad. Considering that you are threatened, 
how could you return? He who wants to get resettlement should not try to go to 
Baghdad so that he won’t mess up his file.  
 
 
In this and other house visits I observed, not necessarily with new-comers, information and 
stories that were sometimes described by officials as gossiping or cheating run in the space of 
protection where Iraqis have had to learn how to extend the space of ʾamān. One of the 
UNHCR representatives commented: “It’s part of being Iraqi, they are like this, they are used 
to aid culture [referring to the 13 years of the UN economic sanctions and the food ration 
system] and they will always complain and demand extra aid.” While an Iraqi politician and 
activist described it: “Deceit and lying are not part of our genuine culture, such behavior if it 
exists today, it serves as the weapons of the weak or the afraid.” However, my extensive 
observations of the aid encounters in the field reveal that there are other factors involved in 
the encounters than simply a cultural characteristic or weapon of the weak. These encounters 
with aid were part of a larger learning process about how to live in conditions of crisis, and 
avoid further losses in the future. These families have already experienced several losses 
during three decades of wars and sanctions and they were now (at the time of my 
observation) trying to rebuild their sense of well-being and ʾamān that in many cases was 
linked to the existence of an Iraqi state that no longer was there (for them).  
 
The cases presented in this chapter thus aim to show how this group of Iraqi professionals 
and state bureaucrats had to learn how to become refugees. It was not about culture or 
weapons of the weak, it was about a pragmatic series of choices in order to regain some of 
the life qualities that had been removed from them, following their expulsion from Iraq. They 
had lost access to their jobs and salaries and were searching for information that could help 
them find some relief in the formal protection space in Jordan. To obtain this they quickly 
learnt that they had to manipulate the minimal aid provided in a way that served their needs.  
 
If culture was involved, it can be observed in the Iraqi attempts at preserving their dignity and 
status as former state employees and professionals. The simple act of perceiving any form of 
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financial aid as “salary”; including the emergency cash assistance or wages paid for voluntary 
work and any form of transportation allowance were all parts of a self-deception; the aid 
money were called by most Iraqis (who relied on aid) as salaries and thus were perceived as 
if linked to an honorable employment. The participation in many of the aid related activities 
that most Iraqis also criticized was itself part of a self-deception. As explained by one of my 
friend-volunteers: 
These courses and training events, and when I get work [she referred to the 
voluntary tasks she is contracted to do on behalf of an international organization] 
saved me from sitting at home, doing nothing. The simple act of waking up in the 
early morning, and putting on my formal clothes, and spending part of the day 
outside this narrow apartment and meeting other Iraqis, this makes me feel alive.  
 
I also noticed that some Iraqi women tended to refer to their participation in training events as 
“going to work”, and almost all the Iraqis who used to receive the monthly emergency cash 
assistance called it a salary or rātib. In their conversations, it seemed that they considered the 
emergency cash assistance as a right, although, according to the aid organization: “It is meant 
for only few Iraqis, the most vulnerable.” Most of the Iraqis in the cases presented above 
have experienced reduction in their sense of being and well-being, but when they had to 
prove that they are as poor as the poorest Jordanians, some had to turn to deceit to make their 
need into a convincing evidence, and get what they considered their right from the limited 
temporary space of protection. These Iraqi attempts can be seen as a critique of the system of 
aid designed to protect them, but only if they could provide strong evidences of the 
conditions of –lessness. This problem is not unique to the Iraqi case in Jordan. Didier Fassin 
explores a similar “paradox” that asylum seekers had to handle in France and Europe in 
general:  
“As asylum is disqualified both quantitatively and qualitatively, states develop 
increasingly sophisticated instruments to scrutinize the “truth” of the applicants 
who, in the great majority of cases, will be rejected and end up added to the pool 
of illegal aliens after they have exhausted every possible appeal” (2011: 221).  
 
Outreaching refugees- The aid organizations’ part of the story 
The tension described in encounters among aid organizations and asylum seekers and 
refugees can be explored ethnographically in an attempt to understand how such a situation 
evolves on the ground. I have discussed the matter from the perspectives of the people 
seeking a status as refugees. To discuss this further let me now turn to the UNHCR part of the 
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story, based on observations in the field. My focus is on what the UNHCR and its partner 
organizations called their “outreach or needs assessment services.”    
 
I have already mentioned that several international and local aid organizations were 
employing Iraqi volunteers to assist in the provision of services to other Iraqis in Jordan, 
usually funded by the UNHCR.42 This served more than one end. It allowed the organizations 
to benefit from the strong social ties among Iraqis, and thus to obtain easier access to both 
newly arrived and unregistered Iraqi families. This is not my conclusion but rather what I was 
told by individuals working in UNHCR. They made no secret of the fact that having Iraqis at 
the delivery stage facilitated communication and allowed better understanding and trust 
during training and other aid events. Obviously ‘communication’ here does not refer to the 
linguistic level, as Arabic is the shared language among Iraqis and their hosting community 
in Jordan. Although there are slight differences in pronunciation and the use of some words, 
according to my experience being a non-Iraqi myself, this did not seem an obstacle. 
Appointing Iraqis as aid workers— on voluntary and temporary basis— was one way to deal 
with the invisibility of Iraqis dispersed throughout various neighborhoods in Amman. As the 
UNHCR spokesperson commented: “Iraqis are well connected and they normally tend to 
gather and form networks.”  
 
The concept of ‘volunteer’ was also a conscious decision. This was to conform with the host 
country’s regulations, as the Jordanian authorities did not permit Iraqis to work in jobs that 
could be done by ‘unemployed’ Jordanians, and thus it was difficult for Iraqis to obtain a 
formal work permit. Voluntary work, on the other side, was possible. And it was attractive to 
the Iraqis who got that chance as it provided an informal employment opportunity and an 
income source which seemed essential for the survival of several Iraqi families I met in the 
field. Volunteers were paid the minimum wage-rate in Jordan (per month) JD 200-300 (US$ 
282-423) by international organizations, though the rate paid by few local organizations was 
much lower JD 50-70 (US$ 70-99). The financial returns Iraqi volunteers called “salary” 
                                                      
42 This is not an uncommon practice in centralized international systems designed to provide welfare for 
refugees, especially in the case of the UNRWA refugee camps, the W in UNRWA, which stand for “works” 
projects was “central to rehabilitation; through work, refugees would acquire a new sense of self and come to 
terms with permanent displacement” as Peteet explained (2005a, 48), but in the case of UNRWA, it was official 
and salaried employment, not voluntary work, as in the case of the Iraqi refugees contracted to do work-tasks on 
behalf of the UNHCR (through the IRD or Care International or other organizations). In the Palestinian case, 
this practice was also used by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in their relief work which 
started in Gaza in December 1948 (see Chapter 3 in Peteet (2005a) for further details).  
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were called “remuneration” mukāfaʾa by the humanitarian organizations, again strengthening 
the point that this was to avoid colliding with Jordanian official policies or with the 
international organization employees’ salary rate that was much higher.  
 
A key strategy of the outreach services was the series of house-visits by volunteers, as 
described in the cases presented in this chapter. And the UNHCR was not alone in pursuing 
this strategy in their needs assessment. To mention but a few from a longer list: IRD (the 
International Relief and Development Organization), IMC (International Medical Corps), 
Care International. There were also the so-called Jordanian Royal Foundations: Queen Zein 
Al-Sharaf Institute for Development, Jordan River Foundation, Queen Nour al-Hussein 
Foundation, as well as other local community centers. I had a chance to observe a meeting 
organized for the IRD volunteers, in which a group of volunteers, both males and females 
participated, and in which the strategy of the outreach services was discussed. 
 
The meeting was organized by the International Relief and Development Organization (IRD), 
one of the UNHCR partner organizations, to arrange the dissemination of the outreach service 
among a large group of volunteers, formally linked to local organizations such as CAC 
(Community Action Committees), CBO (Community Based Organizations), and CHV 
(Community Health Volunteers).43 The big hall was packed with Iraqis and a few Jordanians. 
There were between 70-80 males and females, with a large majority of women. Project 
managers and employees who coordinated the delivery of this international organization 
outreach services to Iraqis on behalf of the UNHCR— to which I will refer by the 
abbreviation IOR for International Organization Representative— each addressed the group 
in turn. The IORs included 5 Jordanians and 2 Iraqis. I will present some of the information 
that was passed along during that meeting which I think, clarifies some parts of the troubled 
encounters during the house visits presented earlier in this chapter between aid 
workers/volunteers and potential Iraqi aid recipients.  
 
The meeting started with one of the Jordanian employees in the IRD addressing the 
volunteers:  
                                                      
43 CACs called Allijān almujtamaʿiyya in Arabic are a number of committees established to coordinate the 
provision of aid in different geographical areas where Iraqis have settled in Jordan. They are linked with the so-
called local community based organizations (CBOs) in each area like (Al Naser and Marka, Al Ashrafiyeh, Al 
Hashimi Al Shamali, Sweileh and Jabal Alhussain, Zarqa and Irbid). A group of outreach volunteers are 




Our requirement from every volunteer is 30 home visits minimum per month plus 
5 visits to new Iraqi families who just entered Jordan. If you do not make (30 + 5) 
per month, we will deduct from your remuneration [mukāfaʾa]. The definition of 
a new family is one that came to Jordan from Iraq during the current month and 
has not been visited by any volunteer; we do not enter data on families that were 
visited 3 months earlier. We have set up a “target” [she used the English term]: 
3000 visits in 9 months. In this meeting with you, we are setting the general 
outlines. Your remuneration and how much will be deducted from it will be 
decided by the administration. You should know that we do not have a system of 
follow-up visits, there will be deduction on your remuneration [salary as Iraqis 
called it] if we discover repeated cases.  
 
Most of the time, the flow of information in the meeting went in one direction. The Jordanian 
representative of the IRD (or the IORs: International Organization Representatives) were 
speaking, showing forms and giving instructions while the volunteers and other aid workers 
were listening, except for few minutes when some volunteers interrupted with questions. At 
this point one of the two Iraqi IORs interfered to explain the distribution of roles and duties:  
The newly arrived Iraqi families are very important and you should work as one 
team, you should share information on new families among yourselves, each in 
his/her own area if you hear of Iraqi families who arrived in other areas. You 
should exchange this information among yourselves both volunteers and 
committees, and distribute the visits among yourselves: you are all part of one 
team: the IRD. We will distribute a description of the volunteer activities, take a 
look at it and sign it. Community committees [he addressed the other group]: your 
role is to run courses and organize awareness dissemination activities and other 
events. We will provide each of you with a list of the community committees and 
volunteers’ names and mobile numbers to enhance better coordination among you 
as a team.  
 
While the IOR was listing the service outlines, I heard one of the volunteers next to me 
asking: “Where are we going to find all these new Iraqi families?” Another answered her 
sarcastically: “Along the borders.” A Jordanian IOR explained with a questionnaire in her 
hand how volunteers should complete the information, during house-visits, and fill in 
consistent data:  
The most important data is fixed, you should know it by now: date of entry to 
Jordan, information on health and social conditions, if you put a tick next to the 
field on special needs, you have to provide explanation from your observations 
during the visit and give some information and evidence on the case. The 
UNHCR prepares lists of the Iraqis who require support based on the data that 
you collect. Many of you write long descriptive details, like composition essays, 
we want you to present the data in the form of condensed bullet points, so that it 
will be clearer for the data entry department when they check the information and 
enter it on RAIS [stands for Refugee Assistance and Information System, a 
centralized online database managed by the UNHCR and shared among local and 
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international organizations to allow the coordination of aid services]. Iraqi 
volunteers are required to present only brief notes in bullet-point format, 
Jordanians should write detailed reports. [I did not have a chance to ask the IRD 
representatives about this division of labor based on the nationality of aid 
workers, and therefore could not clarify whether it was decided according to 
specialty or trust levels]. The UNHCR file number is very important, you have to 
indicate if a family or individual is not registered or does not want to register. So 
you have to check the refugees’ residence document [UN asylum seeker paper] 
and also the passport. The passport is very important: you should demand to see 
the passport and hold it in your hand, write down the number and look at the 
stamps to check if the family has an annual residence permit or not. You should 
explain to them that this is for their own good: that we have conditions, those who 
meet them, will have their names raised in aid provision lists. If they have a 
residence permit, you should indicate what type of residence they have: work 
permit, investment, student, marriage to a Jordanian; and make sure that the 
passport in your hand is the latest one. 
 
One of the volunteers raised his hand and asked a question about an item in the check-list that 
translates into: “Someone who presents a danger on the UNHCR or its partners or others.” He 
asked: “How will we know that someone might present a danger to the UNHCR?” The 
Jordanian IOR answered: “If he is “aggressive” (If he was/Iza kān “aggressive”, she used the 
English term). The Iraqi IOR further explained: “For example if the person says that he or she 
will do any harm to the UNHCR.” One of the volunteers said: “Some Iraqis are aggressive, 
when we call them they refuse the house-visit and sometimes they hang up the phone.” The 
IOR explained that this did not mean anything: “only if we feel that there is a ‘real’ threat or 
danger to the UNHCR, you should not add a tick here unless you are 100% sure that the 
person is dangerous, because if they see the tick [apparently the pronoun “they” refers here to 
the IRD or the UNHCR], the person will be interrogated. A person who constitutes a threat, is 
someone who states that he will do something against the UNHCR or another organization. 
RAIS is a living database and it must be updated daily; an example of a threat could be: I will 
explode or kill, etc. Any item with a tick should be supported with comments and evidence, 
all the forms that are submitted without notes will be rejected and returned back to the 
volunteer.” 
 
The IRD representative gave an example of how need should be measured: “You have to 
make sure that you do not write contradictory information; we receive reports from the 
UNHCR that confuse the data-entry employees because the forms submitted by volunteers 
contain contradictory data. For example, when you tick next to the field which indicates that 
a family needs emergency cash assistance, and that they need emergency support for food 
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supplies, and then you put a tick indicating that the dwelling/ house conditions are good. This 
is one example of contradictory data, there must be consistency.” Another IOR further 
explained: “For example if a family shares an apartment with another family (i.e. when two 
families live together in one rented apartment), and when they have everything they need, 
they are not necessarily eligible for emergency cash assistance. Only if their housing 
conditions are poor, and only then, you should tick the box.” The previous IOR intervened 
again with further clarification:  
There might be people who complain that the aid they receive is not sufficient, 
this is not our business - niḥnā mā dakhalnā. 
 
The above encounter presents part of the hierarchy involved in the refugee aid industry where 
we can observe part of the pressure and tensions created among staff with different ranks and 
administrative roles. To receive the wage, Iraqi volunteers have to reach a defined target of 
Iraqi ‘beneficiaries’, they have to fill in the forms according to given set of standards 
developed by the UNHCR bureaucratic systems of data gathering and documentation, 
through the centralized RAIS databases to effectively define who is eligible to receive aid and 
who is not. The meeting between the IRD aid managers and volunteers (mostly Iraqis) lasted 
for almost two hours, followed by a distribution of lunch meals. I did not go to queue for the 
meal, but a woman who was sitting next to me returned to the queue when she saw that I was 
not eating and brought another meal for me. I tried to apologize but she insisted that I should 
eat. She was one of the few who ate their meals in the center where the meeting took place. I 
noticed that the majority of volunteers put the meal in a plastic bag. I could hear one of the 
women volunteers sitting next to me telling her daughter that they had some leftovers from 
yesterday and with this meal they would have enough food for today. Another woman asked 
me if I had an extra plastic bag, and I gave her a bag with my meal. While, the woman whom 
I had just met and brought me the meal told me that as a CAC (community action 
committee), the duties assigned to her had been reduced compared to the previous year and 
that this month, for example, she would not earn more than JD 15 (US$ 21) as transportation 
allowance.  
 
This meeting presents some aspects of the complexities involved in aid provision. The 
UNHCR— through IRD and other NGOs— delegate the work of documentation and 
description of Iraqis who are eligible to cash assistance and other forms of aid to Iraqi 
volunteers. However, many of these Iraqi volunteers, as observed above are themselves in 
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urgent need of assistance. The details of this meeting should explain the tensions I observed 
in the encounters during the house-visits described earlier in which Iraqi volunteers seemed 
torn between their obligations as aid workers trained to report the Iraqi conditions using 
certain terms and methodologies, and their emotions when having to deal with Iraqis who 
experienced similar tragedies to their own. As we have also seen, the Iraqi volunteers did not 
act as passive workers obeying the instructions they had received to technically fill in 
information in the reports. They behaved as active agents who did their best  to show other 
Iraqis how to be included in the limited systems of aid offered by the UNHCR.  
 
In my meeting with the spokesperson of the UNHCR in Amman, I asked her about the 
process followed to decide whether a refugee would be eligible for a specific service. The 
UNHCR representative explained that they centrally controlled their services through a web 
based system, Refugee Assistance and Information System (RAIS): “protective and 
confidential”, as she described it, to keep information about refugees and arrange for “equal” 
distribution of assistance: “RAIS is an online database shared among local and international 
organizations; it is networked and shared among all our partners who are given different 
levels of access rights for data entry and retrieval, it shows all the necessary information 
about the refugee to allow us to coordinate the aid services and ensure that they are not 
abused by some refugees.” She emphasized that aid and services were provided according to 
assigned criteria: assistance and financial aid would depend on need. While the recognition as 
refugee and resettlement to a third country would be assessed on individual basis: “it depends 
on the story the refugee presents to us, what kind of persecution or threats he faced in Iraq, it 
has to be a well-founded story.”44 When I asked her: “What if a person fails to express his/her 
personal loss in a well-founded story format, will they lose the chance to be counted for 
protection and/or resettlement?” She answered that this might be the case sometimes, yet, 
they tried to avoid it as much as they could: “Our staff, both local and international, are well 
trained about the country of origin, what problems exist, in the different regions, cities, and 
areas and what might have forced the people of a certain area to leave, what role a person had 
in the party if he had a role, if he was senior or at a lower level ….” She meant the Baath 
party, as Iraqis who were affiliated to it (especially high ranking members) had to undergo 
                                                      
44 “Well-founded story” was the exact expression used by the UNHCR spokesperson; she said it in English in 
this interview. It conforms with the universal definition of the refugee: “a refugee is a person who owning to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country….” 
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further screening and checking and some were denied the right to the ‘refugee’ label (and the 
benefits that came with it). 
 
These conditions for aid specified by the UNHCR representative reveal what Liisa Malkki 
describes as the common “tendency to universalize the refugee as a special ‘kind’ [sic] of 
person that occurs in both the textual representation of refugees and in their photographic 
representations” (1995a: 9). Refugees, according to Malkki are presented as “exemplary 
victims” rather than agents: “stripped of the specificity of culture, place and history […]” 
(ibid.).  The power of this discourse is that when the displaced contradict this image of –
lessness (or the zoé i.e. unqualified life), and display other not-so-essential needs according to 
the “agreed” classification of essential needs, they are excluded from the formal space of 
protection, which is designed to serve only those in need of food or shelter (as in the case of 
the woman with a girl in college).  
 
Another source of tension is: How can the personal and shared experiences of suffering, pain 
and loss— as the ones presented during house-visits above— be materialized into 
documented evidences? How can such sensations and feelings that are “so brutally 
nonlinguistic be codified?” (Hastrup, 1993: 773). How can Iraqi survivors turn painful 
personal and collective experiences where they encountered deep losses into a good story and 
“well-founded evidence” that might bring them, as persons, potential gains in the present and, 
probably, in the coming future? While in the field, I rarely saw or heard the Iraqi collective 
story in the formal space of protection. During training events, participants were reminded 
(by trainers, and sometimes one of the participants would remind the rest) that they should 
not talk politics or make the meeting too political.  
 
The collective story when shared outside the private social gathering sphere was usually 
condensed into an individual story. The Iraqi who chose to increase his or her limited 
possibilities of survival by registering in the UNHCR, whether he/she was defined as asylum 
seeker or refugee waiting for resettlement to a third country,45 would get an open file in the 
UNHCR that she or he must update, in personal interviews with UNHCR officers (at their 
headquarters in Deir Ghbar in West Amman), regularly every six months. In addition, local 
                                                      
45 Both certificates: Asylum Seeker Certificate (see Appendix B) and Refugee Certificate (see Appendix C) do 
not grant Iraqi refugees in Jordan residence or work permits. However, they have some protective value, as a 
few Iraqi men mentioned that they showed them in cases when they had been stopped by police officers in the 
streets of Amman.   
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community centers and NGOs which were funded by international organizations (affiliated 
with the UNHCR) to provide services for Iraqis, would send volunteers to visit Iraqis in their 
homes. The volunteer would ask for the UNHCR documentation and the story. Eventually, 
many Iraqis had to learn how to reconstruct the story in a way that presented the “well-
founded” evidences to gain the protection benefits, which might reduce their suffering in the 
present or in the future.  
 
Reflections on –lessness as a precondition of inclusion in humanitarian aid 
The cases presented in this chapter explore ethnographically how the inclusive exclusion 
discourse and practices of humanitarian organizations only “grasp human life in the figure of 
the bare life” (Agamben, 1998: 133). While refugees are described as humans in the texts of 
the international conventions, they are constantly reminded by the discourse of these 
organizations that their lives are less valuable as bios and that this reduction presents the 
conditions which make them eligible “objects of aid and protection” (Ibid.). We have seen the 
clash of positions here. When a family attempted to move above the limit of poverty to 
provide higher education opportunity for their daughter, which is an attempt to increase the 
educational capital, the family was excluded from the formal space of protection (i.e. no 
longer eligible for emergency cash assistance). And such a decision about who can receive 
support and who cannot is made on the basis of bureaucratic processes and quantitative 
methods. The needs of Iraqis were quantified by using a check-list which was to be 
completed in a consistent and technical way providing brief descriptions, and using bullet 
points. Based on such reports the level of –lessness was made visible and quantifiable.  
 
On a general level, we see a process here that is similar to what is reported in other refugee 
ethnographies. One example is Mckay (2012) who in her analysis of humanitarian 
governance in the case of Malawin refugees in Mozambique commented: “Care is 
increasingly extended through categories of vulnerability through which groups (such as 
women, children, or patients with particular diseases) and individuals qualify for selectively 
distributed supports from a patchwork assemblage of organizations” (2012: 290). Mckay’s 
description of another refugee management experience is similar to the current assemblage of 




What we see here is also a response to a change in the larger system of refugee management 
on a global level. The change is in the style of management of refugee protection from a 
macro to a micro oriented system. The macro oriented and centralized management of 
refugees was focusing on refugee crises as collective crises that needed to be handled 
primarily by putting the refugees into camps, with the consequence that the individuals in 
such refugee camps over time got treated in ways that reminds us of mechanism described by 
the concept “biopower.”46 The new approach focused on micro project-based responses 
targeting people staying outside the confines of the refugee camps, as in the case of 
‘outreach’ services described above. Instead of the collective strategies towards refugee 
camps, a new type of management emerges, in which training services are provided through 
micro projects that have as a specific aim to make the refugees able to help themselves, 
within the region and host-country where they are displaced. In a period of neoliberal 
dominance this means to adapt to market forces.  
 
The neoliberal intervention in the Iraqi space was not only at the level of promoting a New 
Iraq, where privatization and free market and trade would be the norm and replace the state 
control of resources and trade, it was also evident in the conditions for international aid in a 
global context, which promoted linking developmental aid to host countries with 
humanitarian aid to refugees, while ignoring the historical and political factors that led to the 
refugee problem. In their introduction of Interpreting Welfare and Relief in the Middle East, 
Naguib and Okkenhaug comment that activities of aid and welfare in general “can never be 
removed from political, social or economic contexts. [...] Interpreting the complexities of 
welfare and relief in the Middle East is another way of drawing attention to the fact that such 
activities also inform power constellations and must be analyzed as such” (2007: 3-4). The 
design of international aid for Iraqis (and other groups of refugees) requires consideration of 
the political context at both its local and global levels. But most of all the design of 
international aid for Iraqis must bring into consideration the human dimension of the refugee 
situation, which brings me to the end of this chapter, but also to its beginning in which I 
introduced the notion of –lessness. What I have shown is that Iraqis who had had the good 
fortune to escape the hard, almost deadly living conditions in their country were not 
                                                      
46 Ethnographies among camp refugees describe the role of sharing the camp space in the production of 
collective narrative and identity (see for example Malkki’s discussion on the camp historicity (1995, 1996) and 
Peteet’s discussion on Palestinian refugee camps (in Lebanon) as sites for the elaboration of social relations 
“characterized by a serious running back and forth between hope and despair” (2005: 93-130). 
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immediately included in the “humanitarian” space of protection. They had to undergo a 
longer process to become eligible for emergency assistance and temporary protection.  
 
Many of the Iraqis I met explained that they initially depended on the money they had 
brought from home. Some, like the woman who was excluded from the formal protection 
space for having a girl in college, ended up selling part of the furniture they had bought upon 
arrival to cover the costs of basic needs such as apartment rent, food, water and electricity. 
She and others, both families and individuals, had eventually to turn to aid organizations. 
When they approached the UNHCR and its partner organizations for assistance, they were 
told that aid was designed to protect only the most vulnerable Iraqis.  
 
There is a dilemma here. The humanitarian agencies, on top of which stands the UNHCR, 
emphasize the rights of individuals to be fed, sheltered and educated at a certain level 
essential for survival outside their homelands until a durable solution could be reached. The 
minimum humanitarian assistance in the Iraqi case was based on the needs of most vulnerable 
Iraqis (and Jordanians) as individuals rather than rights of a collective refugee community in 
need of international legal protection and essential services that these Iraqis could not access 
due to their exclusion from the former Iraqi state. Iraqis had to constantly prove that they 
deserved aid, and thus to be included in the formal humanitarian space as individual 
cases/files, and not as a collective displaced community. Their plight as collective 
communities was ignored not only in the aid context but also in the media.47 Impoverished 
Iraqis thus came to realize that the conditions of -lessness was a prerequisite to obtain 
assistance of food and most-needed cash to cover expensive living costs in Jordan.  
  
                                                      




Ongoing changes in the system of aid and access to work in Jordan 
 
During my fieldwork, I observed how, in the process of creating their spaces of ʾamān, Iraqis 
had constantly to negotiate their positions in Jordan. Some Iraqis, who had little or no access 
to employment and therefore also had difficulties in earning their own living, did their best to 
prove that they were eligible to the rights and benefits provided by the UNHCR system to 
asylum seekers and refugees. While other Iraqis tended to ignore the formal UNHCR 
protection systems, and in such cases the people involved turned to explore other possibilities 
of making their spaces of ʾamān.  
 
In Chapter Three we saw several Iraqi academics and doctors in Jordan who tried to work in 
their professional occupations and maintain their careers. They had to learn how to cope with 
the changing conditions imposed by displacement and dispossession. While some succeeded 
to work as contracted temporary employees in private Jordanian universities and hospitals, or 
as volunteers in international organizations in Jordan, others decided to work inside Iraq 
under the protection of their tribe, ethnic group or neighbors, to support their family needs in 
Jordan. In general, after 2000, highly qualified Iraqi academics and doctors had to go through 
more complex experiences in negotiating the losses and gains involved in working at reduced 
conditions at Jordanian institutions; some who had less access to material and social capital 
either worked in a different field or had to sell their skills and expertise in degrading 
conditions. During their prolonged stay in Jordan, Iraqi professionals had to adjust their 
tactics and strategies to circumstances; according to their access to resources and the 
changing conditions of employment in the Jordanian labor market, and their different 
perceptions of well-being. 
 
In Chapter Four we saw another type of adaptation, represented by Iraqi former state 
employees with less resources than the more affluent highly-skilled professionals. One 
common choice among Iraqis in that chapter was to contact the UNHCR and start a process 
of registering as asylum seeker first and then, apply for the status of refugee. In the period 
during which the applications were handled and the Iraqis were waiting for decisions they 
became involved in several important contexts. One process was a constant search for sources 
of income to sustain their households. But unlike the more affluent groups, these Iraqis had a 
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problem of getting access to any type of legal income within the Jordanian system. The 
second process was the one defined by UNHCR and the aid system, in which a screening was 
carried out to decide who was worthy of resettlement and further support. During their stay in 
Jordan, they could attend courses, workshops and seminars which represented one way of 
coping as the participants were paid travel allowance and got free meals; all mounting to 
whatever ‘income’ they had from remittances or irregular work, thus compensating for the 
lack of formal employment. The money was called "salary" and represented an alternative 
way for those Iraqis to expand their spaces of ʾamān.  
 
This system of aid provided some Iraqis with a feeling that they continued to exist as 
professionals who could create a possibility to work and a purpose to live in dignity. But 
beyond this the opportunities available for those Iraqis went through significant changes 
during periods in which the aid system experienced reduction in available funds, and also 
experienced a change in the overall policies from “humanitarianism” to “developmental aid.”  
 
The above summaries of major conclusions in Chapters Three and Four leave us with a need 
to explore further two crucial contexts that affected the possibilities for these groups of 
former Iraqi state employees and professionals to help themselves. These two contexts were: 
first, the Jordanian context of employment in relation to ‘foreign’ workers or ‘strangers’, the 
two labels governing Iraqis’ presence in the job market in Jordan, and the second context was 
to understand better the changing context of international aid provision for refugees as 
developmental aid which is designed to “help refugees help themselves.” In this chapter, I 
shall discuss both contexts and relate them to the major themes in Chapters Three and Four.     
 
The first context -of work for Iraqis in Jordan 
If we move back in time to the 1990s, the possibilities for Iraqis to find work in Jordan were 
more promising. As described in Chapter 3, Iraqi academics who moved to work in Jordan 
during the times of al-ḥiṣār found employment in Jordanian universities and were paid 
following the Jordanian academic scale based on their academic qualifications. But this was 
to change. With the acceleration of privatization and the opening of several private 
universities in Jordan, many non-Jordanian academics were dismissed from governmental 
universities, despite the role they played in establishing some colleges in the fields of 
engineering, medicine and other scientific fields. Following the 2003 war, many former Iraqi 
137 
 
professors who were employed at governmental universities had to move to work in private 
universities on temporary contract basis. 
 
The cases presented in Chapter Three show how Iraqi highly skilled professionals dealt in 
different ways with the restrictive structures of employment in Jordan, in their attempts to 
live according to their perceived standards of well-being as professionals practicing their 
careers. The ability to practice one’s profession also allowed the Iraqi professionals somehow 
to maintain his/her former social status and also to secure a decent living for one’s family. 
This does not mean that all former Iraqi professionals had similar chances to practice their 
profession.  According to my observations in the field, the ability to practice one’s career was 
conditioned by access to additional resources through remittances sent from Iraq or relatives 
based elsewhere, in addition to the money initially brought from Iraq either from savings or 
selling properties. Such resources were important during the period it took to find work, or to 
pay for the annual residence permit. This is significant because the availability of funds kept 
many Iraqis out of the alternative process, to seek assistance through UNHCR. Access to 
other resources was thus essential to avoid being caught in the complex process of defining 
who was what – a refugee, a guest, a foreigner and so on. One way out was actually to start 
migrating back to Iraq, turning into “circular migrants” relying on tribal networks and new 
strategies of hiding to avoid death threats and other risky conditions.  
 
Iraqis who had been professionals and state-employees in Baghdad, had to learn how to 
extend their spaces of ʾamān by exploring work options in Jordan. Unlike their former 
situation in Iraq, where they were supported by the Iraqi state, in Jordan they had to learn 
how to cope without the support of a state. Here they had to depend on their own skills and 
talents to find an employment opportunity.  The cases presented in Chapter Three show how 
this group of Iraqis had to learn how to preserve their former identity as professionals through 
dealing with the reductionist conditions of displacement, using various coping strategies. In 
this chapter I shall be more concerned in exploring the challenges they met in their search for 
employment. The highly skilled professionals were not alone in meeting such challenges. The 
search for work, and stable employment that could provide a source of income, was a widely 
shared experience for former Iraqi state-employees in all sectors, including Iraqis who 
gradually turned to the UNHCR for support. Even though we might find winners and losers 
among Iraqis in terms of securing job positions in Jordan, yet all Iraqis, were affected‒at 
various levels‒ by the ambiguous Jordanian rules concerning employment regulations for 
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refugees or foreign workers (as Iraqis were often categorized when it comes to their right to 
work).  
 
As explained in previous chapters, the possibilities of work were critical for the production of 
ʾamān among this group of Iraqi former state employees and professionals. However, the 
situation with regard to employment opportunities in Jordan was at best unclear, as described 
by one Iraqi volunteer: 
There is no work, no money! As Iraqis in Jordan, most of us spend our days 
imprisoned in a narrow apartment, doing nothing. In Iraq I had a regular job, 
respect and social status but I am no one here, I am nothing! And you keep 
lecturing me to lecture other Iraqis that I am a welcomed brother and guest; you 
are telling me that I am a “special” guest with rights from the UNHCR, but I don’t 
know where to go to claim those rights, I even don’t know what these rights are. 
 
It was obvious that the Iraqi presence in Jordan was conditioned by several factors which 
made it difficult to describe the limits of Iraqis’ rights to reside, work or settle and resettle in 
that country. Um-Omar, a former Iraqi librarian summarized briefly the ambiguity of the 
rules and regulations governing the Iraqi presence in Jordan. Her protesting statement above 
occurred during a workshop in which a Jordanian lawyer was dictating the rules and 
regulations of the new family protection law issued in Jordan in 2008 to a group of Iraqi 
volunteers contracted temporarily by various international and local NGOs. The workshop 
was held in a 4-Star hotel in Amman on 21 March 2011, a  Jordanian employee from an 
international organization introduced the lawyer-trainer as a legal consultant who will deliver 
an ‘important’ session on the legal procedures to control domestic violence in Jordan. This 
session, as presented in the next section provides some details of the ambiguous conditions 
governing Iraqis’ access to work and protection in Jordan. 
 
The rumor of a ‘secret pardon’  
At the beginning of the workshop, the Iraqi volunteers were asked to share cases of domestic 
violence they had to deal with during their home-visits and interactions with Iraqi ‘refugee’ 
families. The Iraqi participants mentioned several cases in which they were involved as part 
of their work as volunteers to provide outreach services to fellow Iraqis registered in the 
UNHCR. They indicated how, in most of the cases, the Jordanian legal bodies, police and 
family protection units failed to protect the abused Iraqi woman. In the three main cases 
shared by the volunteers during the workshop, the Iraqi woman’s attempt to leave the 
conditions of abuse forced her to search for work to support herself and her children, away 
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from an abusive husband or the bad conditions at protection centers. However, as presented 
by the volunteers, the abused Iraqi women, in the three cases of domestic violence, ended up 
facing more abusive conditions committed by their Jordanian employers.  
 
The lawyer asked the volunteers to focus on the incidents of domestic violence, which is the 
topic of the workshop, but the Iraqi participants wanted her to address “the other violence” as 
they called it: “the economic violence by exploitative Jordanian employers.” This opened the 
floor to questions on the right to work. Most of the questions were ignored by the lawyer 
who, in turn, posed a question aiming to challenge the participants to rethink the cases of 
domestic violence they shared, and most importantly to try to indicate that ‘employment in 
Jordan’ is not the theme of the workshop and in her opinion, it should not be an Iraqi 
concern:  
All the examples you presented, are of Iraqis, this means that they are refugees. 
As refugees in Jordan, do you have the right to work here? 
 
The nineteen male and female Iraqis who were present in this workshop were ‘working’ as 
volunteers in several international or local organizations. They argued with the lawyer about 
a so-called ‘secret pardon’, a term that I remembered hearing from other Iraqis in the field, 
but in this workshop, the volunteers referred every time to the source of the ‘secret pardon’ or 
the rumor (according to the lawyer). They claimed to have heard this from an employee in an 
NGO or international organization who told them that “as Iraqis they are now permitted to 
work to support themselves, and that the Jordanian authorities will pardon those Iraqis caught 
working, without a work-permit.”  
 
The so-called secret pardon seemed to represent one hope for this group of Iraqis to lift the 
restrictions imposed on the possibility to find employment in Jordan. They explained that 
according to the secret pardon, any Iraqi who manages to secure a job contract is encouraged 
to contact the Jordanian Ministry of Labor to obtain a work permit. Following this she or he 
could approach the Ministry of Interior to apply for an official residence permit, and as a 
result they would be exempt from the fines accumulated due to the expiry of their entry visa, 
which was another problem Iraqis had to deal with in Jordan. 
 
The lawyer appeared confused when she could not proceed with the workshop as initially 
planned, while she seemed totally unprepared to discuss the legal procedures concerning 
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employment of Iraqis in Jordan. Instead of addressing the concerns expressed by Iraqis about 
the right to work, the lawyer ordered the Iraqi participants to reveal the sources of their 
information by repeatedly asking them to check the credibility of the sources of this “rumor” 
[as she referred to the secret pardon]. On the other hand, the Iraqi volunteers seemed 
confident in their responses to the lawyer by presenting more examples of specific cases in 
which some non-governmental organizations like Care International and the Legal Aid had 
provided assistance to Iraqis to obtain work permits in certain job positions including nursing, 
restaurant service (as waiters) and car mechanics (as technicians). Iraqi participants explained 
that they were told that this is only one step within a larger process aiming to facilitate the 
working conditions for Iraqis as part of the ‘secret pardon’.  
 
The lawyer, though acknowledging the role of the organizations mentioned by Iraqi 
volunteers, questioned the authority of these organizations when it comes to discussing 
amendments and changes in the legal situation for Iraqi refugees. To make it more 
meaningful in legal terms, the lawyer questioned the sources of the new information shared 
by participants. She considered their legal source as weak and referred Iraqis to the 
conditions listed in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the UNHCR 
and the Jordanian government in 1998.  By this, she concluded that the claims presented by 
the Iraqi volunteers who assumed that Iraqis are permitted to work in Jordan totally contradict 
the ‘official’ legal regulations governing Iraqis’ temporary presence in Jordan as ‘refugees’ 
who (according to the lawyer) have one legal authority to consult, which is the UNHCR. She 
further clarified that according to the MOU (see Appendix A), “Jordan is not a refugee 
country”; and although it receives refugees, the employment of refugees is not permitted, 
because, as the lawyer explained: 
The government fears that if refugees find jobs in Jordan, they will eventually 
settle here. For you [the lawyer addressed the Iraqi volunteers] the only durable 
solutions are repatriation or resettlement in a third country. 
 
The argument went on and the participants continued to refer to concrete examples of what 
they termed as “the recent changes in the Iraqi refugees’ rights to employment” which they 
heard from the organizations they were affiliated to as volunteers and trainees. Unlike the 
legal document (the MOU) the lawyer referred to, the participants— when challenged by the 
lawyer to show their sources— referred to what they called the secret pardon or “royal 





The lawyer in her attempts to redirect discussions back toward the planned workshop topics 
referred to the MOU as the main legal source for Iraqis to consult. This did not seem 
convincing to the Iraqi participants. But the only response from the lawyer was to repeat that 
Iraqis should refer to what she called their “correct” legal source of reference. “The  UNHCR 
is your source of protection and the authority (marjiʻiyya) to which you, as Iraqi refugees in 
Jordan,  should always refer.”  
 
The lawyer used the term marjiʻiyya in Arabic مرجعية; which is commonly used to refer to the 
highest or supreme ranking religious authority or other legal source of authority reference to 
follow. The lawyer’s reference to the UNHCR as the sole source of authority and protection 
which Iraqis could consult created further confusion, especially that these Iraqi volunteers 
had already experienced contradictory discursive practices of protection in Jordan. Presenting 
the UNHCR as the only marjiʻiyya or the highest legal authority and reference did not serve 
the lawyer’s case in this workshop when one of the participants, who was following silently 
the discussions finally decided to raise his hand to demand the right to speak, and directed his 
brief comment to the lawyer: 
Your use of the term refugee is not correct, I am constantly addressed as a guest 
in Jordan. I am not a refugee here.  
 
At this point the lawyer, who seemed already exhausted and confused by the unexpected turn 
of events, ignored the last comment on the refugee vs. guest in the Jordanian discourse 
concerning Iraqis, instead, she announced that it was time to conclude the workshop, one 
hour before the planned schedule‒ by challenging the participants to reconsider their use of 
the secret pardon:  
You should stop repeating rumors, as often our Iraqi “brothers”48 do! This is the 
way rumors spread, instead you should ask yourselves why is this “pardon” 
described as “secret”? And if you were told that this is secret, why do you 
mention it publicly? From my position as a lawyer, I can offer you a legal advice 
not to disclose this issue of the secret pardon because if al-mukhābarāt (the secret 
police) hear you, you will be deported. I am giving you this legal advice: You 
have to be sure of the news you spread, before you repeat such information. In the 
Iraqi community, a term like this [she referred to the secret pardon mentioned by 
Iraqi volunteers several times during the workshop while she avoided using it] 
can quickly spread and turn into a problem. My advice to you is that you are a 
“refugee”, and your marjiʻiyya is the UNHCR. 
                                                      
48 Brothers is another term used by Jordanian officials to describe the Iraqi presence in Jordan in addition to 




The workshop and arguments stopped here without resolving the issues presented either on 
domestic violence or employment conditions concerning Iraqis in Jordan. This final statement 
by the lawyer sounded more like a threat than a legal advice, particularly when al-
mukhābarāt was mentioned. It seemed the lawyer sensed this as she ended the workshop on  
a more positive note, stating that such cases as the ones presented and discussed during the 
current workshop were good because they helped to enrich training events. But her comment 
was met only by more silence. To save the situation she went on to pose a question 
addressing the silent participant who has made the last brief comment of being a guest not a 
refugee in Jordan: “According to the document you received from the UNHCR, are you an 
asylum seeker or a refugee?” The participant responded, briefly, as any wise person would 
respond to avoid further troubles with al-mukhābarāt: “I do not like any of the two terms.” 
No further comments were made by other participants and the workshop was over. 
  
After the workshop ended, the Iraqi volunteers proceeded their discussions over lunch, in the 
absence of the lawyer. I was sitting next to Um-Omar while we were waiting for the lunch to 
be served (lunch was scheduled one hour later according to the original workshop plan). Um-
Omar expressed her disappointment with the workshop and the lack of clarity concerning 
what she called “Iraqi rights” in Jordan: “You see how they [she referred to trainers and 
organizations who organize the workshops; and the lawyer in this case] never give us direct 
responses to our questions.” The discussion then evolved with other participants about the 
lack of jobs and employment opportunities which they described as the biggest problem Iraqi 
families faced in Jordan. The parents who used to work in Baghdad had not only lost their 
professional status in Jordan, they had also lost the ability to provide for their household and 
children’s education. This concern “finding a job, a stable source of living” was shared by 
many Iraqis I met in the field and the workshop was an opportunity for the Iraqi volunteers to 
discuss their biggest concern.  
 
The above case is one example of the ambiguous conditions in which Iraqis had to negotiate 
their terms of survival in Amman. In general, there was little space in Jordan for the Iraqis to 
discuss their situation in a more collective manner so they were left to make their own 
decisions and to pursue individual strategies.  Part of the reason for this was to be found in 
the set up of the assistance programs provided to Iraqis in Jordan by International aid 
organizations, and Jordanian Royal Decrees. For instance towards the end of my fieldwork 
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(2010-2011), the Jordanian government announced an expansion of the protection space for 
the Iraqis, including a General Pardon Law which “allowed” Iraqis to regularize their stay 
and apply for work permits. Some more details appear in the following excerpt from the 
universal periodic review by the UNHCR that was submitted for the Offices of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report in March 2013:  
“Since 6 December 2009, the [Jordanian] Government has had a more lenient 
approach vis-à-vis the Iraqi refugees in Jordan, allowing Iraqis to work in 
professions not occupied by Jordanians and approving some vocational training 
programs. On 11 January 2011, the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Interior 
decided to open more work sectors for Iraqis in Jordan, as they were the vast 
majority of the refugee population. This decision had significant impact on 
persons of concern in Jordan, as it followed General Pardon Law No. 15, issued 
on 1 June 2011, which waived, among other things, overstay fees –thereby 
allowing Iraqis to regularize their stay, secure a residency and apply for work 
permits - and led to a new opportunity for Iraqis and non-Iraqis to work in a wide 
range of sectors” (2013:2-3). 
 
The workshop described above took place on 21 March 2011, and it seems that the news 
about a “secret pardon” that was shared among Iraqis was related to these developments. As 
the UNHCR report cited above indicates, the General Pardon Law was officially issued by 
King Abdullah on 1 June 2011, and it confirmed the rumors in the workshop as the new law 
waived overstay residence fees and indicated that Iraqis could apply for work permits. 
However, the protective space soon shrunk again with the rise of the Syrian refugee problem 
towards the end of 2011.  
 
Although the “secret” pardon (when revealed) indicated that Iraqis could apply for work 
permits, in practice Iraqis were still treated as foreign workers. In official reports by UNHCR, 
they were asylum-seekers and refugees and the Jordanian government representatives kept 
referring to Iraqis as guests and brothers, but when it comes to their legal rights to 
employment, they were considered as foreigners. Therefore, also in reality, they had to apply 
for work permits, like other foreigners to be eligible to work.  
 
Working in conditions of “permanent ‘temporariness’” between rumors and ‘royal’ 
exceptions/decrees 
The effect of the confusing situation was that more often than not Iraqis were denied the right 
to work in Jordan. As per the findings of FAFO in 2007, only 22% of Iraqi adults were 
employed. During my presence in Jordan, most of the Iraqis I met used to work illegally (and 
less often on temporary contract basis) and were paid less than Jordanians doing the same 
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jobs. Being an Iraqi guest or foreigner in Jordan, where the living expenses are much higher 
than in Iraq and other neighboring countries means that Iraqis had to search for ways to 
increase their access to cash, and extend their spaces of ʾamān.  
 
Most Iraqis reside in the Jordanian capital Amman. The majority who do not have a regular 
source of funding, tend to rely on multiple sources including family and relatives’ 
remittances, illegal work in Amman and organizational assistance; they live in the area 
known as East or popular Ammani neighbourhoods (Amman al-sharqiyya/ al-shaʿabiyya).  
While ‘rich’ Iraqis, who have enough resources, usually live in more affluent neighborhoods 
in the so-called West Amman (Amman al-gharbiyya). Some could afford to buy annual 
residence permits that give them the right to travel freely and apply legally for a job (for JD 
50,000/ USD 70,500 bank deposit that can be reduced to JD 25,000/ USD 35,250).  Some 
also own the apartment they reside in. For the more affluent group described in Chapter 
Three, Amman feels like a second capital city after Baghdad where they can do business, live 
as authors, academics or artists, wear the clothes they want and walk in the street without fear 
of being kidnapped, killed or threatened. Above all, they can get access to services, especially 
electricity. Electricity was the most celebrated service in daily discussions among Iraqis to 
the extent that some used to joke describing their presence in Amman as “electricity 
refugees.”   
 
By the time, Iraqis learnt that they could extend their space of ʾamān, through buying a 
residence permit that was officially given to investors or by seeking the benefit of a royal 
decree. One interesting exceptional case I learnt about while in the field was an Iraqi 
musician who received a residence permit by a royal decree. In my visit to this Iraqi musician 
family house, they expressed their relief for having an annual residence permit. When I asked 
if they had to pay ‘the investor banking deposit’, they said that their residence-permit was 
free and showed me an official letter with a list of names of other musicians who were 
granted this permit through a royal decree. The members of Kaẓim al-Saher’s band were 
given rights to a free residence permit which could be renewed annually following their 
performance in a concert on the occasion of the Jordanian king’s birthday. The musicians 
who played with the famous Iraqi singer, got this exceptional treatment when the king’s 
office wanted to pay al-Saher and his musical group. Al-Saher, one of the most famous 
contemporary Iraqi singers, demanded no fee, but requested the right to legal residence for 
his group of 24 musicians and their families, which they were given in November 2005 
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according to a royal decree issued by the Royal Hashemite Court in the same year (2005). On 
the basis of this letter the musicians whose names were listed in the letter could gain 
Jordanian residency valid for one year.   
 
ʾAmān in conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity 
Iraqis in Jordan found themselves in a strange position: on the one side, they have been told 
that they are “special” guests with rights protected by several actors: the UNHCR, local and 
international non-governmental organizations and the Jordanian government. However, when 
it comes to their legal residential or labor rights, Iraqis who have entered Jordan under the 
residency laws as foreigners, will be considered illegal when their visa expires, after six 
months unless they pay a fine of JD 1.5 on daily basis. This lack of legal status remains the 
main protection challenge and inhibits the ability of this group of Iraqi professionals and 
former government employees to reside, move and work legally in Jordan and most of the 
time, this pushed Iraqis into “the exploitative informal sector, or in some cases, ‘partnerships’ 
with local Jordanians. Even those with legal status (residence permit or temporary visas) 
struggle to obtain work permits” (Chatty and Mansour, 2011: 100). 
  
The fact that the host country, Jordan, did not deal with Iraqis as refugees and decided to call 
them guests seemed to have a profound effect for both sides. For Jordan as a country whose 
population is mixed, with large numbers of Palestinian refugees who were offered Jordanian 
citizenship, new refugee flows were perceived as a threat to the national demographic 
structure. As Marfleet notes: “The presence of refugees may be so disturbing to states that 
whole refugee populations are marked out as fundamentally alien and unwelcome, a 
characterization that may persist for years or even for generations” (2006: 200). In addition, 
the Jordanian government had multiple priorities in using the guest label which served more 
than one reason as explained by De-Bel Air: to maintain foreign investment; to continue to be 
seen as an ally to the US and a mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict; to abide by the political 
and economic reforms they had committed to; and to ensure domestic security and stability 
(ibid., 2007). When it comes to the Jordanian population, in a country with poor resources, 
they felt threatened by the newcomers who would be sharing an already impoverished space. 
In this confusing context, Iraqis in Jordan had to struggle to find a safe space during 
prolonged displacement. The following brief description of the living conditions of an Iraqi 
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musician in Amman reflects the feelings of being stuck in conditions of instability and 
uncertainty shared among several Iraqis I met in Jordan:  
We have to learn how to live, with a razor-blade in one’s throat ع الموسالا ب ”, as 
described by an Iraqi musician who left Iraq in 2004. In December 2010, he was 
still classified by the UNHCR as ‘asylum seeker’, because he was not eligible for 
the refugee certificate status or for resettlement (due to his long service in the 
military, where he worked during day-time, while he worked as musician in the 
evenings). Lucky to be a musician by profession and education as a graduate of 
the High Institute of Music in Baghdad, he managed to work illegally in 
Amman’s restaurants and hotels and could make enough money to cover his 
family’s expenses. Living as musician in Baghdad was no longer possible as his 
friends and former colleagues were threatened and targeted by militias of 
religious bodies. He is not considered a potential case for assistance according to 
the UNHCR criteria as he is not vulnerable enough: “I can afford to rent this 
furnished apartment in Dahiyet al-Hussain (a relatively affluent neighborhood in 
West Amman), as long as I succeed in finding work. The UN social worker 
reported that I am living a good life and do not deserve cash assistance.” He 
continues to live and work illegally in Amman and travels to Baghdad to visit his 
parents when the security conditions seem safe enough: “We are stuck here in the 
transit, between Baghdad and Amman, like someone who has a razor-blade in his 
throat, if he tries to swallow it, he’ll die, and if he tries to remove it, it’s risky, one 
may die too. 
 
The fear of being ‘illegal’ became another source of insecurity Iraqis experienced at various 
levels. The 2007 decision of the UNHCR to consider Iraqis as refugees on a prima facie basis 
did not change the conditions of survival for most Iraqis (I met). The fact that no formal 
arrangements were made to receive Iraqis as refugees meant that they were responsible to 
secure their own stay within the limits allowed by available resources. During my time in the 
field this lack of clear legal procedures governing the Iraqi presence in Jordan was one source 
of the ambiguity experienced among various actors in the field, especially Iraqis. According 
to a UNHCR report (2013), when it comes to employment, Article (8) in the MOU 
(Appendix A) states that a legally resident refugee may “work for his own account whenever 
the laws and regulations permit”, and relevant laws stipulate that refugees and asylum seekers 
shall be treated as equal to non-citizens regarding work permits. Article (9) adds that 
“refugees holding degrees recognized by the competent Jordanian authorities could practice 
liberal professions if the laws and regulations permit.” However, according to a report 
compiled by the UNHCR and submitted to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Right in March 2013, the Jordanian government has had a more lenient approach vis-à-vis the 
Iraqi refugees in Jordan. From December 2009 the authorities allowed Iraqis to work in 
professions not occupied by Jordanians and they also approved some vocational training 
147 
 
programs (such as nursing and car mechanics as mentioned by the Iraqi volunteers in the 
workshop described above). In this confusing situation very few of the Iraqis I met, whether 
the highly-skilled professionals in Chapter Three or the asylum seekers and refugees of 
Chapter Four, were able to establish a permanent adaptive strategy. They were left with their 
own abilities to improvise. 
 
The second context -of aid systems and dynamics in the formal protection space 
Another key context for Iraqis in Amman was the aid system. The limited yet needed 
assistance programs provided to Iraqis in Jordan by aid organizations were not fixed. Thus, 
also here we see confusion. It is true, as the lawyer in the case above mentioned, that the 
limits of the protection space were listed in the MOU signed between the UNHCR and the 
Jordanian government in 1998, however the services, rights and assistance provided 
depended on the amount of funds from donor aid in addition to the royal decrees (commonly 
known as exception rules by the King) or Pardon Laws issued by the Jordanian King.  
 
For example, the so called protection space increased in 2007 following an international 
conference organized by the UNHCR in Geneva in which the high commissioner for refugees 
announced that “the humanitarian dimension of the [Iraqi] problem can no longer be 
overlooked.”  In 2007 a royal decree opened public schooling to Iraqi children regardless of 
their legal status. Prior to that period, Iraqis with limited access to resources from their home 
country did not send their children to school as they could not afford private school fees. Yet, 
after 2007, other problems appeared, such as crowding in school classes especially in the 
eastern Amman poorer districts, issues of poor performance, bullying, and limited capacity. 
Some of these issues were addressed by aid agencies and UN organizations while other forms 
of assistance were restricted only to the most vulnerable Iraqi families who could not afford 
to pay for school supplies, uniforms, or stationery and transportation fees. Middle-class Iraqi 
professionals, who had access to free education at all levels in their home country and 
employment opportunities, had to learn how to accommodate to these changes in Jordan and 
elsewhere.  
 
The above increase in funding (in 2007) allowed for a brief period with expansion of the 
formal protection space provided for Iraqis in Jordan through reinforcing the capacity of 
Jordanian institutions in educational and health sectors. And as indicated earlier, on 1 June 
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2011, King Abdullah officially issued another General Pardon Law that waived overstay 
residence fees and indicated that Iraqis could apply for work permits. However, in practice, 
the protective limits were not clear and they soon shrunk again with the rise of the Syrian 
refugee problem.  
 
To understand the ambiguity in the formal protection space, it is important to examine the 
role of the different parties involved: UNHCR and specifically the refugee protection notion; 
Jordan as the host state and its role as provider and recipient of international aid; and the 
Iraqis’ not only when categorized as refugees, but also as active agents in their encounters 
with aid. Here I will focus on the implications of different understandings of such terms as 
‘refugee’ label and the formal ‘space of protection’, offered by UNHCR and other 
international providers of services for Iraqis in Jordan. My second focus is on the role of 
Jordan as host state for Iraqi and other refugee communities.  
 
The ‘refugee’- an unsettling notion 
The formally used definition of a refugee has been made available to us in 1951 by the 
Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees:  
“A refugee is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country….” 
 
The Convention “defined the refugee in strictly limited terms: refugeehood, the status 
associated with the forced migrant, was reduced to a single legal definition. The formal 
definition of a refugee produced a legal category of persons which empirically consisted of 
the large numbers of people fleeing Eastern Europe following World War II. Complex 
experiences associated with historical and political changes were thus reduced to a single 
legal dimension. The concept of refugee was expanded by the Convention's 1967 Protocol 
and by regional conventions in Africa and Latin America to include persons who had fled 
war or other violence in their home country. The definition was an expression of the priorities 
of Western governments then deeply involved in the ideological struggles of the Cold War. 
At the time they viewed refugees solely as victims of specific forms of political persecution” 
(Marfleet, 2006: 11). However, refugees existed prior to the twentieth century, although not 
in the fullest modern sense, in terms of their relation to the hierarchy of organization 
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manifested in the citizen/nation/state ensemble (Soguk, 1999: 58; Chatty, 2010). The lead 
international agency coordinating the categorization process after mid-20th century was the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), mandated by the 
United Nations to protect refugees and find durable solutions for their plight.  
 
The UNHCR activities were and are still based on a framework of international law and 
standards that include the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 on international humanitarian law, as well as an array of 
international and regional treaties and declarations, both binding and non-binding, that 
specifically address the needs of refugees. Thus international refugee law is part of a larger 
mosaic of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The major 
‘solutions’ UNHCR is working with to solve the refugee problem are voluntary repatriation, 
resettlement and integration. Displaced persons, like the Iraqis, were looking at three options. 
First, local integration in the host country. But this option was rejected by the Jordanian 
Kingdom who is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention that defines the rights and 
obligations of refugees. In addition, the kingdom feared any influx of refugees in the country 
as Jordan already had one of the highest ratio of refugees to indigenous population as a result 
of the previous Palestinian refugee waves in 1948 and 1967. The second option is repatriation 
or return to Iraq. This was possible but not encouraged by the UNHCR. Still, the organization 
provided limited financial assistance to Iraqis who chose to repatriate voluntarily. It is not 
clear whether the Iraqis who returned were pushed because of uncertainty in their legal status 
in Jordan (and Syria), or because they could no longer afford to stay in these host states 
without any prospect of employment. On the other hand, at the end of 2007 the Iraqi 
government sponsored television ads that portrayed families returning to safe and happy 
conditions, and promised about US $800 to those who returned, and, for a while, sponsored 
free buses from the borders of Syria and Jordan to Baghdad (Zwiebach, 2007: 786). In 2009, 
the UNHCR also launched a project to facilitate the transition from asylum to the return and 
reintegration of returnees in Iraq during 2009‒2010. The project document published online 
explains that Iraqis wishing to return would be assisted with shelter rehabilitation and 
returnee transitional cash allowance for a period of six months. This did not work as many 
families were forced to flee Iraq again. The third option, resettlement in a third country, was 
seen as “the most appropriate solution for Iraqi refugees”, as I was told in an interview with 
the UNHCR spokeswoman in February 2011. But, she added: “resettlement is designed to 
protect the most vulnerable of the refugees; those who cannot return to Iraq and cannot be 
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assisted to stay in Amman by the UNHCR. And most important of all they should fulfill the 
refugee status requirements and should have a good story with a clean record, which means 
not being involved in the previous regime wars and killings.”   
 
Though resettlement to a third country was described by the UNHCR and host country 
authorities as the most appropriate solution, some Iraqis who thought resettlement would put 
an end to the conditions of uncertainty in Jordan, failed to cope in the third country, 
especially those who lacked access to financial and social capital. I met several Iraqis, one 
family and four separate individual cases who could not survive in the United States which 
was the biggest country of resettlement for Iraqis after 2007. They returned to Iraq and then 
to Jordan again, where I met them. While some of them were still unable to work and cover 
their living expenses in Jordan and tried to get resettlement in Europe or Australia, others 
have had to learn how to create their own space of ʼamān in Jordan. 
 
Looking at the practices of UNHCR it became clear to me that the emphasis of the UNHCR 
was and is on the refugee as an individual person. And as noted in Chapter Four this is so 
despite the fact that the communities of refugees for whom this UN organization caters, such 
as Iraqis, are groups and masses of people who fled and were directly forced out of their 
original places of residence “owing to a well-founded fear.” Refugees in international 
organizations’ discourse and within their activities are basically constructed as humanitarian 
objects and individual victims who require aid to avoid a larger humanitarian or political 
crisis; or what Malkki described as “a singular category of humanity within the international 
order of things. […] The humanitarian interventions tend to be constituted as the opposite of 
political ones” (1996: 378). While it is easy to agree with this, what I observed during my 
fieldwork was also that something new was in the making in the way UNHCR was operating. 
And this change was clearly also related both to local politics in Jordan and to the wider field 
of global politics. Let me start with brief description of the changes that concerned the 
Jordanian involvement. 
 
Transformation of aid: From centralized humanitarian protection managed by the 
UNHCR to developmental programs managed by contracted organizations 
Dealing with the postinvasion Iraqi refugee flow (and the following Syrian refugee crisis) 
involved a complex process of learning for the UNHCR and international aid actors in 
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general who had to rethink their mandate,49 and make amendments to services’ provision 
(Chatty, 2017a; Kelberer, 2017). The UNHCR had to revise its urban refugee policy, in 
response to the large numbers of displaced Iraqis after the US-led invasion in 2003. 
According to Kelberer the revision policy issued in 2009 “represented a major departure from 
the UNHCR’s previous stance, for the first time stating that urban refugees had the right not 
only to live outside of camps, but to access international assistance” (2017,156). 
 
During my fieldwork in 2010-2011, international donor support was channeled mainly 
through the UNHCR and the International Relief and Development Organization (IRD, 
funded mainly by the USA government), and other foreign governmental and non-
governmental organizations. They (international donors) had designed their protection 
programs within this framework to be channeled through local and other international 
organizations which have, in turn, to compete for funds and bid for their share of resources 
dedicated to address the “Iraqi crisis.” To support the most vulnerable Iraqis, the UNHCR 
and IRD coordinate their aid work through partner organizations: international organizations 
and a larger local network run by the so-called “royal organizations.” The competition for the 
main bulk of international aid money coming to Iraqis in Jordan has generally been confined 
to the large Jordanian royal organizations including: Nour Al-Hussain Foundation (chaired by 
Queen Nour, wife of King Hussain Bin Talal, father of current King Abdullah II of Jordan), 
The Jordanian Hashemite Fund for Human Development (chaired by Princess Basma Bint 
Talal, Sister of King Hussain and Aunt of current King Abdullah II of Jordan) and Jordan 
River Foundation (chaired by Queen Rania, wife of current king Abdullah). These 
organizations, in turn, deliver services to Iraqis through other Jordanian community centers 
and privately contracted service providers. This system of aid has been promoted as an 
‘outreach service’ that can better respond to the essential needs of urban refugees with access 
to healthcare, education, entrepreneurship training projects for income-generation skills, legal 
protection and other in-kind and cash donations.   
                                                      
49 The memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the Jordanian government and the UNHCR in 
1998, as mentioned earlier, has been amended in 2014, during the rise of the Syrian refugee crisis. However, the 
amendments did not address the two major concerns observed among refugees regarding official work or 
residence permits. Only two articles were amended in 2014 with the aim to give the UNHCR more time to deal 
with the large number of refugees, as follows: The article that used to give the UN agency between 21 and 30 
days to examine applications was amended to extend the period given to the UNHCR to assess refugees 
applications to 90 days. The second amendment stipulates extending the validity of a refugee identification card 
to one year instead of six months. For further details check Khetam Malkawi’s article in Jordan Times published 





The above-described style of decentralized re-organization of humanitarian aid by the 
UNHCR in the host country represented one side of a shift from the long-term “care and 
maintenance” programs delivered in refugee camps to what is described as “development-
oriented approaches in the refugee responses” (Crisp, 2001). It partly serves saving high 
expenses involved in centralized management in refugee camps, especially when resettlement 
and repatriation do not seem likely in the short-term, which means that refugee camps could 
turn into a permanent solution. De-centralization also serves the international community to 
avoid long-term commitment by passing the responsibility of care and protection to the host 
state’s institutions. While all the above-mentioned partners receive their ‘shares’ from the 
developmental donor-aid,  Iraqis, who are often announced as the main target of this aid, have 
to compete (with agreed percentage of the poorest Jordanians) for the limited funds that are 
packaged in the form of training courses, travel-allowances and few meals and snacks (their 
share from the ‘hospitality’ item, as planned in the project budget sheet). Eventually, this 
arrangement of aid provision, which was designed to target Iraqis through Jordanian 
institutions and community associations, increased the tension and suffering of impoverished 
Iraqis who had no access to alternative resources and could not find employment in Jordan 
and therefore, grew more dependent on the limited aid available (as explained in Chapter 4). 
On the other hand, representatives of the Jordanian organizations I met, explained that they 
too had to compete for funds to cover their staff expenses and services, and support rising 
numbers of refugees, especially after the Syrian crisis, in addition to providing services to the 
poor Jordanians within the communities they originally work for.  
 
The problems with the development-oriented approach 
According to Kelberer, this development-oriented approach favored by donor organizations, 
prioritizes temporary local integration and is backed by transfers of both humanitarian and 
development aid to host states: the right to work and right to education are promoted as 
“pathways to enhance urban-refugee protections, integrate them more fully into local 
structures, and create add-on benefits for the host state and local communities” (2017:155).  
But there were problems, as observed in the field among Iraqis. One result of the 
decentralization aspect in the developmental approach was that with several organizations 
delivering services, there were an increase in service-points to which Iraqis could turn for 
assistance nearby their places of residence. Yet the quality of the service varied depending on 
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the centre that provided it. It also meant that a considerable amount of the aid assigned for 
Iraqis would be spent to cover the logistical and managerial expenses of the UNHCR partner 
organizations and the Jordanian government, as expressed by Chatelard in her review of the 
Iraqi refugee crisis: “A humanitarian agenda serves Jordan’s governmental interests better 
than those of Iraqis who have had no choice but to look for safety and a future outside of their 
country” (2008: 6).  
 
A second problem is related to short-term contracts and temporality of aid. The temporary 
aspect of protection and aid services had negative effects on both the Iraqi recipients and the 
aid workers and organizations. Initially the services provided to Iraqis on the basis of 
vulnerability addressed urgent needs, but, since they now were funded on a project basis, this 
meant that the need had to be quantified (according to measurable evidence), however, the 
response is according to the funds available, regardless of the need (even if the need is 
defined as urgent). I was told by several organizations that Iraqis were usually informed in 
advance about the range of the services they could obtain from various organizations, this 
might provide some relief for the organizations, but for the Iraqis, it certainly produced 
confusion and increased their feelings of uncertainty and fear, as illustrated in the following 
case I witnessed during my fieldwork.  
 
I do not know what happened to that woman whom I had met during a lunch with an Iraqi 
friend, a volunteer whom I met in several training events. I still remember the istikān tea cup 
and her trembling hand stirring the spoon. I had almost finished drinking my first cup of tea, 
while writing down the recipe for the rice kubba that my friend cooked alongside three other 
delicious dishes for lunch (biryāni, potato kubba and rice/timān kubba). My friend asked to 
refill my cup and poured more tea, while the other woman, was still stirring with the spoon 
although there was no more sugar to dissolve. My friend asked her if she needed more sugar, 
but she did not answer her and turned to me asking if I knew somebody that could help fund 
her treatment. My friend told her: “But no, she is a student, not an aid worker!” The woman 
did not seem to listen to us. She explained how she took part in a project on “early breast 
cancer detection,” sponsored by an international medical organization that funded 
mammogram screening sessions for Iraqi women. She mentioned how she had then carelessly 
listened to the social worker when the latter tried to emphasize the importance of going to 
regular checkups and how she had gone for the mammogram though she did not have any 
visible signs of the disease. She could not hide her tears when she said that the mammogram 
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had revealed a tumor and the need for an immediate operation. When she contacted the social 
worker to inform her of the mammogram results, the social worker’s response was that the 
project was solely covering the mammogram test, and that treatment was not part of the 
project outcomes. The social worker advised her to contact other donors. While my friend 
kept repeating “may God help you”, the woman went on describing details of her suffering 
and efforts to secure funds for house rent, her son’s education, and the treatment of her sick 
husband. She addressed her talk to me most of the time, hoping that I might be able to help. I 
could see it in her eyes when she finished the story, she looked at me anticipating some 
response. When she heard nothing from me except some words of sympathy, she asked me 
directly if I could help or advise her on where to go for assistance. And I had to clarify my 
position as a student again to which she responded with an angry question: “Then if they 
don’t have the money to treat us, why should they deceive us to do the free mammogram 
test? Our life here wasn’t easy before their aid came and they turned it into hell now.” During 
the time of my research, the already minimal funding underwent additional decrease, and 
most of the organizations had to stop some of the projects through which they provided 
services to Iraqi refugees.  
 
Yet another problem brings us back to the issue of work, salaries and income. I observed 
many times how several Iraqis were struggling to extend their access to cash aid from all 
possible sources. Attending or delivering courses, often addressing irrelevant topics was one 
source to gain limited access to cash in the form of daily wage (as in the case of voluntary 
work as trainers) or travel allowance (in the case of trainee-participants). A visit I made to a 
local community center with representatives of one of the royal Jordanian organizations, 
mentioned above, which was contracted by an international organization to deliver services to 
Iraqi refugees provides an example of how the new development-oriented approach affected 
the possibility of Iraqis to use the courses and their travels to and from courses to earn extra 
money. The workshop I attended during my visit to the organization targeted young women 
in a training about reproductive health: the workers distributed leaflets with information on 
birth control to raise women awareness about pregnancy and other health-related issues. I 
spoke with some of the Iraqi women who attended, and they expressed that although the 
content of the training sessions at the center is boring but they continue to come to gain some 




At the end of the session, the aid worker explained that this is one in a series of workshops 
funded by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The organizer thanked the women 
for their commitment and attendance and explained that they will continue delivering training 
sessions to raise awareness about important themes. She announced the forthcoming program 
for 2011 which will focus on gender based violence after they completed the program on 
reproductive health during 2010, and opened the floor for questions. The only question that 
one woman asked, and she said that her question is a common concern shared by other 
women was about “cash”: “what about the travel allowance? We leave our homes and come 
to the center and spend hours here listening to lectures.” The response of the organizer was 
that in the new program, snacks will be provided but there will be no travel allowance (i.e. no 
cash) because the training sessions are designed to be delivered in one of the women’s houses 
that should be in a walking distance from their own homes. The women’s reaction was one of 
disappointment and they repeatedly raised their hands to ask about the travel allowance. The 
Iraqi volunteers (trainers), in turn, explained that this design of the courses made it more 
difficult to gather the required numbers of trainees: “It is good in the sense that the training 
provides a space to meet others and leave the confinement of the house, but many women 
stopped coming because it is no longer profitable without the travel allowance.” In addition, 
according to aid workers and trainers, Iraqis preferred to learn more useful skills such as 
English language (for those waiting for resettlement), handicrafts and cooking, than sitting to 
listen to “boring” lectures about birth control or child learning disabilities or domestic 
violence… etc. Several Iraqi women whom I met during such courses had university degrees 
and professional experience, and they often complained about having to attend “boring 
courses.” 
 
Refugees as an important source to attract ‘additional’ international aid  
The response of Jordan as a host state to this development-oriented approach was not 
unexpected. Jordan is dependent largely on foreign money to support its resource-poor 
economy (Massad, 2001: 15). As a state dependent on foreign money through grants, donor 
projects and remittances sent by Jordanians living and working abroad, especially in Gulf 
countries, Jordan easily accommodated to this development-oriented aid structure. Aid funds 
collected to cover expenses for hosting refugees represented another important source of aid 
for Jordan. Royal Jordanian organizations and local community centers benefited from more 
access to funding opportunities by attracting Iraqi refugees in their programs, and in 
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programs that were originally designed to target poor Jordanians. Kelberer provides 
additional context:  
“Jordan’s first significant period of refugee-rentier behavior began during 
international negotiations for aid during the Iraqi refugee crisis in the Iraq War of 
2003. As other sources of foreign aid had decreased in the 1990s and 2000s, 
Jordanian appeals for humanitarian aid during that war centered on the burden of 
hosting thousands of Iraqi refugees. The government highlighted the fact that 
Iraqi refugees lived entirely among the local population and directly affected the 
host community. Jordan has used its refugee policies as leverage in international 
negotiations to lobby for increased access to aid, and threatened to retract 
protections and services if it is not delivered. In 2013, for instance, the World 
Bank approved a $150 million loan to Jordan for its bread subsidy program 
despite its official stance against subsidies. In return, Jordan pledged to spend $55 
million of the loan on subsidies for Syrian refugees. By using this strategy, Jordan 
was incentivized to inflate the size of the crisis and the level of need to elicit 
higher rent payments. It was criticized by many observers for allegedly over 
reporting the number of Iraqi refugees to gain more aid” (2017: 158). 
 
The Jordanian government attempts to seek rents from refugees can be seen in international 
conferences. The Jordanian state received high levels of foreign aid, much of which went into 
local services, in exchange for providing Iraqis with temporary asylum (Seeley, 2016). In an 
already scarce job market, where Jordanians suffer unemployment and had to migrate in 
search for work in the Gulf, Jordan was trying to gain more access to aid to address Jordan’s 
fiscal problems, ideally through loans and grants. Being the second largest host of refugees 
per capita in the world following Pakistan,50 helping Jordan to help the refugees to stay 
within its borders turned aid provision to refugees into an important aid industry. 
 
The changes introduced in the management of the protection space (towards a development-
oriented aid structure) did not mean wider space of protection for Iraqis, as much as they 
benefited the Jordanian organizations. As mentioned earlier, only in January 2007, the 
UNHCR belatedly concluded that people fleeing Iraq were refugees “on a prima facie basis.” 
This did not guarantee their status or security in the main neighboring hosting countries. 
Statistical reports indicate that Jordan received around 750,00051 and Syria 1.4 million Iraqis. 
Iraqis were dispersed in urban areas, in a situation of legal and social insecurity, with limited 
                                                      




51 The numbers of Iraqis in Jordan as announced by Jordanian officials in 2007 at a donor conference for the 
UNHCR was 750,000. However, the official number of registered Iraqis according to the UNHCR was 10,600, 
while according to a quantitative study by Fafo the number of Iraqis in 2007 was 161,000. 
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opportunities for engaging in professional pursuits or collective social activities. A complex 
set-up was deployed to protect and assist Iraqis in neighboring countries, supported by 
international funding and refugee resettlement schemes to western states restricted to certain 
so-called most vulnerable cases (Marfleet, 2007; Sassoon, 2008; Chatelard, 2009; Peteet, 
2010b, Hoffman, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, the development-oriented aid structure did not change much of the legal or 
social conditions of Iraqis in Jordan, as they were still treated as foreigners or ‘guests’ with 
limited opportunities to engage in the employment sector or organize collective initiatives in 
the public space. The Jordanian government “discouraged donors from projects that establish 
a refugee category” (Fagen, 2007: 11). Following an international appeal for funds, which as 
agreed were to be distributed through government channels to improve the Jordanian 
educational system and health services, the Jordanian government allowed (only in August 
2007), on humanitarian grounds, Iraqi students enrollment in public schools and offered 
Iraqis in general access to primary health or emergency treatment regardless of their resident 
status. In my interview with a lawyer from Legal Aid, a Jordanian NGO providing legal 
services for refugees, the lawyer described the Iraqi’s status in Jordan as a “distinguished” 
foreigner:  
Iraqis should know that they are foreigners in Jordan, they receive all the rights 
given to foreigners and have to fulfill their duties as foreigners; but as Iraqis they 
also receive special treatment and protection services from the UNHCR, so the 
conditions of an Iraqi foreigner are different from those of a French foreigner, the 
Iraqi is more “privileged” than other foreigners in Jordan, he is a distinguished 
foreigner.  
 
Thus, the Iraqi entering Jordan on a three months visa, as most Iraqis whom I met in 2010 
and 2011 did, was considered a foreigner. As a foreigner, she or he is not allowed to work 
and is obliged to leave the country and renew her/his visa to avoid accumulating fines. 
Following the expiry of the visa, the Iraqi should pay JD 1.5 (US $ 2) per day as a fine. The 
Legal Aid lawyer indicated that many times Iraqis faced troubles resulting from the ‘rumors’ 
they tend to exchange. The main problems she discussed were related to residence and work 
permits. The lawyer explained that most Iraqis who did not leave the country to renew their 
visas were not deported as the UNHCR interferes to protect them, in addition to various 
levels of leniency by the Jordanian government after 2007. She mentioned that deportation or 
imprisonment is an exceptional and not a normal occurrence; it only happened in cases of 
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Iraqis who committed an offence or violated the law, and therefore were deported or 
imprisoned and released on a bail or through the assistance of a Jordanian sponsor/guarantor. 
During my stay I did not meet families who directly experienced this, but several Iraqis kept 
referring to their fear of deportation or imprisonment that happened to other Iraqis they know, 
who were caught working.  
 
Iraqis’ attempts to extend the limited formal protection space by sharing stories 
of their ‘lack of ʾamān’  
It is at this point— after having presented my analysis in Chapters Three and Four, and now 
in this chapter also added the two contexts that I consider of great importance to understand 
the Iraqis’ attempts of making ʾamān according to their perceptions of what makes life 
worthwhile living— that I see the aid system lose sight of the political dimension of the Iraqi 
refugee collective cause or story. What emerges as problems to the aid organizations and to 
government authorities, with people cheating, or people criticizing the system, should be 
understood as part of the attempts of Iraqis to make their spaces of ʾamān in a restricted and 
limited structure of aid. Iraqis were not only passive objects of aid, they were active agents 
who, following a dramatic change in their lives, were trying to learn how to make their own 
spaces of ʾamān, where they feel safe again. But, as we saw in different cases, the encounters 
between Iraqis and aid are most of all characterized by reduction in their being and well-
being.  
 
I therefore end this chapter with what I observed during a short workshop among Iraqi 
women working as volunteers and trainers for several organizations. The workshop was held 
at a local Jordanian foundation that collaborated with the UNHCR to provide services for 
Iraqi refugees. Perhaps the case would not impress the UNHCR nor other aid organizations, 
but it certainly made a strong impact on me as a participant-observer of the Iraqi encounters 
with aid systems, especially when it comes to the ability to share personal and collective 
stories of losses endured during times of war. Storytelling, once described by Arendt, “as a 
fundamental human activity” when she indicated that almost everything can be borne if put 
into a story shared with others (in Human Condition, 175, quoted in Hansen, 1993: 220); in 
this sense stories are not only consoling but work as a strategy for sustaining a sense of 
agency in the face of disempowering circumstances (Jackson, 2002: 15). The existential need 
of storytelling is made vivid in various literary works such as Coleridge’s Rime of the 
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Ancient Mariner (1798) that is one paradigmatic case which is recalled to explain the 
liberation that follows the telling of a long-suppressed story of suffering and guilt, and how 
people need to get things off their chests or out of their systems to move on. This 
“fundamental human activity” or “existential need” did not exist for Iraqis in the formal space 
of protection where Iraqis, most of the time, had little command of the conditions of the story 
‒telling and –sharing.  
It was during the workshop break when one of the trainees whom I had met in 
previous training events, pointed at a woman in the room, and said loudly: “you 
are writing about Iraqis? You must hear Um-Amira’s story. She has a ‘strong’ 
story: she lost her daughter, a 24-year-old medical doctor who just graduated from 
Baghdad university; she was killed in an explosion in the sūq (outdoor market), 
only a week after her wedding.” We were approaching the corner where Um-
Amira was standing, drinking her coffee. Um-Amira, who heard our conversation 
did not say anything. She listened to her daughter’s story as briefed by my friend 
Sawsan, and said nothing. It was obvious that she did not want to talk about it, so 
I decided not to ask her anything about Iraq or her life in Amman, as I had learnt 
during my stay among Iraqis not to rush into questioning them before clearly 
presenting my research project to make sure that they do not mind taking part in 
it. I greeted Um-Amira instead and tried to change the topic by asking her if she 
liked the training. She told me that she was not interested in training events, and 
that she only came for the sake of her younger daughter, who refused to eat or go 
anywhere, and spent most of her time at home, sleeping or watching TV: “She 
only likes to come to the center when they organize music sessions, especially 
with the Italian musician girl. My daughter’s English is good and they [the center 
staff] ask her to help with translation, so it is the best chance to make my daughter 
leave the house and do something.”  
 
The music session was about to start and we were asked to get ready and sit in a 
circle. An Italian volunteer with a guitar was leading the session which started 
with stress-relieving exercises. The Italian girl demonstrated happy, smiling, 
angry and other facial expressions. She showed us how we could shape and 
reshape our facial expressions by moving its parts and other parts in our bodies to 
release tension and stress. She spoke in English while Um-Amira’s, 15-year-old 
daughter, translated the instructions into Arabic. We were all trying to mimic her 
movements; it was fun and we laughed at the cynical comments some women 
were making. Then the Italian girl announced that it was time for music. She 
played a nice tune and encouraged us all to sing a simple two-word song with her: 
bella mama. The women were repeating the bella mama in the tune, but after a 
short while some started murmuring, and one of them interrupted the session 
asking loudly: “what is this song? What bella mama? Sing something real.” 
During that argument and a pause to change the song, Um-Amira, leaned towards 
me and showed me a picture of a young woman on her mobile phone; she told me 
that it was of her daughter: “Amira, look how beautiful she was, a princess [which 
is also the meaning of her name: Amira is the Arabic word for princess].” I 
nodded my head silently, while the Italian girl was kind enough to play another 
tune, that of a famous popular song from the Iraqi folklore Māli shughul bil Sūq (I 
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have no business in the market) which goes, according to my less-poetic 
translation from the Iraqi accent into English:  
 
“I have no business in the market, just passed by to see you …  
I have been thirsty for long years, and only seeing your face will satiate my thirst 
I wanted to walk across the two bridges: Karkh and Risafa to ask if anyone saw 
my beloved  
I am lost; searching for you everywhere, and you just went and left me alone, 
why? What have I done to you? 
How can I sleep the night while you occupy my mind? Even fish in water weep for 
my plight.” 
 
All the women joined in singing the popular Iraqi song, while three of the women 
jumped up from their chairs to dance in the middle of the circle. Um-Amira could 
not sing, she started crying, while the singing and dancing went on. I was the only 
one who seemed to be disturbed by Um-Amira’s tears, it could be because I was 
sitting next to her, or may be because I was new to the exercise while it felt 
normal to the rest, as it was supposed to release stress, tears and laughter. But 
Um-Amira’s tears were running down ignored (as if flowing in water like the 
weeping fish in the song). I was trying to comfort Um-Amira, while the dancing 
women tried to make some funny movements to change her mood, they even tried 
to push her to join them in the dancing circle and only stopped when her daughter, 
who was still sitting next to the Italian singer to help with translation, interfered 
and told them to leave her mother alone because this had been her sister’s favorite 
song and she normally cried when she heard it. We were all forced to leave Um-
Amira alone when one of the dancing women fainted; she suddenly turned pale. 
Another woman helped her out of the room to get some fresh air and urged us to 
call for medical help saying that this could be serious because this woman had 
recently had open-heart surgery. Luckily, this foundation had a health care unit; a 
nurse quickly came and took the woman to the clinic. And for the rest it was time 
to leave.  
 
This was one of the moments during my fieldwork when I felt the burden of my research 
intervention. I could not talk to any of the women about it and they seemed too preoccupied 
each with her next task. While I was preparing to leave, Um-Amira came to talk to me. She 
apologized for not being able to tell me her story then, as she had to go home to cook; she 
suggested that we meet another time if I wanted to hear her story. Though I felt that her 
invitation sounded real, I was reluctant to call her, and did not. Her story was too painful, as 
other stories in times of wars described by the Iraqi poet Dunya Mikhail: “-To give back to 
your mother-on the occasion of death- a handful of bones- she had given to you- on the 
occasion of birth?”  
 
It took me long time to verbalize this experience of the way loss passed in the lives of several 
Iraqis I met during fieldwork, it made me question the way those persons who survived 
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similar tragic losses, like Um-Amira, were constantly forced to expose them in their attempts 
to gain right to humanitarian assistance. By this the human pain dissolves into the stories that 
are presented to the aid agencies, stories that have a strategic aim of producing access to the 
resources of aid. In some cases, it felt that this construction of ‘ the story’ seemed to produce 
a normalization of loss in the lives of these survivors of war. After a few meetings in the 
field, I could clearly notice a pattern in constructing ‘the story’ in the formal space of 
protection which some Iraqis presented to me in fixed printed format. Upon introducing 
myself and my research in our first meeting, some Iraqis would immediately ask me: “So, do 
you want to hear my story?”, or “Are you interested in my real story or the story that I 
officially told [to the UNHCR and the IOM]”? Others would simply disappear and come back 
with a fixed version of “the story” as an A4 printed paper or offer to save the electronic 
version to my memory stick. 
 
The music incident described above was another chance to reflect on the ability to share 
one’s story and the meanings of ʾamān in the Iraqi social life throughout a longer history of 
structural change. The women in this case did not construct a story. The music incident, with 
the dancing detailed above show a more direct and emotional expression of pain, and can be 
seen as another attempt to create a space of ʾamān for sharing their story of loss collectively 
in the formal protection space, and not only in the limited private space of ʾamān among 
family and close friends. It provided a chance to go back to Iraq, Um-Amira went back to the 
sūq (market) where her daughter’s life ended, other women remembered other changes they 
had to survive during times of wars and sanctions. Instead of the strategically formulated 
story there were tears, words, silence and dancing, fainting or laughing. All outside of the 
official template. This could also explain why the women were so enthusiastic about such 
music sessions. Unlike their disinterestedness in the content of the courses and training events 
in general, this time all of the women were waiting for the music, to the extent that they tried 
to cut short the training session that preceded it to allow extra time for music. They started 
murmuring and some of them expressed loudly their concerns, that they already heard enough 
and that the time (30 minutes) dedicated for the music session was not enough. This was one 
of the rare chances in which refugees were allowed to restructure a service offered to them 
and make it suit their real needs, the need to express the pain produced by the loss of their 
earlier lives. And this expression came in a form quite different from the planned and 
structured meetings they were used to in which their losses had to be made visible in 




In the formal space of protection, Iraqis gradually learnt that having a good story would be 
their ticket to a safe country; to ʾamān. In cases of war-survivors, where protection was 
conditioned on gaining the label of refugee, the stories were future oriented and the 
survivor’s self was reduced to a victim to be saved. In this case, telling the story was 
concerned with: “how to make the period between arrival in the camp and departure to the 
third country as short as possible” (Knudsen, 1990: 127). In the Iraqi case the temporary 
protection offered in host countries within the region was limited; therefore, the burden of 
negotiating options of ʾamān fell mainly on Iraqis who had had to learn how to share their 
experiences with others as well as what to share or hide. A woman told me at the end of our 
meeting: “we have passed through lots of things, but I cannot tell you everything, my file is 
still being processed in the UNHCR and my status is still not settled, I only told you what I 
can share with you at this point; this is not the whole story, we have been through lots of 
things.” Iraqis looking for resettlement to a third country, usually reconstructed their stories 
to describe their losses (and sometimes survival experience) in a standardized version ready 
for consumption to correspond with that told in the contexts of official aid and protection. 
The aim would be to generate some potential gains for the ‘victim(s)’ in the story. 
Storytelling in the Iraqi and similar cases becomes a strategy for survival. It is conditioned by 
the Iraqi’s need to obtain protection and assistance on the one side; and the requirements of 
the protection providers on the other side. In this sense the “existential need” to tell a story is 
transformed into a practical one that is achieved through different tactics; some tended to hide 
parts of their experiences, trim others or make changes in the details to ensure that ‘the story’ 
is a ‘strong’ or ‘good’ one.  
 
“Your protection insurance is a good story”, was common advice Iraqis exchanged, but what 
is a good story? According to Kleinman and Desjarlais, “to receive assistance, it may be 
necessary to undergo a transformation from a person who has lived through the greatly 
heterogeneous experience of political terror to stereotyped victim, to standardized sufferer of 
a textbook sickness” (1997). Similarly, in the testimony version of the story presented to the 
UNHCR, words are carefully selected, and supporting elements introduced (as explored in 
Chapter Four). It seemed as if Iraqis were capitalizing on their personal losses, which occupy 
the story, while history and politics were disappearing. Fassin and Rechtman (2009) address 
this in their Empire of Trauma: An Inquiry into the Condition of Victimhood; when they 
explore how the new conditions of victimhood established through the concept of trauma has 
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created “a new language of the event”, in which “more credence is given to a medical 
certificate attesting to post-traumatic stress than to the word of an asylum seeker.” They ask 
what conception of the law and of the subject is operating? (Ibid., 7) They comment on how 
a system of knowledge and values was shaken and how one truth was overturned and another 
produced. What is lacking in the universalizing process of producing the story as legitimate 
evidence for obtaining survival is history and politics that are considered “too much 
information” (Malkki, 2007: 341) or to put it in Fassin’s words: “The process of 
subjectification of survivors as victims leaves aside the individual and collective histories of 
the subjects” (Fassin, 2008: 555). 
 
When it comes to the victimhood conditions I observed among Iraqis (Chapter Four), 
reducing the story into a humanitarian account in which the storyteller is asked to focus on 
the event experience from the perspective of a victim, deprives the event of its political and 
historical aspects in the sense that it deletes the plurality – the presence of many and not just 
the one. I cannot help compare the experience I had with Um-Amira’s story and the music 
event (above) with a meeting I had with the spokesperson of the UNHCR in Amman. She 
emphasized that recognition as refugee and resettlement to a third country would be assessed 
on an individual basis: “it depends on the story the refugee presents to us, what kind of 
persecution or threats he faced, it has to be a well-founded story.” Would Um-Amira’s story 
be considered as a well-founded story? And how can Iraqis tell their collective story of loss 
as part of urban Baghdadi middle class communities and former state employees? As 
indicated earlier, when Iraqis started referring to their collective experiences, in the formal 
protection space, they were usually reminded by trainers that they should not talk politics or 
make the meeting too political. In such a situation the collective story remained more or less 
hidden in private social gatherings.   
 
As time passed, I began to notice how tiny and restricted the space was that allowed Iraqis to 
share their collective experiences of loss and war in the public sphere52 and the official space 
of himaya/protection, while I could observe the great share it occupied in their private space 
of ʾamān. During social gatherings, Iraqis used to share their memories of past losses and 
                                                      
52 Iraqis residing in Amman are not allowed to form associations or other forms of public gatherings except 
business activities on the condition that those businesses are run in partnership with Jordanian businessmen 
(Chatelard, 2008: 12). 
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fears of further loss in the future in a variety of formats, not restricted to the one-dimensional 
“well-founded story” condition of humanitarian aid.  
 
But I want to turn precisely to these experiences that can show us that Iraqis are agents or 
“bios” in Agamben’s terms with political existence, and to get a glimpse into the change and 
suffering their experiences have caused. I do this in the following two chapters, in which I 
focus on the stories my informants told me about what they had experienced and what had 
brought them to Amman. By listening to the stories and contextualizing the memories of 
Iraqis, the next two chapter provide better understanding of the transformation experiences 
that these Iraqi professionals and state employees had to endure as displaced subjects in 
Jordan in the present, as well as in the past three decades inside their home country during the 






Baghdad 1960s-1980s: Living with promises of a better future 
 
In Baghdad, most women and men used to work. Unlike Gulf countries that rely 
on migrant labor, Iraqis during most of the times were working people, except 
when they were called to serve on the field [battlefield]. Even then, Iraqi women 
filled many posts that became vacant due to the state-call for Iraqi male 
employees to fight on the war front, while Egyptian male labor were hired to work 
in the construction sector.53 
 
The Iraqi state bureaucrats and professionals I met in Jordan shared several common features 
in their stories about living in Iraq throughout the years 1960s‒1980s. They described a 
relatively stable and promising conditions of better future for an Iraqi generation who had 
access to free education from nursery to PhD, and employment opportunities and other public 
services and benefits. This enabled them to enjoy higher standards of living than their 
parents’ generation, for few decades.  
 
It was common among most of the participants in this research who belonged to the older 
generation to feel nostalgic about a past when they had better chances of receiving quality 
education and rewarding job opportunities and ‘welfare’ services. The accounts of living in 
Baghdad during the period between 1960s-1980s present how the lives of these government 
employees were transformed by the intersection of internal regime strategies of development 
and the effects of the militarization and liberalization policies that followed in late 80s. The 
stories these Iraqis shared in 2010-2011 in their spaces of ʾamān in Amman reflect a big 
change in their perceptions of well-being. During the sixties and seventies, well-being was 
linked to being hardworking people (as described in the quote above), and participating in 
building an Iraqi modern nation state through investment in education and stable employment 
conditions in the public sector.  
 
The current chapter presents the experiences of Iraqi professionals and state bureaucrats with 
that period which was marked by relative stability and promising future as well as rising 
                                                      




tensions between the state and society. The experiences shared describe how the livelihoods 
of these government employees were affected by the economic development programs led by 
the state: including the “illiteracy eradication campaign,” the systematic teacher training 
programs, the increase in schools in rural and urban areas and investment in higher education 
and fellowships to study abroad, in addition to job opportunities with welfare benefits for 
university graduates and adequate infrastructure and health services, to be followed by times 
of successive and seemingly endless war conditions in the 1980s onwards.  
 
The presentation of the stories I heard among Iraqis in Jordan does not aim to construct an 
alternative history or histories of Iraq,54 instead this chapter describes collective experiences 
of learning to live as subjects of a state that aspired for rapid modernization. To understand 
the experiences of these groups of employees and professionals with the development of state 
programs and the dismantlement of the state and its institutions, it would be helpful to 
contextualize these experiences within the wider historical and political contexts and events 
which affected the process of state development.  
 
The focus solely on the authoritarian and totalitarian dictatorship practices as omnipotent-like 
presence (Makiya, 1989) while ignoring other aspects of Iraqi life during the period in 
concern (1960s‒1980s) would present a limited understanding of the complex social 
dynamics in the various life stages of these former Iraqi professionals, as explored in 
previous chapters. Their experiences cannot be simply reduced to ‘complicity’ of Iraqi state 
bureaucracy to sustain the brutality of Baathist violence. The stories shared of that period 
present several dimensions; in addition to the hardships of wars and regime repression that 
many Iraqis had to endure. Former Iraqi government employees do not describe their being in 
that period as merely suffering souls or compliant agents to the regime.  
 
The stories shared in the field of former living conditions in Baghdad tend to describe various 
nuanced and complex experiences. It was not just what was told, a careful observer and 
listener among Iraqis in the field could sense the global effects on the Baghdadi urban 
                                                      
54 There are various recent attempts to write the Iraqi history from below. For example, on writing history from 
below, see  Nadia Al-Ali’s work Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present (2007) in which she 
explores the relationship between experiences, memory and truth using the method of oral history among Iraqi 
women (from educated middle-class urban backgrounds). Other debates from different disciplines are compiled 
in Tejel, Sluglett et al. Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political Challenges (2012). 
In my presentations of the Iraqi stories, I am interested in how individuals and communities deal with social 
transformation from the stories Iraqis tell. 
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communities. They were reflected in the diverse food flavors and spices; the rich Iraqi 
melodies and songs; the variety of religious beliefs and practices and the different languages 
and dialects in addition to the unfamiliar words which I had to guess from the context: 
qamṣala (Turkish) for jacket, mayz (Persian/ Farsi) for table, glās (English) for a cup, banka 
(Indian) for a ceiling-fan and many more. These observations during my fieldwork among 
Iraqis in Amman present glimpses of the complex history that is often reduced to the Baath or 
Saddam’s totalitarian regime when discussing Iraq during the last three decades of the 
twentieth century. One of the problems that leads to this reductionist presentation of Iraq is 
that no distinction is usually made between the regime as a ruling power and the state with its 
government bureaucracy and institutions which developed over a longer period of the 
modernization process of the country, during the Ottoman and British rule of the Iraqi space 
(Davis, 2005; Tripp, 2007; Dewachi, 2017).  
 
The Iraqi professionals and state employees I met in Amman often referred to this distinction 
(between the regime and their roles as part of the state bureaucracy) when they described how 
their lives had been transformed by the modernization of state bureaucracy and the regime 
developmental programs and repressive rule of its subjects. The current chapter draws on 
interviews I had with Iraqi professionals and government employees. In addition, it engages 
with other studies which allow deeper understanding of the details and contradictory 
descriptions of living with state policies and the Iran-Iraq war. Due to lack of anthropological 
and sociological works on that period, I refer to Bassam Yousif’s Human Development in 
Iraq 1950-1990 (2012), and other works which help understand the stories shared by Iraqi 
state employees of their experiences with social transformation during 1960s‒1980s in 
Baghdad. 
 
General features of the rising government bureaucracy in Baghdad: 1960s-1980s 
The Iraqi nation-state project, like other postcolonial states in the region had been affected by 
the rules and divisions imposed by the colonial demarcation of borders through the Sykes-
Picot agreement implemented during the British and French “mandate” regimes. The Iraqi 
project of national independence focused on building a strong nation-state through investing 
in institutional infrastructure, human development and social welfare, with particular 
emphasis on the state military apparatus. This project was similar to the urbanization and 
modernization of other neighboring countries, following the dismantlement of the Ottoman 
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empire and European capitalist expansion in the region through drawing borderlines that were 
more suitable to colonial interests than the indigenous communities’ living patterns. Sami 
Zubaida described some common features of the urbanization and modernization processes 
including:  
“the breakdown or transformation of primary communities, urbanization, 
individualization of labor, intensification of the social division of labor, the 
emergence of new forms of government and institutions, widening of education 
and literacy, technologies and networks of communication and transport, and new 
ideational formations, often significantly influenced by European ideas, especially 
in relation to political community and the state” (2009: 129).  
 
Some of the features described by Zubaida were shared in the stories Iraqis tell of the 
transformations they and their parent generation witnessed in Iraq. When it comes to the 
formations of political communities, research on the statecraft in Iraq tend to identify two 
competing visions: Iraqi vs. Arab nationhood (Davis, 2005; Ismael and Ismael, 2015). One 
common aim among the two visions of the Iraqi nationhood project was to “supplant 
traditional categories of identity” (religion, ethnicity, sectarian or tribal affiliations) in service 
of a broader and inclusive Iraqi (and Arab) identity. The strategies used by the state to 
achieve national unity, as identified by Ismael and Ismael (2012), include mandatory military 
conscription, public education and the development of a social welfare structure funded by a 
state-centered oil sector (ibid., 7). This chapter presents another attempt to understand how 
these state employees and professionals managed the changing conditions in the Iraqi state in 
times of affluence and gradual reduction beyond the category of the Baathist regime of 
Saddam, which often reduces those experiences into “good vs. evil” or “victim vs. hero” 
story.  
 
The majority of state-bureaucrats and professionals I met in Amman belong to urban Iraqi 
communities, especially the capital Baghdad; they included doctors, academics and university 
lecturers, schoolteachers, businessmen, lawyers, engineers, army officers and various other 
government employees (with their family members). Access to modern education and 
rewarding governmental jobs allowed the rise of some shared form of citizenship among 
these various members of Iraqi employees who tended to describe the good life in the late 
sixties and seventies in terms of similarities rather than differences. The similarities revolved 
around a ‘rich social life’ with inter-communal mixed neighborhoods and mixed marriages, 
access to free education in Iraq and/or grants to study at universities abroad, stable 
governmental job opportunities for both men and women and higher consumption ability of 
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material and cultural products. This contributed to the rise of a middle-class life style based 
on one’s academic merits and professional training and access to employment in the public 
sector. The policies enhanced later by the regime, which invested in the military sector during 
the long Iran-Iraq war (1980‒1988) and the following wars and sanctions affected the 
potential of many members of this former Baghdadi middle class.  
 
Being a middle class professional in Baghdad, as narrated by Iraqis who came from different 
backgrounds and lived through various periods inside Iraq can be described as a swinging 
experience; the massive rise in oil prices following the war of October 1973 against Israel 
carried promises of better living conditions, however these conditions did not last long as the 
war with Iran in 1980‒1988 meant the militarization of many aspects of the social and 
cultural space in Iraq. Furthermore, the regime decision to invade Kuwait and the 1991 US-
led war accompanied by harsh economic sanctions which lasted for more than twelve years 
led to harming former relations with neighboring countries, as well as the destruction of the 
state infrastructure that severely affected the living potentials of Iraqi professionals and state-
bureaucrats.  
 
Being part of the Iraqi state schooling and labor system during the period 1960s‒2003 did not 
feel the same all the time. Being a state employee in Baghdad in the 70s felt different from 
being one in the 80s, and both periods had very little in common to the 90s. In most of these 
periods, the state apparatus was governed and controlled by an oppressive regime rule 
governing the production of the national space and narrative. Iraqis were disciplined to 
contribute to the survival of that space and their own survival, as expressed in the accounts of 
state bureaucrats and professionals I met in Jordan.  
 
The next sections of this chapter describe the times Iraqis used to call “the good old days” 
during 1960s and 1970s. The stories they tell explore the meanings of well-being and ʾamān 
in retrospective awareness. This did not last for long and was not inclusive for all Iraqis, there 
were several stories of exclusive practices by the regime against opposing parties as 
individuals or groups. The stories describe how the living conditions changed for these Iraqi 
state employees and professionals during the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s, with excessive 
liberalization policies of the state and the militarization of the Iraqi society. Liberalization 
and privatization of Iraqi public services and the shift in investment from education to 
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militarization led to the reduction of ʾamān, well-being and happiness as explored in the case 
of Nagham, a former Iraqi accountant, that is presented in the end of the chapter.  
 
The ‘good old days’ 
Good old days in the memories of the Iraqis I met in Amman date back to the 1960s and 
1970s; when living standards were high thanks to the modern state apparatus investment in 
both human and rich natural resources, not only oil, but the Euphrates and Tigris rivers that 
enabled the country to be self-sufficient in food production. As in other post-colonial states 
around, in the region, the government intended to enhance modernity and good living 
standards. These were the years of a flourishing economy and emergence and expansion of a 
broad and affluent urban middle class (Herring, 2011: 346).  
 
The developmental project of the state transformed many parts of the Iraqi society from a 
primarily rural, agricultural society with a quasi-feudal, quasi-tribal social structure in 1920s 
into a modern urban-based society in 1970s, thanks to the oil wealth and Iraqi state 
investment in the social well-being of the population:  
“The increase in world oil prices in the mid-1970s allowed the regime to 
guarantee employment in the state public sector. This sector ultimately 
engendered a large employed middle class dependent on the existence of the state. 
The state-employed middle class was structurally open to workers and peasants 
through social mobility instruments such as education and membership in the 
Baath Party” (Ismael, 2004: 335). 
 
The stories of the older Iraqi state employees I met in Amman, who were between 65‒80 
years old in 2010 and 2011 describe the living conditions in Baghdad during the mid-sixties 
and seventies when they were in their twenties as prosperous, and promising of new 
opportunities and prospects. Leading a good life then meant acquiring quality education, 
preferably a university degree from an Iraqi and/or foreign university, a rewarding job in 
one’s specialty, access to good health care services and a house and good transportation and 
other public services, and the ability to provide good education for their children in addition 
to the ability to travel and consume55 high quality material and cultural products supported by 
developing state infrastructure. Rich social life meant also spending time together in 
                                                      
55 The rise in consumption capacity described by these government employees is attributed to “a reasonably 
high rate of growth in the national income and expansion in GDP over the period 1955 to 1970, but specifically 
with the increase in Iraq’s crude oil exports as a result of the nationalization of the oil industry in 1972. Bassam 
Yousif provides details of the sharp rise in the oil price in 1973, 1974, 1978 and 1980 (see Yousif, 2012: 49).  
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restaurants, excursions at lake Habbaniyah and Tigris and Euphrates bays, socialization at 
various clubs and in cinemas and theatres and most often in home gardens, away from the 
observing eyes of the regime security. 
 
Higher education was an important asset for the wider middle class members to gaining 
access to the ‘rich’ social and cultural life that was once restricted to Iraqis belonging to 
wealthiest families (merchants and land owners). The state welfare services included free 
education from kindergarten until one completes university education. Graduate students had 
the right to a two-year paid leave to complete their MA studies and three-year paid leave for 
those enrolled in PhD programs:  
This was during the years 73-80, which was a golden period in terms of the 
burgeoning economy. The state managed huge projects to build the infrastructure 
that would improve people’s daily life including schools, universities, hospitals, 
roads, bridges and the cultural and architectural revival of the Iraqi nation.56 
 
The Iraqi population was not large, the salary rate was good, in addition to the government 
intention at modernization and development which was realized by offering welfare services 
including a marriage loan of Iraqi Dinars (ID) 1000 ($ 3400), which state-bureaucrats could 
repay on easy terms, and did not have to begin repayment in the first year. Families were paid 
allowance for children, and free education and health treatment and kindergarten services and 
transportation for working mothers were provided.57 Work and government employment, as 
described by this generation of Iraqi professionals used to be perceived as a way to optimize 
resources and construct their social personhood through educational qualifications and 
consumption practices.  
 
A former army officer mentioned that free education allowed Iraqis belonging to poor or less-
affluent families to gain education and a stable job and ascend to middle or upper-middle 
class income: “When I was in college, I used to receive ID 10 as a monthly study grant. Upon 
graduation from the army college in 1967, I was immediately employed and received ID 60 
as monthly salary, half of which I gave to my parents and the other half was enough to cover 
my living expenses and ensure savings. The Iraqi Dinar then was as strong as the Kuwaiti 
Dinar and used to equal three American dollars.”58 
                                                      
56 Meeting with Professor Taha on 2 March 2011.  
57 This was mentioned by several Iraqis from the older generation, this information is taken from an interview 
with an Iraqi professor on 24 November 2010. 




High school students and university graduates who excelled in their education could apply for 
state grants to complete their studies in Europe or the USA. Professor Naim (67 years old) 
was one of those students who excelled in high school and left Baghdad at the age of 17 to 
study Engineering in the UK:  
I left Iraq on a fellowship funded by the Iraqi government to study in Britain 
where I finished my B.Sc. with honors, and got the first rank in my Master. At the 
age of 26 I got my PhD and I stayed for another two years to finish my post-
doctoral research. I returned to Iraq in 1973 and after two years I had the honor to 
establish the University of Technology in Baghdad and the School of Control and 
System Engineering, many of my students are lecturers in Jordanian universities 
today.59  
 
State-induced policies worked to eradicate illiteracy, educate both men and women, and 
incorporate larger numbers of women into the labour force: in 1974 a government decree 
stipulated that all university graduates—men and women—would be employed automatically 
(Al-Ali, 2005: 744). Graduates were immediately employed following graduation and after 
few months, government employees could think of buying the marriage house60 and a car. 
Some professionals mentioned that they could afford then to enjoy access to quality 
consumer goods and services and even spend summer in Europe. According to an Iraqi 
academic (61 years old), Iraqis were considered highly welcomed tourists as “gulf citizens” 
when they used to travel to Jordan or elsewhere, unlike their displacement after 2003.  
 
Being a member of the Iraqi state bureaucracy in 1970s 
Building a career profile as a qualified working man or woman was one of the most important 
features among this group of professional middle class Baghdadis in 1970s, as described in 
the quote at the beginning of this chapter from an interview with an Iraqi professor who was 
teaching in a Jordanian private university. 
 
Several Iraqi women I met in the field commented that they were surprised to see so many 
non-working Jordanian women in Amman, as my friend Um-Adnan commented during one 
of our first meetings: “In Baghdad, most women work outside home; unlike Amman, you will 
rarely find a housewife.” As part of the regime’s efforts to modernize the society, it “focused 
                                                      
59 Interview on 14 April 2011. Chapter Three presents more details about Professor Naim’s displacement 
experience in Jordan. 
60 Professor Taha mentioned that he had built his house thanks to a program sponsored by the state which 
included the provision of a 600 m2 piece of land for newly married couples, interview on 2 March 2011.  
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on educating women, bringing them into the labor market, transforming their appearance and 
integrating them into the political process as emblems of the successful transformation of 
their nation-state” (Joseph, 1996: 9). Nadje al-Ali attributes the government motivations to 
encourage employment, especially among women, as a way to respond to the need for human 
power and a work force to support the progressive development plan in addition to what she 
calls the Iraqi state attempt to indoctrinate its citizens. She concludes that whatever the 
motivation of the state, this policy increased women’s participation in the public sphere, 
making Iraqi women among the most educated and professional in the Arab region (Al-Ali, 
2005: 744 -745). The state provided urban working women with free public transport and 
childcare facilities, in addition to the assistance of extended family members (Al-Ali, 2007a: 
135). Anthropologist Suad Joseph observed that the Baath framed women’s employment not 
just as a means for national development, but also for the achievement of economic 
independence and the liberation of women themselves (Joseph, 1991).  
 
During the 1970s-1980s, work, usually in the public governmental sector, was an integral part 
of the Iraqi identity and remained so for most educated and professional men and women, 
such as Um-Adnan who continued to work as a teacher until 2003 when many Iraqi women 
(and men) lost their jobs as a result of the reconstruction process or due to the deteriorating 
security conditions. The presence of the state coercive apparatus seemed to be important to 
secure employment, even in times of war. Despite the loss of her right hand during the heavy 
bombing campaign in the first Gulf war in 1991, Um-Adnan could resume her employment 
as school teacher, in which she felt safer than home where she had to deal with occasionally 
violent husband. These developments in the Iraqi women’s status are much older, following 
the 1958 revolution, women were granted political and social rights and encouraged to utilize 
state-sponsored educational facilities (Moghadam, 1993: 70). The developments also 
included allowing women to receive housing, child allowances and welfare benefits if they 
were the main breadwinners in their families (Joseph, 1996: 9). Although these changes led to 
improved rights to education and employment, male control of women’s personal lives in the 
domestic space in Iraq (as in the case of Um-Adnan above) was little changed (Joseph & 
Slymovics, 2001: 36).   
 
The working conditions in public state institutions in the 1970s were perceived as highly 
rewarding by both men and women, especially when compared with times of deprivations 
during the sanctions period. Professor Taha described his working conditions after he was 
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appointed upon his graduation with a BA degree from Baghdad University: “In 1973, I was 
appointed as school teacher and my salary was ID 31, it was more than enough, I used to save 
from it, after few months there was 80% increase and my salary became ID 51. It was 
possible for my generation, shortly after graduation, to afford to build a house, buy a car and 
live a dignified life. Things changed drastically in the 1990s.”61 Access to higher education 
was perceived as a strong driver of social mobility. Professor Taha completed his education 
and got a PhD degree, so did his wife who got a master degree in Mathematics and statistics.  
 
Educational qualifications ensured better working and living conditions and higher social 
status or what is described by Professor Taha as “dignified life.” Despite the state 
development plans and extended public welfare services which led to improvements in 
income distribution among various segments of Iraqi societies (Yousif, 2012), Iraqi highly 
qualified professionals were eventually distinguished from other manual workers by their 
conditions of employment, such as access to regular monthly salary that enabled them to live 
in better-serviced urban Baghdadi neighborhoods than the living conditions in rural and town 
areas.  
 
The ability to consume high quality material and cultural products became another feature of 
establishing high social status. While in the field, I could not help but notice the extra care of 
preserving an elegant appearance among members of this generation of Iraqis who would 
usually dress in formal suits in the public space, this was not part of the daily routine among 
Jordanians or Palestinians. Even on a hot day, Abu-Omar used to wear his brown or beige 
1980s three-piece style suit. During one of my visits to his home, one of his Iraqi neighbors 
came to ask Um-Omar, in her role as a volunteer in one of the international organizations, 
about ways to support the family of one of his friends who just arrived from Baghdad. When 
Abu-Omar joined to greet his neighbor, he apologized more than once for coming in training 
suit and blamed the conditions of displacement that forced him to spend most of his days at 
his rented apartment, while as he explained in Baghdad, he would never meet guests without 
shaving and putting on his suit. This seemed to apply to most governmental employees of that 
generation, as observed in the pictures some of them shared with me from Baghdad. The 
pictures of that period indicated that consuming formal western-style cloths and sharing 
leisure time at a restaurant or a club or the home garden seemed as events to exhibit 
                                                      
61 Interview with Professor Taha on 2 March 2011.  
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professional and economic success. This group of Iraqis who belonged to the older generation 
described Baghdad in the 1970s as the best time they remembered from living inside Iraq. 
They describe the Iraqi state as a modernist state with large investments in science, education 
and urbanization. In addition to the health services that improved with rising numbers of 
qualified Iraqi Doctors (see Dawachi, 2017). 
 
Well-being in ‘retrospective awareness’ 
The personal experiences shared by Um-Adnan, Dr Taha, Professor Naim and others— about 
what they called ‘the good old days in Iraq’ during the late sixties and seventies— convey 
that these were general attributes of the Iraqi social order and state employees standings 
enhanced by the state institutions and the regime in the process of urbanization and 
modernization of the Baghdadi space in the 1970s.  
 
The good life, described above, is not attributed to access to services and good financial 
resources only, but also to the changes in labor law and family law and women status in 
particular. The conditions of women improved with socialist-like economic development 
programs, especially when it comes to the rising educational opportunities “in an egalitarian 
fashion in comparison with other countries in the region. The state efforts to attract women 
into paid employment was unparalleled in its time in the region. And there was progress for 
women under law: complete equality was achieved in social and economic legislation but 
relatively modest gains in personal rights. These gains accompanied and reinforced the 
government’s ambitious development plans and efforts of state-building” (Yousif, 2012).62 
This was the case in several developing countries, as explained by Moghadam, in which the 
state played a major role in the formulation of social policies, development strategies, and 
legislation that shape opportunities for women. The state can act as a facilitator for or an 
obstacle to the integration of female citizens in public life. However, as per Moghadam, 
development strategies and state economic policies are not formulated in a vacuum; they are 
greatly influenced, for better or for worse, by world-systemic imperatives. Moghadam 
considers what she describes as the dual process of economic development and state 
expansion as the major source of social change in the Middle East in the post-World War II 
period (1993: 17-21).  
 
                                                      
62For more empirical details see chapter 6 “The position of women” in (Yousif, 2012: 105-128). 
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In her study, Valentine Moghadam refers to the “Iraqi Baath regime in its radical phase 
(1960s and 1970s) and the social transformation it enhanced by introducing a land reform 
program that changed the conditions of the peasantry and by establishing a welfare state for 
the urban working classes and the poor. In the drive against illiteracy and for free education, 
the Baathist revolution produced one of the best-educated intelligentsias in the Arab world 
(1993: 22). Concerning women “the Baath party had an interest both in recruiting women 
into the labor force to alleviate a continuing labor shortage and in wresting women’s 
allegiance away from kin, family, or ethnic group and shifting it to the party-state.” The 1978 
Personal Status Law aimed to reduce the control of extended families over women. In the late 
seventies the government passed laws requiring attendance at adult literacy classes targeting 
women through trade unions and other organizations and using the TV. Women were 
recruited into state-controlled agencies and put through public education as well as vocational 
training and political indoctrination. According to Moghadam, 51 percent of Baghdad 
university medical school’s first-year class in 1979 was female (1993: 58).63 The ruling Baath 
Party encouraged a wide range of employment for women, who by the late 1970s accounted 
for 29 percent of the country medical doctors, 46 percent of all dentists, 70 percent of 
pharmacists, 46 percent of teachers and university lecturers, 33 percent of the staff of 
government departments, 26 percent of workers in industry, and 45 percent of farm 
employees (ibid.). Furthermore, Shereen Ismael notes that during the seventies “with 
improvements in education and health programs, jobs were created through a state-controlled 
public sector, and a legislated minimum labor wage led to rapid growth in the Iraqi labor 
force as well as in the government bureaucracy” (2004: 335).  
 
These years were celebrated by the Iraqis I met as times of prosperity carrying promises of 
comfortable life, especially when compared to the 1990s‒2000s. The following account from 
an interview with a retired engineer provides some details of the life style some of these new 
highly skilled and upper-middle class professionals could enjoy in the sixties: 
In the sixties, you could call the cinema and reserve a lounge to watch a movie 
and relax; there were several cinemas: Al Hamra Cinema and Granada Cinema 
                                                      
63 To understand the enhancement in female education, these numbers need to be read in comparative 
perspective: “Prior to the Baath Revolution, of the almost 4 million females in the population only 23000 had 
achieved secondary certificates or their equivalents; 8000 college or institute certificates; 200 graduate degrees 
or diplomas; and 90 doctorates. Sixty-seven per cent of the females were illiterate as per the statistics of the 
General Population Census of 1965. However a decade after the Baath take-over, females constituted 43 per 
cent of the children in primary schools […]. In the decade of the 1970s, female enrolment in primary schools 




that had both winter and summer screenings. The transportation services in 
Baghdad were better than transportation in Amman today, a taxi would come to 
pick you up and it was common to pay the taxi driver a lump sum at the end of 
the month. Home delivery services were available, even for food and dairy 
products. We could buy the latest fashion trends from fancy stores owned by 
rich Jewish traders such as Orosdi-Back.64 
 
Recreational activities in cinemas, coffee shops, bookshops and social clubs became an 
important part in the life of the upper-middle class and middle-class Iraqi state employees. 
The clubs were popular spaces mentioned by Iraqis in their stories of that period, while they 
almost disappeared in the stories of the 1990s onwards. Clubs such as al-Alwayia, al-Sayd 
(Iraqi hunting club), al-Mashriq, al-Dhubat (Officers club) and the Air force club provided 
access to swimming pools in winter and summer, and gym and sports activities, as well as a 
space for sharing social events and parties.  
 
When the public space described above was shrinking as a result of fear from the Iraqi regime 
oppressive control and exclusion of opposition voices, the home garden became an important 
space for social gatherings, as described in an account by an Iraqi accountant I met in 
Jordan.65 Most of the middle class families I met in Jordan explained that back in Iraq they 
lived in separate spacious houses with surrounding gardens. The garden around the Iraqi 
house was an important space where family meetings and gatherings with friends and 
neighbors used to take place. The garden was also the site of memories framed in family 
pictures which decorated the apartments of more affluent Iraqis in Amman, these pictures 
usually captured memories from Baghdad with friends and extended family members such as 
cousins, aunts, uncles and married brothers and sisters.   
 
In addition to gaining symbolic capital through quality education and employment 
opportunities, consumption of cultural and material goods was another aspect of “post-
colonial modernity” in Iraq and other neighboring countries.66 The possession of material 
goods, increasingly became another way of establishing social status. Iraqi professionals from 
the older generations emphasized their ability to consume western brands and fashion trends 
from international chain stores such as Orosdi-Back in addition to the consumption of 
cinema-movies and musical events and drama. This was not limited to rich and upper middle-
                                                      
64 Interview on Friday 25 March 2011 with an Iraqi engineer and his wife in their owned apartment in Amman.   
65 Nagham’s account on the loss of happiness at the end of this chapter. 
66 Nadje al-Ali describes similar consumption patterns of western fashion and electrical appliances by Egyptian 
youths, as one aspect of the post-colonial modernity (al-Ali, 2004: 30).  
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class Iraqis, but was mentioned by middle class state employees with a seemingly 
romanticized exaggeration when they compared their past life in Baghdad to the poor present 
living conditions in Jordan: “Iraqis love fashion and they like to look good, I used to purchase 
western clothes from famous international brands. Imagine that when I first arrived to 
Amman in 2006, I brought few costumes and dresses which I had purchased during the 1980s 
in Iraq, and I discovered that in Amman they were just presented as new western fashion.”67 
Consumption of quality cultural and material products, especially food, clothes, books and 
other entertaining activities often came in the stories of this group of former Iraqi state 
employees when they described the losses they had to endure in their well-being. 
Consumerism as an indicator of status and identity is discussed by Turner as an aspect that 
appeared on an unprecedented scale which has meant “a great expansion of the power of self-
production: in other words, the capacity to produce personal identity, create individual and 
group lifestyles, and achieve personal and social values” (Turner, 2003: 53). 
 
Education and employment were not only appreciated as means to increase one’s access to 
consumerism but they were associated, in the stories of some highly skilled Iraqi 
professionals and academics with building the nation. This generation of older Iraqi 
academics have an understanding of education that refers to establishing, creating and 
building the state. Education, as part of a public system was more egalitarian than the private 
university conditions that they experienced in Jordan; it was part of a larger national duty, as 
explained by Dr Naim’s perception of his academic role in Baghdad and Amman (Chapter 3). 
When Dr Naim returned to Baghdad after 10 years of academic training in Britain (from BA 
to post-doctorate levels), his primary task was to establish a college in engineering with the 
aim to provide quality education to new generations of Iraqis to graduate as highly qualified 
engineers. His description of state-governed academic systems in Baghdad which emphasized 
quality education for free contrasted with the current neo-liberal understanding of education 
provided by the private sector in Jordan as a path to individual success and accumulation of 
financial capital, Dr Naim regrettably explained: “in Amman, I have to carefully observe the 
new limits of my role as educator, to not talk to students even when their quality of work was 
lower than anticipated, I was told that if I want to keep my position, I have to be kind and 
careful when giving academic feedback and advice, because they [the Jordanian university 
                                                      
67 Meeting with former Iraqi accountant in the Ministry of Commerce in her rented apartment in Amman, where 
she moved to live with her two daughters and son, following the death of her husband, who was a high ranking 
army officer in Baghdad (August 2010).   
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where he works] want to keep high numbers of students who could pay the high study fees at 
private universities, regardless of quality.”68 
 
During 1960s‒1980s, well-being for this group of Iraqis was associated with being ambitious 
students and hard-working professionals and employees in addition to having access to 
material and symbolic capital to provide stable living conditions to their families. As 
explained in Chapter Three, well-being is not restricted to the individual, it is relational and 
inclusive. For the older generation of Iraqi academics and doctors, the limits of well-being 
were extended to the larger Iraqi society as part of the nation-state building project; they 
aspired to create quality educational opportunities and health services for a wider generation 
of younger Iraqis. Well-being for Dr Naim and other Iraqi professionals belonging to his 
generation— who were part of the state-building project (sometimes described as the 
revolution generation)69— was expressed in relation to larger national aspirations and 
dreams. However, in other periods (1990s-2000s) during the hard times of wars and 
economic sanctions, well-being was reduced within the limits of the nuclear household’s 
needs, and when expressed at wider scale, it included the extended family, tribe or other 
factional groups.  
 
The interest in the well-being of the nation for older Iraqi generations could be attributed to 
the practical enhancement in the living conditions which were experienced then (in 
1960s‒1970) by this group of government employees, coming to work and study in Baghdad 
or abroad from different areas in Iraq (thanks to the support of governmental study 
fellowships). Iraqi family’s access to regular salary income increased among various social 
classes. Bassam Yousif’s review of the income through the period (1950‒1990) suggests a 
fundamental change in income distribution between Iraqis from lower and upper incomes:  
“There is little doubt [according to data from various sources] that the distribution 
of income improved between 1956 and 1976 and, indeed, compared favorably 
with that of many developing and some developed countries.70 The improved 
income distribution was not accidental but was the result of the emphasis on 
social welfare that successive governments after the 1958 revolution put into 
                                                      
68 Interview on 14 April 2011. 
69With reference to the 1958 revolution, see Campbell, 2016: 28-48.   
70 Yousif presents data compiled from a World Bank report in 1994 (see endnote 37, page 177) which indicates 
that in terms of the ratio of the income of the bottom 40 percent to the top 20 percent in 1971, the distribution of 
income in Iraq was more egalitarian than Brazil’s in 1989 (7:67.5 percent), Mexico’s in 1984 (11.9:55.9 
percent), and Malaysia’s in 1989 (12.9:53.7 percent); it was comparable to the United Kingdom’s in 1988 
(14.6:44.3 percent), but slightly less equal than the South Korea’s in 1988 (19.7: 42.2 percent) and India’s in 
1989-90 (21.3:41.3 percent). 
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practice. […] The provision of these services [public education and health] 
disproportionally benefitted the poor ‒ directly by heavy subsidization of goods 
that the poor purchase or indirectly as enhanced educational and health outcomes 
promote higher labor productivities, access to employment and hence income ‒ it 
promotes a more equal distribution of income. Finally, the expansion of the public 
sector, where wage and salary differentials were deliberately curtailed, was 
another factor that likely contributed to lowering income inequality” (2012: 54). 
 
The social welfare policies mentioned by Bassam Yousif above included land reform and 
redistribution (in rural areas) and greater resources devoted to health and education, as he 
explored through various data available from different sources covering that period. The state 
welfare services and investment in education and employment sectors aspiring to turn Iraq 
into a modern developed nation-state raised the aspirations of Iraqi professionals and 
government employees who anticipated a better future for their offspring. The opportunities 
of education and employment enhanced the feelings of secured economic and social 
conditions during 1960s‒1980s, and the nationalization of services and later oil industry gave 
the Iraqi state and bureaucracy direct control over output and profit (Yousif, 2012: 49).  
 
In his analysis of “Human Development” in Iraq (1950‒1990), Yousif explores the 
government strategies of economic development which were associated with various 
problems (including the promotion of inefficient activities and industries). Yet, Yousif 
concludes that the Iraqi state for most of the above-mentioned period which he studied, 
implemented a largely successful and mostly egalitarian strategy for human development. 
With the exception of human rights and political freedoms. Yousif states that these policies 
and programs were proposed before the Baath came to power, and he refers to the seminal 
work of Hanna Batatu (1978), The Old Social Classes and New Revolutionary Movements of 
Iraq, and more recently Eric Davis’ (2005) Memories of State concerning the Iraqi state 
development project. Yousif concludes from his analysis of the data collected from various 
resources that: “there is no doubt that the Baathist regime vigorously pursued long-term 
development, sometimes at the expense of current consumption which does not fit with the 
rentier state economy as one whose concern is mainly to buy public compliance with oil 
revenues.71 The data available on the economic growth, education, housing, health, nutrition 
and other basic services illustrate continuous improvement.  
                                                      
71 Yousif shows evidence of how the Iraqi state attempted to repress consumption during the 1970s despite the 
rise in prices of oil and state revenues in order to increase its investments in its ambitious development program 
by channeling oil revenues into spreading primary education in rural and urban areas, as well as improving 




For example, when it comes to education, throughout the period of Yousif’s study, except for 
a slight decline in secondary enrollment in the 1980s, enrollments in higher education 
reached unprecedented levels. Similarly, the state allocation of expenditures and outcomes in 
health became more equitable and efficient over time. In fact, some human development 
outcomes (for example, infant mortality) improved at an undiminished or accelerated pace 
during the 1980s. In addition, the nutrition standards increased during the Iran-Iraq war, as 
the regime increased imports of grains to ensure adequate food availability to the general 
public. The state also facilitated and supported women’s education and paid employment 
during that period; women achieved some gains in terms of their status under law. However, 
independent women’s organizations, (as in the case for other sectors in the Iraqi society such 
as youth, labor, cultural and political movements), were repressed and replaced with Baath 
party organs. The Iraqi state— Baath for most of the period under Yousif’s study— was 
incapable of tolerating any coherent political opposition: “civil society was smashed, human 
rights were routinely violated, and political freedoms were repressed, [while] at the same 
time much was achieved in the material components of development” (ibid.) Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that even with these improvements that led to expanding the well-being 
of the middle class through education and employment opportunities, the capacity of the state 
economy to absorb investments was limited, as Yousif concludes, and it was thus unable to 
carry through all the planned investment projects in development. This is partly attributed to 
the limited authority of the state bureaucracy in a totalitarian system (obviously the 
experience of Dr Naim above in the engineering sector cannot be generalized in all sectors)72: 
“the state bureaucracy, which controlled most of (even non-oil) GDP after the early 1970s, 
was notoriously slow, cumbersome, and inefficient with bureaucrats reluctant to make 
decisions or take initiative” (ibid, 59).  
 
On the other hand, some governmental policies related to crude nationalization in times of 
war and political tension meant excluding several qualified Iraqi professionals as described 
by Iraqi academics and professionals I met in Amman: “Because they were ‘nationalists’ [he 
referred to the Baathist regime], the regime issued a rule that anyone married to a foreign 
woman should leave the government institution on early retirement, this regulation led to the 
                                                      
72 The Iraqi successive regimes had invested more in certain scientific sectors such as engineering, medicine and 
later military industrialization, while they repressed thinkers, artists and academics in the humanities and social 
sciences fields when they dared to criticize the regime policies or aimed to suggest social change or other 
innovative programs which diverted from governmental plans (See Davis, 2005).    
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loss of some good academics and professionals then.”73 The following section will briefly 
present other policies of exclusion practiced by the Iraqi state during 1970s, which were not 
commonly shared among the Iraqi professionals and state bureaucrats I met in Jordan, though 
they led to the expulsion of several Iraqi professionals then.  
 
On being excluded by the Iraqi regime in the 1970s 
During the 1960s-1970s, the development plans carried out by the state through enlarging 
public education, provision of welfare services and enlarged salaried employment in state 
governmental positions aimed to discipline a new generation of Iraqi highly qualified 
professionals and scientists. In that period, the regime issued some rules to encourage more 
mixed inter-communal life in the Iraqi space, especially in the capital Baghdad. Some 
measures were introduced to suppress former sectarian and patriarchal loyalties which were 
reflected in the tribal family name and religious practices. For example, Saddam Husayn 
issued a decree in the end of the 1970s, “prohibiting the use of the name of the region after a 
person’s surname (laqab), [and..] in 1973 he stopped calling himself Saddam al-Takriti and 
used Husayn, his father’s name.” (Dawod, 2012: 105). This was part of the Baath regime 
attempts to modernize the state by developing the infrastructure and human capital, the 
provision of secular education, public services and employment and ensuring more 
progressive laws, in addition to militarization. Obviously provision of welfare services, 
infrastructure and protection, in addition to political and social participation are important 
elements in strengthening modern nation states. However, in the case of Iraq and other Arab 
states, pre-modern relational networks remained present in the state structure to be recalled in 
times of crisis. The above changes aiming at detribalization were not reflected in Saddam’s 
political ruling system, practically, during late 1980s and 1990s, and at the top levels of 
political organizations, Husayn built a complex power structure in which the tribe constituted 
his first circle of protection (Dawod, 2012: 104). 
 
Furthermore, to benefit more from the state services, one had to hide any oppositional views 
and appear as loyal member to the Baathist regime. The ability to lead a comfortable life as 
described above by this group of Baghdadi state employees was conditioned by one’s loyalty 
to the regime which controlled many aspects of state life. From 1980s‒2003, membership to 
the Baath party was an essential proof to secure access to a good job and related state welfare 
                                                      
73 From an interview on 28 November 2010 with a former Iraqi engineer whose brother and former colleagues 
had to leave Iraq for being married to a ‘foreign’ woman from Western European countries or the USA.  
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services. According to most of the Iraqis I met this meant being registered in the state records 
as naṣīr in the Baath party, at least, (a rank that means supporter) and to avoid expressing any 
opposing views, otherwise Iraqis who were politically active and openly dared to challenge 
the Baathist policies and practices had to face the retaliation of the regime tyranny, they (and 
in some cases the whole family or community members the opposition members belong to) 
suffered torture, execution unless they managed to escape away from the regime reaching 
hands.  Um-Amjad (66 years old Iraqi widow), narrated how her father, a former employee at 
the British Petrol Company in al-Basra (BPC) disappeared in 1976 following the 
nationalization of the BPC, as a result of expressing his opposing views to the nationalization 
process. Her father never came back. Hundreds of Iraqis, who were considered non-loyal by 
the regime had to leave the country to escape persecution.  
 
It is worth mentioning here that there were other stories which I did not hear among this 
group of Iraqis during my presence in the field in 2010-2011, but I have memories of that 
period from my childhood in Syria. I remember family friends, mostly doctors, academics 
and musicians who graduated from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries 
and had fled their country in the late seventies and eighties running away from persecution 
for their affiliation to the communist party or for opposing the Baathist regime of Saddam 
Husayn. Previous research studies provide extensive details of Iraqis expelled from their 
country in the phase of state-making in the 1940s and 1950s (al-Rasheed, 1994; Davis, 
2005:70; Sassoon, 2009; al-Ali, 2007; Tripp, 2007). These included both Baathists as well as 
members of the Iraqi communist party both Shia and Sunni, and members of certain ethnic 
groups such as Kurds and Turkmens who were included or excluded within the state 
apparatus at various levels and scales during different periods. In times of stability, such 
exclusionary practices targeted individuals who were considered “infidel”, as in the case of 
Um-Amjad’s family whose father was punished but her family continued to live inside Iraq 
and had access to the state welfare services. Rohde indicates how disciplining and silencing 
the population was achieved by the dual tactics of buying internal dissent through good 
salaried employment and severe repression (2010: 24-32). The exclusionary practices from 
the state welfare services used to increase in times of crisis and wars, when the regime and 
coercive state apparatus targeted entire households, if a member of those households dared to 




In the worst incidents, during times of political tension, members of certain ethnic or 
sectarian groups had been targeted as collectives, as described in the case above by a former 
Iraqi academic “in the name of nationalization”, the regime attacked professionals married to 
women from western Europe or North America. Former practices of the so-described 
“purging” policies to protect ‘the Arab national pride’ by the Iraqi ruling parties and regime, 
targeted members of certain communities just for being considered part of the “enemy” camp. 
This happened to Iraqi merchants and highly educated and skilled professionals from the 
Jewish community who were attacked after the 1948 Israeli colonization of Palestine and the 
expulsion of the Arab Palestinian indigenous inhabitants to establish a state for the world 
Jews.74 
 
It happened again in the late 1980s, when the Baath party turned to the old networks of 
patronage and encouraged specific communal loyalties, which formalized sectarian advantage 
and identified a host of internal enemies. The party targeted members of the Shia and Kurdish 
political parties repeatedly over the next 20 years, especially during the war with Iran, which 
resulted in the displacement and expulsion of large numbers of Kurds and Shia who were 
accused of being of “Iranian affiliation,” (see Marfleet, 2011: 177-181; Khoury, 2013: 25; 
Chatelard, 2008, 2009). I met some of these families in Jordan and Bergen (where I did my 
Ph D studies), some described unexpected night raids by the secret police (al-mukhābarāt) 
although they were not politically active in any opposition party. They described their 
expulsion as part of targeting the entire Shia community by the former Iraqi regime that 
deported several Iraqis who were not registered as Ottoman citizens to the Iranian borders on 
the pretext of tabaʻiyya Irāniyya (Iranian affiliation).75 These rising policies by the regime 
against the so-called “internal enemies” forced several Iraqi academics, intellectuals and 
artists to leave their country to safer places.  
 
The living conditions for several Iraqi state employees changed, during the 1980s, when large 
numbers of males were forced to join the military front in an “unnecessary war,” as most of 
                                                      
74 The acts of targeting the Iraqi Jews in 1948 did not happen in the context of civil war or local sectarian 
tensions, but were part of larger regional and global conflicts.  
75 The politicization of ethnic and sectarian identities increased in times of conflict, such as the anti-Saddam 
intifada following the Iraq-Kuwait War of 1990-91, and the present situation following the 2003 invasion. 
Despite the claims of the regime to erase these sectarian sentiments, the regime did not change the strange Iraqi 
nationality law. Many of the Iraqi Shia in late Ottoman times claimed Iranian nationality to avoid military 
service, and to enjoy some of the privileges of foreign subjects. These constituted ambiguous citizens of the new 
Iraq, described as tabaʻiyya Irāniyya, “Iranian affiliation.” This status continued to be inherited by their 
descendants to the end of the Baathist regime in 2003 (Zubaida, 2011: 128). 
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the Iraqi professionals (I met) described the Iran-Iraq war. The state development 
opportunities and promises of better future for the children and grandchildren of these former 
Iraqi state bureaucrats were not free of tensions which resulted from the rising regime 
repression and lack of freedom to express political or cultural opinions by members of the 
diverse communities within the Iraqi society. 
 
In their introduction of Contesting the State Kapferer and Taylor describe the state 
bureaucratic process in relation to state violence: “Bureaucratic processes assume particular 
force in the social assembly and regulative dynamics of modern states and, indeed, can 
inhabit the conventional thought processes of the citizenry, thus giving form to state 
violence” (2012: 9). Another form of state violence in the Iraqi bureaucratic processes, was 
the state attempts to militarize large parts of the civil bureaucracy through prolonged 
conscription service in 1980s, as explored in the following sections.  
 
1980s- liberalizing the state and gendering the militarization of society 
Unlike 1970s when the government invested in training young Iraqis and building state 
institutions by employing graduates in rewarding governmental jobs, in 1980s more efforts 
and resources were invested by Iraqi state institutions and the Baath Party to mobilize people 
for war. The stories shared in the field of the 1980s were less homogeneous than the ones of 
the 1970s. It depends on how close war was to one’s home, and the level of losses the 
household endured (martyrs, prisoners, war-disabled and the disappeared). Nearly all Iraqi 
families I met in Amman had somebody on the war front during 1980s:  
All Iraqis born between 1955‒1970 spent between 9 to 10 years in conscription 
service, during the years 80‒88 on the war front. This affected Iraqi’s social life. 
Many households of war generation had only 2‒3 kids compared to the former 
generations who used to have 5‒8 children. I have only one daughter.76 
 
Abu-Wafa had just finished his first university degree in engineering when the war with Iran 
started and he was called to join mandatory conscription. The war affected the ability of this 
generation to pursue their higher education. Being a hard-working student with high 
academic achievements, Abu-Wafa was hoping to follow the steps of his eldest brother and 
complete his higher education studies in the UK but due to the war conditions, he was forced 
to postpone his study plans while his conscription was prolonged for eight years. The war 
                                                      
76 Interview with Abu-Wafa at his owned apartment in Amman, on 4 December 2010.  
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front was one of the most common stories shared about Baghdadi life in 1980s; the prolonged 
service in the military postponed or cancelled former educational and career plans: “What is 
more urgent today: firing the cannon in the battlefield or sending you abroad to gain another 
degree?” This was the response of the head of the academic department to Professor Taha’s 
request to complete the procedures for his PhD grant to leave to France. Taha, was not a 
professor then but a lecturer at al-Mustansiriyah university, and due to the burdens on the war 
front, he had to postpone his PhD plans for 12 years. Travel became highly restricted 
especially for qualified professionals. In 1983, the Iraqi government declared it would 
confront inflation and other economic fallouts of the war with dramatic austerity measures. 
To support the national economy, most foreign imports that competed with locally produced 
commodities were banned. To prevent an exodus of populations, the government issued a 
travel ban, mainly on government employees and men of conscription age (Dewachi, 2017: 
136).  
 
In his ethnography, Dewachi describes how the Iraqi government terminated the decades-
long foreign missions program for medical training. Physicians were strictly banned from 
travel, though a few were allowed to attend medical conferences abroad after acquiring 
myriad approvals from state internal security agencies. The termination of the field 
specialization study-abroad program demoralized the younger generation of Iraqi doctors. 
Many had wished to use state scholarships to pursue medical training abroad. Meanwhile, 
senior Iraqi physicians were told to establish local alternatives. In 1986, the government 
approved the creation of the Iraqi Board for Medical Specialization. The board offered Iraqi 
doctors postgraduate training in different medical and surgical specialties and 
subspecialties (ibid., 137). 
 
The militarization of Iraqi space- “the internal front” 
The war with Iran affected many aspects of the Iraqi social life which were present in the 
former decade. In her book Iraq in Wartime: Soldiering, Martyrdom and Remembrance, Dina 
Khoury (2013) traces the political, social, and cultural processes of what she calls the 
“normalization of war” in Iraq during the last twenty-three years of Baathist rule. When men 





The high investment in the military sector in Iraq, as in other postcolonial states around 
(Syria, Egypt) was not a new development related to the war with Iran. The military used to 
constitute the backbone of the Iraqi bureaucracy during the Ottoman time, and the following 
British colonial administration. The consequent Iraqi republic regimes proceeded this high 
investment in the military sector, as the following table shows:  
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The data reveal a large discrepancy between the percentage of government expenditures of 
GNP on health and education when compared to the rising investment in the military sector 
in the 80s and 90s, the UN reports show that Iraqis used to enjoy relatively good level of 
education and health services during 1970s and 1980s (despite the great losses on the war 
front with Iran):  
“Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Iraq enjoyed some of the highest health and 
educational indicators in the Middle East and was among the most industrialized 
nations in the region. Iraqi children enjoyed healthy home lives and excellent 
education, and were well nourished. Despite more than 250,000 Iraqi deaths and 
significant damage to Iraq’s civilian infrastructure during the Iran–Iraq War, 
Iraq’s health, education and other social programs continued to advance 
throughout the 1980s. Just prior to the 1990–1991 Gulf War, the UN described 
Iraq as a high-middle-income country, with a modern social infrastructure” (UN, 
1999, in Ismael and Ismael, 2015: 151). 
 
Bassam Yousif’s study provides further details that serve to explain the rise in household 
expenditure in the first years of the war (1981‒1982), he attributes this to the Baath regime 
policy of “guns and butter”: “the regime used its foreign currency reserves to shield the 
public as much as possible from the privations of war […] through importing consumer 
goods notably food that were by comparison scarce before the start of the war and selling the 
goods at subsidized prices […and] carrying out its ambitious development program. In its 
attempts to avoid large pay rises in the public sector, and in order to restrain the growth in 
                                                      
77The table is taken from: (Ismael and Ismael, 2015: 16). 
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wages and salaries, which started to increase in real terms in the late 1970s, the regime 
imported labor” (2012: 51-52).  
 
These economic intervention are described by Dina Khoury as the government’s attempt to 
normalize the Iran-Iraq war and make it part of the everyday life of citizens or what was 
termed then the “internal front.” This was a complex and dynamic process in which the Baath 
Party was “instrumental in securing citizens’ obedience through monitoring dissent on the 
one hand, and acting as a social organization ensuring that the impact of the war was borne 
by the population and effecting the social policy that governed the day-to-day lives of Iraqis” 
(2013: 49). In its role as social organization, the Baath party, through its different hierarchies 
and representatives from the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW), the Federation of 
Iraqi Students and Youth and other popular organizations, was involved in ensuring that 
Iraqis had access to services, especially those directly affected by the war, including 
conscripted soldiers, their families, and families of martyrs, who were offered privileged 
access to employment in government enterprises and educational institutions (Ibid., 53). This 
included paying visits to war–affected families by party cadres to foster pride in the children 
of martyrs, prisoners of war, or those missing in action, in addition to servicing the families’ 
needs and linking them to the party’s daily struggle (Ibid., 69).  
 
Many educated professionals and state workers continued to work in the military sector in the 
90s, where government’s investments were higher than the civil services sector. Despite the 
risks involved in dividing the family (due to the absence of male members on the war front), 
affiliation to the army was one way to ensure a regular salary by a governmental job until 
2003. Iraqis from various professional backgrounds were affiliated to the army. The 
government investment in the militarization of the Iraqi society in the 1980s onwards, made it 
an attractive sector for some Iraqi university graduates, who could ensure better conditions of 
survival and regular salary during the 1990s by keeping their military rank as officers 
working in the administrative sector of the military services; this way they used to enjoy 
more privileges than those working as civil servants in the public sector. In the field, I met 
Iraqi engineers, musicians and journalists who were employed in the administrative sectors of 
the Iraqi military for years after the end of their conscription period (ranging from 8‒12 
years), and some of them had a chance to work in the private sector in the evening time. This 
increased their access to resources following the decrease in state welfare services with the 




When it comes to Iraqi men employed in the state bureaucracy in 1980s, serving in the army 
was not a choice. Abu-Hussain who was a former officer in the Iraqi army considered the 
compulsory military service as part of one’s duties as Iraqi, regardless of the way 
international aid organizations in Jordan perceived it:  
Being an Iraqi, whether Sunni or Shia, you were obliged to protect your country 
interests and defend your state from any foreign attack. The UNHCR and IOM 
consider you as a threat for defending your nation-state, while they protect those 
who fled the army or served in the American occupation army and give them cash 
assistance and resettlement to the USA and Europe. After serving my country for 
35 years and spending four years in an Iranian prison, I am not entitled even to 
pension from my home country.78 
 
At the age of 63, Abu-Hussain was denied the right to retirement salary for being affiliated to 
the former government military and was not considered eligible for resettlement to a third 
country. He had to turn to the limited aid in addition to a manual work opportunity in the 
industrial zone in Sahab to provide for his family in Jordan. I met him several times when I 
was visiting his wife in their rented apartment in down-town Amman. His wife was 
occasionally attending and delivering training events to extend their limited space of ʾamān 
by securing additional financial support, though little and irregular. Following the habit of 
their generation, Abu-Hussain and his wife did not refer to their sectarian affiliation but I 
learnt from their son— who had to split his file in the UNHCR from his parents’ file hoping 
to gain resettlement in a third country— that his father is Shii and his mother is Sunni.  
 
Abu-Hussain’s story shows how the larger political and global changes affected the daily life 
of individuals who had to constantly learn how to cope with new exclusionary policies. His 
long service in the army of the pre-invasion Iraqi government led to his exclusion from both 
the protection space in Jordan and the retirement salary provided by the current Iraqi 
government. His only son, Hussain considered himself lucky that he was still young and had 
not been called to serve in the army. Hussain seemed very close to his parental family with 
whom he, his wife and their young daughter, spent most of their time, yet Hussain expressed 
with pain how he decided to split his file from his parental family’s file in the UNHCR 
because he realized that only by excluding himself from his parental family (to prove that he 
had no link to the Baath Party and Saddam’s military in which his father serviced for a long 
                                                      
78 Interview on 28 February 2011, in a visit to Abu Hussain’s house. Abu Hussain holds an MA degree in 
education, his son explained how the family had to leave their area in Baghdad after being threatened for being 
Shia in a “Sunni”-majority neighborhood.   
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time), he would be included in the international framework of protection for asylum 
seekers.79 In April 2011, Hussain’s resettlement application to the USA moved to the final 
stage in the IOM resettlement program. Military conscription in Iraq was inclusive and 
obligatory; as Abu-Hussain explained. When a young man turns 18, if he is out of university, 
he must join military conscription for one year and a half. The majority of Iraqi males who 
were young in the 1980s were called to service, again and again, during the war time with 
Iran and the first gulf war following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990‒1991.  
 
Iraqis I met in Jordan expressed diverse reactions to the militarization of their society and 
their role in the army. I met few Iraqis who took the risk to escape from the military service 
and left the country. In his attempts to avoid ‘losing’ years in the military, Said delayed his 
graduation from the University for two years:80 “I had to graduate in 1982, but I completed 
my BA degree only in 1985, as I could not defer it further.”81 After serving for eight years as 
an English-Arabic translator in a publishing unit affiliated to the military, Said decided to put 
an end to his service, when his unit officer commanded them to get ready for invading 
Kuweit. He managed to pay smugglers and crossed the borders to Jordan.  
 
The critique of the militarization of daily life during the 1980s was shared among members of 
the younger generation who grew up during the Iran-Iraq war. During one of the English 
language classes I volunteered to teach, the students, cynically recalled the state attempts to 
bring the battle-field at home through the daily TV program in the 1980-1988: Suwar min al-
Maʻaraka  Images from the Battleground). The program was broadcasted on)  صور من المعركة
the Iraqi national TV station prior the children’s program (that was before the rise of satellite 
stations, in that period when only one TV channel could be watched in most homes). The 
men— who were children during the 1980s whose fathers were most of the time away in the 
battle front— described how they were bombarded with images of heroism and death. One of 
them joked how his father hated seeing the TV set turned on in the few days he spent at 
                                                      
79 Madeline Campbell presents details of the complex and vague screening process in the US Refugee 
Admissions Program that might lead to US resettlement or rejection. For details, see (Campbell, 2016: 144-
161).  
80 In his study of Iraqi doctors, Dewachi explains that during this period education acquired greater social value 
because, above all, continued schooling in the overwhelmingly state-run education system guaranteed a delay in 
military service (2017: 137). 
81 This was not an option for all males, while the children of better resourced families remained in school, as 
evinced by the increase in enrolment in higher education during the late 1980s. This was also a means for males 
to obtain military service deferments. By contrast, other males, from the poorer classes, were joining the 
workforce in increasing numbers (Yousif, 2015: 80).  
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home, away from the war front. He described an incident when he returned from school one 
day to see the TV screen covered with pictures of Saddam and soldiers while his father 
ordered him to go to his room to rest and study after watching all the TV programs.  
 
Abu-Hussain, however, described his long years of military service as his national obligation 
and one’s patriotic duty, others considered it part of their duties to the state‒ which they were 
forced to perform‒ to be included in the state apparatus and welfare services, and avoid the 
regime punitive measures if they were identified as deserters. His son, Hussain could only 
escape military service due to being the only male child of the family and thanks to his 
younger age (born in 1989), however, living inside Iraq in the 1980s, both men and women 
were increasingly connected to the militarization process of the society. Abu-Hussein’s 
family story was paradigmatic of several Iraqi families who were forced to split their files in 
the UNHCR and eventually ended up living in different continents. 
 
The militarization of the public space affected many aspects of Iraqi life, especially when it 
comes to the father’s, brother’s and husband’s absence, as explained in the field accounts. In 
the following section, I present an excerpt from a longer story about some aspects of this 
militarization, which I heard from Um-Amjad during several meetings. 
 
Um-Amjad: Living as a soldier’s wife 
Um-Amjad, whose father disappeared in 1976 after openly criticizing the nationalization 
process of the BPC (Basra Petroleum Company), married her cousin who was a lieutenant 
and continued his career in the military. Her story as a wife of a soldier presents rich insights 
on the way soldiers’ families had to cope with the long absence of men on the war front. The 
government services to families of high ranking Baathist soldiers were vital for her household 
survival. Nevertheless, Um-Amjad had to lead an unsettled life to cope with her husband’s 
military posts’ requirements; the family had to live in different locations: Baghdad, al-Basra, 
Tikrit, al-Masib, Karkouk until she decided to quit her job and settled in a house in al-
muʿaskar. She described al-muʿaskar as a military housing compound where she lived with 
her two children for some years:  
Military men were valued during Saddam’s time; it was a war-time and Saddam 
needed them. We lived a luxurious life in al-muʿaskar, where we missed nothing; 
they ensured that we got all what we needed. In spite of that, it was war and there 
were no men. [She suddenly stopped the war story to turn to her love story that 
she nostalgically described almost as one of those famous legendry love stories.] 
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Our love story then became everybody’s story; Everybody talked about our love 
story. You know the song yā rail sīh ib qahar sīhat ʿishiq yā rail? [O’ train cry 
out in sorrow and anger, a cry of love, O’ train].” Um-Amjad started humming the 
first part of the popular Iraqi song “The Rail and Hamad”:82 our relatives used to 
say, when I was engaged and my fiancé had to travel from Baghdad to al-Basra to 
visit me that this song must have been written for you two.” I still have the letters 
we used to exchange. My husband spent most of his days on the war front. He 
used to call me in the middle of the battle; you know the telephone service then 
was not as advanced as it’s today. In order to call me, he had to be passed through 
a number of soldier-employees and connecting points and sometimes I could only 
hear the echo of his voice screaming at the telephone switchboard operator to 
connect us and get away, I used to hear the echo of his voice but he did not hear 
me.83 
 
Um-Amjad described how she waited for the few days when her husband would come home 
for a short period of not more than five days per month and sometimes less. Eventually 
during 1986, he was absent for more than six months when he was transferred to the front 
line at the battlefield. By that time, she was tired of military compound life and decided to 
return to their house in Baghdad. In 1987, her husband came home and was planning to spend 
one week with her and their two kids, but on the third day of his home-visit, he was called to 
join Nahr al-Jasem or the so-called al-Buhairat battle: “I knew that he wouldn’t survive this 
time, I had a feeling that he wouldn’t come back. Many died in that battle; soldiers and 
complete brigades were involved and none came back from it.” 
 
One important element in Um-Amjad’s story is the absence of the heroic side when she talks 
of the Iran-Iraq war; instead the focus is more on the love story and the troubles she had to 
endure as a soldier’s wife who became a widow and a mother of two orphan children. Unlike 
the feelings of pride, Um-Amjad expressed whenever she described her deep love for her 
cousin and mentioned how they decided to marry when he was still a lieutenant in the army 
“with one star”; she seemed proud of his brave and heroic stories every time she referred to 
his participation in the fight against the Israelis in 1973.  
 
                                                      
82 From “The Rail and Hamad”, one of the most popular poems of al-Nawwab in Iraqi dialect, written in 1958 
and turned into a song performed by Yas Khader and various other Iraqi male and female singers. Um-Amjad 
explained to me that the rail is the train that is one of the containers of Iraqi memories. The train, al-rail in the 
accent of southern Iraq, is also given a major role in Muthafar al-Nawwab’s poem, which was turned into one of 
the most popular Iraqi love songs. 
83 I met Um-Amjad several times during my fieldwork and we spent time at her rented two-room apartment in 
al-Hashimi al-Shamali and in other common friends’ homes. This excerpt is from a longer conversation on 10 
January 2011.  
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Dina Khoury talks of the war “memory discourse” as an attempt by the state to regulate the 
inner emotional self of the Iraqi individual as he or she experienced war, through the “taken 
for granted” shared memory of war. The official version of war experience was disseminated 
by state cultural institutions and the party organizations in the 80s; the Iraqi state 
monopolized literary output as well as the commemoration of fallen soldiers. The state 
promoted a heroic narrative of the war experience, and the memory discourse disseminated 
by the government during the Iran-Iraq war was dominant. Its categories were: memory, 
martyrdom, mājidāt or strong Iraqi women (Khoury, 2013: 11-12). Unlike Um-Amjad’s 
description of heroism associated with the 1973 war, in her stories of the 1980s, the image of 
the fighter-hero who sacrificed his life for defending the nation pride seemed to have lost its 
weight. Instead feelings of nostalgia and loss replaced those of heroism. 
 
Um-Amjad’s story is similar to other stories I heard in the field— mostly from women but 
also several men— when the eight years of the Iran-Iraq war were mentioned, feelings of 
loss, sorrow and long wasted years away from male family members who were conscripted 
soldiers, were expressed. Rather than political and heroic messages that were promoted by 
the regime in the official public media such as newspapers, television and radio stations, the 
focus of the stories’ on the 80s was more on the suffering aspect in the cases of wives and 
sons of martyrs, war prisoners in Iran, long periods of conscription and military service on 
the war front, and the disabilities among men who returned alive from the battlefield. 
 
The Iran-Iraq war which was conceived in September 1980 as a war of “demonstration” in 
the words of Charles Tripp (2007: 28), turned by 1982—with the Iranian achievements— into 
a war of “survival” to maintain the regime in power against the stated aim of Khomeini who 
made peace conditional on the fall of Saddam and his party (Khoury, 2013: 29). In 1986 Iran 
exerted strong efforts to conquer Basra and break the Iraqi defensive line. On 6 February of 
that year, it conquered the Faw Peninsula. To counter the loss of Faw, Saddam Husayn 
pushed his military to conquer Mehran, but lost it. The loss of Faw and the unsuccessful 
attempt to take Mehran created a serious crisis for the regime. The regime allowed for the 
voicing of complaints by its citizens against the corruption of state organs and party officials. 
It appeared that citizens had much to complain about, including: economic hardship and labor 
shortages: “so critical was the shortage of men that the government conscripted some one 
hundred twenty-five thousand male university teachers and students, a practice it had avoided 
in fear of alienating a critical element of society” (Hiro, in Khoury, 2013: 32). In 1987, one 
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year before the war ended, out of a total population of 2.6 million Iraqi men aged 18 to 45, 
1.7 million were in arms (ibid.: 34). 
 
The deployment and death of large portions of the productive male population led to labor 
shortages. One and a half million Egyptians and other Arab laborers were imported to run the 
agricultural, industrial, and service sectors of the economy, and at times to help transport 
goods to the front. Women were called upon to fill public sector positions, and by 1988 
accounted for 31% of the labor force in that sector, and one-fourth of the total labor force 
(Hiro in Khoury, 2013: 34).  
 
Gendering Iraqi public space(s): recruiting male bureaucrats in the military service and 
feminizing the civil service 
When remembered, the war recalls losses of male members who were either absent for a long 
time, or gone forever. Men talk of wasted time and years in conscriptions while women 
usually talk of their losses and suffering from the absence of their partner/ father/ and 
brothers/ sons on the one side, and of increasing responsibility and independence with a sense 
of pride, on the other side. Being responsible for managing home and the city in general. Men 
also celebrate the role of women in managing the “internal front” during their absence on the 
battlefield: “women saved the country,”84 as an Iraqi engineer who spent long years in service 
told me. On the changing role(s) of women during the 1980s, Ismael and Ismael write:  
“The Iran–Iraq War saw the expansion of women into ever-larger economic roles. 
Due to the enormous numbers of male casualties and the loss of men from the 
economy, women were encouraged to take on new roles. By necessity women 
became the principal food providers in addition to traditional roles overseeing 
child care. To encourage the participation of women in the labor force, the regime 
observed and enacted Labor Law 71 in 1987, which was meant to protect the 
status of women. The Iraqi Revolutionary Council went further with decrees 
taking protective responsibility of the widows of dead soldiers, providing the 
widow with a free plot of land, free housing, as well as social security” (2015: 
181). 
 
As described earlier, Iraq had one of the highest rates of women’s education in the Arab 
region, by the 1980s. The progressive attitude toward women’s education and economic 
independence during the republican era continued under Baath Party rule (Dewachi, 2017: 
205). Yet, the growth of workforce participation and female involvement in social and 
economic life outside the home, while robust, did not mirror the experience of other societies. 
                                                      
84 Meeting with an Iraqi engineer on 29 January, he spent seven years in military service.  
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Iraqi sociologist Lahay Abdul-Ḥussain, in her examination of available statistical record, 
measured the impact of the Iran–Iraq War on women in education and their work outside the 
home between 1980 and 1988 she found that:  
While Baathist development did help expand women’s opportunities in terms of 
education, work and occupations, the Iran–Iraq War pushed women heavily 
toward more segregated work opportunities. Therefore, gender segregation 
became a concrete reality in the formal workplace. For example, the feminization 
of elementary school teacher and secretarial jobs compared with the other 
occupations became apparent. This was in contrast to the experience of women in 
many countries experiencing total war, where the opportunity to advance was 
more meritocratic—even if such opportunities were diminished as gender norms 
returned following the conflict (Abdul-Ḥussain, 2006, quoted in Ismael & Ismael, 
2015: 181-182).  
 
The prolonged war heavily affected Iraqi men and women from all generations and one of the 
biggest changes were related to the process of development planning which were brought to 
an end (Yousif, 2012: 153). This heavily affected the state bureaucracy and professionals in 
the middle class in general whose access to welfare services was heavily affected. Iraqi state 
employees and professionals had to learn how to cope with the liberalization and 
privatization of the state economy that led eventually to the loss of former higher social status 
associated with education and government employment. Economic prosperity was 
conditioned by expressing affiliation to the Baath party high officials which facilitated access 
to resources to run a private business.85 
 
Furthermore, the long periods of conscription and military service created great tension in 
Iraqi family daily lives and changed the community perceptions towards “military duty.” The 
call for men to serve their military “duty” and the prolonged coercive conscription period 
forced the government to employ women in public sector positions at a higher rate, while 
relying on Egyptians and other Arab laborers to fill vacant places in the industrial and 
                                                      
85 Beginning in the 1970s and consolidating through the 1990s and 2000s – most countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa region have been profoundly transformed by neoliberal economic policies. These policies have 
included privatization, labor market deregulation, opening up to foreign direct investment (FDI), increasing 
integration into global financial markets, reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, cutbacks to social 
spending (notably on food subsidies) and so forth. (see Hanieh, 2013:47-74 for an account of neoliberalism in 
the region, and Hanieh, 2015: 63) In the case of Iraq, liberalization was more related to investment of oil 
revenues in militarization and to the funding of expensive war operations in the Iran-Iraq war it relied on loans 
from gulf countries and Saudi Arabia which increased the burden on the state and gradually it reduced its 
investment in human development. However, the privatization was not associated with opening up to foreign 
direct investment (FDI). This became only possible after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as discussed briefly in 
Chapter 1. The CPA orders signed by Paul Bremer focused on promoting free trade in the context of 
transnational production rather than investment in developing local infrastructure (see Klein, 2004, 2007; Doran, 
2012).   
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construction sectors. These governmental strategies of survival seriously affected the 
centralized governmental sector.  
 
Raya, a woman in her mid-fifties when I met her in 2011, told me how the city landscape 
changed when she described Baghdad in late 1980s; like many women of her generation, her 
father and brothers spent long years in the military service, while her husband ran away. Her 
story, of which I present more details in Chapter Seven, explores several features of Iraqis’ 
struggle with compulsory militarization:  
I got tired, my brothers were in the military for long years [I learnt later that she 
lost two of her brothers: one was killed and the other imprisoned and disappeared 
during the war with Iran]. All the men in my neighborhood (al-Saydiyya) were 
called to join the military service. There were times when you would see no man 
in the whole neighborhood. Only women were around, while the men were all the 
time in al-jabha (the war front). I used to spend the evening hours on the roof, 
when you look in front of you, you can see all the women in black: one mourning 
the death of her brother, another lost her son or husband. Once I was sitting in my 
house with my sister, we had a neighbor in the house next to ours who was hiding 
from the conscription. The popular army forces crossed through our house garden 
to our neighbor’s, whose house was surrounded by popular army. The man was 
sick, but they forced him to join the popular army. My husband was all the time 
running from military service, partly in Kuwait and then in al-Mosul. He ruined 
our family life while trying to escape the army service; he lost all his business in 
Kuwait. I used to tell him that my five brothers went to the army, why do you 
have to run away and hide? He used to answer me carelessly: do you want me to 
die? No other nation witnessed what we experienced in Iraq, no one! The Iraqi 
woman suffered a lot, God may help her! At that time, you could not see a man 
working around; when you go for shopping, you never meet men, if you want to 
buy fish, it’s a woman who will open the fish and clean it, and the butcher was a 
woman too. Even ‘those shrūgiyyat86 Shiis’, when they lost their husbands in war, 
they used to come and look for any work in the city. There was an empty green 
piece of land in the opposite side of my store and I used to watch those women 
cultivating the land and living from its products.  
 
Raya presented a vivid image she recalled from her life in Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war 
in times when only women could be seen in the shops and governmental jobs in addition to 
the rise of “the women in black” who turned Baghdad into a “city of widows” to borrow the 
description of Haifa Zangana (2009). The feminization of the government services and the 
                                                      
86shrūgiyya (feminine) and shrūgī (masculine) is a term with degrading meaning that is used to refer to the 
poorer Iraqis who moved from rural areas to settle in suburbs around the capital Baghdad. Hanna Batatu 
mentions that shrūgīs “the Easterners, if literally translated” — migrated from the ‘Amarah tribal country—
whose sarifas or mud huts dotted the landscape of Greater Baghdad during the 1940s and 1950s (1978:49). 
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dependence on the so-called secondary labor forces87 in addition to liberalizing and 
privatizing the state economy, all these had negative effects on the former conditions of labor 
and state welfare services which Iraqi professionals and government employees used to enjoy 
in the 70s. Some of the Iraqi males who spent years on the war front were not able to find 
‘decent’ employment conditions after the end of the war due to lack of vacancies. Dewachi 
describes how these condition affected women’s and men’s presence in the state bureaucracy:  
“When men were mobilized to the frontlines, more women took on 
responsibilities as heads of household and active participants in the state labor 
force. The war saw more Iraqi women enter social, economic, and public life, 
assuming more active, “productive,” and “reproductive” roles in Iraq’s wartime 
society. Decades of progressive social policies that favored and supported female 
education paid off. Increasing numbers of women were hired for low- and middle-
ranking administrative and technical positions in Iraq’s public sector. In a number 
of ministries, women employees constituted between 60 and 80 percent of the 
workforce. Improving work conditions for women and providing an infrastructure 
for managing their family “duties” further facilitated women’s incorporation into 
government jobs. Women’s pay was increased and maternity leave was extended. 
At each government ministry, daycare services for working women with 
preschool-age children were provided. Women’s role in the new war economy 
was not limited to their labor. The government also tapped women’s personal 
resources. The Ba‘th Party conducted donation campaigns across the country—
known as Hamlat al-Tabaru‘ LilMajhūd al-Harbi (Donation Campaign for the 
War Effort). Through coercion and cooptation, women lined up outside party 
headquarters to contribute money and gold jewelry. Although such policies stirred 
resentment toward the regime, it was seen as being balanced by a new social 
contract—defined by women’s economic visibility and assumed independence” 
(Dewachi, 2017: 139-140).  
 
The above excerpt explains the new division of labor in the Iraqi social space imposed by the 
conditions of war and regulated by the state policies and the regime ruling bodies who 
invested in improving the situation of girls’ schooling and higher education and enhancing 
working women conditions and their legal rights in general.  
 
Effects of militarization and liberalization on households and family relations 
In the nationalized Iraqi discourse of the 80s, women were associated with images of glory; 
they were described as majidāt (strong/ glorified women), martyrs’ wives, mothers of heroes 
                                                      
87 To help cope with the manpower shortage, the state opened the door to Arab labor immigration. As explained 
earlier, priority was given to Egyptians, a large population that was dealing with the socio-economic dislocation 
caused by Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat’s “liberalizing” policies (for details, see Mitchell’s America’s 
Egypt: Discourse of the Development Industry (1991)). Filling low-wage menial jobs in construction and 
agriculture, it is estimated that more than 1 million Egyptians worked in Iraq during the 1980s. This was 
probably the largest population of migrant labor working in any Arab state at the time (Dewachi, 2017: 139). 
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who sacrificed to raise strong Iraqi sons and daughters who would, in turn, build and defend 
the nation. In the stories I heard in the field of that time, women related ʾamān to their 
strength and independence and partly, in some cases, to financial security. Such was the case 
of Um-Amjad, who as a martyr’s wife used to receive a monthly salary from 1987 when her 
husband died in the battlefield till 2003. The story of Raya during al-ḥiṣār (in Chapter 7) also 
emphasizes the importance of financial security, unlike Um-Amjad who relied on the state 
support, Raya whose husband had deserted conscription by paying huge bribes had the 
chance to improve her household’s economic conditions by running a private business in 
addition to her governmental job. In both cases, memories of war time reflect the feelings of 
suffering and loss experienced by Iraqi women as a result of the militarization of the Iraqi 
social life.   
 
Well-being in 1980s as described by Iraqi males in the field was related to the ability to gain 
exemption from military conscription, or the ability to minimize the prolonged conscription 
period. An Iraqi young man considered himself lucky if he was the only son in the family or 
had two family members who fell as martyrs on the battle-front, because he could choose not 
to serve on the front line, though not completely exempted. An Iraqi man, who served in the 
military for six years described how difficult, almost impossible, it was to get exemption: 
“one could be exempted from serving in the army only if he was too sick, almost dead: severe 
heart diseases, severe asthma or severely handicapped persons, completely blind, paralyzed 
or over 60 percent disability, cancer patients, and bladder and bowel incontinence. Otherwise 
all Iraqi men should serve in the army! That’s why you won’t find in Iraq a family without a 
martyr or a martyr’s mother.”88 Another effect of the 1980s state policies of militarization on 
family life was related to marriage life and child reproduction. Contrary to the family 
planning programs implemented in many developing countries, child survival was tied to 
“limiting family size as a means of population control.” Dewachi explains that in the Iraqi 
case this was somewhat different:  
“The Iraqi government adopted prenatal policies, promoting higher rates of 
fertility and reproduction, and linked them to the strategy of war mobilization. 
The government adopted new policies regarding contraception. Although 
contraception was not actually illegal in the 1980s, it was definitely discouraged 
and was not readily available, as it had been before the war. Many incentives were 
given, such as the extension of maternity leave to one year—of which six months 
were paid. Baby food and articles were imported and subsidized. In the 
workplace, the government established comprehensive daycare for employees and 
                                                      
88 From a conversation during a social gathering with three Iraqi families on 27 March 2011.  
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facilitated maternity leave and early retirement for women with three children and 
more. The government further offered loans, bonuses, and subsidies for young 
married couples. It regularly held public collective weddings, offering financial 
support for those who could not afford marriage expenses. With each child, 
married couples were entitled to an incremental monthly subsidy. The more 
children in a family, the larger the subsidy” (2017: 143).  
 
During my fieldwork, I noticed that among the war generation, this seemed like another site 
of resistance as some parents of small families (who had one or two kids) expressed that they 
tried to avoid bringing more children, in an attempt to avoid sending them to war. It is not 
clear whether this was a common reason among families with one or two children (compared 
to the larger households among their parents’ generation), or whether this was a natural 
outcome for working mothers, but in several cases, some parents attributed this to the long 
absence of the father on the war front; as one of the women who had one son explained that 
this was not her intention, but due to the imprisonment of her husband in Iran and his long 
absence, she (and other women she knows) lost the chances of conceiving naturally.    
 
Despite the large increase in the participation of women in state public life in the 1970s and 
1980s, the war with Iran brought new problems to the women who had to learn how to live as 
widows or wives of missing husbands and prisoners of war and single mothers of young sons 
(to turn into soldiers or martyrs in the future). A collective response by various state agencies 
was planned to increase the formal space of protection for Iraqi women who lost their 
husbands and sons in war. This was observed through the involvement of the party 
associations, such as the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) in managing the social 
costs of war. The federation focused more on families who were directly harmed by war. As 
Dina Khoury explains, the Federation expanded its reach to include 850,000 members 
reaching 62% of Iraqi neighborhoods in rural and urban areas with 30% of membership 
among urban women by 1987 and was active in pushing for amendments to the Personal 
Status Law in 1983 and 1985 to accord more rights within the family to individual women. 
The GFIW and other popular organizations, increased their involvement, which included 
assessing the social needs of individuals and families affected by war. This resulted in the 
development of laws; the GFIW played an important role in reforming the Personal Status 
Law that defined the rights of inheritance, marriage and divorce as part of the modernization 
and development project of the Iraqi state, in addition to its interest in the facilitation of 
inheritance and compensation for martyr’s widows and the wives of those missing or 




In commenting on these government actions to mobilize Iraqi women, Joseph argued that this 
official mobilization has been less about liberating women and more about strengthening the 
state (2000: 36). In the seventies and eighties, Iraqis belonging to various groups including: 
young children’s Talāʾiʿ, paramilitary groups, student associations, science, sports, cultural 
clubs – all had to learn how to become loyal to the party and the state as part of their 
socialization for discipline and political loyalty (Joseph, 1991: 181). According to Joseph, 
women and families played an important role in the dynamics of the Iraqi state. Another 
important factor is the economic boom after the nationalization of Iraqi oil which offered the 
state extensive public resources to fund its public sector programs in education, social 
services, industry, agriculture and commercial services: The Iraqi Baath Party had an interest 
both in recruiting women into the labor force in the context of a continuing labor shortage 
and in wresting women’s allegiance away from kin, family, or ethnic group and shifting it to 
the party-state. Women were recruited into state-controlled agencies and put through public 
education, vocational training, and political indoctrination (ibid., 1991: 177). 
 
Similar arguments to Joseph’s above concerning the progressive Iraqi state policies in 
relation to Iraqi women were raised in several writings which tend to argue that formal 
mobilization of Iraqi women had been less about liberating them in the Western meaning of 
the term and more about strengthening the state (For example, Joseph, 1991: 184; Joseph and 
Slomovich, 2001: 36; Moghadam, 1993, 2004, al-Ali, 2005; Al-Jawaheri, 2008: 15-29; 
Rohde, 2010). In general, they refer to the higher female participation in the labor force and 
polity as needed for the state-building program, in addition to the revisions of the personal 
status law as necessary and useful to ensure wider female participation in the public sector, 
through several programs developed by the Baath party and other state agencies: “The Baath 
have sought to redirect the allegiance of women towards the party and state not only by 
providing them organizational alternatives but also by extending rights and services to them. 
Legislative reform as well as programs of immediate relevance to women have been 
developed towards these ends” (Joseph, 1991: 179, 184).  
 
This role of state apparatus can be observed in Iraq and other modern regimes of 
governmentality, but what makes the Iraqi case a unique case is not only the sudden rise in 
the levels of education and employment among women, but the big decline in the living 
conditions of these women who experienced increasing levels of reduction in services and 
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“rights” from 1980s onwards (at least till 2011, the time of this research). Wives and 
descendants of army officers were affected at various levels depending on their educational 
and career backgrounds in addition to their access to political and material capital. Iraqi 
women described enthusiastically their former career life and how they were encouraged to 
participate in the public social life and government employment sector to cover for the 
absence of male working force who were called to fight on the war front. As described 
earlier, this was perceived as positive effect by most women I met, in retrospect, when they 
compared the opportunities they had then to what they witnessed in the recent past in times of 
war and displacement following the US-led invasion. Most women in the field celebrated 
former state policies and the increase in state services and legal protection for women, 
especially the women who were affected the most by the war; they mentioned the ability to 
lead a “decent” life as single mothers and martyr’s wives: “the state ensured that wives of 
martyrs would need nobody to live a decent life, because the state provided services to cover 
their and their children’s needs.” This is how Um-Amjad described her life throughout the 
1980s until 2003 (when the monthly financial entitlement assigned by the former Iraqi 
government stopped). The ‘decent’ conditions referred to their right to access state welfare 
for performing one’s duty in defending the nation pride.  
 
In their stories, Raya (the wife of a wanted soldier for military desertion) and Um-Amjad (the 
wife of a martyr soldier who died on the war-front) and other women I met, talk of their 
struggles as mothers and wives of soldiers, dissidents and martyrs in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Some present their experiences as citizens of the Iraqi and Arab nation who had to fight and 
resist in a “defensive war.”89 Others were more critical to Saddam’s oppressive policies and 
his authoritative decisions to force Iraqis into one war after another.  
 
Um-Amjad who became a widow in 1987 was considered eligible for state welfare services 
in Iraq, like other widows who described different levels of gains and losses. In one of our 
informal gatherings in Um-Amjad’s rented apartment, we realized that four of the women 
sitting in the room, including Um-Amjad, were widows of martyrs and one was also the 
mother of a martyr. The women repeated several times how the wife of the martyr in Iraq was 
treated “like a queen.” They mentioned this to compare that ‘more affluent’ life before 2003 
                                                      
89 Rohde explains what he describes as a “massive patriotic propaganda campaign” developed by the Iraqi 
regime to enhance its legitimacy in its war against Iran, at least during the first years of the war, especially 
among the Iraqi Shias; according to Achim Rohde: “the Baath regime apparently managed to achieve a degree 
of Gramscian hegemony vis-à-vis its Shiʿite population, at least during the war years” (ibid., 34).   
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to the poor conditions in the small rented apartments in al-Hashimi al-Shamili where they 
have been living for years waiting for resettlement. Um-Amjad had been hoping to gain 
resettlement to Germany to reunite with her daughter, but according to the resettlement 
regulations she was not considered eligible.  
 
The perceptions of lack of ʾamān were measured in retrospect. In conditions of structural 
violence and ongoing wars and losses, the former sacrifices for the Iraqi nation state— which 
these widow women had to endure as soldiers’ wives and later as single mothers of 
orphans— were no longer appreciated or rewarded by the new Iraqi state government as “war 
heroes” or by international protection frameworks which Iraqis could access in their refuge 
place in Amman as “war victims.” On the contrary, being affiliated to the former Iraqi army-
men was one of the conditions to be excluded from the Iraqi state welfare after 2003 and 
many times from further internationally designed solutions such as resettlement to a third 
country. To be eligible for resettlement that was considered the best solution by some Iraqis 
like Um-Amjad, she had to prove that she was not involved in Saddam’s regime or military 
prior 2003 and her resettlement application would be stronger if she could prove that she was 
a victim of that regime. Being affiliated to military active persons in Saddam’s government 
could be one reason for being excluded from the formal protection space in Jordan or 
postinvasion Iraq. 
 
However, the reality was more complex as Um-Amjad and other widows described their 
relationships to the former regime by talking of the opportunities and welfare services the 
regime used to provide, which in their expression were sometimes personalized in the figure 
of Saddam rather than the state: “Saddam did not hurt us, on the contrary, Iraq was safer 
during his rule and as wives of soldiers and widows, our conditions were better in terms of 
accessing education, having more stable jobs and protection services. Living in Baghdad was 
safer and I felt prouder.” This is how one of the women commented during a meeting in Um-
Amjad’s rented apartment when she described her life as an Iraqi widow (among several 
other widows who accidently gathered to drink tea in one cold afternoon in January). Like 
Um-Amjad, this woman’s husband was a martyr killed during the Iraq-Iran war and she 
received state support services. She compared her conditions in the 1980s-1990s in Baghdad 
with the condition’s of her son’s wife who was widowed after 2003 but did not receive any 
support from the state for her or her son. We can see how ʾamān for these women is reduced 
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to reflect the ability to secure decent living standards for their orphan children that was 
possible through former state services and support.  
 
Towards the end of that decade, in late 1980s, many Iraqis had to experience further 
reduction in their well-being and deterioration in the general economic situation due to the 
reduction of state investments in the public sector and infrastructure. According to Rohde, 
with the financial burden of maintaining the war with Iran, and the decline in oil revenues, 
the Iraqi regime embarked on a broad program of economic liberalization that led to decline 
in state services and former development plans (ibid., 2010: 42). 
 
Liberalizing the state economy and the privatization policies 
During the Iran-Iraq war in 1982, the Baathist congress de-emphasized the “socialist” aspects 
of its economic programs, paving the way to a policy of liberalizing the economy, allowing 
private entrepreneurs to become subcontractors of the state by providing them with low-
interest loans and tax concessions (Khafaji in Khoury: 31). The economic costs of the Iran-
Iraq war were staggering. Iraq emerged burdened with a foreign debt of $50 to $82 billion US 
dollars, the bulk of it owed to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Unemployment, caused in part by 
the demobilization of soldiers and the dismantling of the war economy, as well as the 
increase in the demands for social services, severely stressed the state’s ability to create jobs 
and meet the population’s social needs. In response, the government accelerated the rate of 
privatization that had begun during the war and introduced fees on some public sector 
services. Consequently, inflation rose 35-40% and “complaints about government and party 
officials enriching themselves at the expense of Iraqis who had sacrificed for the nation 
permeated the press” (Bengio, in Khoury: 34).  
 
In his Ph D thesis, Yousef Baker refers to the effects of the privatization and liberalization 
campaign on the state bureaucracies whose power dwindled: “The regime undermined the 
power of labor by allowing industries to import Arab labor and removing minimum wages. 
Industries shed between 40 and 80 percent of their work forces. The government itself 
downsized its own bureaucracy” (Baker, 2014: 124-125).  
 
Despite the activation of the Baath party ground-based organizations, the effects of war on 
the educated and highly skilled labor were still high. Many former middle class Baghdadis 
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had to learn to live with lower ambitions in terms of career rewards, especially after the 
liberalization of the economy and the retreat of the former ‘socialist’ aspects in state welfare 
services. With the rise of the inflation rate, the state role in economic life was negatively 
affected and the private sector was enhanced to benefit a small rate of government and party 
officials while the investment of the state in public welfare such as education, health and 
social and cultural sectors decreased at the expense of its investment in military 
infrastructures. Yousef Baker explores some of the reasons of this transformation:   
“War with Iran transformed Iraq from a creditor nation to a debtor nation, which 
became one of the reasons the Baath regime invaded Kuwait in 1990 [….]. For an 
economy so dependent on oil revenue, dramatic changes in the oil sector sent 
shock waves throughout the economy. This included increasing inflation, 
decrease in public spending and public services, decrease in non-military 
government spending, decrease in non military imports, an overall reduction in 
the standard of living, decrease in foreign exchange reserves and an increase in 
foreign debt” (Baker, 2014: 120).  
 
Towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war, the economic liberalization process which had begun 
during the war was extended and reinforced. Price controls were removed, entrepreneurial 
activity was encouraged, and a number of state factories were sold off to private individuals, 
as were some other minor state assets. Licenses were granted for private industrial projects; 
the private sector accounted for nearly a quarter of all imports. These activities provided 
excellent opportunities for profit-making by a few individuals; however, they led to massive 
inflation which became so serious that regulations had to be re-imposed in a number of areas 
(Tripp, 2007: 241-242).  
 
The regime management of the country resources including human resources during the long 
eight-year war with Iran led to a gradual decline in former development plans. The prolonged 
war affected the allocation of resources to development when the state poured the resources 
from nationalization of the oil industry in 1972, agriculture, “strategic rents” from oil-rich 
gulf states for defending the “eastern flank of the Arab nation” into financing the war, and 
“the militarization of its population” (Khoury, 2013: 6). Compared to the rich social life 
enabled by the state welfare services in 1970s, declining oil prices worsened Iraq’s economic 
woes in 1988, as did the curtailment of its oil production due to the destruction of some of its 
oil production facilities. There was “a shift in the categories of people targeted by the social 
and security policies of the state. Soldiers, deserters, insurgents, and martyrs’ families 
became the primary objects of state policies” (Ibid., 7). The Iraqi state then developed a 
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reward system that depended on “a hierarchy of rights-based, precise definitions of 
martyrdom”90 (Ibid., 71). In addition to the hierarchies established in state services when it 
comes to employment and protection, the narratives of war shared by the women and men I 
met in Amman are different from the heroic narrative of war in the official version presented 
by the Iraqi State. 
 
This focus on military activities and the high level of conscription of university graduates 
(including some academics and professionals and large number of government male 
employees) affected the former prosperous middle class life style that was linked to 
professionalization and successful career. Within five years of the start of the Iran-Iraq war, 
the regular army grew from 200,000 to 500,000, mainly through the broadening of the 
conscription age. On the other hand, “recruits” to the Baath-run paramilitary Popular Army 
reached close to 650,000, mainly through the recruitment of men above the official age of 
military service (Dewachi, 2017: 136). 
 
Conscripting the male population into the military had serious effects on the country labor 
and living standards of the Baghdadi urban middle class households. Women’s role in the 
public space increased while many of them had to suffer the double burden to substitute for 
the absence of the men at home and in the public services. The former professional and state 
employees conditions began to change and working in a state job (in the public sector) was 
no longer considered as the best paid job. The rise of private businesses meant the appearance 
of new rich families and the gradual decline of the middle class. Former high educational and 
cultural life was shrinking, and education became less effective in its role to upward mobility. 
Eventually, Iraqis who had more access to resources to run private businesses could ensure 
better living conditions for their families than the ones solely dependent on their professional 
                                                      
90 I observed similar cases like Um-Amjad’s who described how they lost their rights to state welfare in the 
postinvasion Iraq, but in few cases I heard different stories about other martyr’s widows which reflect that these 
benefits were not extended at the same level to the less-educated and the less desired segments of society who 
were excluded from many opportunities described by middle class and upper middle class Iraqis. In her story, 
Raya described the poor conditions she observed among few widows who used to visit her shop. She explained 
that some of these women used to grow vegetables in an unused land lot (near her shop) to feed their orphan 
children. It was not easy in 2011 when I met Raya to check the accurate dates of such incidents: whether this 
happened during the 1980s or 1990s when state services deteriorated, as Raya left Iraq in 1996 and witnessed 
the difficult years of al-ḥiṣār. Raya described the women as poor shrūgiyyat Shia from al-Thawra district. Al-
Thawra district (literally means revolution district), or sometimes called Saddam district which was a public 
housing project often described by Iraqis as a neighborhood with poorer services when compared to other 
Baghdadi neighborhoods; it used to host Iraqi households who migrated from rural areas in the 1950s‒1960s to 
search for job opportunities in the capital Baghdad. In postinvasion Iraq, the district was named al-Sader city 
after the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.  
206 
 
qualifications and governmental jobs. The following story presents Nagham’s experience, 
which reflects the reduction in former rich cultural and social Baghdadi life.  
 
Nagham: Learning to live with reduction in one’s well-being and ‘happiness’ 
Nagham, who came to live in Amman with her Jordanian husband and her two small children 
towards the end of the Iran-Iraq war, vividly narrated her feelings of reduction which she 
often described to her son and daughter as an absence in their lives that could never be filled.  
 
I heard Nagham’s distinctive Iraqi dialect while I was reading at the Shoman public library. 
When I noticed that everyone was exchanging greetings with her, I expected that she was one 
of the regular library users and followed her through the reading area but she entered one of 
the offices and took her seat next to a window overlooking the huge Ishtar gate of the Iraqi 
Embassy that is standing on the other side of the library street. Her voice and looks changed 
when she started talking about her memories of Baghdad.  
 
Her relatively small family used to live in Zayouna suburb in Baghdad, in the so-called 
‘Officers Neighborhood’: she and her younger sister used to live with her father who was a 
doctor and her mother who was a school principal and music teacher. Nagham was not able 
to complete one sentence whenever she talked of the current situation in Iraq, although as I 
noticed from her comments later, she was following the daily news from various sources, but 
her pain when she tried to talk of today’s Iraq felt as big as her enthusiasm when she 
described her former memories of living in Baghdad during the late seventies and eighties. 
Her memories of being an Iraqi in the seventies and eighties focused on the social and 
cultural activities shared by Baghdadi professionals and bureaucrats or what she called the 
‘rich social and cultural life’ as she described the gatherings of extended family and friends:  
I remember our weekly gatherings; we used to meet every Thursday evening, 
around 80-100 persons from all ages. I remember how we used to listen to music 
and then examine and explore various melodies and explain the history of specific 
rhythms. We used to discuss the latest intellectual works, novels and articles on 
drama, music and literary works. Books were very cheap then in Iraq; one could 
buy two or three books for only one Iraqi Dinar. This was the kind of life and 
experiences we had in Iraq in the seventies and eighties. These are the stories I tell 
my children who grew up here in Amman and never returned to Baghdad. Iraqis 
were fond of reading. One of the popular games during our gatherings was poetry 
games; one starts reciting a line from a poem and the rest will follow, each person 
will recite a line from another poem that starts with the same rhyme and/or word 
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with which the previous poem line ended. That is the life I miss here in Amman, 
my children missed it too, and my grandchildren will miss it.  
 
Looking back nostalgically to the past was common among successive Iraqi generations in 
their stories of Iraq. Similar to what Batatu (1978) observed in his work, which was written 
during the 1970s, that in their stories in the sixties many Iraqis looked back nostalgically to 
the epoch of the monarchy. Under the monarchy, however, many more felt that they could 
not have had worse governance than they had. Coups or outbursts of national or local 
significance characterized, in fact, almost the entire life span of the monarchy— in the period 
1921‒1958 (see Table 17-1 in Batatu, 1978). Similarly, many of the Iraqis who had been 
forced out of their country post-2003 longed for many aspects of their former lives in Iraq. It 
was common to feel this nostalgic longing to the past among the Iraqis who had been forced 
out of their country during the sanctions period in the 1990s and post-2003, especially the 
older generation who longed for many aspects of their former lives in Iraq. The loss here is 
many times expressed as the loss of access to formerly shared social and cultural capital in 
the Baghdadi space, in addition to the loss of personal economic capital, and particularly 
rewarding career opportunities (see Chapter 3). 
 
Nagham was 55 when I met her in May 2010, and although she left Iraq in 1991, her 
description of the former Baghdadi life was as nostalgic as the stories told by the older 
generation of Iraqis who left Baghdad after 2005. They too shared Nagham’s longing to a 
beautiful past, especially when that past was contrasted with difficult conditions in the  Iraqi 
space. Nagham was aware, as she told me that her memories of the beautiful days in Baghdad 
in the seventies and eighties might not have been shared by all Iraqis, as she learnt from the 
stories she had heard from her father about the suffering of the peasants he treated in the 
province hospital. Being part of an educated and affluent family, she could complete her 
higher education at university in Baghdad and the USA in the field of economics and 
business management and find a good job. Her nostalgic story focused on the rich cultural 
and social life that had been “completely destroyed” after 2003, as she explained. However, 
she blamed the deterioration in the rich cultural life to the oppressive rule of the former 
regime that focused on militarization and controlling all aspects of Iraqi life and restricting 
access to wider sources of knowledge. She found it difficult to live with that reduction, and 
her decision was to leave Iraq with her family in 1991. Being married to a Jordanian, it was 
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easier to settle in Amman and find a job in one of Amman’s largest public libraries where I 
met her. 
 
She recalled the suffering of her family and friends who stayed in Baghdad after she had left. 
Her focus was on lack of access to educational and cultural materials “whenever they heard 
of a visitor coming, they asked me to send them latest issues of journals and periodicals. They 
lived out of history with the oppressive regime and economic sanctions (ḥiṣār): no access to 
satellite dishes, or journals. In 1991, Americans threatened to bomb Iraq back to the stone age 
and they did.”91 Nagham visited Iraq only once in 1995 to attend the funeral of her mother, 
and in her attempt to reconnect with the memories of her past, she carried with her what she 
could collect in her travel bag from the family photos and books, but she failed to save the 
thick arts encyclopedias and two large paintings that were confiscated by the guards at the 
borders. Her other attempts to arrange with taxi drivers to bring the rest of her family library 
failed. Nagham’s former rich social life in Baghdad was reduced to the stories she tells her 
son and daughter and the pictures and few books she could save from her family house that 
she never returned to. Her story did not address the loss of material property, such as the 
house and other belongings but the reduction of well-being and happiness; i.e. the rich social 
life she enjoyed in Baghdad, which was based on a wider network of family and friends. The 
loss of chances to regain this source of happiness results from the reduction in the inter-
communal mixed urban Baghdadi life of the 60s, 70s and 80s with the potential it offered for 
sharing diverse cultural products. Her relatives and friends were scattered all over the world: 
her sister lives in London, and other relatives are based in Dubai, USA and the UK.  
 
Despite her relatively settled conditions, after spending 19 years in Amman, gaining the 
Jordanian nationality and having a permanent job, a heavy weight of loss was present, which 
she described as ‘the inability to be happy’ as she was in Baghdad:  
We, human beings, each of us have been assigned a share of the happiness 
available in this universe. When it comes to us, the Iraqis, we have consumed our 
share of happiness in Iraq, there is no hope to find it anymore. 
 
Happiness as perceived by Nagham and other Iraqis I met is related to the rich cultural life, 
social relations and family ties her generation shared in the Baghdadi space during the late 
                                                      
91 Nagham was referring here to the threat by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker during his meeting with Iraqi 




sixties and seventies with “an expanding middle- and lower-middle class educated, largely 
urban population” (Khoury, 2013: 205). The stories of her family social gatherings present an 
image of educated and hard-working Iraqis who had more space to enjoy a rich social life 
through sharing poetry and music. Although Nagham’s story refers to her own extended 
family, her story tells some general aspects of being Iraqi in 1970s and 1980s that were 
sporadically shared by less-settled Iraqis I met in Jordan. 
 
The state’s investment in expanding institutions of higher education, and building a 
bureaucracy of government employees with access to rewarding monthly salaries and other 
benefits especially entertainment generated higher expectations for Nagham’s generation. 
Nagham’s father and mother had access to free university education and government jobs that 
ensured some stability and allowed more access to free time in which they enjoyed sharing 
literary and artistic activities. As described by Dina Khoury this generation which she calls 
the “revolution” generation had cultivated new sensibilities articulated in outlets of modern 
public culture that distinguished them from the generations of their fathers and grandfathers 
who were mostly uneducated and relatively poor. This can explain the disappointment of 
Nagham’s generation who had to witness the gradual demise of access to quality education 
and cultural venues with the increasing investment by the state in a destructive war and the 
militarization of society.  The transformations witnessed in the modernization process with 
the promises they carried for Iraqis who enjoyed the cultural and educational rise in the 60s 
and 70s, are perceived as loss of former well-being and happiness when compared to the 
drastic changes following wars, economic sanctions and destruction of the state 
infrastructure.  
 
The decline of well-being among Baghdadi communities and the rise of longing to 
‘old good days’ 
In his introduction of the edited book on Culture and Well-Being: well-being, according to 
Jiménez in several cases explored ethnographically, is always measured against its absence 
(2007: 22). Similarities can be drawn in the stories explored in this chapter among martyr’s 
widows, and other Iraqi women and men belonging to older generations who measured their 
current well-being in relation to what is absent, as revealed in their nostalgic stories of a lost 
past. Nagham described the meanings of happiness or well-being by recalling the absent 
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happy moments shared with her Baghdadi community of family and friends, when she 
recalled access to high quality education and rich cultural life in Baghdad before the 90s.  
 
The older generations of Iraqis I met in the field preferred, like Nagham, to share their 
memories of a beautiful Baghdad with their children and grandchildren. The nostalgic stories 
of the former Iraqi rich cultural life was less common among other Iraqis who left Baghdad 
after 2005. There was another kind of absence that they considered in measuring their current 
well-being; the absence of the Iraqi state institutions and order. What they missed was: 
rewarding working conditions, stronger state education programs, good health services and 
other basic services provided by state institutions such as electricity and clean water and 
wider protection space as described by Um-Amjad and other Iraqi widows, in addition to 
longing to feel safe or the absence of ʾamān in postinvasion Iraq.  
 
In 1980s, the state’s investment in the war with Iran put an end to former development plans 
(Yousif, 2012). In its attempt to save resources, the regime started a process of privatization 
and liberalization. According to Baker: “the privatization and deregulation process started 
during the war but it really took off in 1988 after the cease-fire with Iran. The focus of the 
state moved from equity to increasing production levels, by setting targets for production and 
providing subsidies to privately owned farms. This was a dramatic turnaround in policy” 
(2014: 123). The focus on military activities and the high level of conscription of university 
graduates, including academics and professionals, affected the former prosperous middle 
class life style that was linked to professionalization and successful career. Iraqis’ accounts of 
the social transformations they witnessed over the last four decades present how being part of 
the former Iraqi state, in times of peace and more often wars, transformed the social realities 
of these middle class state bureaucrats and professionals. These social transformations cannot 
be explained solely by the internal dynamics of the former Iraqi regime rule of the state and 
society. As indicated above external interventions through wars, liberalization, the oil boom 
and the armed invasion and accompanied neo-liberal globalization played important roles in 
disrupting the everyday life of the government bureaucracy.  
 
The survival of these Iraqi agents within the above described state systems is a complex 
experience, which cannot be reduced to supporting or opposing the regime. In the seventies 
till mid-eighties hard work is mentioned as one of the means to achieve success and well-
being. Iraqi state employees and professionals had to constantly learn how to live with 
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reductions in their well-being. During 1970s‒mid 1980s, free education and governmental 
employment were mentioned as the means to achieve success and enjoy rich social and 
cultural life. The state-society relations changed from investment in Iraqis’ welfare and 
infrastructure development to the militarization of society, and the gradual decline in state-
welfare services, especially for Iraqi professionals and government employees who could not 
find a job in the private sector.  
 
While the advent of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic reform policies and 
structural adjustment programs enhanced state “liberalization” and marketization in Egypt, 
Jordan and other Arab states, the Iraqi state was more immune to these policies due to access 
to large oil resources. However, by mid-1980s, the Iraqi government issued several steps to 
encourage privatization and liberalization. These were not directed by the IMF, but were 
meant to cover the increasing war debts. I agree with Bassam Yousif that in the case of Iraq, 
the state failure to proceed its development plans was more relevant to its decision to invest 
resources in war rather than receding to liberalization policies as other Arab states did and 
turned to rentier states (2012, 67).  
 
The responses of Iraqis to these changing state strategies of governing the human and 
material capital, included several tactics ranging from fleeing the army and the country 
altogether to discursive tools such as humor and mockery at their experiences with war. The 
accounts of this group on the effects of larger political and global changes on their personal 
lives present a reduction in their perception of well-being from the good life associated with 
the effects of the state ‘socialist’ development program in 1970s to learning to live with 
reduced social space as a result of militarization and declining role of the state in service 
provision. The ‘good old days’ as perceived by Iraqis in this chapter experienced further 






Baghdad 1990s-2011: From filling freezers to counting calories 
The decline of the State institutions and inter-mixed urban communities  
 
Since we were children 
The sky has slipped into clouds in winter 
And it always rained. Yet we’re hungry.  
In Iraq not a year has passed without hunger 
Rain … Rain … Rain … 
Every drop of rain, holds a red or yellow flower. 
Every tear of the starved who have no rags to their backs 
Every drop of blood shed by a slave 
Is a smile awaiting fresh lips 
Or a nipple glowing in the mouth of a newborn 
In tomorrow’s youthful world, giver of life! 
Rain … Rain … Rain … 
Badr Shaker al-Sayyab92 
 
 
Rain, in the Arabic and ancient Mesopotamian culture, symbolizes fertility and the renewal of 
life; however, as al-Sayyab tells us in his poem which my generation memorized at school, 
the fall of rain did not save Iraqis from hunger and poverty. Similarly, many of the Iraqis who 
were forced to leave their country and learn how to live elsewhere used to tell me: “Iraq is a 
land of wealth, but this wealth was not accessible to the Iraqi people.” Some would further 
explain: “The Iraqi land is fertile: arḍ al-sawād;93 we have oil, mercury, Tigris and Euphrates 
and rich cultural heritage, but all this is not ours to enjoy.”  
 
The high expectations of “good life” perceived by Baghdadi professionals during the 
previous two decades in the 1970s and 1980s were no longer possible, as a result of the 
structural violence Iraqis have endured during successive war conditions: eight years of war 
with Iran (1980-1988), followed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), the first US-led Gulf 
war (1991), and the external interventions that destroyed the state infrastructure during the 
Gulf war (Desert Storm) in 1991, in addition to the severe ḥiṣār (UN economic sanctions) 
                                                      
92From al-Sayyab’s poem “Canticle of the Rain” written in 1954, and translated by Abdullah al-Udhari, Modern 
Poetry of the Arab World. London: Penguin 1986, p31 (in al-Musawi, 2006: 70). 
93 This is one of the oldest Arabic names used to refer to the alluvial land around Tigris and Euphrates. The 
ancient name Mesopotamia is of Greek origin and means the land between rivers “Bilād ma bayn al-nahrain.” 
Bottéro describes this place at the end of the 4th millennium: “Mesopotamia, a land of alluvia, of rich and fertile 
soil, owing to its location, its resources, and its industrious and culturally advanced population, found itself 
destined for wealth from the fruits of its labor  […] at the same time it was very open, through its trade to the 
west, Asia Minor and Syria, Egypt , Iran, and even further away to the western shores of the Indian peninsula” 
(2000: 15).  
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from 1990-2003 which ended with the US-led invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. 
These events resulted in structural changes in the Iraqi space, which affected the daily lives of 
Iraqis and their perceptions of well-being, and brought the process of development planning 
to an end (Tripp, 2007; Yousif, 2012). 
 
Iraq had to undergo huge transformation from a country which was perceived in the region, 
during 1970s and 1980s, as competent in education and health; and a strong and rich state 
with the region’s second-largest reserves of oil; well-equipped socially with a large base of 
professionals, artists and scientists in addition to its strong military skills and army. An image 
that was reinforced with the travel of Arabs to Baghdad to study at its universities, the trade 
exchange among Iraq and nearby countries, and cultural events and works, especially poetry 
and music (such as al-Marbad Arabic poetry festival), in addition to its financial aid and 
support to Arab states such as Jordan and Palestinian martyrs’ families. All this changed 
throughout the nineties and following the 2003 war. The images coming from Iraq in 2010-
2011, during the time of my fieldwork were restricted to what was broadcast on TV: the 
destruction of the state and its institutions, the assassination of targeted groups of 
professionals: academics, scientists, medical doctors, and kidnappings and explosions in 
streets, restaurants and shopping areas and the rise of ISIS during 2014 which further 
destroyed the Iraqi social fabric by targeting the indigenous communities of Christian Iraqis 
in the northern areas and the Yazidis who were also expelled from their homeland where their 
ancestors had lived and preserved their ancient traditions and languages.94 
 
In the stories of Baghdadi government employees and professionals, I could many times hear 
the old pain experienced in reduced well-being as expressed in the rain poem of al-Sayyab 
(with which I started this chapter). The de-valuing of highly qualified professionals (Chapter 
Three) is related to the decline of the nation-state developmental role and Iraq is not a unique 
case, it happened in other cases regionally (such as Egypt, Syria and Algeria) and globally 
(Soviet Union and Eastern European countries); all these states, at various levels, invested 
huge resources in education and welfare services to build a class of qualified state-
bureaucrats and professionals who accumulated advanced scientific skills and professional 
expertise. However, all this changed, and in the case of Iraq, the prolonged war conditions 
                                                      
94 The expulsion of these groups, their historical presence in Iraq and relationship with the former state, and 
their suffering from ISIS brutality which amounted to ethnic cleansing campaigns of the material and cultural 
existence of these communities in Iraq, in addition to their gradual resettlement in Europe and the USA can be 
explored ethnographically as another experience of searching of ʾamān and learning to live again.   
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and “structural violence” forced many of the highly skilled professionals to search for new 
ways of living, sometimes through migration to countries with better employment 
opportunities.  
 
In his description of war-torn Mozambique, Lubkemann defines the violence of structural 
changes in the case of Machazians as follows:   
“Structural violence is inherently wrapped up in dynamic processes of structural 
change. More than absolute thresholds or social differences, it is the way in which 
social transformation can reduce the capacity for subjects to realize their own 
expectations—and most particularly those they associate with normal everyday 
living—that matter most in generating sentiments of loss and deprivation. 
Structural violence thus occurs when changes in the broader social, economic, and 
political environment render everyday and strategic life projects dramatically 
more difficult or even impossible to realize” (2008: 112).  
 
In this chapter I draw on Lubkemann’s explanation of structural violence in the case of 
prolonged war conditions not only as objective force but also with reference to the subjective 
sense of acute deprivation produced by changing socioeconomic and political conditions. 
Lubkemann explains “deprivation” as referring to the subjective package of sentiments—of 
disappointment, disempowerment, loss, and frustration— that results when groups or 
individuals perceive that their own experience is falling short of some standard they expect 
and believe they have a right to achieve (2008: 112).  
 
In the Iraqi case, the broader changes in the social, economic and political features as a result 
of prolonged years of war have affected the potentials of leading a “good life” as described 
by government employees and highly skilled professionals in the previous chapter. The 
situation was worse for the less developed communities in rural areas who were already 
suffering from poor state services. However, during the 1990s, life changed for all Iraqis, it 
appeared as if the clock in Baghdad had been turned centuries back. When the US Secretary 
of State, James Baker, warned Tariq Aziz, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, in Geneva in 
1991 that Iraq would be bombed back into the Stone Age, he was true to his word and more. 
The following excerpt from a longer legal case presents part of the direct effects of the 1991 
US bombing of Iraq:  
“The US administration ordered the destruction of facilities essential to civilian 
life and economic productivity throughout Iraq; systematic aerial and missile 
bombardment of Iraq was ordered to begin in January 1991. The bombing 
continued for 42 days. It met no resistance from Iraqi aircraft and no effective 
anti-aircraft or anti-missile ground fire. Iraq was basically defenseless. Most of 
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the targets were civilian facilities. The United States intentionally bombed and 
destroyed centers for civilian life, commercial and business districts, schools, 
hospitals, mosques, churches, shelters, residential areas, historical sites, private 
vehicles and civilian government offices. In aerial attacks, including strafing, over 
cities, towns, the countryside and highways, US aircraft bombed and strafed 
indiscriminately. As a direct result of this bombing campaign against civilian life, 
at least 25,000 men, women and children were killed.”95 
 
 
The Red Crescent Society of Jordan estimated 113,000 civilian dead, 60% of them children, 
the week before the end of the war. The intention and effort of this bombing campaign 
against civilian life and facilities was to systematically destroy Iraq’s infrastructure leaving it 
in a pre-industrial condition. As a direct intentional and foreseeable result of this anti-civilian 
destruction, over one hundred thousand people have died after the war from dehydration, 
dysentery, diseases, and malnutrition caused by impure water, inability to obtain effective 
medical assistance, and debilitation from hunger, cold, shock and distress. So-called ‘super 
bombs’ were dropped on hardened shelters with the intention of assassinating Iraqi President 
Saddam Husayn. Under the cover of weapons inspections in particular, scores of factories, 
schools, chemical plants of a civil nature — indeed anything suspected even remotely of 
having a prohibited military function — were blown up or bombed. The US administration 
ordered the destruction of facilities essential to civilian life and economic productivity 
throughout Iraq; systematic aerial and missile bombardment of Iraq was ordered to begin in 
January 1991. The bombing continued for 42 days. It met no resistance from Iraqi aircraft 
and no effective anti-aircraft or anti-missile ground fire. Iraq was basically defenseless. Most 
of the targets were civilian facilities. The United States intentionally bombed and destroyed 
centers for civilian life, commercial and business districts, schools, hospitals, mosques, 
churches, shelters, residential areas, historical sites, private vehicles and civilian government 
office. The U.S. assault left Iraq in near apocalyptic conditions as reported by the first United 
Nations observers after the war.96 
 
                                                      
95 From a paper published online by Francis Boyle on 2 September 2002, originally presented to a symposium 
held by the Albany Law School. The symposium, held on February 27, 1992, was titled: International War 
Crimes: The Search for Justice. This paper documents the numerous occasions that international laws were 
broken and disregarded during the Gulf War:  http://www.counterpunch.org/2002/09/02/us-war-crimes-during-
the-gulf-war/ , retrieved in August 2014.  
96 For further details see, ‘US genocide in Iraq’ by Ian Douglas, Hana al-Bayaty, Abdul Ilah al-Bayati published 
online on 1 June 2007: http://ianrobertdouglas.com/2007/06/01/us-genocide-in-iraq/#sthash.vdsZ0Qw4.dpuf , 
retrieved in August 2010. 
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The invasion of Kuwait- personal and collective losses 
The Iraqi state investment in the military sector did not decrease after the end of the war with 
Iran. In the immediate aftermath of the war, a military-industrial complex fueled by the 
building of a military infrastructure increasingly swallowed up state resources (Khoury, 2013: 
35). Being an Iraqi and part of the military and Baath party apparatus seemed as blessing and 
curse. According to Sissons and Al-Saiedi, membership in the Baath party (and military) 
carried strong economic benefits, especially during difficult times such as the time of 
currency collapse and great economic hardship; party section members (ʿudu Shuʿba) 
received a monthly stipend of roughly $250 in 2002, a significant sum (in a time when Iraqi 
professionals reported that the monthly salary equaled $6-10). Other benefits of party 
membership included bonus points for children’s educational results in their secondary 
school examination, vehicles, and greater ease of access to civil service positions and 
promotions. It was also vital for obtaining any kind of government employment (2013, 5). 
 
Said, a university graduate, but working in a military unit, perceived the prolonged state 
warfare with Iran as a burden and curse. However, the hardest part was in August 1990, when 
he had received the army order to join the forces invading Kuwait, this order came as a 
shock:  
As soon as I graduated from the university, I had to go to the compulsory military 
service, my service which lasted for eight years was in the publishing unit of the 
army; university graduates are not always based on the war front. However, it all 
finished when the officer in charge of our unit gave us military orders to prepare 
ourselves to enter Kuwait. I was in shock at this news and couldn’t focus or think. 
I left everything, didn’t take any of my personal belongings and walked through 
the desert until I reached the main road and took a car home. I was lucky to obtain 
a fake passport quickly and flee to Jordan during the chaotic times, but others who 
fled the military service were executed.  
 
Kuwait, by the nature of its physical proximity and political relations during the Iraqi war 
with Iran, was part of the lives of several Iraqis I met, either through mixed marriages, or for 
being the place of residence and work for several Iraqi families. In the collective memory of 
most of the Iraqis I met, the war with Kuwait was an unnecessary war, and it was described 
as a big transformation in some personal life stories, such as in the cases of Tamara and 
Nadia below.  
 
Life after 1991 was never the same for Tamara, a woman who was in her fifties when I met 
her in a women’s shelter in Amman. She grew up in Kuwait where she was born to an Iraqi 
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family. Upon completing her high diploma, she got a job at the Kuwaiti airport. During 12 
years of work she travelled in the vast world. The big change in her life was after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, when her family as other Iraqi individuals and families residing in 
Kuwait were accused by the Kuwaiti returnees (those who left Kuwait upon hearing of the 
Iraqi invasion) of being part of the so-called “ṣāmidūn” (those who remained in Kuwait 
during the Iraqi invasion) who were also perceived (by Kuwaitis) as traitors. Tamara’s family 
members had been forced to leave their jobs and home in Kuwait. They moved to their home-
town, al-Basra in Iraq, where the family faced many economic difficulties during al-ḥiṣār. 
Tamara could not find a job in al-Basra or Baghdad, or afford medical treatment when she 
got sick, eventually she moved to Amman for medical treatment and could not return back to 
Iraq due to problems with her travel papers. To survive in Jordan she had to work as domestic 
worker and endure abuse until she was rescued by a woman’s shelter, where she was living 
and working as a cook when I met her in July 2010.  
 
Similarly, Nadia— an Iraqi woman I met in a Palestinian refugee camp in Amman (married 
to a Palestinian-Jordanian whom she had met in Baghdad in the 1990s) was born in Kuwait to 
a Kuwaiti mother and Iraqi father, she was also forced to leave Kuwait when the Kuwaiti 
family of her former husband asked him to choose between being their son or the husband of 
an “enemy” Iraqi woman. Nadia had been forced to leave her two small children and Kuwaiti 
husband when Iraq turned into Kuwait’s number one enemy:  
The family of my former husband asked him to choose either to be their son or 
my husband; they did not want to see me after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and 
arrest of their son, my husband’s brother, who was arrested by the Iraqi army, I 
was 23 years old and had to leave my little son and daughter with my husband, 
they told them that their mother died and I never met them again.97 
 
Nadia went to live with her paternal family in Baghdad, like thousand other Iraqis, who lost 
their jobs and former connections in Kuwait, but she had to cope also with living apart from 
her two kids whom she never met since 1992. When I met her, she only briefly mentioned 
this personal loss, though she was very passionate when she mentioned later the difficult 
conditions in Iraq and the brutal slaughtering of her two brothers in Baghdad in 2007. When I 
asked her how she coped with this forced separation from her former Kuwaiti husband and 
children, she only repeated in brief what she mentioned when she started talking about her 
life as an Iraqi in Amman: “We, Iraqis, had to learn how to move ahead without looking 
                                                      
97 Interview on 20 Nov 2010 in Nadia’s house. 
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back.” Obviously, Nadia had not left that part of the past behind as she could have simply 
chosen not to mention it and start her story from the hard sanctions times which forced her to 
flee Baghdad with her new family.  
 
The cases of Nadia, Said and Tamara present some examples of how larger political events 
played integral part in the personal choices, losses and living conditions of this group of 
Iraqis at various scales. Iraqis who had family members living and working in Kuwait were 
severely affected by their regime decision to invade Kuwait.  
 
The invasion was condemned by both the international community and the Arab League. The 
UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions: Resolution 660 called for Iraq’s 
unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, and Resolution 661 imposed an economic embargo 
on Iraq. The Iraqi leadership’s expectations of US-improved relations, culminating with the 
exchange of ambassadors following their war with Iran, proved to be false, as just days after 
the invasion of Kuwait, Bush’s administration began to consider a military option against 
Iraq. The first contingent of US troops was deployed to Saudi Arabia on 7 August (the 
invasion started on 2 August). The US succeeded in bringing 28 countries into an 
international coalition of forces including the Arabic countries of Egypt, Syria and Morocco. 
The official American decision was announced in a claim of an initial goal of protecting its 
oil interests in Saudi Arabia and liberating Kuwait from the clutches of another “Hitler.” A 
deadline for withdrawal was set for 15 January 1991 and approved by UN resolution 678, 
which authorized war against Iraq (Khoury, 36).  
 
This UN resolution (678) turned into a tool to punish the entire Iraqi society. The First Gulf 
War or Operation Desert Storm by the US-led coalition waged an air campaign which lasted 
for 42 days from 16 January until 24 February. The ensuing bombing of Iraq destroyed the 
achievements of decades of infrastructure work. For months, Iraqis living in the capital had 
no electricity, no clean water, and no telephone lines (Dewachi, 2017: 148). The air war 
targeted civilian infrastructure and inadvertently led to “the loss of civilian life”, referred to 
in the parlance of the US military as “collateral damage.” The destruction of state 
infrastructure that was hardly repaired left the urban Baghdadi communities dependent on the 




Power plants, bridges, and communication networks were hit, as were shops and, in one case, 
Al-Amiriya, a shelter housing more than 400 Iraqis, including entire families. The Iraqi cities 
experienced the full impact of a bombing campaign that dwarfed anything their populations 
had experienced during the Iran-Iraq war. Salsabeel98 described how her family survived the 
bombing of Al-Amiriya Shelter when her father preferred to stay at home, where he could 
follow the war news on the radio: “the bombing lasted the whole night, and although we had 
covered the windows with layers of adhesive brown tape and mattresses and blankets which 
we fixed with screws on all the windows, we were covered with dust in the morning. My 
father was all the day and night carrying a small transistor-radio to follow the news, but only 
in the morning, we realized that we survived the bombing of al-Amiriya shelter in which we 
were hiding during previous nights.”  
 
First Gulf War: The disillusionment with state official narrative and practices 
The 1991 massive bombing campaign of Iraq heavily destroyed the state infrastructure, 
industrial capacity, agriculture, telecommunications, and critical public services, particularly 
electricity and water treatment. Iraqis had to witness the demise of many aspects of their 
former living space and observe the weakening role of the state institutions despite the 
increasing power of the regime daily control of Iraqi public space. The ruling system 
experienced big changes in both the institutional and discursive levels. For some Iraqis, 
Baghdad was no longer the city they knew, they decided to leave when they could no longer 
cope with the changes imposed on their being and well-being as they perceived it in their 
former rich social and cultural life (like in the case of Nagham in Chapter 6).  
 
The following excerpt from Raya’s story presents further details of Iraqis’ encounter with the 
weakening of the material state forces. In 1991, during the American bombing of Baghdad, 
Raya realized that she could not rely on the police or other legal state bodies to protect her 
family members and belongings. She decided to move to live in her store to protect it from 
thieves, when most of her neighbors followed the advices of their relatives in the military to 
leave Baghdad and hide in neighboring rural areas. Raya sent her two eldest kids to their 
father’s town, al-Mosul. Eventually when the bombing increased, one of her neighbors 
convinced her to move with her to what they thought would be a safer place, al-Siniya.  
 
                                                      
98 I met Salsabeel (35 years) during dinner with Iraqi friends in April 2011.  
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Raya describes how she and her two children survived and escaped death as if by “a miracle” 
as she likes to call it. One interesting element in Raya’s story of the 1991 bombing is linking 
well-being to super-natural power, as observed in her several references to the good energy 
and the strong sense of intuition she has developed over years, which she said had saved her 
and her children several times from certain deaths. Following is Raya’s story with the First 
Gulf War, which I present as she narrated it, although my translation from Arabic into 
English sometimes fails to convey the sense of cynical humor and supernatural effects to 
which Raya turned in the absence of state protection: 
The Americans first bombed the electricity-generating plants; we spent the nights 
by candlelight, there was no electricity, the whole district, al-Saydiyya, was 
empty. Everyone left to safer rural areas or hid in the shelters; a friend of mine 
came and forced me to close my store and leave with her, because they expected 
that the neighborhood would be bombed: her husband is ʿaskary (military man) 
and he knows. I was with my youngest son and daughter. I took all the food that 
was in the freezer. It was the 16th or 17th of January and we went to hide with my 
neighbors in al-Siniya, north of Tikrit. I didn’t know what is al-Siniya. There was 
fog and it was very cold, my friend’s acquaintances had a big house. It was full of 
people, for seven days we were hearing dee da dom [she imitated the sound of 
bomb explosions], bombs were falling. I found their kids, once playing with my 
three year old son. They tied him with a rope, and were making fun of him: 
because we fled from Baghdad, they were making fun of us calling us jubanā 
(cowards). They called my son jabān (coward) and spit on him; he had to pee 
then and peed on them. We spent seven days hiding in that house, we ran out of 
food, they had 12 kids and I came with two. We had only milk to drink from the 
cows our host owned, and radishes they planted earlier to eat. On the 8th day, I 
decided that this is enough and left immediately. I decided to die in my house in 
Baghdad. They tried to stop me: are you mkhabla (crazy)? Baghdad inḍarbat 
[Baghdad was bombed], no one is there! But I was determined to leave, there was 
a voice inside me urging me to leave. I saw a car, and waved to the driver, he 
passed in front of us and seemed unwilling to stop. I shouted at him: STOP [she 
uttered the word in a sharp loud voice]. The driver stopped the car and I 
immediately (without saying a word) put my two kids with my stuff in the car. He 
asked me: are you crazy? Where are you going? He was a military man, and he 
swore that the car was out of fuel. But I had a car and mastered driving; I advised 
him to switch the car off-and-on several times. The road ahead of us was a 
downward slope, the car rolled down the road and we managed to reach the next 
garage where a taxi was waiting for two passengers: there was a pilot sitting next 
to the driver and a soldier in the back; I sat next to him with my son and daughter: 
the driver asked for ID 16, I told him he can charge ID 50: just drive us to 
Baghdad. The car ran towards Baghdad, we passed 10 km when suddenly we 
heard the sound of a huge explosion: miṣfat al-Siniya (al-Siniya oil refinery) was 
bombed and the fire reached to the sky. The taxi driver left us on the main road 
and there were no cars. I had to walk for miles with my 3-year son and 5-year old 
daughter, no taxi, no car! I found another military car and asked the driver to give 
us a lift, and we were soon joined by ratel ʻaskary (a military convoy), who was 
leading us all the way. We finally reached our house in Baghdad, there was no 
221 
 
one in the neighborhood, but I felt relaxed when I reached home. I told myself 
that it is better to die at home. I went to check my store, the window was broken 
and everything was robbed. I went to register a complaint at the police station. It 
was after mid-day, and a police man came rubbing his eyes half asleep. It 
appeared that the Russian embassy was also attacked and one of the embassy staff 
members was waiting to register his case too. I looked at the policeman standing 
unshaved with his untidy suit and asked myself: what can he do for me? How will 
he help me? While he told me: rūḥy bābā, go, if the Russian embassy had been 
stolen, what could we do for your store! In the nineties, life became unbearable in 
Baghdad, our neighborhood was initially built to host families of military men 
and police, but it was unsafe. In 1996, I decided to leave. I came to Amman with 
my children. It was very difficult to leave Iraq then, I had to pay lots of money 
and bribes to obtain a travel permit from the authorities to cross the border to 
Jordan. 
 
Raya’s personal story above with the First Gulf war presents several details of the dynamic 
processes of structural change in the Iraqi social space. Her cynical approach in describing 
her hiding experience among rural communities and the perceived cowardness of Baghdadis 
as reflected in the ‘children’s game’ indicates how the changes in the political environment 
generated sentiments of loss and deprivation and reduced many former capacities which 
could not be realized with the lack of state protective apparatus resulting from the weakened 
army and police. Raya, as mentioned in Chapter 6, descends from a family whose males were 
army officers, including her father and her three brothers, but in the story above she decided 
to trust her intuition rather than following the military advice of her neighbors, the military 
officers, who were supposed to know the safest areas to hide from the bombing operation. 
Her story describes the attack on former state authorities including the police who failed to 
provide the expected protection during the heavy campaign of US-led bombing. Iraqi 
civilians in her story seemed as defenseless as the members of military and police services: 
the unshaved look and reckless attitude of the policeman in the station, the pilot and soldiers 
who deserted their fighting positions and were like her and her two small children looking for 
the safest way to reach home in Baghdad. In the midst of this “structural change” 
(Lubkemann, 2008), Raya presented herself in better control of the situation thanks to her 
intuition and what she called “good energy.” She preferred to die in her familiar Baghdadi 
neighborhood than stay in what was perceived, by others around (including her neighboring 
military families), as the safe rural area.  
 
The effects of the Iraqi army retreat from Kuwait under the heavy US bombardment were 
rarely discussed in the official Iraqi stories in which the military duty was usually associated 
with bravery and heroic actions. However in 1991, many Iraqi soldiers were attacked by air 
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bombs during withdrawal from Kuwait. On 24 February 1991, the US-led coalition began its 
ground offensive to liberate Kuwait. While the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council 
ordered troop withdrawal from Kuwait and Iraqi troops began their pullback, the US military 
decided to block all routes for Iraqi troops back into Iraq and on 26 February, the US military 
bombarded retreating Iraqi soldiers in various locations (the Jahra-Basra highway, the Jahra-
Umm Qasr road, and the Umm Qasr-Baghdad-Nasiriyya road). The bombardment continued 
until the American President Bush declared victory on 28 February and called for a cease fire, 
which Iraq accepted two hours later (Hiro, 514-520, quoted in Khoury, 39).  
 
Raya continued to live and work in al-Saydiyya, with neighboring families of army and 
police officers. Unlike other Iraqis who left Baghdad due to the deterioration of economic 
conditions, Raya’s economic situation was better as an employee at the Ministry of Trade in 
addition to her private store business which she could establish in the 1980s thanks to the 
remittances sent by her husband who deserted military conscription to work in Kuwait. In 
1996 Raya decided to leave Baghdad to save her two sons from conscription and mandatory 
military life.  
 
The decline of the heroic image of Iraqi warrior (of 1980s) and the rise of al-ḥiṣār 
victim 
The effects of the prolonged war conditions and the destruction of many former aspects of 
state institutions led to gradual decline of the heroic image of Iraqi warrior and the rise of al-
ḥiṣār victim. The attributes of heroism and loyalty associated with military life in the official 
Iraqi discourse in 1980s, when loyal soldiers, martyrs and majidāt women were glorified, 
changed in the First Gulf War and al-ḥiṣār period. The new war experiences in the 1990s was 
the hapless civilian victim of the violence of war and the gritty survivor of the sanctions 
regime (Khoury, 2013: 11-12). This shift was more noticeable in the commemoration of the 
dead: the prototypical martyr was no longer the heroic fallen soldier, but the civilian victim of 
US bombardment and the UN-imposed siege.  
 
Iraqi families who remained in Iraq during the 1990s were hoping that the situation will 
improve one day, but instead war had become the norm with al-ḥiṣār. Al- ḥiṣār created the 
conditions of structural violence which erased many of the aspirations of a former middle 
class life style. Unlike the 1970s when Iraq met its own food needs, in the 1980s, investment 
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in agriculture decreased and Iraq produced only one-third of the food it consumed, relying on 
imports for remainder (Gordon, 2010: 21). This high dependence on imports to meet basic 
needs increased Iraqis’ suffering during the UN economic sanctions and siege.  
 
The 1991 war and the destruction of state infrastructure had affected the former perceptions 
of Iraqis towards the state role in economic and political protection, as reflected in Raya’s 
story above. The conditions of al-ḥiṣār further affected the well-being of Iraqi professionals 
who relied on the state as main employer. The number of Iraqi professionals and former state 
bureaucrats who decided to leave their country and search for security and ʾamān abroad 
increased during the 1990s.  
 
From filling large freezers to counting calories 
The sanctions regime was imposed on 6 August 1990, four days after Iraq’s invasion of 
Kuwait, the sanctions that Joy Gordon (2010) describes as 13 years of Invisible War 
prevented Iraq from restoring any of its welfare services to the level it had achieved in the 
1980s. Yasmin Al-Jawaheri presents what she calls “Food and Medicine Crisis” during al-
ḥiṣār: 
“Iraq’s welfare state was described as having been [until 1980s … ] among the 
most comprehensive and generous in the Arab World, which ensured that Iraq had 
the highest caloric consumption per head in the Middle East (by the end of 
1980s). However, after the imposition of sanctions, the Iraqi government 
instituted a food rationing system in September 1990 that was considered 
internationally to be ‘crucial’ in sustaining the survival of the Iraqi population 
over years of sanctions, and in preventing an imminent famine. […] Basic 
subsistence for the majority of the Iraqi people was only attained through access 
to the government’s rations, which were provided at nominal prices” (2008: 7). 
 
The sanctions devastated the health, education, and basic well-being of almost the entire Iraqi 
population, who had to learn how to survive on a food ration system. The high level of 
dependence of the middle class on the state’s economic services and infrastructure increased 
the suffering of these government bureaucrats when the state economic capacity deteriorated 
during the sanctions period, this “effectuated the contraction of the middle class” (Ismael, 
2003: 335). About 60% of the population became dependent on a system of monthly food 
rations given out by the government and paid for by the oil-for-food program (UNICEF, 
2004, in Gordon, 2010). The government used to distribute food baskets of 1,200 kilocalories 




Iraqis were already exhausted by eight years of war and suffering from economic austerity 
and were not ready for the hardships brought on by the UN-imposed embargo and the human 
costs that a military confrontation with a coalition of twenty-eight countries could bring. Dina 
Khoury explains in Iraq in Wartime: “The crisis and the war transformed the UN as an 
international organization and linked its Security Council, if not its other humanitarian 
organizations, to US interests. For the next twelve years, the UN oversaw and gave legal 
sanction to the harshest and longest embargo ever imposed on a nation, reshaping the 
meaning of humanitarianism and linking it with the political agenda of its most powerful 
states” (2013: 40). As Dewachi explained these UN sanctions on Iraq were officially 
designed as a regime of “global governance” and as a containment program aimed at 
disarming the regime and preventing it from reconstituting its military capacity (2017:7). The 
impact of economic sanctions had far-reaching consequences—in both economic costs and 
humanitarian terms.  
 
Prohibiting exportation while Iraq depended on revenue generated by oil and importation, 
when two-thirds of food consumption used to come from imports, led to great suffering 
among the population (Gordon, 2010: 21). Economists estimate that Iraq’s GDP fell by one-
half to two-thirds of its pre-war level by 1997. Hyper-inflation meant that the vast majority of 
Iraqis employed in the public sector saw their buying power evaporate. Per capita income 
declined from its prewar level of US$ 3500 to US$ 450 in 1996. Malnutrition became a 
severe problem affecting 22% of children under five; in addition, the sanctions destroyed the 
ability of the state to invest in the crucial areas of health and education. The public health 
services deteriorated in addition to the lack of water treatment and medicines (UNICEF, in 
Khoury, 2013: 44). 
 
The drastic change in the living standards was shocking to the educated and highly skilled 
members of middle class and upper-middle class Iraqis whose careers were no longer 
securing the essential living needs of the household. Um-Mazen, a mathematics teacher, was 
about to lose her youngest son in 1998 when he contracted a poisoning disease99 from the 
milk that was imported in Iraq through the Oil-for-Food program:  
                                                      
99 Before sanctions, Iraq had one of the best health care systems in the Middle East, both in terms of access and 
quality of care. The population enjoyed health conditions that were high by the standards of middle-income 
countries, and accordingly the incidence of malnutrition was uncommon. However, health and health care 
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They used to send us poisoned milk, I was lucky that I was able to leave with my 
son to Amman, but we had to sell our house and car in Baghdad and I asked my 
parents in al-Basra to sell a plot of land to pay for my son’s treatment. After six 
months of my stay here, I decided to bring the rest of my family, we did not 
intend to stay in Amman this long. Our plan was to go back when the Americans 
lift al-ḥiṣār, but things got worse after they occupied Iraq.100 
 
Al-ḥiṣār produced great pressure on most Iraqis and led to unprecedented impoverishment of 
members of the middle class with varying impacts according to socio-economic status, age, 
gender, geographical location and more important the affiliation to rising patronage networks. 
Iraqi Women, as Nadje al-Ali’s has presented from numerous accounts she collected before 
and after the US-led invasion of 2003, have been the biggest losers in Iraqi wars (Al-Ali, 
2005, 2007, 2009). Illiteracy increased by 2000; 23% of Iraq’s children did not attend 
elementary school due to shortage of class seats (UNICEF, in Khoury, 2013: 44). The losses 
of the educated and professional Iraqi communities were most of the time unbearable, 
especially for families who were completely relying on their monthly salary as an income and 
had no properties to sell. 
 
Contrary to the announced objectives of the First Gulf war in 1991 and the UN sanctions to 
weaken the Iraqi regime, the war and ensuing sanctions resulted in the destruction of Iraq’s 
civil infrastructure and deterioration in the living standards of the wider Iraqi society, while 
the highest level of regime officials enforced a stronger client-patron system that was used to 
increase their personal wealth rather than protecting the wider population needs which were 
harmed by the destruction of the country’s civil infrastructure (Tripp, 2007; Ismael & Ismael, 
2015; Gordon, 2010). 
 
A UNDP report on the deterioration in the economic conditions indicated that: “GDP per 
capita dropped to an estimated US$715 [from US$3,508 before the First Gulf war], which is 
a figure comparable with such countries as Madagascar and Rwanda” (UNDP report, 2000: 6, 
in Ismael and Ismael, 2015). Raya’s story reflects how she had to learn how to live with the 
decline of state services in terms of social, legal and economic protection. Raya did not 
directly criticize the state with its regime and apparatus, but her story presents the Iraqi state 
                                                                                                                                                                     
rapidly deteriorated under the impact of sanctions, and by 1997 “general malnutrition (underweight for age) 
occurred in 24.7 percent of children under five years” (WHO, 2003) and the mortality rate for children under 5 
years went from 56 deaths per 1,000 live births before sanctions to 131 deaths per 1,000 live births in the 1994–
1999 period (UNICEF, 1999 in Ismael and Ismael, 2015). 
100 Interview with Um-Mazen in her rented home in Amman on 13 January 2011.  
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apparatus in 1990s as weak and vulnerable as reflected in her description of the police and 
army officers. Raya’s coping strategies with impoverishment included opening a private 
business that was possible through the support of her husband who left the country during the 
1980s to Kuwait to avoid longer years of military service. Raya was able to preserve good 
standards of living, unlike many other state bureaucrats who had to depend on the 
government food basket.  
 
The relatively high living standers and consumption habits described by Iraqi professionals in 
the seventies and eighties experienced a sharp decline: “By 2000, with rising food prices and 
declining per capita income, the UNDP estimated that the average family spent as much as 75 
percent of their income on food. As a result, dietary energy supply had fallen from 3,120 to 
1.093 kilocalories per capita/ per day by 1994-1995 […]. Despite a UN target of 2,463 
kilocalories and 63.6 grams of protein per person per day, the nutritional value of the 
distributed food basket did not exceed 1,993 kilocalories and 43 grams of protein” (Ismael 
and Ismael, 2015: 18). 
 
The amount of suffering and loss this UN-led economic sanctions and siege system created 
was overwhelming and included all sectors of Iraqi working class. In particular, children 
mortality rates increased to an alarming rate of 131/1000 in the 1990s compared to 56/1000 
prior to the sanctions. One of the biggest problems then was the United States’ block on 
infant milk on the grounds that it “could not be considered medicine” and humanitarian 
circumstances still had not been shown (Gordon, 2010: 54). This increased the suffering of 
working women in their attempts to provide basic survival for their household, especially 
when it comes to feeding their young children (as in the case of Um-Mazen above who had to 
leave Iraq to save her child). To survive inside Iraq, government employees and professionals 
had to revert to various coping strategies such as baking bread at home and saving on many 
expenses, in addition to selling their belongings of property and furniture.  
 
In al-ḥiṣār time, well-being was contrasted with lack of essential food items, the most 
common symbol was the “empty freezer.” The large home freezer was often mentioned in the 
Iraqi accounts about the good times that preceded the embargo and sanctions, but during the 
1990s Iraqi women had the hardest responsibility to stay in control and ensure the survival of 
the family on essential food items. The large freezers disappeared to be replaced by fixed 
amounts of food ration:  
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During the sanctions period, we used to receive a fixed amount of food ration. 
Women had no free time, because we had to make everything at home. The 
government used to distribute flour, either you take it to the nearest bakery and 
exchange it with bread or you make your own bread at home, we learnt how to 
bake and had to prepare many things at home, we worked all day with minimum 
breaks.101 
 
The freezer, electricity and other infrastructure hosting the ‘former rich Iraqi meals’ no longer 
existed for several Iraqi families and the ability to lead a middle class life demised for many 
educated and professional Iraqis. The consumption of food was limited to the ration products; 
this meant that women’s responsibilities increased as they had to find means to distribute the 
limited food among the household members. Meat as a main ingredient in the Iraqi diet was 
rarely present in Iraqi lunch or dinner during al-ḥiṣar times. 
 
The ration system lasted for a long time and became an essential part in the lives of many 
Iraqis for years to come, to the extent that it was celebrated as one of the former state 
achievements proving the efficiency of the former regime in distributing essential items for 
all Iraqis. When compared to the postinvasion state services or the aid structure offered to 
displaced Iraqis in Jordan (pre-conditioned by visible vulnerability), the ration in al-ḥiṣār 
times is described as “adequate and it reached every member of the Iraqi society from the 
minister to the guard (min alwazīr lal ghafīr), to cover their needs of food and cleaning 
materials and even shaving blades.”102 Each individual in the household used to receive: three 
kilos of rice, 13 kilos of flour, 2 kilos of butter and 3 kilos of sugar,.. etc., per month”103. The 
ration card became an essential element in the daily survival lexicon of many Iraqis, 
especially those who formerly relied on governmental salaries. It was not uncommon during 
my fieldwork time to hear Iraqis speaking appreciatively of the ability of the former state to 
manage and organize the Public Distribution System. The system was not only used as the 
essential means of survival, it was considered as a right that every Iraqi was entitled to.  
 
                                                      
101 I met Um Ahmad at her house on 28 November 2010. She was a school teacher in Baghdad, and her husband 
is academic who has Ph D in economics from the UK. They left Baghdad to Amman in 1997 but her husband 
returned to work in Baghdad in 2009, while his family lives in Amman, as in the few cases of ‘circular 
migration’ among highly skilled Iraqi professionals presented in Chapter Three.  
102 Meeting with Um-Laith, an Iraqi widow and mother of two in January 2011.  
103 A chat with Um-Omar and friends in February 2011.  
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The effects of prolonged war and economic sanctions on family relations and 
women’s conditions 
Despite several attempts to reorganize the Iraqi society through education, urbanization and 
bureaucratization that appeared in the Iraqi government discourse of the seventies and 
eighties, Iraqis’ stories of living experience during the times of al-ḥiṣar in the 1990s and the 
occupation of 2003 reveal the return of familial and tribal networks and the rise of 
inequalities embedded in patriarchy. Al-ḥiṣar had affected Iraqi families at different levels 
and various scales. The difficult economic conditions led to several changes in the state 
support to family life which in turn affected the roles of household members.  
 
The Baath regime in its attempts to survive the conditions of war and suppress any existing or 
rising opposition returned to the use of patrimonial connections and networks of patronage. 
This gradually subverted the former role of the Iraqi state institutions and laws in favor of 
factional and patriarchal systems, which were used in the establishment of modern state 
bodies in the late Ottoman period and throughout the British colonial rule. The war 
conditions and regime reactions created different levels of ruptures in the lives of these urban 
Baghdadi communities who had to learn how to live through continual changes. 
 
Following the decline of state welfare services due to state policies of militarization and 
privatization in 1980s, and the weakening of the state institutions and economic conditions as 
a result of the extensive bombing of state infrastructure and the long period of the UN- 
economic sanctions, former government employees could no longer rely on their monthly 
salary and many had to search for additional jobs. Researchers focus particularly on the 
change in women’s conditions and roles (Ismael, 2004; al-Jawaheri, 2008; al-Ali and Pratt, 
2009; Rohde, 2010). Ismael argued that with the lack of previously available public services 
(such as free transportation to work, school, childcare facilities etc.), the Iraqi regime had 
been actively promoting women's return to the home (2004: 338).  
 
In her explanations of the specificities of state-society interactions and their implications for 
women’s citizenship rights, Suad Joseph argues that rights and entitlements in the Middle 
East are mediated via membership in families and communities, which she describes as 
hierarchical entities animated by a patriarchal logic that privileges men over women and the 
old over the young. There exists, in other words, no autonomous associational arena between 
state and society that is not thoroughly permeated by both the reality and the idiom of kin and 
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family relations. Therefore, an associational life premised on autonomous self-bearing rights 
in his or her own person does not have much resonance in a social context where connectivity 
rather than contractuality structures notions of selfhood. This applies equally to men and 
women, but it is women and the young who bear the brunt of the inequalities inherent in 
patriarchy (Joseph, 1996). At the social level many Iraqis turned to factional networks such as 
tribal, religious and ethnic relations to ensure social security in times of privation. 
 
Joseph and Slymovics further describe the conditions in Iraqi (and Syrian) states as one 
where states, as part of their building projects, tend to undermine local communities in order 
to control and claim the loyalties of their citizens (2001:11). Their argument is that in 
societies where the state is more repressive than the communities, women secure themselves 
in their communities to receive protection from the repressive state and they see that the 
disadvantage of this sort of protection is that women must submit to the control of the men of 
their community (ibid, 12): “Familial bonds are seen as sources of support and security 
against what is perceived as an even greater source of oppression, the state” (ibid., 2001: 13). 
 
In such conditions, economic empowerment, though important, does not lead necessarily to 
more equal social and economic relations; working outside home, did not lead to real change 
in gender roles (as observed in the Iraqi case and other neighboring societies). In the social 
imagination prevailing in these societies, reproductive tasks remained the responsibilities of 
women— who most of the time were responsible for rearing children and handling other 
related house-working duties, which were seen as the natural responsibilities of women. This 
put larger burden on Iraqi working women—as described in the cases of (Um-Amjad in the 
previous chapter) and Um-Ahmad, Raya and Um-Mazen above— that increased in the 1990s 
when the state protective role and services gradually diminished. In general, women 
conditions deteriorated with the decline of state welfare services and the backlash against 
former women’s entitlements such as free public education and wider employment 
opportunities with childcare benefits and free transportation. Several Iraqi women I met in 
Amman described how they had to leave their jobs during al- ḥiṣār period to take care of 




Being a member of the Iraqi state bureaucracy class in 1990s 
Life in Baghdad, under al-ḥiṣār, changed for many former Iraqi middle-class men and 
women. Following decades in which they were directed towards obtaining a university 
degree and a suitable profession in the governmental sector, Al-Jawaheri explains how highly 
educated Iraqi men, who worked in the daytime as teachers, lawyers or engineers had to take 
jobs as taxi drivers or shopkeepers in the evening in order to make ends meet, while women 
became more dependent on male providers, and many were pushed back home or turned to 
the so-called ‘socially acceptable’ and often low-paid jobs typically in the public sector 
(2008: 37-38). With the weakening of state authority and regulations in the 1990s, an 
increasing number of Iraqi professionals and young men started thinking of migration. Iraqis 
who left in larger numbers in the 1990s came to Jordan searching for work and when they 
failed to find jobs, they moved to other Arab countries (including the Gulf, Libya and 
Yemen) or applied to international bodies as asylum-seekers, to turn into political refugees 
and humanitarian cases who had to present a convincing story of persecution by the Iraqi 
regime. Others managed to reach Europe through rising smugglers’ networks. Their exit 
journey from Iraq was not easy, it was prohibited for medical doctors (and other 
professionals) to leave the country and their certificates were held by the Ministry of health; 
some had to alter the profession indicated in their passports and others left with fake 
passports.  
 
The Iraqi state, in its attempt to prevent the brain-drain, continued practicing a long-standing 
travel ban on doctors and other professionals. Dewachi explains in detail the difficult process 
Iraqi doctors had to follow to leave the country:  
“The doctor’s escape from Iraq began with a counterfeit passport. In an attempt to 
curb their exodus, the Iraqi government had instituted a long-standing travel ban 
on doctors. Furthermore, the government and their universities withheld doctors’ 
graduation certificates and grades. Doctors needed to obtain clearance and permits 
from the Ministry of Health, the Internal Security Forces, the Directorate of 
Conscription, and in some cases the Office of the President” (Dewachi, 2017: 
157). 
 
The sanctions, more particularly, induced an alarming degeneration of the country’s health 
infrastructure and contributed to the exodus of thousands of doctors. Increasing numbers of 
senior specialists and junior doctors alike have escaped the country, contributing to further 
shortage of physicians and expertise. It is estimated that close to half the medical force has 
escaped Iraq over the past two decades—probably among the largest flights of doctors seen in 
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recent history from one single country (Dewachi, 2017). The harsh regulations described by 
Dewachi and the ban on travel applied to other groups of academics and professionals in 
medical sectors who had to wait until 2003 to return to Iraq to get their original certificates. I 
met few Iraqis, including doctors and academics, who came to Jordan, during the 1990s 
fleeing these conditions of massive impoverishment. The majority of qualified doctors 
proceeded to Europe and other western and Arabic countries, while several university 
professors, were still teaching at Jordanian private universities.  
 
Hussain, a professor of Economics and Finance explained how they had had to sell all their 
properties in Iraq in 1998 including his car, three land plots, and his house furniture to cover 
his family’s travel expenses from Baghdad to Amman: 
I was an associate professor at the University of Baghdad. I am ashamed to talk 
about my salary, imagine that a university professor monthly salary then was 
7500 Iraqi dinars (ID), this was equal to two and a half Jordanian Dinars. You can 
imagine how difficult it was when you compare our income to the prices of 
essential items: the egg tray cost was ID 3500. My wife, who has a BA in 
statistical science, decided to quit her job when she calculated the costs of her 
daily transportation which exceeded her monthly salary of ID 2500. One of our 
daughters was still a baby and we had to use old pieces of cloth as diapers when 
the price of one diaper bag reached ID 5500. To pay for the passports and the 
bribe needed to obtain an official travel permit, we had to sell everything, except 
our house, which we kept thanks to relatives who moved in and protected it. 
Travelling from Iraq then was prohibited for all professionals and government 
employees except in urgent conditions, as the state needed all its human resources 
to survive war and sanctions conditions. I had enough years of public service in 
teaching, so I could ask for early retirement which was accepted by my college 
dean and I got ID 2500 as retirement salary. I paid ID 400,000 for obtaining a 
valid passport then.104 
 
In order to travel outside Iraq during the 1990s, an employee required the approval of the 
head of his/her department or unit; an academic, for example, required a travel permit from 
the department of higher education. The state funds were invested in war efforts and travel 
allowances for academic conferences were no longer offered while limited scholars were 
allowed to travel for educational purposes. Being an academic, one was not allowed to leave 
his teaching position during war time even for joining an academic conference: “for twenty 
years they kept asking us to join military trainings, although we already served the military 
                                                      
104 From an interview in November 2010 with Professor Hussain, an Iraqi academic, born in 1949. He moved to 
Amman during al-ḥiṣār in 1998 with his wife and three daughters. 
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conscription, and some Iraqi academics were taken to the war fronts to serve in the popular 
army.”105 
 
Moving in search of work out of Iraq became the solution to preserve the former life style 
among highly-qualified professionals who started looking for contracts abroad. When the 
state authorities noticed the brain-drain of skilled labor, they imposed stricter restrictions on 
travel, as Professor Ali explained:  
To travel I had to obtain an official agreement from my department and the 
relevant ministry; the Ministry of Higher Education. The government stopped the 
allowances assigned for attending conferences and scientific missions. Education 
was no longer a priority, all government expenses were invested in the military 
sector. Military service was prolonged even for those like me who had already 
completed their conscription service. 
 
The inflation was unprecedented. Between 1945 and 1989 inflation in Iraq had remained 
within the single digits. But inflation rose from 6 percent in 1989 to 500 percent in 1994. The 
Iraqi Dinar depreciated from a level at 1990 where 4 dinars could buy one dollar, to where 
1700 dinars could buy one dollar in 1995, a drop of 425 percent (Foote et al., in Baker, 2014: 
134). Everyone but those very close to the regime were impacted.106 Former state employees 
and teachers left their jobs on early retirement with low pension (ID 2500), to search for 
another job in the private sector. This affected higher numbers of working women whose 
duties increased with the deterioration in public services. In general, the poor salary and lack 
of free public transport and kindergartens made it difficult to continue working for women.  
 
As mentioned by several Iraqis in the field, the person who dared to criticize the bad living 
conditions and the despotic rule of the regime would become vulnerable to the regime 
oppressive punishment, being a former Baathist who quit the party or a military man who fled 
his duty station was another source of vulnerability, while others who were affiliated to the 
Baath party (including Palestinians and other Arabs, as I was often told) benefited in terms of 
study grants and other privileges. The critique of that period focused on the sharp retreat of 
the middle class and lack of essential resources among the majority of Iraqi people, compared 
to the high salaries, new cars and other privileges that staff in security apparatus and high 
political and party positions used to enjoy.  
                                                      
105 Interview with Professor Hussain in November 2010.  





The harsh conditions during al-ḥiṣār forced large segments of Iraqi academics and 
professionals to think of alternatives. The most impoverished state-employees had to look for 
additional jobs, some could only work as peddlers. Academics and doctors who were 
prohibited from leaving their positions had to work for a poor salary and do additional work 
in their free time. An academic who hold a PhD in Mechanical Engineering explained how he 
started to work in car maintenance in 1994. In that period, it was common to see both 
partners working (this applied to most of the families I met in Jordan), yet salaries were not 
enough to cover the basic needs of households. Abu Jibour holding an MA degree in Physics 
started working in trades and was eventually appointed as a head of trading company.  
 
When al-ḥiṣār is compared to the postinvasion period, this group of Iraqis generally describe 
the destitute but add that even then people could lead a more normal life; they could organize 
wedding parties and could still go out and meet in home gardens, unlike the ban on music and 
celebrations imposed later by rising sectarian and religious parties and militias during the US 
occupation of Baghdad. In terms of losses, one common expression was: “We suffered from 
scarcity of resources but during the sanctions Iraq was much more secure, it felt safe to go to 
one’s work and move around.”  
 
When they talked of the 1990s, Iraqi educated members lamented the lack of high cultural 
events and educational opportunities when compared to what they called “the rise of al-ḥiṣār 
culture. The culture of al-ḥiṣār is related to the rise of bribes, corruption, document forgery 
and human trafficking. As a way to escape the travel ban imposed by the state bodies (such 
as the Ministry to which a government employee is affiliated and internal security forces or 
secret police (al-mukhābarāt) and the directorate of conscription), as Dewachi explained: 
“Still, in 1990s Iraq, everything was possible for the right sum. The deterioration 
of everyday life under the sanctions regime and the inflation of the Iraqi Dinar 
had made bribes a common income supplement for poorly paid government 
employees. A middle-ranking government employee received between $2 and $4 
per month, which barely covered transportation costs to and from work. In certain 
cases higher-ranking government managers would collect such bribes and 
redistribute them among their directorate’s employees to guarantee a fair and 
equal distribution of wealth” (2017: 157). 
 
Like other countries in the region, the military expenditure represented the highest percentage 
in the government budget. There was no way one could be exempted from mandatory 
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military service and only few could afford it: “wealthy or connected Iraqi men could pay an 
exemption to avoid military service. […] The uneducated poor constituted the largest part of 
the Iraqi fighting machine. As largely middle-class, educated, and urban young people [...] 
tended to serve in higher military positions, and they were sometimes quite removed from the 
frontline” (Campbell, 2016: 42).  
 
The decline of the ‘old’ state bureaucracy and the rise of new business elites and 
the ‘black market’ 
The 1991 bombing fiercely hit the former life style of the educated professional and state 
bureaucrat communities, as a result of the destruction of larger part of state infrastructure, 
including electricity and the main state factories and industries and health and education 
institutions.107 Furthermore, al-ḥiṣār left larger groups of these communities isolated from the 
outside world, except through the small transistor- radio working on batteries. 
 
To face the inflation, Iraqis had to learn how to increase their access to resources. State- 
bureaucrats survived by finding an extra menial job or by leaving one’s position in the public 
sector to work in private business or services. For example, I met an Iraqi former chemical 
engineer who lost his job when the pharmaceutical factory he had worked in was closed, as a 
result of the economic siege.108 In his attempt to secure his household living expenses, he 
turned to work in the second-hand cars trade sector during the nineties which enabled him to 
sustain good life for his family.109 Other university academics and engineers had to work in 
shifts. After completing their daily tasks at state institutions, many worked as taxi drivers, 
private teachers or in maintenance services and house painting. I also met Iraqi state 
bureaucrats who found it easier to retire early and with the right connections and access to 
resources, some were able to establish a profitable private business in the trade and 
construction sectors.  
 
                                                      
107 The US-led campaign in 1991 Gulf War and UN-imposed sanctions on Iraq deliberately targeted civilian as 
well as military facilities, with the aim of severing the “supply lines” on which the Iraqi regime depended. 
During the forty-day military campaign, more than ninety tons of bombs were dropped on Iraqi cities, targeting 
bridges, factories, roads, oil refineries, power stations, and water sanitation and sewage treatment plants. (al-
Dewachi, 2017: 7) 
108 According to Bassam Yousif’s analysis of Iraqi economy during 1920-1990, reductions in the government 
development spending in the end of 1980s affected manufacturing more than other sectors, reducing 
manufacturing’s share of investment (2012: 57). The ban on imports imposed by the UN sanctions regime 
further harmed the industry and manufacturing sector.  
109 Interview with Husam on 3 February 2011.  
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Al-ḥiṣār affected this group by transforming their living conditions from previously affluent 
economy into survival. The regular monthly salary lost its value as explained above, in 
addition to the restrictive measures that were imposed on various levels and the rise of 
patronage networks. This led to downward mobility for the majority of middle class members 
while a small group of workers in high positions experienced upward mobility. Other means 
of survival that were sporadically mentioned with less details are references to small thefts or 
bribery: “Imagine when employees are paid poor salaries, some turned to bribes, when $ 100 
equaled ID 280,000.”110 
 
This led to the rise of a new class of traders and businessmen and businesswomen. The rise of 
the private sector did not restore old powerful dominant classes such as landlords, 
industrialists and large-scale traders (Zubaida, 2009: 165), the new class of private business 
owners was often mentioned as a beneficiary of the state and its resources, and in contrast to 
the declining fortunes of the old middle class who used to constitute the larger segment of the 
state public sector including teachers and civil servants in addition to other highly skilled 
professionals such as doctors, academics, lawyers and engineers. The new elite grew closer to 
the government that used its oil revenues to create a social base of state-dependent capitalist 
class along with a burgeoning military and bureaucracy. The state-dependent capitalist class 
grew in size and wealth as the government invested in the private sector and became its 
biggest consumer. The state had let go of direct control of some sectors but retained control 
of the overall economy. Through the sanctions in the 1990s, the Iraqi economy became 
informalized, depending on illicit networks and smuggling to retain its social base and its 
power. The government had been weakened, yet it was still in control and its dependent elite 
held on to their privileged social positions. Iraqis saw inflation, decreased living standards, 
food shortages, along with the concentration and centralization of wealth and power in the 
hands of a small clique of politically connected class (Baker, 2014: 144-145). 
 
A women who was an active member of the General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW) 
explained how she increased her household access to income during al-ḥiṣār when she left 
her job in one of the state departments in 1993 to work in cloths trade. Through her 
relationships with state officials, she managed to enter containers of cloths and accessories 
                                                      
110 Interview with Professor Waleed on 14 April 2011.  
236 
 
from the USA and Europe. Later, she further increased her business when she signed a 
contract with one of the state institutions to manage its cafeteria as a private investor.111 
 
The rise of a new business elite and the opening of public institutions to private investment 
accelerated during the 1990s as observed in the experience of state bureaucrats mentioned in 
this chapter. This process of privatization started during the 1980s. For example, when it 
comes to agriculture, in 1960 the Iraqi government owned half of Iraq’s agricultural land. 
By1989 the Iraqi government had sold or leased 99 percent of the land to private investors 
with favorable terms. These investors were made up largely of the contractor class faction 
mentioned earlier, many of whom were from Anbar and Salah al-Din provinces and part of 
Saddam’s close supporters. This centralization and consolidation in the private sector would 
repeat itself in other sectors. During the sanctions, this was the same fraction that profited 
from the smuggling of oil and trade in outlawed commodities, all of which was accepted and 
promoted by the state (Baker, 2014: 123).  
 
Baker explains the role of the privatization and liberalization reforms in the concentration of 
wealth in a new business elite: These reforms did not lead to more competition but rather 
simply replaced government monopolies with private ones held by individuals or families 
close to the regime. The total shares in the ‘mixed sector’ plants that had extraordinary rates 
of profits due to access to government foreign exchange were given out for political 
patronage to those state-dependent elites. […] Baker argues convincingly that “the economic 
liberalization did not aim to procure more money nor was it due to some ideological change 
in the governing elite. Neither was this due to external economic interference such as 
structural adjustment programs. Rather, the government was trying to accomplish three 
objectives, the first of which was to increase foreign exchange to operate the various 
industries and to keep up with the subsidies it was offering before. Secondly, it wanted to 
control the ballooning administrative costs of running the various economic sectors. Lastly 
and potentially most significantly, it wanted to buffer itself from any social upheaval due to 
growing economic problems and allowing it to blame the new business elites if it had to” 
(2014: 124-125). 
 
                                                      
111 This woman continued to work in trade until 2007 when her neighborhood was attacked and she had to 
evacuate her house and eventually left to Syria and later to Jordan where I met her in April 2011.   
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The effects of the 1991 destructive war and sanctions were determinative in shaping Iraq’s 
future for decades to come. As expressed by Dewachi (2017), the sanctions induced an 
ecology of “state failure”, where the besieged state became unable to restore its damaged 
infrastructure to prewar conditions. Furthermore, corruption emerged as a systemic problem 
during the 1990s, as one of the strategies to deal with the comprehensive sanctions, bringing 
the collapse of the local currency and encouraging smuggling and the emergence of an 
informal ‘grey’ economy. While chronic shortages of key goods, notably medical supplies, 
affected the mass of Iraqis, those at the center of the regime benefited from their links to the 
smuggling networks, accumulating vast sums of money as well as strengthening their grip on 
the state apparatus (Marfleet, 2019). 
 
During my fieldwork, I often heard stories about how rich Iraqi businessmen managed to 
expand their trade business in an economic sanctions and embargo situation by relying on the 
“black market” which became a new source of living for few privileged families who grew as 
parasitic groups, dependent on the state and its resources. Those families had better abilities 
to cope with the economic sanctions as one of the women I met in western Amman ascribed 
her household prosperous life in al-ḥiṣār times and afterwards to her husband’s job as an “oil 
trader.”112 
 
However, turning to the private sector was not a profitable option for all Iraqis. Teachers had 
less options and turned to give private lessons,113 while a mechanical engineer started 
working in repair and maintenance work following his daily work in the governmental job. 
Other families started selling private properties to secure the cash they needed to buy 
essential items for the family survival. The regime tended to encourage privatization, while 
bribery and corruption were institutionalized when some state officials promoted the idea of 
“helping the civil servant.” The privatization of state services in oil regimes, as explained by 
Zubaida, created great problems to the young educated sectors of the population by excluding 
them from former career prospects to which they were led to aspire. The firm linkage 
                                                      
112 Several resources refer to oil smuggling outside of the Oil For Food Program (OFFP) through a network of 
neighboring states, different border groups and companies. Yousef Baker explains that this was done primarily 
though signing of trade agreements between Iraq and neighboring states, called “trade protocols.” Interestingly 
smuggling occurred on the borders of Iraq even with countries that did not sign protocols like Iran and even 
Kurdish groups supposedly hostile to Baghdad became entangled in this economy. At times, this occurred right 
under the gaze of American forces and with their conspicuous silence on the activities (Al-Ahmad, in Baker, 
2014: 141-142). Outside of the OFFP, Iraq’s government was able to smuggle oil through a network of 
neighboring states, members of UN, different border groups, network of smugglers, and companies.  
113A teacher’s salary was 3000 Iraqi Dinars (around 2-3 US dollars). 
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between education and career in the popular mind aroused the expectations of Iraqis (2009: 
166). In the 1970s and 1980s as explained in Chapter Six, the state had a policy of enhancing 
higher education through a system of scholarships abroad and free university education inside 
Iraq, and the graduates were mostly absorbed as employees in the governmental public 
sector, mostly into the military and civil services bureaucracies. In the 1990s, most university 
graduates struggled to preserve a middle-class life-style in conditions where essential 
commodities were scarce. Some explained how they were compelled to sell properties and in 
the late 90s pieces of furniture and even the room doors (inside houses) to buy food items.  
 
The decline of the middle class following the 1991 Gulf War and the prolonged economic 
sanctions period, was also intensified by the increasing flow of Iraqis who managed to cross 
their country borders in search of more rewarding job opportunities and decent life for their 
families. Around one million Iraqis and foreigners working in Iraq had crossed into Jordan 
over a period of two months. While some of these returned to Iraq, successive groups of 
individuals kept arriving in Jordan, whose border remained constantly open between 1990 
and 2003 as Jordanian exports of vegetables and clothes doubled during the time of 
sanctions.114 In that period, Iraqis were fleeing the deteriorating economic situation that 
ensued from the UN-imposed economic embargo on Iraq in addition to various types of 
violence exerted by the Iraqi regime security apparatus. Most of those who fled Iraq in the 
1990s belonged to the educated Iraqi middle-class with a large number of professionals and 
academics (Chatelard, 2009: 5). They were hoping to improve their living standards and 
ensure a better future for their children which was no longer perceived in Baghdad.  
 
Postinvasion Iraq- the dismantlement of state institutions and loss of ʾamān  
As described by Iraqi professionals and state employees who lived through al-ḥiṣār period, 
the difficulties and suffering experienced during the war with Iran, the First Gulf war and 
more than twelve years of harsh economic sanctions which destroyed the largest part of the 
socio-economic Iraqi-state infrastructure, all this suffering “seemed like nothing compared to 
the destruction that followed the US-British led invasion and occupation of Iraq.” The brutal 
invasion and military occupation of Iraq in 2003 erased the former Iraqi state with its 
repressive and ideological apparatuses. The early bombing campaign proved eventually 
successful in turning Iraqis’ lives in awe through a shocking spectacle. “Shock and awe” was 
                                                      
114 For information on the trends in Jordan’s exports to Iraq and the role of Iraqi investment in Jordan, see Saif, 
Ibrahim and David Debartolo (2007). ‘The Iraq War’s Impact on Growth and Inflation in Jordan’.  
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the name US invaders gave to their initial military attack that promised to bring democracy to 
the Iraqi people and the conditions for free-market economy and prosperity for a global 
business club:  
“Large-scale destruction of infrastructure, mass murder and the comprehensive 
dismantling of state institutions that left only chaos allowed occupation forces to 
orient the new political order towards its own interests while leaving ordinary 
Iraqis helpless in facing daily suffering, lawlessness and insecurity” (al-‘Assaf 
and Jawad, 2013, in Ismael and Ismael, 2015). 
 
Samer Abboud notes that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the new governing body 
of Iraq following its occupation in 2003, rejected any role for public sector enterprises in the 
new economy: construction, engineering, technology and transport enterprises were all 
marginalized during the reconstruction process (2008: 432). Many of the factories simply 
closed and awaited purchase. For example, a state-owned tractor factory just outside Baghdad 
that had employed 6000 people remained idle for 3 years after being targeted for privatization 
(Cloud 2006, quoted in Abboud, 432). Worse than this, is the role US allies and the members 
of the Iraqi political opposition in exile played in advocating what is described as the “Year 
Zero” approach (Klein, 2004), those who believed that Iraq was so contaminated that it 
needed to be rubbed out and remade from scratch, so destroy the Cardiac Centre that had 
Saddam’s name and picture on it and kick out the doctors to reconstruct a new one, as part of 
rebuilding a new democratic Iraqi state (see Dr Omar’s story in Chapter One).  
 
Paul Bremer, the head of the US occupation forces, bluntly announced the plan in 2004 as “a 
full-scale economic overhaul. We’re going to create the first real free-market economy in the 
Arab World. […] To corporatize and privatize state-owned resources and to wean people 
from the idea that the state supports everything” (Chandrasekaran, 2006: 58). In the 20 June 
2003 issue of Wall Street Journal, Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) ‒the US-British body which governed Iraq for 14 months from May 2003 to June 
2004‒ announced a wholesale reallocation of resources and people from state control to 
private enterprise. The makeover list included: revamping the banking system; modernizing 
the stock exchange; privatizing some 120 state-owned enterprises; tax reform; and removal of 
all restrictions on foreign investment through suspension of all customs duties and tariffs.115  
 
                                                      




The US plan for Iraq was to eliminate food subsidies, along with below-market prices for 
gasoline and electricity. Iraq was to prepare to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which meant the elimination of tariffs, the creation of new laws to protect businesses, and the 
entry of foreign-owned banks (Chandrasekaran, 2006: 58). One practical step to achieve this 
was the denationalization of Iraqi assets and trade. In September 2003, the CPA announced 
Order 39 permitting complete foreign ownership of Iraqi companies and assets (apart from 
natural resources), total overseas remittance of profits and some of the lowest taxes in the 
world. Iraq was officially “open for business” [sic] (Medani, 2004). This was achieved 
through an aggressive privatization program, or in the words of Naomi Klein, “a radical 
economic shock therapy” that cut out the usual middlemen in such processes of privatization: 
the IMF and the World Bank were relegated to supporting roles leaving the US front and 
centre. Paul Bremer was the government and there was no need to negotiate with the local 
government. So while Bremer may have signed the laws, it was private accountants who 
designed and managed the economy. Think tanks were paid to think such as Britain’s Adam 
Smith Institute who was contracted to help privatize Iraq’s companies. Private security firms 
and defense contractors trained Iraq’s new army and police (Dyn-Corp, Vinnell and the 
Carlyle Group’s USIS, among others). And education companies drafted the post-Saddam 
curriculum and printed the new text-books (2007: 343-348).    
 
The long 13 years116 of the most comprehensive set of economic sanctions in modern history 
had failed to coerce the Iraqi regime into neoliberal reform. The US-led invasion and 
subsequent occupation of Iraq was one practical step to promote the New World Order in the 
name of liberating the Iraqi people. Many Iraqis did not anticipate what happened next. The 
liberation, democratization and reconstruction of Iraq that had been presented by the US 
media as the main missions for the invasion alongside the protection of Iraqis’ violated 
human rights under the undemocratic rule of Saddam, had a strong effect on the decision of 
some Iraqis to stay in their country until it was not possible to control the chaotic violence 
which spread as fire spreads amid dry straw: “We were waiting for things to improve when 
the Americans invaded Baghdad, after long years of a cruel economic embargo that isolated 
Iraqis from the rest of the world. Nothing changed unfortunately, things only got worse”, as 
Hanan said. I met Hanan in April 2011, she told me that she had been working earlier as a 
                                                      
116 Following the US occupation of Iraq in March 2003. The sanctions, which governed petroleum revenues and 
state assets frozen abroad in 1990, were not lifted until December 2010 (Ismael & Ismael, 2015: 182). 
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teacher of physics but decided to change her profession. After the invasion, she enrolled in 
the university to take another BA in English language hoping to get a better job in one of the 
various international organizations and NGOs which have flourished in Iraq following the 
US-led invasion.117 
 
Max Weber argued long time ago that bureaucracies play a vital role in producing stability 
when regimes change. In the case of Iraq following its invasion and occupation in 2003 and 
Bremer’s orders that led to the dismemberment of state institutions deprived the country of 
the largest base of its former bureaucracy. This produced further instability in the main fields 
of life such as education and health services, but above all the security services when the 
police and military forces were dismantled. A wide group of former state employees were 
affected by the destruction of the state institutions. These include hundreds of thousands of 
former army soldiers, police officers and active Baathist who were affected by the de-
Baathification policy and left with few choices. They had to either face death, or learn how to 
live in disguise according to the terms of their tribe to deserve its protection, or fight in a 
chaotic war where the boundaries between resistance fighters and terrorist militias were 
blurred.  
 
Former businesses were destroyed, and jobless men and women were attracted to work with 
the newly established government. As presented in the case of the physics teacher above 
some were even ready to acquire new skills to gain a job in the new rising NGO sector. 
Eventually they were targeted by militant fighters and militia groups for collaborating with 
the US occupying forces and the often so-called “Iraqi puppet government.” The situation of 
academics and professionals such as doctors and lawyers were not better. They were targeted 
by killings118 or kidnapping operations and the few who wanted to work in their specialty in 
Iraq had to secure their own protection by affiliating themselves to one of the rising powers: a 
strong tribe, militia or sect.  
 
Reconstruction was placed at the heart of the political agenda of occupying powers. 
Therefore “reconstruction has to succeed to prove that the military strategy was correct” 
                                                      
117 For a critical discussion of the rise of NGOs working on women’s issues in the post-invasion Iraq, see al-Ali 
and Pratt (2009: 57-71 and 145-148): many international organisations and NGOs relocated to manage their 
programmes remotely from Amman in 2005-2006 due to the deteriorating security situation.  
1181.2 million deaths have been directly attributed to the invasion and in daily unidentified events of explosion 
and assassination.  
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(Barakat, 2008: 3). Despite the rise in wages, there was lack of ʾamān (no stability or safety). 
For several former state bureaucrats, it was not possible to stay in one’s job when several 
state apparatus were dismantled including the Iraqi army and police, they were deprived of 
their jobs and sources of living. One of the tactics that some Iraqi professionals used in the 
beginning was to return to their original town or city where they could rely on the protection 
of extended family and tribe, hoping to return to their former lives when conditions improve. 
Several Iraqis I met in Amman attempted to hide in the province cities, eventually when 
conditions did not improve in Baghdad and after failing to find safe job opportunities inside 
Iraq, many had to cross the borders looking for safety and work elsewhere. 
 
Expulsion of Iraqi state-bureaucrats and professionals 
The US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, resulted into a large military occupation of the 
Iraqi territory, the US troops ‘official’ departure from the country had not happened until 
December 2011. The result was liberating Iraqis’ assets and resources and, as some Iraqi 
academics and professionals used to describe their expulsion: “liberating Iraq from Iraqis.” 
Iraqis used to describe this targeting of academics and doctors as a plan to decimate Iraq from 
the educated elite class. While many jobs and the employment sector in general were 
previously regulated by the state institutions and the Baathist regime, the 2003 war on Iraq 
was primarily an attack on the regime and those state institutions on which many of the 
current group of expelled Iraqis in Jordan once relied. Depending on the resources they had 
access to, some Iraqis had better chances of survival than others. While most had to make 
risky decisions to deal with the chaos at home or flee.  
 
Initially, Iraqi neighbors from various sects and religions arranged survival by exchanging 
homes between Sunnis and Shiis. When the levels of danger increased, they moved to other 
cities inside Iraq where attacks and explosions did not happen at similar scale. However, 
when going to schools became a dangerous journey, some parents stopped sending their girls 
and boys to school. This was not an easy decision for educated parents who eventually 
decided to leave the country to seek education opportunities for their children in safer 
conditions. The culture of bribes that were popular during al-ḥiṣār continued and increased in 
amount. Former officers and employees who lost their jobs in the army and other state 
institutions started looking for other jobs. Some turned to work with the US Army in services 




Eventually, members of all sects and ethnic groups had to learn how to live with rising levels 
of unexpected attacks, kidnappings and explosions. Iraqi Christians who were told that they 
have no place in their former neighborhoods, had to hide with Muslim friends until they 
arranged to leave to Amman, one of the Christian families I met described how they bought 
air tickets as soon as they got the visa for Amman to avoid any questioning or targeting if 
they came in a taxi by road.  
 
These changes gradually forced a large part of professionals and state bureaucrats to leave 
Iraq, looking for safety and protection; they did not all plan a permanent exit from Iraq. Um-
Mina’s family is one of those Iraqi families who left in 2005 and did not intend to leave Iraq 
for good. They had a chance to return to Baghdad in 2007 but finally in 2008, they left and 
decided to stay in Amman, where they were waiting for resettlement in a third country: 
When we returned, I was shocked by the changes in my area, one is stopped, 
every 100 meters, at a checkpoint, cars are not allowed to enter all areas. In some 
places you have to walk 5 km in the heat. Imagine that I couldn’t find the house 
where I lived my entire life with my family. I was roaming around the area and 
the taxi driver was telling me that this is Al-Amiriyah: The concrete walls were 
all around, like the Israeli wall you have,119 you have to enter the area from one 
entrance, after passing the controlling check-point (sayṭara). They took our IDs 
and we had to wait for one hour and a half for them to return our IDs, it was 
turning dark and there was no electricity, add to it the polluted air in Baghdad. I 
couldn’t stop crying, this is not the Baghdad I know, I can’t raise my children 
there, I decided to sell the house and search for another state where I could live 
with my family. 
 
The absence of essential services and their privatization affected the possibilities of survival 
for many Iraqis. Former Baghdadi serviced-neighborhoods played an important role in 
shaping a middle class life style and rich social relations. Many aspects of this former social 
life disappeared with the harsh conditions of the 1991 bombing and economic sanctions. In 
2003 the former middle-class life style among this group of professionals and state 
employees had been severely targeted when they became the subject of direct attacks by 
kidnappings, assassination and ethnic cleansing of formerly mixed neighborhoods. In 
addition to the direct threats to their lives, I will explore two common factors presented by 
these former urban Baghdadi state employees and professionals to explain the chaos and lack 
of ʾamān that forced them to exit Baghdad: First, the physical division and fragmentation of 
                                                      
119 Several Iraqis made this comparison between the Israeli wall in the West Bank and the wall in Baghdad.  
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the Baghdadi space, and secondly the retreat of former social relations in inter-mixed 
neighborhoods and state institutions to be replaced by sectarian and factional divisions of the 
political and social Iraqi space.  
 
For several Iraqis, like Um-Mina’s family, Baghdad did not feel like home anymore, and 
their displacement is on-going. I close this final chapter of the thesis with two detailed stories 
of complex and long journeys some of these displaced Baghdadi families were forced to 
make in search of a new safe State, where they were hoping to live in ʾamān.  
I. Fragmentation of a former inter-communal Baghdad — the spread of anomie 
The above brief presentation of the political and economic changes enforced in the so-called 
New Iraq following the invasion is useful in understanding the global background of the 
conditions that forced the Iraqis I met in Jordan out of their homes. The invasion of Iraq, its 
occupation and dismantling of state institutions, the establishment of the CPA following the 
violence of the shock and awe, and the intensified operations of killing performed by the 
growing militias, criminal gangs and death squads the Salvadoran way,120 gradually affected 
the social contract that had formerly been established in the mixed Baghdadi neighborhoods 
and in the Iraqi society at large. This contract was further damaged by the institutionalized 
ethno-sectarian divides introduced by the CPA with the appointment of the Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC) on a sectarian basis.121 Inter-communal relations were attacked forcing many 
Iraqis to leave their neighborhoods for another place where they would not be threatened for 
belonging to a particular sect or religion. 
 
The walling of Baghdad was another step in dividing the city into small manageable pieces 
with walls and military checkpoints, which further intensified militia attacks on sectarian 
                                                      
120 See for example the special investigation by The Gaurdian published on 6 March 2013 titled “From El 
Salvador to Iraq: Washington’s man behind brutal police squads on:  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/06/el-salvador-iraq-police-squads-washington, retrieved on 20 
August 2014.    
121 The IGC that was formed as an advisory body to the CPA from July 2004-May 2005 comprised of twelve 
Shii (from Da’wa party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)), five Sunnis (from 
the secular-oriented US allies the Iraqi National Congress INC and Iraqi National Accord INA), five Kurds 
(from the two Kurdish Nationalist parties PUK and KDP), a Turkmen, and a Christian, while Bremer refused to 
introduce a gender quota (al-Ali and Pratt, 2009: 90). For more on the composition of the Iraqi Governing 
Council (IGC) appointed in mid-July 2004 by Bremer see Tripp (2007: 284). For their part, the CPA, the IGC 
and the representatives of the allied forces of occupation retreated inside the ‘Green Zone’ that had been created 




pretext and forced many inhabitants to relocate. Introduced by the US-led occupying forces, 
the walling was presented as an attempt to protect the city residents from militia and armed 
groups’ attacks. However, according to the Iraqis who left Baghdad after 2008 and those who 
continued to visit Baghdad, this was another factor that led to the division of Iraqi society and 
the promotion of sectarianism. Walling also increased the daily suffering of Iraqis who had to 
waste long hours to reach their places of work or study or medical treatment. A doctor from 
al-Saydiyya described the walling of his neighborhood: “instead of minimizing the acts of 
killing, it increased the suffering of the neighborhoods’ inhabitants and did not stop the 
‘killing on identity’ [the term Iraqis use to describe the killings of Sunnis or Shiis].” Al-
Saydiyya, as this doctor explained, was walled from all sides and isolated from its 
surrounding neighborhoods, and, most of the time, there was only one open point that was 
used as both entrance and exit. He explained how the daily journey to his clinic that used to 
take him ten minutes by car before the walling, became a long two- or three- hour journey, 
not to forget the risks one might face at the checkpoints where he or she had to decide which 
ID card to show by guessing the affiliations of the armed men guarding the point. One tactic 
that Iraqis developed was to carry two ID-cards: one identifying the person with a Sunni 
name and the other indicating a Shii name; however, this tactic did not work all the time for 
everybody, especially given that there were so many fake check points (sayṭarāt wahmiyya as 
Iraqis call them), who acted like mafia or gang killers involved in the profiteering kidnapping 
business. The doctor from al-Saydiyya was forced to leave Iraq after being targeted by the 
armed guards at his neighborhood entrance who shot at his car following the regular checking 
of his ID. He was not hurt, but two of his close neighbors died in similar incidences and his 
family decided it is time to leave to a safer place, so they left to Amman.  
 
The sectarian wall, as it was called by some Iraqis, was a physical embodiment of the 
destruction of the social Baghdadi inter-communal life. It split neighbors and families and 
further reduced the already limited possibilities of living for the majority, who did not feel 
safe leaving their homes and could no longer reach their work and schools. It created the 
conditions for anomie, a concept originally coined by Durkheim to refer to a situation in 
which former norms of solidarity break down due to a rapid change in society (2005 [1952]). 
Iraqis were forced to search for ways to bring a sense of connectedness and solidarity in their 
lives. Most of the time they sought the protection of powerful individuals and lucky were 
those who belonged to a strong tribe. The violent changes in the Iraqi state gradually affected 
the former solidarity norms among Baghdadi communities as expressed by Iraqis: “you don’t 
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know anymore who is your enemy and who is a friend, the neighbor who supported me to 




Violence spread in Baghdad and across Iraq from multiple sources, criminal gangs whose 
primary concern was looting by removing all obstacles in their way. A gang business 
flourished and went beyond looting to include kidnappings and hired killings under various 
covers: sectarian, religious affiliation or killing on identity, and violations of what was 
announced as good religious conduct. Such violations included: women not respecting the 
dress codes of ḥijāb/ veil or black ʿabāya (a big black piece of cloth traditionally used by 
Iraqi women as a loose fitting cloak to cover the entire body except the face and hands), 
women hairdressers, barbers for providing al-haf or haf al-wajih (using a thread to remove 
face hair), market sellers for mixing tomatoes and cucumbers (because cucumbers are viewed 
as a male vegetable and tomatoes as female, and mixing them in a box is seen as lascivious), 
street vendors selling ice, etc. It was not uncommon to hear that the same gang men who 
killed Shiis in what was assigned as a Sunni neighborhood in the morning, were seen killing 
Sunnis in another neighborhood in the evening.  
 
It was normal, my informants used to say, to see dead bodies mutilated, burned or shot at the 
entrance of a street in a Baghdadi neighborhood, while the American soldiers would stand at 
                                                      
122 A map depicting the walling of postinvasion Baghdad and the physical borders of the sectarian division. Map 
source: http://www.mappery.com/map-of/Baghdad-Sectarian-Divisions-Map , retrieved on 27 November 2014.  
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the other end of the street, doing nothing except following any moving object and shooting at 
it. This scared other Iraqis in the neighborhood who could not pull the dead bodies to be 
properly buried for several days without risking being shot themselves as terrorist suspects.  
 
In their book Iraq in the 21st Century, Ismael and Ismael (2015) provide analysis of the main 
features of the Anglo-American war in deconstructing the Iraqi state and the attempt to 
reconstruct an Iraqi society that is weak without substantive sovereignty or independence in 
forming its economic and social policies and the rise of a politicized sectarianism. In my 
attempt to explore the experiences of Iraqi professionals and state bureaucrats following the 
deconstruction of the Iraqi former state-building project during 1990s-2003, it is important to 
emphasize the centrality of former experiences of Iraqi state bureaucrats with privations of 
wars in understanding the coping strategies after the recent 2003 US-led war and occupation 
of Iraq. 
 
Among the very few anthropological works on life in postinvasion Iraq, (based on prolonged 
ethnographic fieldwork in post-occupation Basra) Hayder al-Mohammed has efficiently 
shown how—in the context of deterioration of security, militia kidnappings, and breakdown 
of the country’s infrastructures—everyday life in Iraq is predicated on ethical modes of 
sociality and dwelling that contrast with the somewhat flat representations in media and 
academia of social life in the country: 
“The entangling of lives—which manifests through interest, attention, or small 
gestures of politeness and which has no formal account as an ethics of the 
everyday within the social sciences—indicates movements, understandings, and 
encounters of lives that exist beyond the monopoly that Islam, sectarian and 
religious identities, or social forms and structures such as tribalism enjoy within 
studies of the Middle East” (2015: 112).  
 
According to Hayder al-Mohammad, the ability of Iraqis to survive the two recent gulf wars, 
the crippling 12 years of sanctions, and the violence and deprivation of life after the invasion 
points to some of the courage, relentless battling, and “talent for life” (Scheper-Hughes 2008) 
it has taken to maintain one’s own life and the lives of those one cares for and looks after (Al-
Mohammad, 2015: 114).  
 
In post-2003, maintaining one’s life and the lives of those one cares for was associated with 
survival and feeling safe. The good days which the old generation miss in their present 
Baghdad is feeling safe or what they called ʾamān whose limits are set by the historically and 
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socially situated conditions of its production, the ʾamān habitus: i.e. being able to work in 
their profession in rewarding conditions and provide for their children’s education and well-
being (in 1970s) and avoiding long years of military service or loss on the war-front or 
simply feeling safe (in 1980s): “In those days, when we used to forget our house door open 
without fear of coming back home at 3:00 a.m after a party.” Compared to the 1990s years of 
privations during al-ḥiṣār and the present conditions in which they experienced rising levels 
of threats, uncertainty and insecurity. Another aspect of ʾamān that we observed among 
displaced former state employees in previous Chapters is to be capable of practicing one’s 
profession: “I like to have order, some kind of routine and systematic life; to wake up early 
and go to my work without fears.”  
 
II. The decline of inter-communal relations and the rise of sectarianism 
One obvious distinction in the stories told by professionals and state bureaucrats of their life 
in Baghdad in the 1970s-1980s is the absence of reference to one’s sectarian affiliation.123 
The older generation would insist that it was not an issue, Um-Amjad in her story about her 
father who disappeared during the nationalization campaign did not mention his religious or 
sectarian belonging (as a Shii man married to a Sunni-Kurd woman), instead she focused on 
her father’s political views, as one of the high ranking officers who opposed the processes of 
the BPC nationalization (Chapter 6). Her story of the 70s shared many elements of the 
nostalgic stories retold among the older generation of those times, especially when she 
described the mixed inter-communal origins of her extended family. Um-Amjad’s husband, 
who was also her cousin was Shii, and her daughter is married to a Kurdish Iraqi from the 
north whose family migrated to Germany during the 1990s, while her son was married to a 
Sunni woman from Baghdad. One of her brothers was married to a Christian woman while 
another brother and one of her sisters had to leave Baghdad and hide in Kurdistan after being 
targeted by armed militias for being part of one of the Sufi orders, who were not considered 
as proper Islam by the current Shii or Sunni militias controlling segregated neighborhoods in 
Baghdad.  
 
                                                      
123 While the recent Sunni/ Shii sectarianism appears as the main factor in the ongoing killings in Iraq as 
presented by the media and many stories told by Iraqis who left the country, few analysts of the Iraqi society 
criticize the “overplaying” of the heterogeneity of Iraqi society and describe the sectarianism issue as more the 
product of political conflicts and competition for power than a reflection of any fundamental hostility between 
the two denomination (Dawod, 2012: 93). 
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Another shared response observed among this group of older generation Baghdadi state 
employees was the apologetic attitude whenever they had to mention their communal or 
sectarian affiliation and critique to the Jordanian governmental institutions and international 
organizations for requesting this detail in official documentation. Um-Amjad and other Iraqis 
from her generation often expressed their refusal of what they called the “sectarian thinking” 
that was growing in the Iraqi political life after 2003. In their stories about living in Baghdad 
before the US-led invasion, they described mixed families and Baghdadi neighborhoods 
where difference in religious or ethnic identity seemed more normalized especially in times 
of stability and prosperity, comments like: “Feasts were celebrated by all during various 
religious holidays and occasions” were more popular among the older generation of Iraqis. It 
seemed that personal identity, as perceived by this older group of former state employees and 
professionals was more related to being part of the Baghdadi urban middle class; the main 
aspects of identity emphasized was the rich cultural life, high educational levels and 
rewarding governmental jobs and close family ties as well as a consumption style of modern 
products.  
 
However, I argue that understanding this inter-mixed or “cosmopolitan”124 aspect of Iraqi life 
is more complex than the way it was described in the above comment and other similar 
comments about the absence of sectarian thinking among Iraqis. Several other factors were 
involved in the rise of sectarian views or intolerance during different Iraqi historical periods 
at various levels. The effects of the British mandate colonial rule through sectarian divisions 
were not sidelined during the post-colonial rule when Iraqi rulers used ethnic and sectarian 
divisions at various scales, especially during times of wars and tension (Yousef, 2014; Tripp, 
2007). In the 1980s, this was reflected in discourses concerning the political loyalty of 
various groups in the Iraqi society: one example is the questioning of the Iraqi Shia loyalty by 
the former regime during the Iran-Iraq war, in addition to the changing socio-economic 
factors during long decades of historical changes. 
 
It is more common to hear in the main stream media after 2003, descriptions of Iraq as  “the 
land of divisions”  الشقاقأرض  i.e. ethnic, sectarian, tribal and religious divisions (Sunnis vs. 
Shiʻis; Arabs vs. Kurds with less common references to Assyrian- and Chaldean-Christians, 
Yazidis and Sabaeans), and as referred previously, this division was presented as one of the 
                                                      




main structural problems that have affected the establishment of a certain form of Iraqi 
democratic state before 2003 (with specific emphasis on the dominance of the Sunni Arabs in 
Iraqi politics). Rohde indicates in his study of Iraqi state-society relations that “a degree of 
skepticism remains concerning the normative power of communal loyalties in Baʻthist Iraq”, 
he refers in his analysis of these loyalties, to other studies, to conclude that in Iraq “the 
significance on a day-to-day level of an individual’s regional background, family, clan, and 
tribal affiliation continues to be more pronounced than in the long-established, settled urban 
and rural societies in some of the neighboring states” (Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991; Zubaida, 
2002 in Rohde 2010: 11).  
 
This perception about Iraq is also reflected in the mainstream media news which often refer 
to sectarian and ethnic differences in Iraq as the main cause of the chaos which spread in the 
country following the US-led invasion, rather than seeing it as a product of deeper underlying 
internal and external factors such as class division and competitions between elites for finite 
resources in addition to colonial interests. The former decline of ethnic and tribal role, as 
described by the older generation of urban Baghdadi communities, can be perceived in 
relation to the rise of general state-welfare services which ensured certain level of stability 
and security, eventually the decrease in security and decline of welfare and state protection 
was accompanied with the return of tribal and sectarian relations, and as we explored above 
in the times of al-ḥiṣār, sometimes these factional and tribal relations were revived and 
sponsored by the regime as one of the tactics to strengthen its rule. As explained, this 
politicization of ethnic, tribal and religious differences was practiced by the Iraqi state at 
various levels during times of wars and sanctions, and it was one of the strategies carried out 
with American occupation (Baker, 2014; Zubaida, 2012). According to Zubaida the political 
chaos following the removal of the regime had roots in oppressive practices of the Baathist 
rule (1986-2003) which suppressed all forms of politics outside its control with brutal and 
indiscriminate violence. In addition, the decades of destructive wars and the sanctions regime 
from 1991 resulted in great hardship and dislocation in the populace at large, and pushed 
people increasingly into the embrace of reconstituted communal and tribal solidarities and 
allegiances (2011: 102).   
 
In the following excerpt from Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in 
Modern Iraq, Eric Davis explores the changes in the state policies concerning traditional 
tribal relations over the last four decades:  
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“Nationalist ideologies of modernity and unitary solidarity of the nation were 
central to Ba'thist ideology, reinforced by an agenda of eliminating alternative 
centers of power and "traditional" solidarities. However, this suppression of 
tribalism was to change in the 1990s. The Kuwait war, the intifada that followed, 
and then the sanctions regime diminished the power and wealth of the regime and 
the party's ability to control the provinces. Saddam then resorted to a 
reconstruction of the tribes, their shaykhs, and their judicial tribunals, supplying 
the nominated shaykhs with resources and arms, as a measure of social and 
political control in the provinces. This was not the first tribal manifestation of the 
Saddam regime. The process of Saddam's consolidation of personal power in the 
party and the state, and the purging of all possible opponents and rivals, led to the 
narrowing of the power base to what has been called ‘the family party’” (ibid., 
2005: 27).  
 
Zubaida explains this transformation and the rise of the Takriti Baath which came to be more 
narrowly based on family and clan solidarities, with Saddam's immediate cognates in the key 
positions and the security apparatus manned by concentric circles determined by degrees of 
kinship. While this arrangement empowered segments of certain Sunni tribes of the 
northwest, it did not amount to the official endorsement of tribalism that came in the 1990s. 
Until then Baathist ideology conformed to the nationalist and modernist denunciation of 
tribalism (2012: 341-342).  
 
When they often described what they missed from the past, most Iraqis mentioned the former 
inter-communal Baghdadi life, and preferred to ignore the ethnic “boundaries” that were 
shrinking or extending in their Iraqi space during different historical periods. The old 
generation of this group of urban Baghdadi professionals shared with me many examples and 
stories of mixed marriages within their families and mixed celebrations among neighbors and 
friends of various religious events. However, these boundaries seemed to “persist despite a 
flow of personnel across them,” to borrow Barth’s (1969) analysis of ethnicity as a social 
process and relationship between groups rather than the content of those groups. Barth 
describes how interaction in such mixed social system does not lead to its liquidation through 
change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and 
interdependence (ibid., 9). In a more recent attempt to explain the rise of ethnic division, in 
its tribal and sectarian faces, in the Iraqi case, Kadri brings in the role of political and 
economic players in the enhancement of religious and sectarian identities. His analysis of 
ethnicity is similar to that of Barth in the sense that he describes it as a process rather than an 
ontological being: “sectarian identity itself has no being or ontological being of its own; it is a 
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political relationship defined within particular circumstances of the class struggle and in a 
historically determined social formation” (2016: 161).  
 
The Iraqi and other experiences (in former Yugoslavia) prove this but they also prove that 
when a social system produced its strong socio-economic productive basis, these cultural 
differences move to the background and lose their political roles, as many former Iraqi 
professionals used to repeat in the field. However, whenever the collective social system was 
attacked whether by former state oppressive policies or foreign military interventions, these 
cultural differences were politicized and were assumed as a social system for their followers. 
Older generations of Iraqis who were raised in more “secular” environment preferred to 
silence or ignore religious and sectarian differences in their stories about living in Iraq during 
the last four decades. But when they addressed incidents of social exclusion practiced by 
various Iraqi governments or militias, the boundaries become clear and individuals who did 
not perceive religion or sect as an important feature in their social relations with other fellow 
workers, neighbors and even marriage partners had to learn how to deal with “deadly 
identities” (Maalouf, 2012). One’s presence or absence in the New Iraq, is determined by 
one’s sect, ethnicity and their former relationship to the state/ regime. This new situation in 
Iraq, and in the region at large, imposed new representations on the inhabitants of those 
states. It is reflected in the rising Shii vs. Sunni discourse in the Arab Media in general.  
 
Another common explanation of the rise of sectarian and religious movements in politics, as 
presented by researchers of the Middle East is the failure of Arab “secular” nationalist 
regimes to bring about sustained socioeconomic development and to prevent the expansion of 
the state of Israel after the 1967 war that helped generate popular support for Islamist 
movements (al-Ali and Pratt, 2009: 11). It is true, as often explored by researchers, that there 
are several other causes for the decline of national secular ideologies in favor of more Islamist 
or other religious ideologies and identities, and while I agree with this wider view of the 
decline of nationalist secular politics and the rise of sectarian thinking before 2003, the point I 
wanted to make is related to the effects of ‘the official institutionalization’ of a sectarian 
government-style in Iraq after 2003, as an important context to understand the displacement 
experiences of former Iraqi state-bureaucrats I met in Jordan. The new Iraqi government set 
up by the CPA was based upon communal (sectarian) affiliation and later encouraged the 
development of political parties and militias which recruited in ethno-religious constituencies, 
within two years of invasion, the United States had created a novel sectarian system: what is 
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described in the media as the “Lebanization of Iraq,” the parliament was eventually 
established in 2005 and ministries were allocated according to the relative weight of such 
parties and of parliamentary blocs, and the reconstructed armed forces followed this pattern. 
Previously, of little significance, sectarian parties and networks started to exert a much 
stronger influence in the absence of a strong central state” (Marfleet, 2007: 409). The years 
2004 and 2005 evolved in terror tactics including assassinations, disappearances, killings by 
death squads and imprisonments that were directed to minorities and also professionals such 
as doctors, lawyers and academics.  
 
Based on my former analysis, it would be naïve to blame the rise of religious and sectarian 
divisions in the Iraqi society solely on the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq, and this is 
not the point I wanted to make here. The stories of lived experiences shared by former Iraqi 
state employees and professionals in their home country and in their transit space in Jordan 
can be perceived as life changing experiences in the context of larger structural violence. This 
structural violence did not stop with the attack on the former regime. On the contrary, with 
the destruction of the centralized coercive apparatus of the state: several Iraqis explained how 
they had to deal in the past with the state violence by strategies of hiding, avoidance, 
resistance or complicity, while in postinvasion Iraq, they had to learn how to avoid the 
chaotic violence coming from various sources: militia groups affiliated to various political, 
religious, sectarian and ethnic communities in addition to the rising American El Salvador-
style death squads and privately run mercenaries (like black water), and militias funded by 
regional and global actors such as al-Qaida and ISIS (the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria).  
 
Following 2003, many former potentials to live as middle class intermixed neighbors in 
Baghdad disappeared with the destruction of state institutions and the spread of violence and 
lack of security to the extent that some Baghdadis found it safer to move out of their homes in 
the neighborhood where they spent their entire lives to their original city or town, where they 
could gain some protection from extended family members and their larger tribe. Although 
the town was more secure than Baghdad, it lacked essential services that these internally 
displaced Iraqis used to enjoy in the capital city, regardless of how limited they were.  
 
Another aspect that was presented as a reason to leave Iraq entirely are the unfamiliar 
practices ordered by religious figures who imposed the head cover on all women and 
254 
 
prohibited music and former social life in clubs, in addition to other ‘pre-modern practices’ 
described by this group of educated Baghdadis. Eventually, they felt further excluded from 
the new Baghdadi fragmented space by these practices and the sectarian segregation imposed 
on former inter-communal mixed neighborhoods. After 2003, being Iraqi was not enough to 
continue living in Iraq, one has to be Sunni to live in a Sunni-majority district or Shii to stay 
in a majority Shii district. Due to the inadequacy of government social service programs and 
the factional setup of governmental structure, familial and tribal relationships offered a 
source of compensation and Iraqis turned to their families to get access to wider political 
networks. In the current Iraq, family origin became more important to gain access to political 
and administration positions than qualifications and skills. The Iraqi state institutions could 
not strengthen their role as the primary service provider (as in the period before 1990s), 
therefore, many Iraqis began to align themselves with various tribal and sectarian groups that 
could provide access to services, or at least to protection.125  
 
The above stories of the expulsion from former Iraqi mixed neighborhoods imply the 
transformation in the Iraqi social space from one governed by a centralized hegemonic and 
despotic power of a nation-state and regime that functioned through a mixture of modern 
state institutions and various levels of patrimonial and traditional powers, to one governed by 
several factional and sectarian representative bodies. The decline of collective state 
institutions and the rise of privatization and liberalization of resources led eventually to the 
spread of sociopolitical disorder and the rise of “corporate-like groups” which are based on 
kinship, religious or ethnic affiliations. This does not make a less violent state as per 
Kapferer: “In this case the chaotic “violence at the periphery is not a mere fact of the failure 
of state orders, nor of traditionalism, but of the appearance of new forms of ordering practice 
that are part of the modern emergence of the corporate state” (ibid., 2005: 294).  
 
The destruction of former state apparatus left many Iraqis unprotected; they did not only lose 
control of their individual lives when they lost their working positions and access to state 
services, but they also lost the main source of protection of a former communal life. They had 
to learn how to avoid the violence coming from different parties and militias. The easiest way 
was to leave the country. Those who decided to stay had to learn how to live and work 
                                                      
125 Hayder Al-Mohammad (2012) presents an ethnographic case about the protective role of the tribe in 




without the protection of the state, eventually, some turned to these “new forms of ordering 
practice” organized within sectarian and tribal groups affiliated to various militias and 
sectarian parties. Such as the doctor (Sabah) who returned to work under the protection of his 
tribal group (Chapter Three); although this older generation of Iraqis often announced their 
refusal of communitarian and sectarian thinking but they had little opportunity to avoid 
engagement with sectarian and tribal groups if they wanted to survive in postinvasion Iraq. 
Security services were privatized and employees were hired by private security firms to 
perform jobs that would otherwise be done by the Iraqi police and military. This 
commodification of security created a bourgeoning market. Security agencies owned by 
Iraqis and non-Iraqis alike hired both Iraqis and non-Iraqis.  
 
This is not unique to Iraq. Friedman describes a similar process of transformation of the 
entire social space by the establishment of non-modern conditions of identification in the case 
of Eastern European countries like Yugoslavia. The spread of disorder, as Friedman states is 
“a universally recurrent phenomenon, along with many of the forms that it takes such as 
social fragmentation, individual crises, new collective identifications, and what I [Friedman] 
have referred to as ethnification” (2008: 211). He attributes the variable reactions to a 
disordered social arena to its variable constitution (2008: 205). Thus, Friedman establishes a 
link between hegemonic decline and commercial expansion caused by decentralization of 
capital accumulation in hegemonic organizations and resulting from this decentralization 
(ibid., 212). 
 
Another explanation of the rise of factional identities or “identity problems” as Friedman 
described them is the downward mobility that results from the economic crisis; specifically 
the effects of decentralization of capital accumulation on areas abandoned by capital where 
people turn to the past, “to roots, to ethnicity and to other collective identities, whether 
regional, religious, or even gender based, that replaces the vacuum left by a receding 
modernist identity” (ibid., 216). Friedman further argues that ethnification and social and 
political disorder are expressions of declining hegemony in global systems and that this 
relation occurs in spite of the fact that the societies involved might practice very different 
forms of ethnicity (ibid., 222). In the world of the decline, the “new rising hegemonies 
become new zones of nationalization and homogenization where a former cultural and 




Friedman’s analysis sheds some light on the new situation in Iraq, and in the region at large, 
which imposed new representations on the inhabitants of former states. Ethnic and 
religious/sectarian backgrounds were always present at various levels and scales in the 
modern Iraqi state (Zubaida, 2009). Gaining access to free public education and regularly 
paid jobs in addition to quality medical services affected social relations and practices within 
families, it also affected the organization of the social space in Iraqi society, allowing 
satisfactory living standards. The sixties and seventies witnessed the development of a new 
class of professionals and intellectuals in addition to wider segments of administration 
workers, to add to the former military and state functionaries (see Chapter 6). However, the 
investment in the militarization of society by drawing large part of professionals into the war 
front for long periods of time had negative effects on the development level, as well as the 
decrease in resources dedicated for building institutions and human capacities. There was a 
rise in the transnational system of trade and financial transactions in which the nation-state is 
no longer the primary organizational framework of the economy, this did not mean that the 
state lost its role completely during the 1980s. The rise of the neoliberal discourse at the 
international level through corporate and financial elites and within several Arab states in 
Egypt, Jordan and Iraq led to narrowing the ideological basis of popular identification with 
and loyalty to the state and its institutions of political participation. According to Turner, the 
rise of global capitalist system or the increase in transnational capital markets did not mean 
the withering away of the state, it has heightened rather than undermined the importance of 
state boundaries (2003, 48). The hegemony of neoliberal policy led to the weakening of 
popular sovereignty on which the modern state has been based since the eighteenth century 
(ibid., 50). 
 
With the destruction of the Iraqi state and its institutions came the negative effect on the 
former social networks which once served as safety nets. As police and army forces were 
made redundant, new types of loyalty started to grow; some Iraqis turned to their sectarian 
group (and militias) for protection; while others recalled tribal connections. Eventually this 
state of anomie “freed Iraq from Iraqis” as Iraqis in Jordan repeatedly described their 
displacement. Iraq had been freed from Iraqis as national subjects and citizens; in the New 
Iraq, Iraqis were presented more as members within tribal, sectarian or ethnic communities 





This approach led the country into what Sahlins describes as “the state-of-nature effect” in his 
reading of the disorder that erupted in Iraq: “It takes a lot of culture to make a state of nature. 
[…] The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 set off a terrible civil strife in which a myriad of 
local forces killed each other, often in the name of global causes. For all its nation-building 
ideology, US policy supposed Iraq to be historically and inevitably divided into opposed 
religious and ethnic groups […]. Indeed there was a lot of essentialism informing the 
invaders’ conquer-and-divide policies—which ignored a long history of intermarriage 
between the various groups, the mix of Shiites and Sunnis in the Iraqi army during the war 
with Iran, the contingent of Shiites in the ruling Baath Party, and other such preexisting 
conditions of national coherence” (2011: 27-28). 
 
The above-described destruction in Iraq might be read as some Iraqis I met have described it, 
as another phase in the troubling history of Iraq. The Iraqi state was established through 
various economic and political interventions of colonization, coups d’état, developmental 
projects, wars and conflicts, all of which resulted in several waves of displacement. Crisis is 
also presented as the leading force of the Iraqi community growth, as per Hannah Batatu’s 
study of the Iraqi social classes: “It should be borne in mind that what is becoming the Iraqi 
community has also grown in crises, in moments of great danger and common suffering, in 
the tremors of agitated masses and their outbursts of anger: if this community in embryo will 
in the future hold together and maintain its separate identity, the Uprising of 1920, the War of 
1941, the Wathbah of 1948, the Intifadah of 1952, and the Revolution of 1958, though not 
free of divisive aspects, will be seen as stages in the progress of Iraq towards national 
coherence” (Batatu,1978: 36).  
 
Batatu tells us in his work, which was written during the 1970s, that in their stories in the 
sixties many Iraqis looked back nostalgically to the epoch of the monarchy. Under the 
monarchy, however, many more felt that they could not have had worse governance than they 
had. Coups or outbursts of national or local significance characterized, in fact, almost the 
entire life span of the monarchy— in the period 1921-1958 (see Table 17-1 in Batatu, 1978). 
Similarly, many Iraqis who had been forced out of their country post-2003 longed for the 
inter-communal aspects of their former Baghdadi life; although sentiments of fear and shock 
were more present than nostalgia in their stories. Displacement or being-on-the-move is 
another event in the present Iraqi story, as reflected in the following two long journeys by 




Iraqis on the move- complex journeys seeking asylum and ʾamān in a safe State 
The Iraqis’ troublesome experience with mobility and travel is not recent. As explored earlier 
in this and previous chapters, it was not uncommon to hear that Iraqi males were denied 
travel rights by former state authorities for years because, they were constantly told, their 
country needed them in times of wars and emergency. There were periods during the eighties 
and nineties when the former Iraqi regime imposed strict regulations on the mobility of its 
subjects to the extent that some Iraqis expressed that one of their biggest wishes was to cross 
their country borders. An Iraqi musician, who had served in the army from 1983‒2003, 
expressed his excitement when he first learnt that the Iraqi borders were left open following 
the attack on the regime: “I could not believe it when in 2004 I realized that I could finally 
travel. I could obtain an interim travel document issued by the CPA,126 with which I entered 
Syria.” Syria and Jordan were not the end destination for impoverished Iraqis who were 
unable to secure jobs and provide for their families. In 2010‒2011, making a space of ʾamān, 
for several former Iraqi state employees was linked to asylum in one of the so-called safe 
States (buldān ʾamina) in the West. Despite lifting the restrictions on travel imposed by the 
former Iraqi regime, the number of Iraqis who were accepted for asylum in 1997‒2002 was 
much higher than the number accepted in 2003‒2006.  
 
As explored in his book Rethinking Asylum, Matthew Price clarifies that this solution is not 
granted to all refugees: “only a fraction of the world’s asylum seekers are Convention 
refugees; the majority do not qualify” (2009: 17-18). Still reaching a safe state was the dream 
of several Iraqis I met in the field: “preferably European or best if we can gain resettlement in 
a Scandinavian country.” Iraqis were repeatedly told that asylum is limited and designed to 
serve the most vulnerable of refugees and is not a solution for all. After 2003, the more 
preferred humanitarian responses are designed to provide temporary protection space in the 
neighboring states where the UNHCR and other international players will ensure the 
distribution of relief and development aid to refugees who remain in their countries or regions 
of origin. This temporary refugee policy tool, as explored ethnographically in Chapters Four 
and Five, aims to provide relief aid directly to refugees or through intermediaries—such as 
the state of origin, international humanitarian organizations like the United Nations High 
                                                      
126 I had the chance to see this document titled Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq Interim Travel 
Document, it states that: “the bearer of this document is a citizen or born in Iraq and does not possess a valid 
Iraqi passport but has identified himself to the undersigned issuing authority” (i.e the CPA).  
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Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), or nongovernmental organizations—and 
development aid of various kinds designed to ameliorate the suffering of refugees.  
 
In the last section of this chapter, I will present two of several stories shared by Iraqis moving 
in search for ʾamān. The increase of restrictions on mobility for Iraqis, in addition to the slow 
recognition process to evaluate the Iraqi needs of protection according to international 
standards, forced many individuals and families like Amal’s family to rely on smugglers’ 
services, while other families like Sundos’ had to wait for long years to be counted in the 
official UNHCR resettlement program. Before presenting the two stories as narrated by Amal 
and Sundos, I will present a short brief about the Iraqi asylum experience as another coping 
strategy with the lack of ʾamān during the last four decades.  
 
This style of temporary ‘in-region’ protection is prioritized not only because it decreases the 
flow of unwanted migrants to the western countries, but it is also less expensive to keep these 
unwanted displaced persons as refugees in neighboring countries instead of granting them 
asylum in Europe: “In 2003, for example, Britain spent more than US$1.5 billion to support 
93,000 asylum seekers. Meanwhile, the entire UNHCR budget, meant to provide relief for 
over 20 million refugees and internally displaced persons, amounted to US$1.17 billion in 
that year, of which the UK donated about US$47 million” (Price, 2009). 
 
Leenders (2009) critically explores the growing phenomenon of the “securitization” of 
refugees with reference to Iraqi refugees’ abandonment in terms of humanitarian protection. 
His review of the latest Iraqi refugee presence in the region shows that despite the absence of 
Iraqi refugee warriors, “few western policy-makers or UN officials will dare to take credit for 
it publicly, but judging from the large numbers of Iraqis now stuck in neighboring countries, 
the Iraqi refugee crisis appears to mark the triumph of the in-region solution” (2009: 358). In 
his discussion of the effects of using the refugee warrior label or the “growing securitization 
of refugee studies” as an excuse to contain them to the region and deny them access to 
asylum in North America and Western Europe (2009: 344). Leenders’ observation is 
confirmed in the following figure which presents the distribution of displaced Iraqis around 
the world; the highest percentage of the displaced resided in Syria and Jordan (44%) as well 




The temporary protection space in neighboring countries or the so-called regional solution to 
refugees represents a shift in responsibility and its standards from international law to 
individual human rights. In his essay ‘The New Humanitarian Order’, Mamdani (2008) 
describes this as a fateful shift from law to humanitarian protection order. As the Bush 
Administration made patently clear at the time of the invasion of Iraq, humanitarian 
intervention does not need to abide by the law. Indeed, its defining characteristic is that it is 
beyond the law. It is this feature that makes humanitarian intervention the twin of the ‘war on 
terror’ [sic]. This new humanitarian order, officially adopted at the UN's 2005 World 
Summit, claims responsibility for the protection of vulnerable populations. That 
responsibility is said to belong to the international community, to be exercised in practice by 
the UN, and in particular by the Security Council, whose permanent members are the great 
powers. Whereas the language of sovereignty is profoundly political, that of humanitarian 
intervention is profoundly apolitical, and sometimes even anti-political. Looked at closely 
and critically, what we are witnessing is not a global but a partial transition. The transition 
from the old system of sovereignty to a new humanitarian order is confined to those states 
defined as ‘failed’ or ‘rogue’ [sic] states. The result is once again a bifurcated system, 
whereby state sovereignty is obtained in large parts of the world but is suspended in more and 
more countries in Africa and the Middle East. “If the rights of the citizen are pointedly 
political, the rights of the human pertain to sheer survival; they are summed up in one word: 
protection. The new language refers to its subjects not as bearers of rights and thus active 
agents in their emancipation but as passive beneficiaries of an external responsibility to 
protect. Rather than rights-bearing citizens, beneficiaries of the humanitarian order are akin to 
recipients of charity. […] Humanitarianism [according to Mamdani] does not claim to 
reinforce agency, but only to sustain bare life. If anything, its tendency is to promote 
dependence. Humanitarianism heralds a system of trusteeship” (Ibid., 2008). Mamdani in his 
essay presents another critique of the reductionist effect of the humanitarian aid system, in 
addition to Agamben’s critique mentioned in Chapter Four.  
 
Military intervention in the Iraqi case was another substitute for refugee protection and 
asylum policies. Despite the harm to the displaced, coercive interference in the form of 
military intervention seemed a practical solution to contain the refugee problem within the 
Iraqi borders. As per Marfleet, this policy was pioneered in Iraq: “Since the early 1990s, both 
states and international agencies have worked to contain some large groups of displaced 
people within their country of origin, largely in order that they cannot make claims for 
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asylum” (2011: 173). In the Iraqi case, the UN Security Council Resolution cited the 
“repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in 
the Kurdish populated areas which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across 
international frontiers” as a threat to international peace justifying military action to create a 
safe haven (Price, 2009: 77).  The safe haven or area is a zone within which people in danger 
could seek security; Stubbs notes that by definition: “Safe havens are not places of asylum in 
which protection is offered by a host state, rather the policy of choice is to restrict these 
havens to within the country in conflict” (Stubbs 1999, quoted in Marfleet, 2006: 203).  
 
In the 2003 military intervention, the announced aim was to bring prosperity, gender 
empowerment and democracy to the rest of Iraq and liberate Iraqis from the rule of the 
repressive regime of Saddam. Iraqis in 2006 became once again the leading nationality 
seeking asylum in industrialized countries. However, border restrictions then were increasing 
at all levels. Locally: eleven of Iraq’s 18 governorates put restrictions on movement within 
Iraq. Regionally: strict entry restrictions were imposed following the November 2005 suicide 
bombings in three luxury Amman hotels where western military contractors and diplomats 
usually stayed. Al-Qaida in Iraq claimed responsibility for the bombings, and the Jordanian 
government responded by deporting Iraqis, limiting the number of residence permits, and 
prohibiting the entry of Iraqi men between the ages of 18‒35. The Jordanian borders were 
closed to all but extremely exceptional cases including Iraqi investors, students or patients. 
Saudi Arabia set plans to build a 560-mile fence along its border with Iraq to keep out illegal 
migrants from Iraq. In addition, the limited protection space in Jordan and Syria was 
temporary, and both countries introduced visa restrictions despite the encouragement by 
western countries to contain Iraqis fleeing war in the region through the so-called burden 
sharing policy which contributes to funding the educational and health services in host 
countries. Globally: refugees and migrants fleeing harsh conditions in their countries have 
been constrained by the cost of the journey and restrictive administrative practices in 
receiving countries. The process of global integration by means of economic liberalization, as 
described by Marfleet, is accompanied by intensified border control and rigorous policing of 
aliens. This pushes more people to use smugglers’ services and, because most of them 
originate in crisis zones far from desired countries of asylum, they are compelled to make the 




Despite the restrictions, Iraqi asylum claims in the 36 industrialized countries that report data 
to UNHCR more than doubled in the first six months of 2007 compared to the first six 
months of 2006. Sweden received the largest number of claims and accepted most Iraqis as 
prima facie refugees (O’Donnell and Newland, 2008: 2). However, according to the UNHCR 
records, the total number of asylum seekers arriving in industrialized countries in 2006 was 
less than half the average number who had arrived during the six years prior to 2003. During 
the first half of the 1990s, more than 5000 Iraqis were resettled each year to industrialized 
countries. After 2003, the numbers of asylum applications submitted in industrialized 
countries fell by around half when compared to the numbers in the period 1997-2002, as the 
following UNHCR graph shows.      
 
 
 127Figure 2: source UNHCR 
In the period January – December 2007, the UNHCR referred nearly 21,000 Iraqis for 
resettlement to 16 countries. Of those 14,798 were referred to the United States and the rest, 
around 6,000, to Australia and other Western European countries and Chile and Brazil. 
However, by the beginning of December 2007, only 4,575 Iraqi refugees had left through a 
formal resettlement program. Only 202 Iraqi refugees were admitted to the US in 2006, and 
fewer than 600 were admitted between 2003 and 2005. In 2007, the US Congress passed the 
“Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act” which gave priority for resettlement to Iraqis facing persecution 
or who were at risk for having worked with a US government agency, contractor, media 
organization, or NGO inside Iraq. According to this Act, those Iraqis would be eligible to 
                                                      




apply directly to the US refugee resettlement program rather than having to apply outside of 
Iraq through the UN referral system. The Act also specified that 5,000 special immigrant 
visas would be available yearly for five years for Iraqis who had worked for the US 
government in Iraq (O’Donnell and Newland, 2008: 17-20).  
 
Despite the fact that during the late 1990s larger numbers of Iraqis were admitted for asylum 
in Europe, apparently as a political tool to condemn the Iraqi so-described rouge state, yet the 
asylum route for many Iraqis in the 1990s was not necessarily shorter than today. In contrast 
to previous generations of Iraqi exiles, who had been able to enter and settle in Europe or the 
US through labour or student migration regimes, the post-1990 migrants were faced with the 
non-entry policies that most wealthy states had started to adopt in the 1980s and had little 
choice but to acquire legal status through asylum regimes. Various actors were involved then 
including smugglers. Chatelard lists several actors who facilitated Iraqis’ journeys to Western 
Europe, North America or Australia including the UNHCR, churches that sponsored refugee 
arrivals through national schemes in Australia or Canada, embassies, migrant smugglers who 
operated travel services, religious leaders, Christian or Shii, who were in Amman or had 
made it to a safe country, or the International Committee of the Red Cross. All other means 
were preferred over smugglers. However, the UNHCR was neither trusted nor favoured as 
the UN system was, in general, perceived to be responsible for imposing the economic 
sanctions over their country, and because many migrants did not want to be forced to resettle 
in a country that they had not chosen (2009b: 8). Social capital is identified by Chatelard, as 
Iraqi migrants’ main asset. Among the various components of this capital, kinship and 
religious ties appear to be those mobilized first because they have already gained a 
transnational dimension (2005: 363).  
 
In general, the numbers of Iraqis reaching resettlement countries through organised 
resettlement programs have been small compared to the large numbers who enter European 
countries. Amal told me the story of her long and painful experience with failing smuggling 
attempts.  
 
The story of an Iraqi family’s long journey with smuggling attempts to reach 
Europe 
Amal, a Chaldean Christian Iraqi woman married to an Assyrian Christian had to move from 
their district in Baghdad al-Jadida where their new neighbors refused to see them as Iraqis; 
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they called them al-Nasara.128 In 2004, one year following the US-led invasion and 
occupation of Iraq, Amal and her family became too anxious and afraid, she had stopped 
sending her three children to school. Later, her husband, who had a car repair workshop, was 
forced to close it following annoying questions and bullying by a group of youngsters: “Why 
are you hanging that woman’s picture on the wall?” referring to a painting of the Virgin 
Mary that had been hanging on his garage wall for more than fifty years, from the time of his 
late father. In the beginning, Amal’s family moved to stay with her husband’s family in 
another inter-mixed Baghdadi neighborhood. Eventually, they realized that their 
neighborhood is not safe anymore and they were forced to sell their house (for much less 
than its real price), in addition to selling the old car and furniture to cover the costs of their 
journey to safety: “Sweden is our dream, we wanted to reach Sweden to reunite with my 
parents.” Amal, her husband and three children started their journey with the help of 
smugglers, they paid them all the money they had brought with them from Iraq, but only 
reached Athens. In Athens, they faced many troubles but thanks to her husband’s work in car 
maintenance they managed after one year and a half to collect enough money to pay to 
another smuggler who promised to get them to Sweden. After six months in Stockholm 
where they reunited with her family, the Swedish authorities informed them that they would 
have to return and claim asylum in the country that had their fingerprints. They consulted a 
friend who helped them to cross the border into Norway, where Amal spent “the happiest 
seven months in her life”, as she described it: the Norwegian authorizes arranged for an 
apartment in Bergen, a monthly financial allowance, school for their kids and she and her 
husband started Norwegian language courses. But they were told again that as per the Dublin 
regulation,129 they could not stay longer in Norway and had to return to Greece where their 
asylum claim would be determined. Back in Athens, they received an order to leave for Iraq 
within 31 days, but the money they had collected from Norwegian aid was not enough to buy 
five airplane tickets and her husband had to work again to earn extra money.  
                                                      
128 Al-Nasara is a term that is used by the followers of some political Islamic fractions to refer to Christians, it 
has negative connotations as expressed by an Iraqi Christian man I met for it refers to the earlier Jewish 
Christians, in addition to bringing back the old pre-citizen category of dhimmi or non-Muslim communities who 
were asked to pay a certain tax in return for protection and safety by the Islamic ruler (see Chatty for the 
description of Ottoman government of dhimmi peoples, 2010: 45-48). In July 2014, ISIS painted a number of 
houses in Mosul with the Arabic letter ن for N to impose its rule on the Christian communities who had not yet 
escaped; they were given three choices: conversion, payment of al-Jizya (a special tax) or death (Cockburn, 20 
July 2014).  
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/time-runs-out-for-christian-iraq-isis-deadline-passes-
with-mass-flight-9617606.html   
129 Under the Dublin Convention of 1990 the European Union agreed that a refugee’s first safe country of 
arrival should accept responsibility for determining her/his status, establishing the concept of the “safe third 




In October 2007, they returned to Baghdad to stay with her husband’s family. The conditions 
were worse than in 2004 when they had decided to leave Iraq. This time they had to live 
through the nightmare of negotiating with a gang who kidnapped their eldest son and asked 
for a high ransom of US$ 10,000, expecting that a family coming from Europe would be rich. 
The family managed to negotiate with the kidnappers and settled the release of their son for 
US$ 5,000. Amal’s father-in-law sold a piece of land, and they paid the ransom with part of 
the money and, with the rest, headed again to Sweden in January 2008. On their way in 
Turkey, the smugglers decided to split the family because they were too many, Amal and her 
husband refused but, in the end, had no choice but to send their eldest son, who was 14-years-
old with another Iraqi couple who promised to take care of him. They gave him a list of 
phone numbers in Sweden and Iraq in case they failed to reach Sweden on the same day. 
Amal boarded the airplane with her husband and the two younger kids. Their son’s journey 
took him to Holland while the rest of the family reached Athens again. This time they 
recognized the airport and managed to leave without having their fingerprints taken. They 
stayed with friends in Athens, while her husband worked for few months to collect enough 
money to buy airplane tickets to Baghdad. Back in Iraq again, they stayed more than a year, 
this time with one family member missing. Amal described how they were locked in at home 
day and night, as she was afraid to send her two kids to school to protect them from 
kidnapping or death by explosives. Friends advised them to go to Jordan and apply for 
resettlement to the Netherlands; they expected that having a son there would make it easier 
for the family to gain asylum rights. In 2010 they left for Amman, where I met Amal. She 
talked most of the time about her eldest son with whom she communicated daily online. She 
still missed her parents in Sweden but could not stop thinking of her son. Amal’s family 
registered in the UNHCR and received refugee certificates, but the UNHCR informed them 
that neither Netherlands nor any other European country accepted their emigration request, 
and that they would have to wait for the implementation of the UNHCR resettlement program 
in the United States.      
 
In the case of Amal, as was true of other survivors who had an urgent need to reach a safer 
place, she and her family had to sell all their possessions in Iraq to pay the smugglers who 
were supposed to help them to overcome the obstacles and cross the borders that separated 
them from Sweden. Her son had reached Netherlands by chance while she was sitting in 
Amman counting the days and hours that separated her from her son and waiting for 
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resettlement to the United States where she hoped to obtain the ‘green card’ with its expected 
benefits of mobility and access to protection and other services. Amal was thankful that her 
family had managed to escape a worse tragedy which thousands of asylum seekers had had to 
face in their attempts to enter Western Europe or Australia: “At least we are all alive unlike 
many Iraqis who died on the mountain roads and those who died along the coast of Christmas 
Island few days ago.”130  
 
The complex journey of Sundos’ family in search for ʾamān in a new State 
The Baghdadi urban space was fiercely attacked by the US-led invasion and eventually the 
inter-mixed neighborhood communities were un-mixed through a violent sectarian division of 
the city by concrete walls and checkpoints. In the following excerpt Sundos presents some 
details of the early days of the US-led invasion and following chaotic conditions and the rise 
of ‘sectarian thinking’ which extended to neighboring countries as reflected in the visa entry 
restrictions that appeared more restricted toward members of certain sects:  
In April 2003, our district, al-Amiriya, turned into a war zone; the Americans 
targeted all places in Baghdad in turns. They invaded Baghdad from every side; 
from the south: Babel, al-Saydiyya, Doura, al-Yarmouk, and from the airport 
street. There was no fierce resistance like that in al-Basra, but there were armed 
clashes in the outskirts of Baghdad, especially in al-Saydiyya and Doura, and the 
big battle was at the airport. Our house is close to the airport street, more than 
3600 Iraqi soldiers have been exterminated and the Americans threw tons of 
weapons from the sky; we used wet underwear as face masks to avoid inhaling 
chemicals. The building next to our house was shelled; we were all in the house: 
my two sons, two daughters, my husband and my son’s wife. My eldest son is 
from my first marriage; my first husband is a martyr who died in a battle during 
the Iranian war. The Americans were throwing cluster bombs. We know that the 
destructive effects of these bombs extend to a large space within a whole 
kilometer, we also know that when a place is targeted once, there’s a big chance 
that they will bomb it a second time, that’s why we decided to run out of the 
house. We managed to leave on time, except for my eldest son who could not 
make it and is now a martyr like his father, to repeat the tragedy for his son who 
became an orphan, like my son.  
 
In July 2003, we left Baghdad to Amman. We stayed here for a year until we 
spent all the money we brought with us and returned to Baghdad. Few months 
later, we received a letter containing a bullet and a note written by hand saying: 
“this is one bullet, and the rest 29 bullets will follow.” Although some of our Shii 
neighbors left, we thought that we are safe as I am Shii married to a Sunni in a 
majority of Sunnis district. But at the end we decided that it’s better to leave, so 
we moved to stay with my family in al-Bayaa district. We lived there for nine 
                                                      
130 For details of the Christmas Island incident see: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/15/asylum-
seeker-boats-capsizes-australia-christmas-island on 15 December.  
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months but the situation got worse especially following the attacks on the Sunnis 
and the “killing on identity” which extended all over Baghdad. In 2006, we left to 
Syria, and lived there for some time, we got refugee certificates from the UN and 
were hoping to get resettlement in Europe when ‘the UNHCR terminated my 
husband’s residence’ and asked him to return to Iraq; they helped around 2000 
families to return during that time. My husband was happy to go back, but I 
remained in Syria as my son and daughters were in the middle of their school 
year, besides I had nothing left in Baghdad except the house which was partially 
destroyed by the bombing; it was a nice house: two-storey and three toilets, and 
look at us here, we have to share two rooms with one toilet. My husband, a former 
school teacher lost his job when they accused him of being a member in the Baath 
party. He found a new job when he returned to Baghdad as a taxi driver, but he 
was kidnapped and they only released him after paying a big ransom. His family 
collected the money and helped him to leave Baghdad following his release, and 
we are still in debt.  
 
My husband left Baghdad again, this time to Amman. He rented first an apartment 
in Jabal al-Hussain and called for us to join him. We left Damascus to Amman 
later in March 2009. I had to wait for long hours at the Jordanian border as first 
they did not want to let me in for being a Shii, but they allowed me when my 
grandson started crying. It was very humiliating and I got angry when I had to 
explain to the soldiers on the border that this is not an issue for us; I’m married to 
a Sunni, my mother is Kurd and my children are mixed and we live together 
without problems. It is difficult to live here in Amman where my husband works 
one day and spends 10 days searching for work. I just want a State to catch me 
(with my family), and we will work hard and be obedient citizens as we were in 
Iraq, I just ask them to give us a chance to live a decent life. Any State, 
preferably Scandinavian but if not possible, we may even go to the US, my son 
wants to return to Iraq and refuses to go anywhere but we have to go if our 
application for resettlement succeeds: we will have rights to work freely, our 
daughters and son will have access to education and health care and maybe obtain 
travel documents that will allow us to travel and move around freely.   
 
This story presents a summary of the nine long years this Iraqi middle class family spent in 
the transit space of neighboring countries. In October 2010, when I first met Sundos in a 
rented apartment in al-Hashmi al-Shamali, she told me that they were waiting for resettlement 
to a third country because they were convinced that there was no safety or future in Baghdad 
anymore: “mākū ʾamān, mākū mustaqbal.”  Sundos’ story resembles in many aspects the 
stories of other Iraqis who fled the destruction and death in their homeland seeking safety 
elsewhere. The limited formal protection provided and the deteriorating situation in their 
country forced many Iraqis to undertake complex journeys within the region and elsewhere.  
 
Sundos’ husband who was a teacher in the former government was excluded like many of the 
state bureaucrats from governmental jobs and returned to Baghdad to work as a taxi driver 
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but was kidnapped and the family had to pay a high ransom to release him. The limited space 
of protection in Jordan shrank more with the rise of the Syrian refugee problem towards the 
end of 2011, and resettlement to a third country seemed like the only solution for lots of Iraqi 
families.  
 
One of the striking elements of her story is how Sundos has dealt with her losses. The family 
could anticipate the dangers coming with the bombs falling on Baghdad in 2003; thanks to 
the long military experience of Iraqis during the past twenty three years of wars (1980‒2003), 
they managed to evacuate the house in time, however Sundos had to experience another 
devastating loss in 2003. She had lost her first husband in the Iranian-Iraqi war in 1986 and 
then their son in 2003. Her survival in 2010 was linked to saving the remains of her social 
world: her family, which in her view would be achieved by finding a new State to work in 
and lead a decent life in ʾamān. She compares the differences of the living conditions in Iraq 
with the poor dwelling they could afford in their temporary asylum in Syria and Jordan. This 
applies to many Iraqis I met: most of them ended up living in apartments or rented rooms 
sometimes shared with others, whereas in Iraq, most middle class and some lower middle 
class families had lived in houses.  
 
The dismantling of the Iraqi state and the destruction of state infrastructure was experienced 
by these state bureaucrats, academics and professionals, as loss of ground to stand on, as 
expressed by Sundos’ need for a State to ‘catch’ her.  The use of the term ‘catch’: Sundos 
used the word تكمشني in Arabic, which means to catch a ball or another thrown object— 
symbolizes a state of being thrown and hanging somewhere in between, as if being deprived 
of a State and what it represents means deprivation of gravity.  
 
Arendt once presented a similar description of the stateless man, “a human being without 
ties”: “when one becomes simply a ‘human being’ without ties to political life deprived of 
expression within and action upon a common world loses all significance.” The loss of State 
came to be shared by more and more people who, while nominally citizens of legally 
recognized states, nevertheless lacked a share of a genuine common world. Expelled from a 
meaningful political community, individuals could plausibly assume both that the world was 
run by mysterious and ineffable forces and that they had no responsibility for its shape” 
(2004 [1951], 297-300). However, what is different here from Arendt’s reading is that the 
‘ties’ that this Iraqi woman is looking for in the new State seemed to be reduced to services 
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and institutions that might save her from impoverishment as well as secure education, 
employment and health services for her family.  
 
What is clear at this stage is the absence of official hegemonic or common Iraqi versions of 
the story about the 2003 war and occupation of Iraq. The story Sundos told about the airport 
battle (Saddam International Airport, before the Americans changed its name to Baghdad 
International Airport),131 brings to mind another perplexing incident from my fieldwork when 
I attended a gathering at the Jordanian Writers’ Association in April 2013 on the occasion of 
the 10th anniversary of the occupation of Baghdad. The opening event was a lecture by an 
Iraqi journalist discussing the role of media in showing the realities of the US-British led war 
on Iraq in 2003. Several arguments were presented, followed by a sharp dispute about ‘what 
really happened in the battle of the airport?’ The participants, mostly Iraqis and few 
Jordanians, spent the entire Q&As session arguing about the details of the battle. There were 
several stories with contradictory information about the exact dates of the battle incidents (2-
8 April 2003), and what ‘really’ happened: A victory for the Iraqi army? Treason? Or defeat? 
Or a massacre in which the American army used a neutron bomb that melted the bodies of 
Iraqi soldiers and left the airport building intact? The numbers of the soldiers killed from both 
sides were also unclear: while western media presents a number of between 300‒400 Iraqi 
soldiers and 2 or 3 American soldiers,132 Iraqis argue that more than 2019 American soldiers 
were killed, in addition to a large number of Iraqi soldiers from the Republican Guard unit.133 
 
The religious, ethnic and professional identifiers are emphasized in the stories of the current 
Iraqi refugee wave as reasons for being forced out of their homes and city. As explained in 
the previous section of this chapter, religion and ethnicity were not part of the stories I heard 
among older Iraqis, especially the few professionals and academics who left in the 1990s and 
were still waiting in Amman for a chance to return to Baghdad. They focused more on the 
                                                      
131 The Battle for Baghdad. By Galal Nassar, 10-16 April 2003, issue no. 633, published online in al-Ahram 
weekly: http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/633/sc1.htm. The battle of Baghdad Airport: is it a massacre or a great 
achievement? By Alaa al-Lami published online on: http://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=351714 
(Arabic), both sites were retrieved in September 2010. 
132 See US forces tighten noose, battle for Baghdad airport, published on 4 April 2003. Available online on 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-04-04/news/0304040260_1_uniformed-iraqis-iraqi-soldiers-iraqi-
capital. Other sources mention the killing of 2 US soldiers, without a word about the Iraqi causalities, see for 
example: US troops killed in battle for Baghdad airport published on 4 April 2003: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2003-04-05/us-troops-killed-in-battle-for-baghdad-airport/1830492 , both sites 
were retrieved in September 2010. 
133 The Battle of Baghdad Airport 2003, published on 1 September 200: http://noqta.info/page-59078-ar.html , 
retrieved in September 2010.  
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difficult conditions that had forced them to leave Baghdad brought on by the economic 
deterioration and state political pressures in the times of international sanctions against Iraq. 
 
Sundos’ angry response to the soldiers on the Jordanian border, when they refused to let her 
in for being Shii, typifies the responses of this wave of displaced Iraqis who have tended to 
openly express their rejection of attempts to politicize ethnicity and religion. On the other 
hand, the nostalgic reference to the former “conviviality” or “everyday-living-together”134 in 
Baghdad has been fading especially in the stories of the new comers and those who have 
visited Iraq since 2006. What they shared was a growing concern of uncertainty about their 
present and future lives, having been expelled from a newly fragmented Baghdadi space 
redesigned in the US-led occupying forces vision to homogenize formerly mixed 
neighborhoods by segregating them with concrete blast walls. The walls represent a direct 
step towards the de-nationalization of the Iraqi urban communities implemented through 
redrawing the Baghdadi neighborhoods and state rule along religious, sectarian and ethnic 
lines. 
 
Despite the increasing risk members of this professional and state employees class faced in 
their attempts to remain connected with Baghdad, circular migration was one solution, 
especially for the academics and skilled professionals, who preferred to work and live in 
disguise, out of their former neighborhood in Baghdad, or under the protection of their tribe 
in town than accepting low payment conditions in Jordan. This was possible for doctors, 
academics, pilots and other highly skilled workers whose services were in demand, while 
former state bureaucrats had to live in disguise and work in the private sector or other 
services like Sundos’ husbands who worked as taxi driver. I heard in the field stories of Iraqi 
families who were too afraid to cross their country border, their option was to live in disguise 
hiding in towns or villages inside Iraq, especially the ones affiliated to the former regime 
such as army officers. Nawal (51 years old) described the life of her uncle, a former officer in 
Saddam’s army: “My uncle who was close to the leadership office lives under disguise in one 
                                                      
134 I heard various stories from Iraqis in the field about the former inter-mixed way of living in Baghdadi 
neighborhoods. The most common expression they used was “mākū farq” (i.e. there is no difference between 
Sunni/ Shii/ Christian/ Muslim/ Sabean ..etc), however, it is beyond the scope of this research to follow how 
much these inter-mixed spaces had been inclusive of the various ethnic and religious identities. I find 
“conviviality” as used by Annika Rabo in her description of every-day civility and co-existence of Aleppians a 
useful concept here. Rabo explains that “conviviality captures more closely this everyday living together. The 
idea of conviviality does not exclude the presence of conflicts, expressed both discursively and in practical 




of the Iraqi rural towns where nobody knows him, he is keeping a low profile and dresses 
simple; the way people in that town dress. To save his family, he sent them to al-Musol. 
However, the state stopped his wife’s salary and when she went to complain, they told her 
that she received enough money from Saddam. One of their sons committed suicide, he could 
not reconcile with the harsh conditions of the family new life.” Moving or staying where one 
is— were not easy decisions to make, as observed in the former two cases. Most of the time, 
they involved a complex process of measuring capacities and present and future possibilities, 
as Jackson commented on displacement in similar conditions of uncertainty and lack of 
ʾamān:  
“Critical to these processes of capturing or commanding life is a capacity to move 
to where life appears to be most abundant and accessible, or to orient oneself so 
as to see what other possibilities may exist where one is” (2013: 3). 
 
Concluding remarks: Well-being/ ʾamān in the absence of a State  
Living in conditions of –lessness has not been a new experience for Iraqis as discussed in 
Chapter Six and the current chapter; the experiences of living through three wars in two 
decades and one of the most severe economic embargo and sanctions regimes (al-ḥiṣār) has 
been felt as a present past that seemed to regulate the Iraqi’s current practices in expanding 
spaces of ʾamān.  In some way the current coping strategies could be seen as this presence of 
past experiences that governed the Iraqi practice in the new conditions of –lessness; in this 
sense these past experiences functioned in a way similar to what Bourdieu described as 
habitus (1990: 55).  
 
The structural violence that resulted from the militarization and privatization policies of the 
Iraqi regime, the 1991 US-led bombing of the Iraqi state infrastructure, and 13 years of al-
ḥiṣār to be followed by the US-led invasion and occupation generated various losses, 
difficulties and possibilities for these groups of men and women. Their former experiences of 
extended circumstances of deprivation and destructions led to adopting strategies and tactics 
of survival embedded within former social networks and cultural practices. In prolonged 
conditions of war and displacement, they had to explore other possibilities; some could return 
to work inside Iraq and had to rely on tribal and sectarian affiliations for protection (Chapter 
Three), while others, like Amal’s family in this chapter, had to try longer and costly journeys 




Loss, which is not a new experience in the Iraqi life, was not restricted to the material 
existence at home, it extended to the symbolic capital which these former highly skilled 
professionals and government employees used to enjoy in Iraq (before 1990s) and that had 
been devalued after 2003 in Jordan. In the current context, education was presented as a 
capital that lost its value when the nation state had been weakened and finally destroyed. The 
majority of Iraqis I met, both those who left in the nineties and the ones who joined them 
later in Jordan after 2003, were well-educated. In their stories, they described how certificates 
and academic titles were sources of living (before 1990s) as well as dignity at home, but 
university degrees and professional expertise gained from working in the previous state 
institutions became a source of danger in the New Iraq while their degrees were not valued 
when de-territorialized.  
 
The above family stories of expulsion from Iraq and search for safety in a new state imply the 
transformation in the Iraqi social space from one governed once by the hegemonic and 
despotic powers of state and police to one that is controlled by various acting bodies of 
primordial sectarian, ethnic and tribal origin: a transformation from conditions of modernism 
during the former four decades dominated by the state institutions in which these Iraqis 
participated as part of the state bureaucracy— into the decline of the state and the rise of 
disorder controlled by new actors such as the rising sectarian, ethnic and religious groups. 
 
Iraqis who had been professionals and state-employees in Baghdad had to learn how to 
extend their spaces of ʾamān/ safety by exploring the best conditions for family survival 
through tactics of negotiation with— and avoidance of— the limits imposed by Jordanian 
authorities and international organizations or through turning to other less formal networks 
inside Iraq or abroad. Their decisions were, most of the time, based on extending the 
possibilities of survival, as per one’s perception of what constitutes better living 
opportunities.  
 
In general, the economic conditions for the majority of these displaced Iraqis did not change 
much from the bad times of al-ḥiṣār, however, their daily routine changed when several 
government employees stopped going to work135 and education also stopped for a while, and 
                                                      
135 According to Sissons & Al-Saiedi (2013), the number of Iraqi civil service prior to 2003 is estimated from 
900,000 to more than a million, not counting the military. De-baathification committees were created in each 
ministry. Employees who had been senior party members were dismissed. The Ministry of Education was the 
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when it restarted, nothing seemed similar to how it was before 2003. One of the factors that 
affected the education and employment conditions was the increased role of political parties 
and sectarian militias in universities and other institutions formerly run by the state. In 
general, the salary scales improved after 2003 (for Iraqis who were allowed to work in the 
institutions of the New Iraq), but ʾamān became the biggest concern as repeated by several 
Iraqi professionals in the field: “one does not know when she or he leaves her/his house in the 
morning, whether they would return home that evening.”   
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
most affected, followed by the ministry of higher education and the Ministry of Health which came next. Many 







Our lives were turned upside down. One morning some of us woke up deprived of 
their future hopes when they lost all their past: home, job, status and rich social 
life and relations, while others woke up with a new future. You can see them in 
the rich neighborhoods of West Amman, they own large houses, hotels and 
manage prosperous businesses between Amman and Baghdad.136 
 
As in most cases of wars, there were losers and winners following the 2003 US-led invasion 
and occupation of Iraq, however, this was not the end of the story. The story of this thesis 
started with the experiences of former Baghdadi middle class state employees who were 
displaced in Jordan in 2010-2011, to conclude with the stories they shared about other 
experiences of gains and losses during the rise and decline of Iraqi state institutions from 
1960s‒2000s. Loss in the Iraqi context grew as a combination of series of losses Iraqis had to 
endure inside Iraq during years of state oppressive policies, wars and UN-imposed economic 
sanctions, the violence that erupted after 2003 and the destruction of state institutions; which 
prompted Iraqis to engage actively in learning how to live again by extending their space of 
ʾamān. The observations and stories collected in Jordan among Iraqis as displaced 
individuals, families and communities were explored within the wider historical and political 
contexts in which this group of Iraqis lived and survived in a war-torn society.  
 
I used ʾamān as one framework to contextualize and present the current experiences of 
displacement and survival of this group of former state employees and professionals, within 
the longer historical and political contexts of the rise and decline of modern state apparatus 
and relations. ʾAmān was the shared motivation among Iraqis fleeing the conditions of 
structural violence in Iraq. In Jordan, Iraqis had to experience additional conditions of 
marginalization as foreign workers or ‘refugees’ or guests and strangers who were constantly 
reminded that they should be polite, and disciplined to respect the limits. They all sought 
ʾamān but found it in various ways and scales, most of which pointed beyond the official 
protection space established by the UNHCR (and the development aid to the Jordanian 
government). Being Iraqis involved a complex relation to the possible as agents who had to 
deal with increasingly restricted and restrictive structures over the past four decades. My 
                                                      
136 Abu Omar, Iraqi engineer, 57 years old, I met him several times during my fieldwork (2010-2011) when I 
visited the family in their rented apartment.  
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observations among Iraqis in the field in Jordan (Chapters Three‒Five) and the stories shared 
about other troubling events with the post-colonial regime in Iraq (Chapters Six and Seven) 
show that these complex experiences cannot be reduced to experiences of victimization by 
state oppressive policies and ongoing wars and forced displacement. Similarly, making a 
space of ʾamān cannot be captured as one category of being Iraqi, after 2003, such as 
refugees or asylum seekers in Europe, or volunteers, or temporary and foreign workers in 
Amman or circular migrants between Iraq and Jordan. Being Iraqis after 2003 (and for some 
after 1991) was all of these, in addition to being professionals and state employees, fighters 
on the war front or builders of a strong nation, or survivors of bombing and severe regime of 
economic sanctions, as presented in the Iraqi stories of past experiences in Baghdad during 
1970s-2000s. The memories expressed in stories about recent and past incidents in Baghdad 
were not only nostalgic feelings but they were presented as embodied history of continuity in 
times of change. Making ʾamān is observed as a process which involved past experiences in 
the form of habitus, to build certain level of social continuity and create a feeling of safety 
and familiarity in conditions of structural change. Well-being or ʾamān, as observed in 
several cases was also relational, not restricted to the individual. It involved the well-being of 
family members, friends and the ʾamān of the larger Iraqi community through joining efforts 
in building the nation and sacrificing in the war-front in Iraq, and supporting fellow Iraqis in 
Amman, as we observed in the cases of several Iraqi professionals in Chapter Three, and also 
among Iraqi volunteers in Chapter Four.  
 
The ethnographic observations among former Iraqi state bureaucrats and professionals show 
that in the absence of clear structure of aid, these Iraqi professionals and state employees 
followed various paths in making their space(s) of ʾamān. Iraqis, with dwindling access to 
resources, had to learn how to accept the refugee label with its ‘promising’ entitlements, as 
well as reductionist effects. While, the highly skilled professionals who had access to some 
sources, could explore other possibilities to extend their space(s) of ʾamān such as living 
between Jordan and Iraq, or paying smugglers to help them move out of the region to search 
for safety in Europe. To understand the variety of Iraqi experiences presented in the 
individual stories, they were explored within the context of the changing role of Iraqi state in 
the two “transformative moments” (Masaad, 2001) during 1990s and 2003 which led to the 
displacement of high numbers of former Iraqi state employees. One important feature of 
social and cultural life in Iraq and the region was an accommodation of diverse ethno-
religious and linguistic communities particularly characteristic of the major cities within and 
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beyond the Ottoman empire (Chatty, 2010; Marfleet and Haneih, 2014). As explored in 
Chapter Seven, one of the collective losses shared by these former class of state employees 
was the loss of the communal life-style in inter-mixed urban Baghdadi neighborhoods, which 
gradually demised after 2003, especially after the forced displacement of  this group of state 
employees and professionals from Baghdad, who constitute “an entire layer of Iraqi society 
schooled in secular nationalist traditions” (Marfleet, 2007: 409).  
 
Abu Omar’s description of his losses in the beginning of this last chapter is indicative of the 
experiences of displaced Iraqis and their struggle to cope with changes when their lives 
turned up-side down. These former Iraqi state employees and highly skilled professionals in 
Amman where I met them in 2010-2011, seven years following the US-led invasion and 
occupation of Iraq were dealing with a combination of series of losses in their home country, 
in addition to the lack of an organized protection program in Jordan, the host country. Within 
such constrained and constraining structure by prolonged conditions of war and displacement, 
Iraqis, even in the same family, turned to explore various coping strategies in a complex 
relation to the possible. After 2003, Iraqis were not only struggling to cope with the loss of 
their jobs, property, loved ones and other aspects of their former cultural, social and 
professional Baghdadi life, many of them were searching for ways to avoid further losses and 
realize both current and future goals; a process which was described in this thesis as the 
search for ʾamān.  
 
This research explores the experiences of middle class state employees and highly skilled 
professionals with losing many aspects of their former lives when they lost access to regular 
salaried jobs and free education and other public services. Similar losses had been observed 
in other cases of regime change and collapse such as the case of the eastern bloc countries in 
1989-1990, which affected the ability of survival among families and communities as 
described by Don Kalb: 
“People complain that what they got from socialism – the chance to make and 
sustain a family, build a career around honest work, and maintain a house of one’s 
own – can’t so easily be gained today. The stories of decline are also about a 
keenly felt erosion of solidarity and communal life” (Kalb, 2011:25). 
 
Iraqi state employees expressed similar feelings of being “left behind, left on their own” 
(2011: 30),  in postinvasion Iraq as Kalb described in the case of postsocialist state 
employees. One important difference is that in the latter stories of state decline, people could 
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stay in their homes and country, but several Iraqi former government employees and 
professionals were forced to leave their homes with the destruction of the former state 
bureaucratic institutions in 1990s and 2000s and the decline of public services, when they had 
to deal with different levels of state violence in addition to the effects of the UN-imposed 
economic sanctions. Until 2003, many Iraqi state bureaucrats still tended to look at the state 
as the main source of protection as well as misfortune and oppression, however, the US-led 
attack on the oppressive regime and the state apparatus did not stop the violence, it 
redistributed its sources among various militias and sectarian groups. The destruction of 
former state apparatus left many Iraqis unprotected; they did not only lose control of their 
individual lives when they lost their working positions and access to state services, but they 
also lost the main source of protection of a former communal life. They had to learn how to 
avoid the violence coming from these different new ruling groups. The easiest way was to 
exit Iraq with either temporary or permanent intentions. 
 
The current study positioned the displacement and expulsion of Iraqi government employees 
within broader literature about social change during war-time and regime change. The 
transformations and changes in the institutional structures had affected the lives of once 
prosperous Baghdadi professionals and middle class government employees, who had to deal 
with different scales of change; from the former state apparatus to the spread of chaos and 
violence in the postinvasion period. The absence of unified governing regulations in Iraq and 
Jordan in 2010-2011 and their diverse access to resources led to different patterns of coping 
and livelihoods. The common denominator in most of the stories and experiences observed 
was the loss of ʾamān, as a result of the gradual decline of their former middle-class status 
linked to their relation to the Iraqi state as professionals and government employees. 
 
ʾAmān or its lack (mākū ʾamān) became the most common phrase to describe life in Iraq and 
the host state after 2003. For many former highly-skilled professionals and state employees 
ʾamān, after 2003, meant not being threatened, kidnapped or killed, therefore, moving out of 
Iraq seemed as the main coping strategy to extend the space of ʾamān. Iraqis described 
Jordan, and its capital Amman, as a safer place to be in, than in postinvasion Baghdad. 
Amman provided these former Iraqi state employees with access to safety, health and 
education, and other basic services including electricity, and more importantly freedom to 
move around and dress the way they pleased. Making a space of ʾamān was linked to 
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restoring some stability and life routine that Iraqis used to enjoy in their former Baghdadi 
lives. However, as we saw, this was not the case for all Iraqis.  
 
In their search for ʾamān, these Iraqis were not leading a pleasant or easy life, they had to 
deal with multiple forms of restrictions on entry, residence and access to labor and other 
essential services to reproduce their lives in a meaningful form according to their perceptions 
of what is a life worth living. The thesis presented several tactics and strategies adopted by 
these displaced groups of Iraqi professionals and state bureaucrats. One of the most important 
aspects was the ability to reconnect with a profession and employment activity that allowed 
more stable existence in the past, even if this meant exposing their lives to risks by returning 
to work in Iraq.  
 
Access to work for this group of displaced professionals seemed to play an important role in 
creating more familiar spaces of ʾamān by sustaining social status and relationships within 
the limited formal protection space (as explored in Chapter Five). Work here acted as a 
collective meaning of making ʾamān, and an opportunity to improve the well-being of the 
Iraqi collective through the anticipated return of qualified Iraqis and their persistence and 
hard-working nature. It was not only a ticket for individual return of highly qualified 
professionals, but it could be seen as a way to revive a Baghdadi society. This optimism 
towards the future of Iraq, as observed among few Iraqi professionals in Chapter Three was 
not common in my meetings with most Iraqis who had little connection with home. ʾAmān 
for highly skilled professionals who were not able to return to work in Iraq, also meant the 
ability of living in dignity and not “starting from zero”, as many medical doctors used to 
repeat.  
 
In the shrinking spaces of privatized systems in both Jordan and Iraq, the conditions of work 
were increasingly exploitative with minimal rights or benefits to workers. This forced some 
professionals to examine the alternative possibility of  ‘circular migration’ between Amman 
and Baghdad or their original tribal town in Iraq where they could locate a relatively safe and 
well-paid job in their profession, despite the high risks involved. This growing circularity of 
migration among Iraqis and later Syrians (Chatty, 2017a) in the Middle East challenges the 
prevailing assumptions and definitions of refugees and asylum-seekers. Iraqis, as we saw in 
Chapter Three, explored various other possibilities‒ than becoming refugees‒ including: 
working as skilled doctors and academics with reduced authority and payment in Jordan and 
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living as ‘circular migrant’ workers between Baghdad and Amman. Working in Iraq, for 
some of those highly-skilled professionals meant more secure economic returns and social 
relations, despite the existing risks that initially drew them out of the country.  
 
Making ʾamān in conditions -of reduction and -a complex relation to the possible  
The making of ʾamān was related to adjusting to the particular conditions of reduction as 
perceived by the various groups of Iraqis who were affected by the changes -characterized by 
the dismemberment of Iraqi state institutions and formal communal life style. The majority of 
Iraqis I met had been state-employees in Baghdad and were forced to leave Iraq under direct 
threat of death and had lost their jobs and means of living. Only few Iraqis, among the highly 
skilled professionals were able to find temporary jobs in Jordan. As explored in Chapters 3‒5, 
most had to choose among limited choices in restricted structures to extend their and their 
families spaces of ʾamān.  
 
The search for work and employment opportunities, which could provide a more regular 
source of income was a widely shared experience among former Iraqi state-employees, 
including those who gradually turned to the UNHCR for support, after failing to secure any 
kind of work. Relying on their past experiences of losses in times of wars and economic 
sanctions, on the one hand, and on their abilities to secure resources from social and financial 
remittances, on the other hand, Iraqis had to learn how to live and survive in increasingly 
restricted structures by following various routes.  
 
The stories of past experiences from 1960s‒2000s explored in Chapters Six and Seven 
provided the general political and historical background to contextualize the experiences 
observed among Iraqis in Jordan during 2010‒2011. By following the stories Iraqis shared in 
their ʾamān space, we learnt how their lives have been shaped by conditions of structural 
change in a once wealthy oil developmental state severely affected by three wars within two 
decades and thirteen years of comprehensive economic sanction. One relevant example is the 
various strategies Iraqi women and men developed during the times of war and sanctions, to 
extend the family access to ʾamān. The stories of 1980s in Chapter Six explored the 
gendering of the Iraqi public space and how women played a larger role in preserving both 
the daily family and institutional survival needs. During the times of war and sanctions at 
home, Iraqi women and men developed various strategies of survival: women played a larger 
280 
 
role in the so-called domestic front, when men were absent defending the ‘national pride’ on 
the war front. Similar trends were observed in the Iraqi survival experiences in Jordan 
(Chapters Four and Five). The women in impoverished Iraqi families were more proactive 
than men in seeking aid and voluntary jobs to secure the basic family needs in Amman, this 
can be partly attributed to the pattern observed in other times of crisis during wars and 
sanctions, but we need to take into consideration the objective chances in the new situation in 
Jordan, where men’s chances of finding voluntary or regular work were less possible.  
 
Contrary to the stories of 1970s and 1980s and part of 1990s which expressed collective 
representation of Iraqi losses and coping strategies, the stories of their survival after the US-
led occupation of Iraq in 2003-2011focused more on personal losses. In 2010, Iraqis did not 
have a collective force to teach them how to live and die in fighting another war as part of 
preserving national pride or surviving economic sanctions. The experiences and stories of 
Iraqi women and men in this ethnography presented examples of how the burden of 
negotiating survival possibilities fell mainly on Iraqi individuals and families who actively 
had to learn how to live again by making their own spaces of ʾamān. ʾAmān in its various 
meanings explored in this thesis, was one common theme shared by most Iraqis I met: while 
they tended to describe collective meanings of ʾamān (under a centralized state, especially in 
the good old times), the absence of collective solutions to Iraqis in Jordan (and elsewhere) 
forced them to investigate different options to measure the best possibility to regain part of 
the ʾamān they lost.  
 
Well-being or ʾamān, as termed by displaced Iraqis in Jordan, is related to being able to lead 
a life according to one’s expectations as a highly skilled professional. The stories Iraqis 
shared in 2010‒2011 in their spaces of ʾamān in Amman reflected also a big change in their 
perceptions of well-being. During the sixties and seventies, well-being was linked to being 
hardworking people and participating in building an Iraqi modern nation-state through 
investment in education and stable employment conditions in the public sector. However, 
after 2003, Iraqis’ notion of the state seemed unsettled when several Iraqis expressed their 
dream to become members of a State, any state that can provide them stability and good 
living opportunities, as explained in the cases of Amal and Sundos’ families in Chapter 
Seven. The former notion of the state—that once allowed a more collective presence of Iraqis 
as a national body not as individuals or factions divided in tribal, ethnic and sectarian 
groups—was severely attacked by the US-imposed constitution for governing the New Iraq. 
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Yet, the story of this collective loss was rarely shared among displaced Iraqis who were made 
visible under the collective identity of refugee only in 2007, and only in numbers to attract 
money for aid.  
 
We observed how these Iraqis who used to form part of the majority hegemonic elite as 
highly skilled state employees inside Iraq had to experience reduction in their well-being in 
Iraq and Jordan, when they were marginalized during the last four decades by various 
structures of change, including the militarization and liberalization of the state economy and 
the privatization policies during the late 1980s, and the extreme decline in state infrastructure 
and rising conditions of impoverishment during the UN-imposed sanctions in the 1990s, until 
the large scale destruction of former state-institutions and communal urban life style which 
led to their expulsion from Iraq. As presented in Chapters 3‒5, the highly skilled Iraqi 
professionals and other state-employees who used to occupy elite positions in the Iraqi labor 
market during the last three decades (1960s‒1980s) had to explore among a few possibilities 
to extend the limits of their being-in-the-world according to their perceptions of well-being or 
ʾamān from where they came as professionals and state-employees. To explain the various 
scales of agency explored in the thesis, I used Lubkemann’s description of structural violence 
in prolonged conditions of war:  “a function of how far one has come from where one once 
was, rather than a common destination that is reached” (2008, 346).  
 
Feeling safe and being in ʾamān, as explored in the chapters of this thesis had different 
meanings for Iraqis, depending on the period in question. We saw that the past experiences of 
good life on the one hand, and experiences of losses in times of wars and economic sanctions, 
on the other hand, were present in the Iraqis’ attempts to search for ʾamān. Coping with the 
changing conditions after 2003 has not been a new experience totally for Iraqis. In some 
ways, the present coping tactics with reduction in possibilities to work and leading a middle 
class life in Amman could be seen as a presence-of-past experiences with reduction that 
governed Iraqi lives during times of war and the severe UN-economic sanctions. In this 
sense, the making of ʾamān is a process embedded in history, the past experiences functioned 
in a similar way to what Bourdieu described as habitus. Iraqis were active in shaping their 
present space of ʾamān, not only as a response to the changes after 2003, but also as part of 
habitus that seemed to play an important role in their continuity to exist according to their 




While, the highly skilled professionals, who had access to more sources could explore more 
possibilities to extend their space(s) of ʾamān, such as working in reduced conditions in 
Jordan as the doctor-volunteer or as academics on temporary contracts, other highly skilled 
professionals turned to circular migration and living between Jordan and Iraq (Chapter 
Three), while others, like Amal in Chapter Seven wanted to move further away where they 
expected to find more favorable conditions of labor under the protection of a strong ‘State’, 
and some of them invested lots of wasted money, tears and efforts in paying smugglers to 
help them search for safety in Europe. However, impoverished Iraqis, with dwindling access 
to resources, had no choice but to turn to the UNHCR for protection as we followed in 
Chapter Four, they had to learn how to accept the refugee label with its limited advantages of 
voluntary work and ‘salary’ as well as reductionist effects.  
 
In the encounters I observed among less-affluent and impoverished former state employees 
and professionals, they had to cope with the reductionist conditions of becoming a refugee, 
which seemed like the only solution to gain some access to present (limited aid) or future 
ʾamān (resettlement in a third country). Many times, though not always, it was part of a 
larger strategy of survival to create some certainty, through quantifying one’s needs 
according to the conditions of aid to be eligible for gaining access to cash assistance and 
paying their monthly house rent or daily travel allowance, which they appropriated as rātib 
(salary), or ‘work’ as trainer volunteers or trainees. In Chapter Four, we saw how Iraqis 
struggled to adjust their appearance in the formal protection space to how they were expected 
to look like and behave. Obtaining a job, even as volunteer, seemed like the best choice to 
extend their access to ‘salary’ and also dignity and ʾamān, as expressed by these former 
government employees. This involved a process of negotiations to survive the ambiguous 
terms of losses and gains in Jordan, as explained in Chapter Five. We observed how Iraqis 
had to re-discipline their needs within restricted limits in the already limited formal space of 
protection in neighboring countries.  
 
For most Iraqi professionals, practicing their careers and securing higher education for their 
sons and daughters were not only considered essential needs, but were part of the continuity 
of their social status and cultural being as members of middle-class Baghdadi communities. 
The limited official protection space and absence of welfare programs within the neo-liberal 
agenda ‘to help individual “refugees” to help themselves’ forced many Iraqis to re-define 
their well-being within the possible limits. Most of them had to work in temporary jobs or 
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illegally and were paid less than Jordanians doing similar or lower-level jobs. Making their 
spaces of ʾamān was not less complex for academics, medical doctors and other qualified 
professionals. The ‘lucky’ ones who could find temporary jobs used to complain that they 
were facing discrimination and had to work below their qualifications. Categorized as foreign 
workers, after 2003, Iraqi academics and doctors employed by Jordanian private universities 
and hospitals seemed regular on paper but when it comes to working conditions, being a 
temporary employee on annual contract increased their feelings of insecurity and limited their 
responsibilities and rights as official workers.  
 
The processes described cannot be reduced to structural change with absent agents, Iraqis as 
observed were not helpless or power-less, and they exercised various levels of agency to cope 
with structural violence and change. Some of them expressed larger scales of change “from 
where [they] once [were]”, as in the cases of the doctor, academic and nuclear engineer 
presented in Chapter Three (Possibility 3), who all used to work as qualified professionals in 
their home country, but in Jordan they had to accept any available work as secondary and de-
valued labor. Other highly-skilled professionals who had some access to material resources 
could practice their professions at various levels as temporary workers and volunteers and 
preserve their former social status and professional life style, while Iraqis who had access to 
financial capital and sectarian, ethnic or tribal support in Iraq took the risk to return and work 
under the protection of their sectarian or tribal ruling groups of the New Iraq.  
 
The decision to stay in Amman or move back to (and from) Iraq depended on their access to 
capital: both financial, social and symbolic. As presented in chapters 3‒5, Iraqis realized that 
they could extend their space(s) of ʾamān in Jordan, through buying a residence permit that 
was officially given to foreign investors (or by seeking the benefit of a royal decree). This 
meant that the ability to secure ʾamān in Jordan was not possible for all Iraqis at the same 
scale; some Iraqis could enjoy better living conditions and mobility rights than others who 
had to endure gradual decline in their ʾamān (well-being) possibilities, and eventually, had to 
negotiate the terms of temporary survival, and learn the rules for becoming a refugee, in order 
to be included in the restrictive protection space that is conditioned by the visibility of need 
and –lessness (Chapter Four).  
 
According to my observations in the field, one important factor in extending the space of 
ʾamān was Iraqis’ access to financial support and remittances sent from Iraq or relatives 
284 
 
based elsewhere in Europe or the Gulf, in addition to the money initially brought from Iraq 
either from savings or selling properties. Being able to pay the deposit of $ 50,000 (and 
freeze $ 25,000 in a Jordanian bank) allowed easier circular mobility for Iraqi highly skilled 
professionals to work and live between Amman and Iraq. Therefore, perceptions of well-
being among these more affluent highly qualified professionals varied according to their age 
and access to social connections.  
 
Having the right social connections in Amman and Baghdad was another factor in allowing 
circular mobility. Iraqi professionals and state-employees know from their previous 
experiences with wars and living with an oppressive regime that establishing strong social 
networks with influential figures in the government is important to protect one’s life, family 
and property. For the highly skilled professionals who could afford to return and work inside 
Iraq, this option was perceived as the best possibility for extending the space of ʾamān and 
well-being not only for their families (who were living in Jordan to enjoy better services), but 
also as part of renewing their national aspirations of rebuilding a strong Iraq, as explored with 
detailed ethnographic cases in Chapter Three. This return was not the safest choice, but these 
professionals learnt that similarly to the pre-2003 times, ʾamān for postinvasion displaced 
Iraqis was realized in relational terms; this time it was more related to affiliation to one’s 
tribe and particular sectarian group or militia. The Iraqi professionals who took the risk to 
return had to learn how to live and work without the protection of the state, eventually, they 
had to negotiate with the rising ruling militias and sectarian groups to gain their protection 
and purchase rights to private protection services ranging from electricity to property 
protection. As we explored in Chapter Three in the case of the doctor who returned to work 
under the protection of his tribal group, and other doctors and academics who had to rely on 
their ethnic and sectarian affiliations to secure job positions and safety, this older generation 
of Iraqis often expressed their refusal of sectarian and factional thinking but with the 
privatization of security and most services in postinvasion Iraq, Iraqis had to arrange for their 
own safety and protection through relational networks and/or purchasing security services. I 
heard several stories about the eve of the US-led invasion, when some Iraqis had access to a 
personal gun, but later they had to buy additional weapons to protect themselves and their 
belongings, as a former Iraqi employee in the Ministry of Trade explained: “I bought a 
machine gun in 2005, as my neighbors did but it wasn’t enough because the militia men 
started using mortar shells, and 4x4 jeeps in kidnapping school students, so I decided to leave 




In the case of other highly skilled professionals who could not establish similar networks of 
protection inside Iraq, making their space of ʾamān was perceived as creating a possibility of 
practicing their profession in Amman as volunteers or hired employees on temporary or 
contract basis. They saw this choice as acceptable as they could treat Iraqi patients and teach 
Iraqi students. This compensated for the relatively low returns of employment in Jordan, and 
was considered, by highly skilled professionals from the older generation, better than the 
possibility of third country resettlement, where they expected to end up sitting alone at home. 
The relational aspect of survival was not based on blood ties only, Iraqis were active agents 
in the process of extending the space of ʾamān for themselves, their families and households 
and their fellow Iraqis. This was observed in both Iraq as in the examples mentioned above 
and in Jordan, where we saw aspects of these relational networks in cases of households 
composed of young male or female Iraqis sharing apartments in Amman to survive on the 
minimal aid provided by refugee protection networks.  
 
As explored in Chapters 3‒5, there was little space for establishing relational networks 
among Iraqis in the official protection space in Jordan. The music incident described in the 
closing section of Chapter Five was one rare opportunity in the official protection space in 
Jordan to reflect collectively on the meanings of loss and ʾamān in the Iraqi social life 
throughout a longer history of structural change. The Iraqi women’s request from the Italian 
musician to play an Iraqi song; what they called a “real” song represented a chance to create a 
space of ʾamān for sharing their story(s) in the official space of protection managed by aid 
organizations in Jordan and funded by the UNHCR. This was a chance to go back to Iraq and 
express their happy and sad experiences through singing and dancing. This was the only 
chance when I observed Iraqis sharing their stories collectively in the public space in Jordan, 
while I had the chance to listen to several stories Iraqis shared in the spaces of ʾamān about 
the changes they had to endure during the last four decades in both Iraq and Jordan and how 
they actively coped with and responded to those changes as explored in Chapters Six and 
Seven.  
 
The coping strategies in some cases, such as in the cases of Amal’s family in Chapter Seven 
and Abu-Hussein’s family in Chapter Six which involved the split of the family and the 
separation of parents and sons/daughters, might be perceived as failing coping strategies (or 
attempts), which led to further reduction according to the Iraqi common perception of ʾamān 
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in relational terms, however, understanding these cases within the larger context of structural 
change in which Iraqis had to learn how to live with losses and gains, such coping strategies 
can be perceived as attempts to accumulate some gains, and/or avoid further losses in the 
future, even though this separation might seem, to an outsider, as the worst choice these 
Iraqis could make to deal with their present losses.  
 
As I argued in Chapter Three, the cases of ʿcircular migrationʾ embodied the most proactive 
form of agency. The highly-skilled Iraqi professionals who decided to work and live between 
Amman and Iraq did not only consider the probable option that is constituted in the 
prolonged relationship with a world structured according to the categoris of the possible and 
the impossible; “of what is appropriated in advance and what one can reasonably expect for 
oneself” (Bourdieu, 1990). These professionals refused the limited possibilities imposed by a 
world structured according to the “national order of things” (Said, 1986; Malkki, 1994, 
1995a), instead they negotiated new possibilities to preserve their ʾamān (and well-being) in 
the world as hard-working professionals, regardless of imposed borders and restrictions on 
mobility. As agents in these conditions of structural change, Iraqis had to  “adjust to the 
objective chances” of satisfying their desire to work in reductionist conditions, and “so to 
become accomplices of the processes that tend to make the probable a reality” (Bourdieu, 
1990: 65), similarly to what they did in 1990s during the sanctions period. The highly-skilled 
professionals were not alone in meeting such challenges, the process of becoming a refugee 
was not less complex, at various scales.  
 
Observing the various coping strategies among this group of Iraqi professionals and listening 
to the stories they share after 2003 reveal that ʾamān was not only dependent on access to 
resources from Iraq and the limited official protection provided in Jordan (which was lacking 
for many Iraqis I met), it was also embedded in the Iraqi habitus, which I called in this thesis 
ʾamān. This ʾamān habitus is reflected in the capacity of Iraqis to engender thoughts and 
actions to adjust to the new conditions of reduction in postinvasion Iraq and host states. It is 
an embodied experience within the larger Iraqi historical and social experiences with 




Moving between different labels and places: Re-thinking the ‘refugee discourse’ 
as a framework of researching forced displacement  
 
Iraqis had a long history with mobility and forced displacement. As explored in Chapter 
Seven, forced displacement and/or being-on-the-move was not a new strategy Iraqis used to 
cope with structural change. Moving out of Iraq was in itself one of the coping strategies 
among this group of former Iraqi state employees. There was no one common pattern in the 
Iraqi crossing of borders after 2003, and in many cases it was not an immediate choice. As 
explored with Iraqis’ experiences in the previous chapters, many families, even those who 
had capital and connections abroad, tried several strategies before making the ‘final’ decision 
to cross the borders of their home country. They negotiated with neighbors on survival 
tactics, tried to keep their jobs and their kids at school. Some tried to temporarily move to 
various towns and cities inside Iraq. Even after moving out of their country, some decided to 
keep their property by asking relatives or friends and neighbors to stay in the house, what was 
called as ḥirāsa حراسة (guarding) in the Iraqi lexicon of war. Others with fewer resources, had 
no alternative but to sell their belongings to secure the money they needed to cover 
transportation expenses, visas, smuggling services, renewal of passports and certification of 
school and university degrees that could not happen quickly without bribery in the growing 
culture of nepotism in the New Iraq.  
  
As explored in Chapter Seven, asylum and displacement were not new occurrences in the 
Iraqi context (Chatelard, 2005, 2008). In 2003, Iraqis living outside their country as refugees 
or asylum seekers or diaspora were estimated to reach 3- 4 million. Chatelared reported that 
more than one million Iraqis left Iraq over the 13 years of the sanctions especially from the 
middle class as a result of impoverishment due to hyperinflation, loss of employment or 
wages, limitations of public liberties, and long years of military conscription. Over 300,000 
Iraqis have requested asylum in a Western country since 1991. In most cases, they have 
reached their countries of final destination through irregular channels after transiting Turkey, 
Syria or Jordan (2005: 344). In 2000, Iraqis reached the highest rate of asylum seekers 
worldwide: 41,000 applications according to the UNHCR. In 2002, Iraqis constituted the 
third largest refugee caseload in the world, and human rights organisations were arguing that 
half of the Iraqis residing abroad had a well-founded fear of persecution were they to return 
under the regime of Saddam Husayn (Chatelard, 2008). In the experiences observed and 
stories told by Iraqis in the field, I realized that despite a long history of forced migration, the 
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terms “refugee” and “asylum seeker” were less commonly used by Iraqis to describe their 
displacement.  
 
As explored in Chapters Two and Five, Iraqis used other terms to describe their forced 
displacement, such as exile (manfy or mughtarib) and emigrant (muhājir), migrant worker or 
guest. These labels signify more collective experiences than the notion of the individual 
refugee. Nadje al-Ali defined the Iraqi diaspora as “a conflict-generated diaspora.” She 
argues that forced migration cannot simply be contrasted with voluntary or economic 
migration. Rather, there exists a continuum between flight in a situation of conflict and acute 
danger and  migration in a pre-conflict yet tension-ridden period. In her view, Iraq is a case in 
point, presenting a continuum of economically driven migrants, especially under economic 
sanctions (1991-2003), who were part of a political crisis together with political refugees 
fleeing the persecution, torture and repression of the dictatorship of Saddam Husayn (1979-
2003). According to al-Ali, the current displacement needs to be seen in the context of a 
longer history of various forms of migration–for education, labor and from persecution‒well 
before the rise of the Baath (2007b).   
 
In 1990s, migration, particularly of highly-skilled professionals, played an important role in 
terms of securing more rewarding employment opportunities in the hospitals and universities 
of neighboring countries (or elsewhere in Europe (Dewachi, 2017) for Iraqis who were 
seeking asylum). Moving out of Iraq in 1990s was related, as we read in Chapter Seven, to 
Iraqis’ search of rewarding jobs and better medical treatment and education services for their 
kids (the two sectors that were highly affected by the UN economic sanctions). After 2003, 
the term refugee was more commonly used to describe Iraqi presence in neighboring 
countries, especially in humanitarian aid organizations reports and few academic studies. 
Iraqis in Jordan were labeled as migrant workers, foreign workers, guests, asylum seekers or 
refugees waiting for resettlement in a third country. Rather than developing collective 
identities around one of these labels, Iraqis moved between unsettled categories and 
localities. In conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty about the limits of protection in Jordan, 
it was not always possible to draw a clear cutline between who is included in the space of 
protection and who is excluded from it. Crossing their country’s borders in search for safety 
was a complex process in which Iraqis had to explore various possibilities, of which 




Anthropological research on forced displacement and refugees have addressed the 
problematic encounter between refugees and protection systems which tend to construct the 
refugee as an object and category of intervention by an international protection and relief 
regime (Peteet, 2005a). In a review of refugee studies by Malkki (1995b), she shows how the 
discourse‒ presented by anthropologists and other reports produced by international 
organizations and human rights agencies‒ does not only construct refugees as “people who 
can find themselves quite quickly rising to a floating world either beyond or above politics, 
and beyond or above history, but refugees also tend to be constructed in these studies as 
simply being victims” (ibid., 518). This reductionist effect of the humanitarian aid and 
discourse, which is linked to victimization is explored in ethnographic studies of refugees in 
various localities (Fassin, 2011; Feldman, 2009; Peteet, 2005a). The problem stems from the 
disempowering and reductionist aspects of the humanitarian system that preconditions 
protection on ‘visible’ vulnerability and victimization; which certainly fits with what I 
discussed in Chapter Four as the conditions of –lessness.  
 
It is true that refugees are usually victims of atrocities in times of war. But by emphasizing 
the victimization of refugees at the expense of revealing the forces in the field that reproduce 
this victimization; and by using the ready-made terminology and measures of international 
agencies and ignoring the larger political and historical contexts, a researcher can only 
produce a reductionist reading of the field. The process is similar to what Nietzsche described 
in his criticism of the simplification of reality through “reducing something unknown to 
something known [which] calms the mind and also gives a sense of power” (Bourdieu, 
Chamboredon and Passeron, 1991 [1968]: 25). As argued in this thesis, exploring the 
encounters among Iraqis and the limited systems of aid reveals the complexity of establishing 
a protection space through measuring loss by the reduced image of refugee as a ‘bare life’. 
 
Through reference to broader debates about protection, refugees and agency in relation to the 
Iraqi displacement, I attempt to explore another framework for explaining life and survival in 
conditions of reduction during times of war, regime change, destruction of former living 
conditions and forced displacement. In these debates, researchers and academics have dealt 
with the challenges involved in the humanitarian response to the Iraqi refugee problem. 
Perveen Ali uses methods of critical legal geography to map and analyze how states, 
institutional and individual practices reproduced, intersected with, or contested sovereignty 
and exceptionalism in what she terms the four spaces of the Iraqi refugee crisis: the Iraqi 
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state, host states in the region, camps in the borderlands, and resettlement. Using Agamben’s 
theory of sovereignty, she relies on experiences and observations during her work in the 
UNHCR Iraqi resettlement program to examine how sovereignty was expressed, naturalized, 
or contested in the Iraqi refugee crisis. Ali argues that Iraqi refugees, their legal status and the 
spaces they occupied came to embody the contests for identity, power, and authority lodged 
between states, local actors, and the UNHCR (2012: 14-15).  
 
Another researcher who explored international protection systems provided for Iraqis in the 
region is Sophia Hoffman in her study among Iraqi refugees in Syria. According to 
Hoffman’s description, Iraqis’ collective presence was more visible in Damascus (than 
Amman) through Iraqi cultural societies and mutual-aid organizations (Hoffman, 2016:8). 
Hoffman argued that international aid organizations introduced a different concept of “state-
citizen relations” and a different concept of “statehood” to Syria. According to Hoffman, the 
roots of this development lie in the importance that liberal states give to stringently 
distinguishing between citizens and foreigners, as she discussed: “To maintain their 
boundaries and sovereignty, liberal states require a constant differentiation between those 
who belong to the nation and those who do not. Refugee-aid organizations follow this 
concept of statehood. But in Syria, and the politics of the Bashar al-Asad government, 
marking foreigners as different was by far not as important.” This, according to Hoffman, 
explains why Iraqi migrants encountered much greater “freedoms” in Syria than those usually 
allocated to migrants in Western states” (2016: 9-12). 
 
Another relevant argument to Hoffman’s discussion above was presented by Dawn Chatty in 
which she explored the “disconnect between international rights-based protection approaches 
to refugees and what she called the duty-based asylum (karam) commonly accepted in 
Middle Eastern societies” (2017b, 177). According to Chatty, Iraqi and Syrian exiles and 
refugees have regularly confounded the international system of humanitarianism, for 
example, Iraqis did not flee their country when expected to, nor did they return in the 
numbers expected by the UNHCR after 2011. Chatty explains that the Iraqi rejection of 
camps caught the international community off guard and has since resulted in a rethink at 
UNHCR and other refugee agencies. Only a few years ago, refugees who evaded camps were 
‘criminalized’ for such acts. However in 2009, largely as a result of the Iraqi crisis, UNHCR 
issued new guidelines to address the bureaucratic requirements for effectively dealing with 
the urban, self-settled refugee  (ibid., 195). This applied to the specific Iraqi refugee 
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population in Syria and Jordan, and as Chatty explained it became a ‘gold standard’ for 
UNHCR operations. But as she further adds these “innovative measures to assist the self-
settled are being tested piecemeal by various agencies” and for example in the complex 
Syrian humanitarian crisis these lessons learnt  from the Iraqi crisis have proven 
extraordinarily difficult to operationalize (Chatty, 2017b: 180).  
 
Chatty’s analysis of the history of displacement in the region provides interesting insights of 
alternative ways to deal with complex forced migration. She refers particularly to the Middle 
Eastern constructions of duty-based obligations to the guest, stranger, and person-in-need or 
what she describes as generosity, solidarity and hospitality using the Arabic term “karam.” 
And towards the end of her article, she promotes what she calls a “holistic approach” which 
taps into the social and ethical norms of hospitality in local contexts together with the 
delivery of rights-based asylum as provided by international humanitarian organizations 
(which is currently limited in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon that are not signatory to the 1951 
convention on the status of refugees). Though she is more concerned in exploring the two 
approaches, Chatty also referred to the limited space created by the duty response which 
forced refugees in huge numbers to take dangerous journeys in the Mediterranean,  as she 
describes: “it is no wonder that the ‘house’ has become full and some of those seeking 
asylum have had to look further afield to the northern shores of the Mediterranean. This one 
might say is what happens when a duty-based approach faces the pressure of extreme 
numbers; some will need to move on” (ibid.,195). Chatty presents more detailed ethnographic 
cases in her book Syria: The Making and Unmaking of a Refugee State, of the decisive role of 
historical ties and other links with local communities in the choices of Syrian refugees in 
neighboring countries to live outside the UNHCR camps, where they could enjoy more 
freedom of mobility, especially to travel between Syria and their camps; what Chatty calls 
“circular migration” (2017: 226-246).  
 
Geraldine Chatelard, another anthropologist who did several research studies among Iraqis in 
Jordan indicated that a humanitarian agenda serves Jordan’s governmental interests better 
than those of Iraqis who have had no choice but to look for safety and a future outside of their 
country (2008). Chatelard emphasizes the continuum of Iraqi migration. She explains that 
Iraqis started to talk about themselves as refugees or asylum-seekers in the post-1990s with 
the growth of the non-entry policies that most wealthy states started to adopt. The categories 
of refugees and asylum seekers were used to acquire legal status through asylum regimes, but 
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they did not use these terms to qualify Iraqi migrants collectively (2009b: 9). Chatelard 
looked critically at the humanitarian response to the recent Iraqi flow and argued against 
isolating the current wave of Iraqi flow after 2003 from what she calls a continuum of forced 
or induced migration from Iraq going back decades with a marked trend towards acceleration 
as of 1991, and again as of 2005. Recent refugee flows from Iraq, according to her, have to be 
considered in relation with vast pre-existing Iraqi diasporas (2008, 2009b). Furthermore, 
Chatelard criticized the way NGOs and international organizations have tended to adopt a 
needs-based approach or a rights-based approach without considering individual migrants as 
resourceful individuals. These agencies, according to Chatelard have been designated to the 
Iraqi refugee crisis less because of the number and conditions of forced-migrants than 
because of political agendas and imperatives of institutional survival. One of the aims of this 
political agenda is conceptualized as burden-sharing, which finds its origin in the 
international refugee regime and has been advocated by the humanitarian community to 
provide incentives to Iraq’s neighbors to act in the interest of enhanced protection for Iraqi 
refugees as a means to contain forced migrants in their regions of origin.  
 
I agree with both Chatelard’s and Chatty’s arguments against isolating this wave of Iraqi 
displacement from former experiences of Iraqi displacement and forced migration, and the 
importance of exploring historical experiences of displacement which reflect alternative 
notions of hospitality and solidarity in the region (Chatty, 2017: 189). However, as explored 
ethnographically in Chapters Four and Five in this thesis, I do not see the current Iraqi 
expulsion as just another wave in a continuum of Iraqi migration resulting from “a new 
conflict and a regime change” as expressed by Chatelard (2008).  
 
I suggest that the context of the current expulsion needs to be explored within the broader 
historical and political context that affected this group of middle class Baghdadi state 
employees; namely, the dismantling of the post-colonial Iraqi nation-state and the great 
changes it brought into the Iraqi political, economic and social life. This did not only produce 
another episode of displacement: the Iraqi displacement following the 2003 events did not 
only displace Iraqis as individuals, but it unsettled the notion of the nation-state that once 
bound them as a collective national body to be replaced by tribal communities from different 




My journey with Iraqis revealed that their problem with the minimal aid does not result from 
excluding them from the more visible humanitarian protection system by depriving them of 
the label of refugee and the collective space of the refugee camp.137 I argued in Chapter Five 
that the problem lies in the notion of refugee, which was once assigned by international law 
and the reductionist aspect of the humanitarian aid discourse in the current neoliberal context 
with its focus on a development-oriented approach. The problem also stems from the 
disempowering and degrading aspects of the humanitarian system that preconditions 
protection on vulnerability and victimization; what I term as the conditions of –lessness 
(Chapter Four), while ignoring the historical and political context of the specific 
displacement and displaced group.  
 
The aid provided to Iraqis in Jordan was limited and based on a developmental rather than 
humanitarian approach. The thesis explored several aspects of the exclusionary effects of the 
formal protection and aid systems and how Iraqis responded to the ambiguity and uncertainty 
by which their protracted displacement was managed, through negotiating the limits allowed 
to live and work in Jordan in relational terms. Regardless of the formal label designated to 
these flows of people through borders, displacement and refugeeism have become a regular 
feature of our times. As Minh-ha described it for another region:  
“No longer an extraordinary occurrence that requires a temporary solution, […] 
refugeeism a matter of life or death for many, the act of crossing overland and 
oversea to seek asylum in unknown territories is often carried out-especially in 
mass flight—as an escape alone, with no specific haven of refuge in mind. Thus, 
the creation of refugees remains bound to the historical forces and political events 
that precipitate it” (2011: 46). 
 
Unlike other cases of prolonged forced displacement in the region, such as the case of 
Palestinian refugees, the “refugee” label was not adopted as a collective identity in this Iraqi 
case of displacement. The use of ‘refugee’ by Iraqis was more related to increasing their 
space of ʾamān through access to aid and less commonly through attempts to connect with 
other Iraqis in the field by relating to their past way of life (and losses), as we observed in the 
music event in Chapter Five. This event was one of the moments in my research that forced 
me to move with Iraqis in the field, beyond the categories used by the official bodies of 
protection in the host country, and explore the experiences and stories shared by Iraqis within 
                                                      
137 Julie Peteet presented a strong argument in her brief analysis of the minimal international response to the 
Iraqi displacement in her discussion of why the US ignored the humanitarian crisis that it was responsible for 
creating (2007: 8-9). 
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the wider historical and political context (Chapters Six and Seven). By ethnographically 
exploring the Iraqi encounters in the formal space of protection in Jordan and listening to the 
stories they share about the presence and absence of ʾamān (well-being) in both countries 
(Iraq and Jordan), the current thesis argued that becoming a refugee was only one mode of 
survival—one that was limited and not available to all Iraqis in this case, and that for many 
was not the desired choice. In the current conditions for international aid in a global context 
which promote linking developmental aid to host countries with humanitarian aid to refugees, 
while ignoring the historical and political factors produced a protection system that led to 
increasing the restricted and restrictive structures these displaced Iraqis had to deal with, as I 
argued in Chapters Four and Five.  
 
The thesis presents ʾamān as a concept to explore Iraqis’ current and past experiences with 
conditions of structural violence through following the changes in their perceptions of well-
being with the presence and absence of protection systems in Jordan (as reflected in the 
conditions of development aid) on the one hand, and the presence and absence of state 
regulatory policies in the various periods discussed inside Iraq, as narrated by Iraqis, on the 
other hand (Chapters Six and Seven). I used the concept of the space of ʾamān as a productive 
concept in Lefebvre’s sense; it serves to explore the social space produced by Iraqi Baghdadi 
urban communities, as an outcome of a process or “a field of action” (1991:191): “the 
outcome of past actions”, and “what permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others 
and prohibiting yet others” (1991: 73). As elaborated in the thesis, the production of the space 
of ʾamān involved relationships and networks among family, friends and relatives, it was not 
related only to responding to the present needs of survival, ʾamān was measured against what 
these former Baghdadi professionals and state-employees perceived as well-being and ʾamān, 
taking into consideration the changes they had to endure in the longer period between mid-
1960s‒2011, in addition to the future possibilities they aspired to achieve. The experiences 
and accounts of this group portrayed the complex effects of larger political and global 
changes on their personal lives during times of big changes.  
 
The conditions of war and refuge had imposed on this group a complex structure of human 
relations to the possible(s). The variety in the experiences of ʾamān making can be attributed 
also to the lack of a strong protection and aid structure in Jordan. Iraqis had to negotiate the 
terms of losses and gains among several actors in the field — at the national level (the former 
regime relations and the rising ruling groups in the New Iraq based on sectarian, ethnic and 
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other private interests and affiliations), regional (neighboring state authorities and people), 
and global (UNHCR, and other international organizations, resettlement countries, especially 
the United States as an employer inside Iraq, aid provider and migration destination, the allies 
army, al-Qaida (ISIS), etc.)—in addition to the players who evolved from the complex set of 
relations and interests among these actors, including social networks and organizations, 
smugglers and militias. Negotiating with various actors and moving among different labels 
produced complex forms of agency among Iraqis who had to deal with various scales of 
restrictive and restricting structures. This meant that each Iraqi family had to depend on the 
resources and relations they had access to in their hiding space in Iraq and temporary space of 
protection in Jordan to create the best possible conditions for their family survival. According 
to available resources, Iraqis were able to transcend some of the structural restrictions, and 
engender new actions and expressions which seemed adjusted to the historical and social 
conditions in which their ʾamān habitus was constituted. The work of Bourdieu is useful here 
in exploring the complex set of relations in moments of crisis “when the social world loses its 
character as a natural phenomenon”, the crisis conditions in this case could provide the 
condition for questioning and criticizing the situation that is usually taken for granted 
(Bourdieu, 2010 [1977]: 169).   
 
The new situation in Iraq, and in the Middle East at large, imposed new representations on 
the inhabitants of the countries in the region. Being in the New Iraq, after 2003, is determined 
by one’s sect, ethnicity, religion and your former relationship to the state/ regime. This 
affected entire communities who felt that they had no place in the new social fabric of the 
country despite their ancient presence in the area, as expressed by several Christians, Sabeans 
and Yazidis I met in the field.138 In other stories, families turned to the tribe for help to 
release their kidnapped sons and daughters. While one of the Christian families I met told me 
that his family had no future in the New Iraq because they did not have a tribe to protect 
them.      
 
The liberalization program of the CPA (the Coalition Provisional Authority in postinvasion 
Iraq) rendered hundreds of thousands former Iraqi civil and military employees jobless, 
                                                      
138 During 2010-2011, I met few Yazidis and several Christian families who left their homes in Baghdad after 
receiving direct threats. This was before the attacks of ISIS (Daish) in 2014. However in August 2014, the so-
called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attacked the Yazidi communities living for centuries in the area of 
Mount Sinjar in Nineveh governorate, and killed and kidnapped thousands, while others who managed to flee 
escaped to the Kurdish areas (see Cetorelli et al, 2017).  
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throwing whole communities who relied upon income from the state into crisis. The 
immediate effects of dismantling the Iraqi state did not result into mass refugee influx as per 
UNHCR and other studies, the studies attribute this to the Iraqis’ coping mechanisms 
developed over the course of two decades of wars and sanctions (Marfleet: 2007). However, 
the economic and social effects of this radical destruction of the state accumulated gradually 
to sweep away an “entire layer of Iraqi society schooled in secular nationalist traditions” 
(notwithstanding the complex ethno-religious makeup of the state created by Britain in the 
1920s, the postcolonial order was assertively secular). 
 
To understand the displacement experiences of former Iraqi bureaucrats and professionals I 
met in Amman in the years 2010 and 2011, this thesis explored ethnographically how do 
Iraqis learn to live again and reformulate a sense of well-being (or ʾamān) after the 
destruction of many aspects of their familiar social world. By following the experiences of 
Iraqi professionals and state-bureaucrats with the making of ʾamān, the thesis asked kind of a 
“Zafimaniry question”: How humans deal with loss and reduction in their being-in-the-world 
due to social transformations— whether imposed by regimes, wars, invaders and forced 
displacement— as active agents, and not only as victims of oppressive structures?  
 
In the absence of a strong central state, the new ruling sectarian parties and militias started to 
exert a much stronger influence in Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003. The invasion later 
became military occupation which lasted until mid-December 2011, when the American 
President Obama formally declared an end to the Iraq war. The war, as described by Iraqis 
who witnessed it, resulted in many casualties, but the most striking in this war (as expressed 
by the main participants in this thesis) was the targeting of specific groups including state 
bureaucrats and professionals. In the opening quote to this thesis final chapter, Abu-Omar 
referred to other Iraqis who had benefited from joining the new regime’s militias and 
businesses, not necessarily in its formal programs, but through taking part in the acts of 
violence and looting that commenced in the first week of the invasion. I did not meet Iraqis 
from the latter group who were interested to share their stories “with gains” but the news 
coming from Iraq during the hot summer of 2019 presented protests of angry Iraqis over the 
corruption and theft of the country resources and the government’s failure to provide basic 
services like electricity and water in the second largest oil producer country in OPEC. Iraq is 
described in media reports among the most corrupt countries; or a “kleptomaniac state” as 
Patrick Cockburn wrote: “where hundreds of billions of dollars have disappeared into the 
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pockets of the ruling elite over the past 15 years, while everybody else endures shortages of 
everything from jobs and houses to water and electricity.”139  
 
While I was writing this final chapter of the thesis in December 2019, massive 
demonstrations took to the streets of Baghdad to protest the corruption of the Iraqi 
postinvasion regime and its sectarian ruling parties. This new generation of Iraqi students and 
professionals, who grew up after 2003 during the hard times of violence, corruption and 
sectarian division of the Iraqi space gathered in Baghdad’s Tahrir Square (liberation square) 
to demand change. Hundreds of thousands protesters from different backgrounds came with 
agreed set of demands: the dissolution of the Parliament, a new election law, and a new 
constitution. This can be read as an attempt to reclaim an inclusive Iraqi space and remove the 
‘ethno-sectarian’ (muhāsasa tāʿifiyya) system of rule that was institutionalized by the United 









                                                      
139 Patrick Cockburn’s article in the Independent on 6 July 2018: “After ISIS is gone, Iraq will continue to be a 
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